The Tehran, Yalta & Potsdam Conferences. Documents

i

The TEHRAN
YALTA
& POTSDAM
CONFERENCES

Documents

PROGRESS PUBLISHERS

moscow

TRANSLATED FROM THE RUSSIAN

TErEPAH — AJITA — HOTCOAM

CBOPHMK JOKYMEHTOB

Ha GQu2auucKom a3oixe

First printing 1969

Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

CONTENTS

Introduction

| The Tehran Conference (November 28 to December 1, 1943)

The First Sitting of the Conference of the Heads of Government

Conference of Military Representatives

The Second pisne of the Conference of the Hew of oa
ernment ‘

The Third Sitting oe the Gonfevante: of the Heads a ‘Gov-

ernment

The Fourth Sitting of the Gontumnce af ‘he Heads oF Gov:
ernment

Communiqué on the Copter af the Heads of Ghvernment

of the Allied Countries—the U.S.S.R., the United States and
Great Britain—Held in Tehran a eet Re co we os

The Crimea Conference (February 4-11, 1945)

1*

First Sitting
Second Sitting
Third Sitting
Fourth Sitting
Fifth Sitting
Sixth Sitting
Seventh Sitting
Eighth Sitting

Communiqué on the Giimnes Ganferenee én the Huads St fence
ernment of the Soviet Union, the United States and Great
Britain

Protocol of Proccedinies nf the Gres Conferente

25

38

40

51

54
65
80
97
104
114
125
129

133
140

The Potsdam Conference (July 17-August 2, 1945)

First Sitting

Second Sitting

Third Sitting

Fourth Sitting

Fifth Sitting

Sixth Sitting

Seventh Sitting

Eighth Sitting

Ninth Sitting

Tenth Sitting

Eleventh Sitting

Twelfth Sitting

Thirteenth (Final) Sitngy

Communiqué on the Tripartite Ganferenes a Bérlin
Protocol of Proceedings of the Berlin Conference

147
158
168
184
198
214
229
240
254
259
271
293
307
317
334

INTRODUCTION

The Tehran (November 28th to December Ist 1943),
Crimea (Yalta, February 4th to 11th 1945) and Potsdam
Conferences of the leaders of the Soviet Union, the United
States of America and Great Britain occupy a special place
in the history of the Second World War. At these Confer-
ences the leaders of the three Great Powers debated and
adopted concerted decisions on the basic military and polit-
ical questions connected with waging war against Hitler’s
Germany and post-war arrangements. These Conferences
and their concrete decisions were vital to the formation of
an anti-nazi coalition, the co-ordination of military efforts
and the mobilisation of all peoples, for the defeat of nazi
Germany.

The Second World War and the Tehran, Yalta and Pots-
dam Conferences vividly proved the possibility of co-opera-
tion between countries with different socio-economic systems
in the struggle against a common aggressor and the possi-
bility of a mutually acceptable decision on topical ques-
tions. Here we do justice to the leaders of the Western coun-
tries which during the war entered into military and politi-
cal co-operation with the Soviet Union against the common
enemy, nazi Germany.

The decisions of the “big three” at these Conferences have
topical significance today and are closely related to the prob-
lems being wrestled with in modern Europe. Among these
decisions particularly important are the Potsdam Agreements
aimed at smashing militarism and revanchism in Germany
and obviating the threat of a new war for the peoples of
Europe and the whole world. The socialist countries and all
the peace-loving forces of Europe are pressing for the imple-
mentation of the Potsdam decisions, for only scrupulous

5

observance of them can obviate the danger hanging over
Europe and the whole world as a result of the rebirth in
West Germany, with the support and connivance of the
United States of America and other Western powers, of the
forces which had already plunged the world into the abyss
of the most devastating war in the history of mankind.

We present here the text of Soviet records made during
the sittings of the three Conferences (no agreed records were
made at the Conferences; each delegation made its own
records independently). They bear out the Soviet Union’s
loyalty to the ideas of peace, democracy and progress and
its tireless campaign for a just settlement of post-war prob-
lems in the interests of peoples, for achieving European se-
curity, creating the conditions rendering impossible the
rebirth of militarist forces in Germany and a repetition of
aggression and for the development of international co-
operation and securing the right of every people to deter-
mine its destiny independently.

The documents in the book were published in the journal
International Affairs over the period 1961-1966.

THE TEHRAN CONFERENCE
(November 28 to December 1, 1943)

The First Sitting of the Conference
of the Heads of Government of the U.S.S.R.,
the United States and Great Britain

Tehran, November 28, 1943
Opened: 16.00; Closed: 19.30

Roosevelt: As the youngest head of Government present
here I should like to take the liberty of speaking first. I
should like to assure the members of the new family—the
members of the present conference gathered around this
table—that we are gathered here for one purpose, for the
purpose of winning the war as soon as possible.

I should also like to say a few words about the conduct
of the conference. We do not intend to make public any-
thing that will be said here, but we shall address each other
as friends, openly and candidly. I think that this conference
will be a success, and that our three nations, which united
in the course of the present war, will strengthen their ties
and will create the prerequisites for the close co-operation
of future generations. Our staffs can discuss military matters,
and our delegations, although we do not have any fixed
agenda, can discuss other problems as well, such, for exam-
ple, as problems of the post-war settlement. If, however, you
do not wish to discuss such problems, they can be left aside.

Before beginning our work I should like to know if Mr.
Churchill wishes to say a few general words on the impor-
tance of this meeting, and what this meeting means to
humanity.

Churchill: This is the greatest concentration of world
forces that ever existed in the history of mankind. We hold

7

the solution of the problem of reducing the length of the
war, the winning of victory, the future of mankind. I pray
that we may be worthy of this remarkable opportunity grant-
ed to us by God, the opportunity of serving mankind.

Roosevelt: Would Marshal Stalin like to say anything?

Stalin: In greeting this conference of the representatives
of the three Governments I should like to make a few re-
marks. I think we are being pampered by history. She has given
us possession of very big forces and very great opportunities.
I hope that we shall do everything at this conference to
make due use, within the framework of our co-operation, of
the power and authority that our peoples have vested in us.
Let us now begin our work.

Roosevelt: May J start with a general review of the war
and the requirements of the war at the present time. Of
course, I shall speak of this from the standpoint of the
U.S.A. We, like the British Empire and the Soviet Union,
hope for an early victory. I should like to start with a re-
view of that part of the war which concerns the United
States rather than the Soviet Union and Great Britain. I
mean the war in the Pacific Ocean, where the United States
bears the brunt of the war, receiving help from the Austra-
lian and New Zealand forces. ...

Taking up the more important question, which is of great-
er interest to the Soviet Union—the operation across the
Channel—I should like to say that we have been drawing
up our plans for the last year and a half, but because of
the shortage of tonnage we were unable to decide on a date
for this operation. We want not only to cross the Channel,
but to pursue the enemy into the heart of the territory. The
English Channel is that unpleasant strip of water that ex-
cludes the possibility of starting the expedition across the
Channel before May 1, that is why the plan drawn up at
Quebec was based on the premise that the expedition across
the Channel would be made on approximately May 1, 1944.
All landing operations involve special craft. If we under-
take large-scale landing operations in the Mediterranean, the
expedition across the Channel will have to be postponed for
two or three months. That is why we should like to have
the advice of our Soviet colleagues on the matter, and also
advice on how best to use the forces now in the Mediterra-
nean area, considering that there are few ships there too.
But we do not want to defer the date of the invasion across

8

|
|

the Channel beyond May or June. At the same time there
are many places where Anglo-American forces could be
used. They could be used in Italy, in the Adriatic area, in
the Aegean area, and finally, to help Turkey if she enters
the war. All this we must decide here. We should very much
like to help the Soviet Union and to draw off a part of the
German forces from the Soviet front. We should like to have
the advice of our Soviet friends on how we could best ease
their position.

Would Mr. Churchill like to add anything?

Churchill: May 1 speak and express my opinion after
Marshal Stalin has expressed his. At the same time I should
like to say that I agree in principle with what has been said
by President Roosevelt.

Stalin: As for the first part of Mr. President’s speech con-
cerning the war in the Pacific Area, we can say the follow-
ing: We Russians welcome the successes that have been
and are being scored by the Anglo-American forces in the
Pacific.

As for the second part of Mr. President’s speech about
the war in Europe, I also have several remarks to make.

First of all, a few words in the form of a report about
the way we have been and are conducting operations since
the July offensive of the Germans. If I am going into too
great detail I could shorten my statement.

Churchill: We are prepared to hear everything you wish
to say.

Stalin: 1 must say, in passing, that we ourselves have been
lately preparing for an offensive. The Germans were ahead
of us, but since we had been preparing for an offensive and
had massed a great force, after we beat back the German
offensive, it was relatively easy for us to go over to the
offensive. I must say that although the opinion about us
is that we plan everything beforehand, we did not expect
the successes we scored in August and September. Contrary
to our expectations the Germans proved to be weaker than
we expected. At present, according to our intelligence, the
Germans have 210 divisions on our front, and another six
divisions on the way there. In addition, there are 50 non-
German divisions, including the Finns. Thus, altogether the
Germans have 260 divisions on our front, including up to
10 Hungarian, up to 20 Finnish, and up to 16 or 18 Ruma-
nian.

Roosevelt: What is the numerical strength of a German
division?

Stalin: The German division consists roughly of from
8,000 to 9,000 men, excluding auxiliary forces. With the
auxiliary forces the division numbers from 12,000 to 13,000
men. Last year, there were 240 divisions on our front, 179
of them German. This year, there are 260 divisions on our
front, 210 of them German, with six German divisions on
their way to the front. From 300 to 330 divisions are operat-
ing on the Russian side. Thus, we have more divisions than
the Germans together with their satellites. This surplus of
forces is being used for offensive operations. Otherwise there
would have been no offensive. But as time goes on the differ-
ence between the number of Russian and German divi-
sions becomes smaller. Another great difficulty is that the
Germans are barbarously destroying everything as they
retreat. This makes ammunition supply more difficult. That
is the reason why our offensive has slowed down. In the
last three weeks the Germans launched offensive operations
in the Ukraine, south and west of Kiev. They have recap-
tured Zhitomir, an important railway junction. This has
been announced. It looks as if one of these days they will
take Korosten, also an important railway junction. In that
area the Germans have five new tank divisions and three
old tank divisions, altogether 8 tank divisions, and also 22
or 23 infantry and motorised divisions. Their goal is to
recapture Kiev. Thus, we are faced with some difficulties
in the future.

That isthe report part about our operations in the summer.

Now a few words about the place where operations of the
Anglo-American forces in Europe would be desirable in
order to ease the situation on our front. I may be mistaken,
but we Russians thought that the Italian theatre was impor-
tant only to the extent of ensuring free navigation of Allied
shipping in the Mediterranean Sea. Only in that sense is the
Italian theatre of operations important. That is what we
thought, and that is what we continue to think. As for the
idea of launching an offensive from Italy directly against
Germany, we Russians think that the Italian theatre is not
suitable for such purposes. Consequently, the fact is that
the Italian theatre is important for free navigation in the
Mediterranean, but it is of no significance in the sense of
further operations against Germany, because the Alps block

10

the way and hinder any advance towards Germany. We Rus-
sians believe that the best result would be yielded by a blow
at the enemy in Northern or North-Western France. Even
operations in Southern France would be better than opera-
tions in Italy. It would be a good thing if Turkey were
prepared to open the way for the Allies. After all, it would
be nearer from the Balkans to the heart of Germany. There,
the way is not blocked either by the Alps or the Channel.
But Germany’s weakest spot is France. Of course, this is a
difficult operation, and the Germans in France will defend
themselves desperately; nevertheless that is the best solu-
tion. Those are all the remarks I have.

Churchill: We have long since agreed with the United
States to attack Germany via Northern or North-Western
France, and extensive preparations for this are under way.
It would be necessary to give many facts and figures to show
why we were unable to carry out these operations in 1943.
But we have decided to attack Germany in 1944. The place
for the attack against Germany was selected in 1943. We
are now faced with the task of creating the conditions for
the possibility of transferring an army into France across
the Channel in the late spring of 1944. The forces that we
shall be able to accumulate for that purpose in May or June
will consist of 16 British and 19 American divisions. But
these divisions are stronger numerically than the German
divisions of which Marshal Stalin spoke. These forces would
be followed by the main force, and it is planned that the
whole of Operation Overlord! will involve the transfer of
about a million men across the Channel in May, June and
July. Together with the armies in the Mediterranean and
the Indian Ocean it is all we Britons can give, considering
our 46-million population and the numerical strength of
our air force. Remanning of the above-mentioned divisions
depends on the United States. But the date I mentioned is
still far off. It will arrive in six months’ time. In the talks
between the President and myself we asked each other how
best to use our forces in the Mediterranean in order to help
the Russians, without any detriment to Overlord, so that
this operation could be carried out in time or, possibly, with
some delay. We have already sent seven battle-wise divisions
from the Mediterranean area, and also a part of the landing

1 Overlord—the code name for the forced crossing of the Channel.

1

craft for Overlord. Taking this into account, and the bad
weather in Italy besides, | must say that we are somewhat
disappointed at not yet having taken Rome. Our first task
is to take Rome, and we expect to wage the decisive battle
in January and to win it. General Alexander, the Command-
er of the 15th Army Group who is under the orders of
General Eisenhower, believes that it is quite possible to win
the battle for Rome. In addition, it may be possible to cap-
ture and destroy more than 11 or 12 enemy divisions. We
are not planning to move on into Lombardy or to cross the
Alps into Germany. We merely plan to move on somewhat
north of Rome up to the Pisa-Rimini line, after which we
could make the landing in Southern France and across the
Channel.

The next important question is to convince Turkey to enter
the war. This would make possible the opening of commu-
nications through the Dardanelles and the Bosporus, and we
could send supplies to Russia across the Black Sea. Besides,
we could use the Turkish airfields to fight the enemy. It
would take only a small force to occupy Rhodes and other
islands. We could then establish direct contact with the Rus-
sians and send them supplies continuously. We have been
able up to now to send only four convoys to Russia’s north-
ern ports, because of a shortage of escorts but if a way
is opened across the Black Sea we could regularly send sup-
plies to southern Russian ports.

Stalin: It should be said that these convoys arrived with-
out losses, without having met the enemy on the way.

Churchill: How can we make Turkey enter the war? What
will she have to do? Will she have to attack Bulgaria and
declare war on Germany? Will she have to start offensive
operations or should she refrain from advancing into Thrace?
What would be the Russian attitude to the Bulgarians who
still remember that Russia liberated them from the Turks?
What effect would that have on the Rumanians, who are
already looking for ways out of the war? How would that
affect Hungary? Would not the result of this be great polit-
ical changes among many countries? All these are questions
on which our Russian friends, naturally, have their own
views.

Are our operations in the eastern part of the Mediter-
ranean, which could cause some delay in the operation across
the Channel, of any interest to the Soviet Government?

12

We do not as yet have any definite decision on this question,
and we have come here to settle it.

Roosevelt: There is another possibility. It might be expe-
dient to make a landing in the northern part of the Adriatic
when the Soviet armies approach Odessa.

Churchill: 1f we take Rome and block Germany from
the south, we would then commence operations in Western
or Southern France, and also extend assistance to the guer-
rilla armies. These operations are not yet worked out in
detail. A commission could be set up to study the question
and draw up a document in full detail.

Stalin: I have a few questions: I understand that there are
35 divisions for invasion operations in the north of France.

Churchill: Yes, that is correct.

Stalin: Before the operations to invade the north of France
it is planned to carry out the operation in the Italian theatre
to take Rome, after which it is planned to go on the defen-
sive in Italy.

Churchill: Yes. We are already withdrawing seven divi-
sions from Italy.

Stalin: I also understand that three other operations are
planned, one of which will consist of a landing in the
Adriatic area.

Churchill: The carrying out of these operations may be
useful to the Russians. After the seven divisions are dis-
patched from the Mediterranean area, we shall have up to
35 divisions for the invasion of Northern France. In addi-
tion, we shall have 20 or 23 divisions in Northern Italy.

I should like to add that the greatest problem is the trans-
fer of the necessary forces. As I have already pointed out,
Operation Overlord will be started by 35 divisions. From
then on the number of troops will be increased by divisions
transferred from the U.S.A.; their number will go up to
50 or 60. J want to add that in the next six months the Brit-
ish and American air force now in Britain will be doubled
and trebled. In addition, work is being continuously carried
on to accumulate forces in Britain.

Stalin: Another question. Did I understand correctly that
apart from the operations to take Rome it is planned to car-
ry out another operation in the Adriatic, and also an oper-
ation in Southern France?

Churchill: The plan is to carry out an attack in Southern
France at the moment Operation Overlord is launched.

13

Troops that can be released from Italy will be used for
this. But this operation has not yet been worked out in
detail.

Stalin: Another question: if Turkey enters the war, what
is to be done in that case?

Churchill: 1 can say that it would take no more than two
or three divisions to take the islands along the west coast of
Turkey so as to allow the supply ships to go to Turkey, and
also to open the route to the Black Sea. But the first thing
we shall do is send the Turks 20 air squadrons and several
air defence regiments, which can be done without detriment
to other operations.

Stalin: In my opinion, it would be better to make Opera-
tion Overlord the basis of all operations in 1944. If a land-
ing were made in Southern France at the same time as that
operation, both groups of forces could join in France. That
is why it would be well to have two operations: Operation
Overlord and the landing in Southern France as a support-
ing operation. At the same time the operation in the Rome
area would be a diversionary operation. In carrying out the
landing in France from the North and the South, there
could be a build up of forces when these forces are joined.
France is Germany’s weak spot. As for Turkey, I doubt that
Turkey will enter the war. She will not join the war no mat-
ter what pressure we exert. That is my opinion.

Churchill: We understood that the Soviet Government is
highly interested in making Turkey enter the war. Of course,
we may fail to make Turkey enter the war, but we must
try to do everything in this respect.

Stalin: Yes, we must try to get Turkey to enter the war.

Churchill: I agree with Marshal Stalin’s considerations
concerning the undesirability of dispersing the forces, but if
we have 25 divisions in the Mediterranean area, three or
four divisions and 20 air squadrons may well be set aside
for Turkey, particularly since they are at present being used
to Ero Egypt, and they could be moved from there to the
nortn.

Stalin: That is a big force, these 20 air squadrons. Of
course, it would be a good thing if Turkey entered the war.

Churchill: Vm afraid that in this six-month period, during
which we could take Rome and prepare for big operations
in Europe, our army will remain inactive and will not exert
pressure on the enemy. I fear that in that case Parliament

14

would reproach me for not giving any assistance to the Rus-
sians.

Stalin: | think that Overlord is a big operation. It would
be considerably facilitated and would be sure to have an
effect if it were supported from the south of France. I per-
sonally would go to this extreme. I would go on the defen-
sive in Italy, abandoning the capture of Rome, and would
start an operation in Southern France, drawing off German
forces from Northern France. In about two or three months
I would start the operation in the north of France. This plan
would ensure the success of Operation Overlord; the two
armies could meet, and that would result in a build up of
forces.

Churchill: 1 could adduce even more arguments but I
wish to say only that we would be weaker if we did not
take Rome. Besides, in order to carry out an air offensive
against Germany it is necessary to reach the Pisa-Rimini
line. I should like the military specialists to discuss this
question. The struggle for Rome is already on, and we
expect to take Rome in January. Refusal to take Rome
would mean our defeat, and I could not explain this to
the House.

Roosevelt: We could carry out Overlord on time if there
were no operations in the Mediterranean. If there are
operations in the Mediterranean this will defer the date of
Operation Overlord. I should not like to delay Overlord.

Stalin: From the experience of our operations we know
that success is gained where the blow is dealt from two
sides, and that operations undertaken from one side do not
yield enough effect. That is why we try to strike at the
enemy from two sides to make him shuttle his forces from
one side to another. I think that in this case too it would
be well to carry out the operation from the south and the
north of France.

Churchill: 1 personally quite agree with this, but I think
that we might undertake diversionary acts in Yugoslavia,
and also make Turkey join the war, regardless of the inva-
sion of Southern or Northern France. I personally regard
the idleness of our army in the Mediterranean as a highly
negative fact. That is why we cannot guarantee that the
date of May 1 will be met precisely. It would be a big mis-
take to fix that date. I cannot sacrifice the operations in the
Mediterranean just to keep the date of May 1. Of course

15

we must come to a definite agreement on the matter. This
question could be discussed by our military specialists.

Stalin: All right. We did not expect a discussion of purely
military matters, that is why we did not invite representa-
tives of the General Staff to come along, but I think that
Marshal Voroshilov and I can arrange something.

Churchill: What are we to do with the question of Tur-
key? Should we also refer it to the military specialists?

Stalin: It is both a political and a military question. Turkey
is an ally of Great Britain and has friendly relations with
the U.S.S.R. and the United States. Turkey should no
longer play between us and Germany.

Churchill: I may possibly have six or seven questions
concerning Turkey. But I should first like to consider them.

Stalin: Very well.

Roosevelt: Of course, | favour making Turkey enter the
war, but if I were in the place of the Turkish President, |
would ask a price that could be paid only by inflicting
damage on Operation Overlord.

Stalin: There should be an effort to make Turkey fight.
She has many idle divisions.

Churchill: We all have feelings of friendship for each
other, but we naturally have differences. We need time and
patience.

Stalin: That’s right.

Roosevelt: And so, the military experts are meeting to-
morrow morning, and at four o'clock there is a session of
the conference.

Conference of Military Representatives
November 29, 1948, at 10.30

Admiral Leahy suggests that General Brooke should re-
port on the Mediterranean theatre of military operations.

Gen. Brooke says that the cardinal task facing the Anglo-
Americans is to exert pressure on the enemy wherever pos-
sible. At the same time it is desirable to stem the tide of
German divisions that could be directed by the Germans to
Northern France where their increase would be undesir-
able. Operation Overlord will divert a great number of Ger-
man divisions. But this operation cannot take place before

16

May 1, as the most suitable date for the landing. That is
why there will be a break of five or six months before the
start of this operation, during which something must be done
to draw off the German divisions. Brooke says that the
British have big forces in the Mediterranean, which they wish
to use in the best possible way.

Addressing General Marshall, Brooke says that if he says
anything that does not accord with the opinion of the Amer-
icans, he, Brooke, asks that he be interrupted.

Gen. Marshall asks Brooke to continue his review.

Brooke says that the Anglo-American plans provide for
active operations on all fronts, including those in the Medi-
terranean. At present there are 23 German divisions in Cen-
tral and Northern Italy. The Anglo-Americans have enough
forces to move the front up into Northern Italy. But in
view of the terrain, the Anglo-American forces are unable
to exert enough direct pressure on the German troops, and
that is why it will be necessary to carry out a flanking
operation from the sea. It is expected that this operation will
involve 11 or 12 divisions which the German Command
will be forced to reman. As a result of these operations,
the present number of German divisions will be kept
in Italy; besides, these divisions will be considerably
weakened.

On the question of Turkey Brooke says that if the purely
political considerations are left aside, Turkey’s entry into
the war would be highly desirable from the purely military
standpoint, and would yield great advantages. First, it
would open the sea lanes through the Dardanelles. This
would be of great significance in the sense of a possible
withdrawal from the war by Rumania and Bulgaria. In ad-
dition, contact could be established with the Russians across
the Black Sea and supplies sent to Russia that way. Finally,
the establishment of Allied air bases in Turkey would make
possible raids on key German objectives, in particular the
oil fields in Rumania, etc. The shorter route for cargoes
across the Black Sea instead of the roundabout way via Per-
sia would release tonnage that could be used elsewhere. To
open the way to the Black Sea it would be enough to take
several islands along the Turkish coast, beginning from the
island of Rhodes. That will not be a difficult operation and
will not entail the use of big forces. Brooke says that in the
Mediterranean the British have special landing barges which

2-876 2

could be used for the operations he described. Operation
Overlord would need to be postponed only for the period
required for the use of these craft in the Mediterranean. At
the same time these operations would hold up the German
troops which could otherwise be used by the Germans dur-
ing Operation Overlord. Brooke says that it is highly im-
portant to ensure airfields in Italy in order to start raids on
industry in Southern Germany. These air operations, to-
gether with raids carried out from Britain, would be highly
important for the conduct of the war in 1944. If the pro-
posal made yesterday were accepted, to go on the defensive
in Italy before the operation there is completed, it would be
necessary to maintain large forces there in order to hold
back the German troops. In consequence, only a limited force
could be released for operations in Southern France. Brooke
says that he is in full agreement with the strategy proposed
by Marshal Stalin to deal the enemy a blow in two places.
But this is easier done when the operations are developed
on land, than when a sea landing is concerned. In that case
two such operations are not always able to support each
other because it is not easy to manage the alternation of
reserves between the two groupings. If we were to land six
or eight divisions in the south of France at present, the Ger-
mans could easily cope with them. That is why it is neces-
sary that the two operations should be undertaken closer
in time to each other. But this will require a great number of
landing facilities. Brooke says that the Allies had planned
to carry out a small landing in the Mediterranean during
Operation Overlord in order to draw off a part of the Ger-
man forces from Overlord. But the difficulties lie in the
timely reinforcement of such an auxiliary landing. The fact
is that only three or four divisions could be landed right
away, later to be brought up to the strength of 35. It is neces-
sary that the Germans should not be able to increase their
forces while the Allied force is still insignificant. Brooke
says that that is all concerning land operations, and invites
Air Force Marshal Portal to make a review of air operations.

Marshal Voroshilov says that it would be better to hear
the American report on land operations, and then go on to
air operations.

Marshall says that he wants to shed light on the military
situation as it appears from the American standpoint. At
present the Americans have to fight on two theatres of mil-

18

itary operations, namely, in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.
The main problem is that American operations extend over
two such great oceans. In contrast to ordinary conditions
the Americans do not have a shortage either of troops or
supplies. Marshall says that apart from the divisions already
in action, there are more than 50 divisions in the U.S.A.
which the Americans would like to use as soon as possible.
But the problem lies in tonnage and in landing craft. Mar-
shall says that the Americans can still say that they have
achieved considerable successes and are now prepared to
intensify their pressure on the enemy. It is the desire of the
Americans to put into action all their available forces as
soon as possible. When mention is made of landing craft it
concerns above all ships for the transfer of tanks and motor-
ised units. That is just the kind of vessels lacking for the
successful realisation of the operations in the Mediterranean
of which General Brooke spoke. Marshall repeats that the
Americans do not have any shortage either of troops or sup-
plies. Marshall points out that the Americans are deeply
interested in reducing transportation time and the stay of
ships in ports. Marshall says that the advantage of Opera-
tion Overlord is that it involves the shortest distance to be
overcome at the initial moment. Subsequently, it is planned
to transfer troops to France directly from the United States.
About 60 American divisions are to be transferred to France.
Marshall says that no definite decisions have yet been
taken in respect of the Mediterranean, because the idea was
to discuss this question at Tehran. The question now is what
is to be done in the next three, and depending on that, the
next six months. Marshall says that it is highly dangerous
to undertake an operation in Southern France two months
before Operation Overlord, but it is very true, at the same
time, that an operation in Southern France would promote
the success of Operation Overlord. Marshall thinks that the
landing in Southern France should be carried out two or
three weeks before Operation Overlord. It must be borne in
mind that a serious obstacle to these operations will be the
German destruction of all ports. For a long time the armies
will have to be supplied across the open coast. American
combat engineers have extensive experience in restoring
ports, but Marshall nevertheless believes that there will be
some delay. He says that during the landing at Salerno only
108 tons a day of supplies could be got through in the first

2° 19

18 days. Altogether 189,000 men were transferred across the
open coast. It must also be borne in mind that this requires
strong fighter cover from the air. Marshall says that at Sa-
lerno the Anglo-American planes had only from 15 to 20
minutes of action. In Operation Overlord the planes may
have up to 30 minutes. Marshall points out once again that
the problem facing the Americans is not a shortage of troops
or supplies, but a shortage of landing craft. Marshall says
that he would like Marshal Voroshilov to understand that in
the Pacific the Americans are now carrying out five landing
operations accompanied by heavy air battles. Four other
landing operations are to be undertaken in the course of
January. Marshall says that that is all he wished to say.

Leahy suggests that Air Force Marshal Portal should add
to the reports of Brooke and Marshall.

Marshal Portal declares that he will speak only of air
operations. Up to now the main raids on Germany were car-
ried out from Britain. Now such raids are being started also
from the Mediterranean area. At present, the Anglo-Amer-
icans are dropping from 15,000 to 30,000 tons of bombs on
Germany a month, and their main purpose is to destroy the
enemy’s industry, communications and air force. In addition,
considerable numbers of German fighter planes are being
destroyed from the air. There is a heavy struggle ahead but
it can be safely said that the Anglo-American plan of de-
stroying the German Air Force will be crowned with success.
That the plan is being successfully implemented is evident
from the deployment of the enemy’s forces. At present, there
are from 1,650 to 1,700 fighters in Western and Southern
Germany, while there are only 750 German fighters on all
the other fronts. How sensitive the Germans are to the raids
is evident from the fact that only one raid by the Anglo-
American air force on Southern Germany, undertaken from
the Mediterranean, forced the Germans to transfer 300 fighter
planes from Central Germany. Portal says that he under-
stands that Soviet aircraft is almost entirely engaged in land
battles, but it would be well for the Soviet command to have
the possibility of setting aside a part of the air force for
bombing Eastern Germany. This would have a great effect on
the situation on all the other fronts. Portal says that that is
all he wished to say.

Leahy says that it would be well to hear the opinion of
Marshal Voroshilov.

20

Voroshilov says that as he understood from General Mar-
shall’s report, the Americans have from 50 to 60 divisions
which they want to use in France, and the only delay is in
transport and landing facilities. Voroshilov asks what is
being done to solve the problem of transport and landing
facilities.

Voroshilov says that he understood from General Mar-
shall’s report that the Americans regard Operation Over-
lord as the principal operation, and asks, whether General
Brooke, as the chief of the British General Staff, also re-
gards this operation as the principal one, and whether or not
he considers that this operation could be replaced by another
operation in the Mediterranean area or elsewhere.

Marshall says that he would like to reply to Marshal
Voroshilov’s question about the preparations for Operation
Overlord. Everything is now being done to carry out Oper-
ation Overlord, but the whole question turns on transport
and landing facilities. Marshall adds that while there was
only one American division in Britain in August, at present
there are already nine American divisions and more divi-
sions are coming up.

Voroshilov refers to the reports made by Generals Dean
and Ismey at the Moscow Conference, which said that there
was large-scale construction of landing facilities in Britain
and the United States, and that preparations were under
way for the construction of temporary floating ports, and
asks whether it can now be said that this construction will
eventually ensure the necessary quantity of landing craft by
the time Operation Overlord is to start.

Marshall replies that General Brooke can say more about
the ports. As far as it concerns the United States, every-
thing is being done to have all the necessary preparations
completed by the start of Operation Overlord. In particular,
landing barges, each to carry up to 40 tanks, are being
readied.

Brooke says that he would first like to answer Marshal
Voroshilov’s first question as to the view taken of Opera-
tion Overlord by the British. Brooke says that the British
attach great importance to this operation and regard it as
an essential part of this war. But for the success of this
operation there must be definite prerequisites, which would
prevent the Germans from using the good roads of Northern
France to bring up reserves. Brooke says that the British

21

believe such prerequisites will exist in 1944. All British
forces were reorganised for the forthcoming operations.
Special divisions are being trained for the purpose. At
present, four divisions have already been transferred from
Italy and Africa. A part of the landing ships has also been
transferred from the Mediterranean. The British are doing
everything to realise these operations, which must be car-
ried out in the course of 1944. But the difficulties of the
Anglo-Americans lie in landing ships. In order to be ready
for May 1, the bulk of the landing ships should be trans-
ferred from the Mediterranean now. But that would result
in a suspension of operations in Italy. At the same time the
British would like to keep the maximum number of German
divisions in continuous action. That is required not only to
draw off German forces from the Russian front, but also
for the success of Operation Overlord. As for the construc-
tion of temporary floating ports, Brooke says that experi-
ments in that respect are now under way. Some of these
experiments were not as successful as expected, but at any
rate there is success in this matter. Brooke says that the suc-
cess or failure of the forthcoming operation will depend by
and large on the availability of these ports.

Voroshilov says that he wants to ask General Brooke
once again whether the British regard Operation Overlord
as the principal one.

Brooke says that he had expected this question. He,
Brooke, must say that he would not like to see the failure
of the operation either in Northern or in Southern France.
But in certain circumstances these operations are doomed
to failure.

Voroshilov says that Marshal Stalin and the Soviet
General Staff regard the operations in the Mediterranean
as of secondary significance. Marshal Stalin believes, how-
ever, that an operation in Southern France, carried out two
or three months before the operation in Northern France,
could be of decisive significance for the success of Over-
lord. The experience of the war, and the successes of the
Anglo-American troops in North Africa and the landing
operations in Italy, the operations of the Anglo-American
air force against Germany, the organisational trim of the
forces of the United States and the United Kingdom, the
powerful equipment of the United States, the naval strength
of the Allies and especially their superiority in the Medi-

22

terranean, show that given the will, Overlord can be a suc-
cess. Will is the only thing required.

Voroshilov says that the military must plan operations
in such a way that auxiliary operations, far from hindering
the principal operation, should promote it in every way.
Voroshilov then goes on to say that Marshal Stalin’s propos-
al is to have the cross-Channel operation supported by the
action of Allied forces in the south of France. With that
aim in view he allows the possibility of going on the defen-
sive in Italy, and of making a landing in Southern France
with the forces released, so as to strike at the enemy from
two sides. If the operation in Southern France cannot be
carried out two or three months before Operation Overlord,
Marshal Stalin does not insist on it at all. This landing can
be carried out either simultaneously, or even somewhat later
than Operation Overlord. But it must take place.

As for the operations of the Soviet Air Force, it is well
known that it is engaged in combat operations together
with the land forces. At present, there are on the Soviet-
German front 210 German divisions alone, there being 260
enemy divisions altogether, as Marshal Stalin reported. The
intensity of the combat operations has drawn our air force
to the front and rear of the enemy, and we have no pos-
sibility of using any air force for raids on Eastern Germany,
but, of course, as soon as this becomes possible, our Su-
preme Command will take a relevant decision.

Voroshilov says that we regard the operation across the
Channel as not an easy one. We realise that this operation
is more difficult than the forced crossing of rivers. Still, on
the basis of our experience of the forced crossing of big
rivers, such as the Dnieper, the Desna, and the Sozh, whose
right bank is mountainous and in addition was well forti-
fied by the Germans, we can say that the operation across
the Channel, if it is carried out in earnest, will be a success.
On the right bank of the above-mentioned rivers the Ger-
mans built strong modern reinforced-concrete fortifications,
armed them with powerful artillery, and were able to bring
our low left bank under fire to a great depth, preventing
our troops from approaching the river; still after concentrat-
ed artillery, mine-thrower fire, after powerful strikes by
the air force, our troops succeeded in crossing these rivers,
and the enemy was routed.

I am sure, says Voroshilov, that if well prepared, and,

23

above all, if well supported by a strong air force, Operation
Overlord will be crowned with full success. Needless to say,
the Allied air force must secure full domination of the air
before the land forces go into action.

Brooke says that the Anglo-Americans also regard the
operations in the Mediterranean as operations of secondary
importance. But since there are large forces in the Medi-
terranean area, these operations can and must be carried
out in order to help the principal operation. These opera-
tions are closely bound up with the entire conduct of the
war, and, in particular, with the success of the operation in
Northern France.

Brooke says that in connection with Marshal Voroshilov’s
remarks about the difficulty of the operation across the
Channel he would like to say that the British watched the
Red Army’s forcing of rivers with great interest and admi-
ration. The British think that the Russians have achieved
great successes in landing operations. But the cross-Channel
operation requires special facilities and needs to be worked
out in detail. For several years now the Anglo-Americans
have been studying all the necessary details connected with
this operation. There are considerable difficulties also in the
fact that there are beaches on the shore of France, and big
sand banks. That is why in many places ships find it hard
to approach the shore itself. All this requires preparations.

Voroshilov says that in August or September the British
held exercises in the Channel area. He, Voroshilov, would
like to know how the British assess the results of these
exercises.

Brooke replies that the purpose of these exercises was
to bring about an air battle with the Germans. In addition,
these exercises did a great deal for the training of the troops.
It was not, of course, a landing exercise. Such exercises are
carried out by the British on the coast of Britain.

Voroshilov asks how the Germans reacted to these
manoeuvres.

Brooke replies that the Germans failed to react to these
manoeuvres to the degree expected by the British.

Marshall says that he must raise an objection to Marshal
Voroshilov’s statements on a cross-Channel landing. He,
Marshall, was trained in land operations, he also had
knowledge of the forced crossing of rivers, but when he
came up against landing operations across the ocean, he had

24

to start all over again. For if a defeat of troops landed in
a forced crossing of a river is only a setback, a defeat in
a landing across the ocean is a disaster.

Voroshilov says that he does not agree with this. In such
a serious operation as Overlord the main thing is organisa-
tion, planning and well thought-out tactics. If the tactics
accord with the set task, even a setback for the advance force
will be only a setback, and not a disaster. The air force
must win domination of the air and must crush the enemy’s
artillery, and after the intensive artillery preparation only
the advance force is to be sent out. After this force consol-
idates its positions and appears to have succeeded, the main
force is to be landed.

Marshall says that another thing that must be borne in
mind here is that artillery support from the sea is more
complicated than from the opposite bank of a river.

Voroshilov agrees with this and asks what is the expected
ratio between the German and the Anglo-American air
force by the start of the invasion.

Portal replies that it will be five or six to one.

Voroshilov says that agreement should be reached on
the decision to be adopted at this conference.

Brooke says that he considers that not all the questions
have yet been discussed at this conference, and therefore
proposes that the conference be adjourned until tomorrow.

It is agreed to adjourn the session until November 30.

The talk continued for three hours.

The Second Sitting of the Conference
of the Heads of Government of the U.S.S.R.,
the United States and Great Britain

Tehran, November 29, 1943
Opened: 16.00; Closed: 19.40

Roosevelt: | do not know what went on at the conference
of the military this morning. I suggest therefore that Mar-
shal Voroshilov, General Brooke and General Marshall
should report to us on their work.

Stalin: I agree, but it appears that the military have not
yet finished.

25

Churchill: 1 think it would still be useful to hear the
military.

Brooke: Our conference today was not finished. We
started out by examining possible military operations and
their interrelation. We examined Operation Overlord and
all the ensuing consequences. We concentrated on the period
intervening from the present to the date of Operation
Overlord; we took into account the fact that if we do not
carry out active operations in the Mediterranean in this
period before Operation Overlord, we shall be giving the
Germans the possibility of transferring their troops to the
Soviet-German front, or transferring them to the West with
the aim of counteracting Overlord. We examined the pos-
sibility of continuing our operations in Italy, where we are
holding German divisions, and where we have concentrat-
ed large forces. We then turned our attention to the East
and examined the desirability of Turkey’s entry into the
war, and the possible consequences this may have in terms
of helping us to conduct the war and open the Dardanelles
so as to supply the Soviet Union, and also of opening a way
to the Balkans. We examined the possible operations in
Southern France in combination with Operation Overlord.
The Chief of Staff of the British Air Force reviewed the
operations of the Anglo-American Air Force against
Germany, and showed the effect of these operations on the
over-all course of the war. General Marshall gave figures
on the concentration of the American forces in Britain, and
spoke of the preparations of the British troops for going
over from the defensive to the offensive. The question of
Overlord was also studied. Marshal Voroshilov asked sever-
al questions which we tried to answer. Marshal Voroshilov
set forth the view expressed by Marshal Stalin at the con-
ference yesterday in respect of the operations to be carried
out next year. That is about all we had time to examine
at our sitting this morning.

Would General Marshall like to add anything to my
report?

Marshall: There remains little for me to add to what has
been said by General Brooke. His report was sufficiently
detailed. The problem facing the Americans is not man
power but tonnage, special landing facilities and also the
availability of air bases sufficiently close to the area of
operations. When |] say landing facilities, | mean special

26

landing craft capable of carrying up to 40 tanks or vehicles.
It is precisely the number of these vessels that is limited.
The transfer of American troops, equipment and ammunition
to Britain is proceeding according to plan. One million tons
of various equipment has already been transported to Brit-
ain. But landing facilities remain the limiting factor. We
have a plan for the manufacture of landing facilities, which
was expanded both in the United States and in Britain.
The accelerated production of landing facilities will result
in an increase of their number for invasion across the Chan-
nel and for operations in the Mediterranean. In short, prep-
arations for Overlord are proceeding according to plan,
insofar as materiel and personnel are concerned. The prob-
lem is mainly transport and the distribution of landing
facilities. As General Brooke has explained, several divi-
sions have already been transferred from Italy.

Voroshilov: The reports of Generals Brooke and Marshall
correspond to the talk we had this morning. My questions
were intended to specify the technical preparations for Oper-
ation Overlord and they were answered in the manner
now set forth by General Marshall. We made no effort to
specify the dates for Operation Overlord and all the details
connected with the operation considering that these ques-
tions could be dealt with at our next meeting if it is held.

Stalin: If possible I should like to know who will be
appointed to command Operation Overlord.

Roosevelt: This matter has not yet been decided.

Stalin: In that case nothing will come of Operation
Overlord. Who bears the moral and military responsibility
for the preparation and execution of Operation Overlord?
If that is unknown, then Operation Overlord is just so much
talk.

Roosevelt: The British General Morgan is responsible for
preparing Operation Overlord.

Stalin: Who is responsible for carrying out Operation
Overlord?

Roosevelt: We know the men who will take part in car-
rying out Operation Overlord, with the exception of the
commander-in-chief of the operation.

Stalin: It may happen that General Morgan will consider
the operation prepared, but after the appointment of the
commander responsible for the execution of the operation
it may turn out that the commander will consider the opera-

27

tion unprepared. There must be some one who is responsible
both for preparing and executing the operation.

Churchill: General Morgan was given the assignment of
preliminary preparations.

Stalin: Who gave General Morgan this assignment?

Churchill: Several months ago the assignment was given
to General Morgan by the Joint Anglo-American Staff with
the consent of the President and with my consent. General
Morgan was assigned to carry out preparations for Overlord
together with the American and British staffs, but the com-
mander-in-chief has not yet been appointed. The British
Government has expressed its readiness to place its forces
under the command of an American commander-in-chief
in Operation Overlord, because the United States is respon-
sible for the concentration and remanning of forces and has
a greater number of forces. On the other hand, the British
Government proposed the appointment of a British com-
mander-in-chief of operations in the Mediterranean, where
the British have a greater number of forces. The question of
appointing a commander-in-chief cannot be solved at such
a broad sitting as today’s. This question should be decided
by the three heads of Government among themselves,
in private. As the President has just told me—and |
confirm this—the decision on the appointment of a com-
mander-in-chief will depend on the talks we are now
having.

Stalin: 1 should like to be understood that the Russians
do not claim participation in the appointment of the com-
mander-in-chief, but the Russians would like to know who
is going to be the commander. The Russians would like him
to be appointed sooner, and would like to see him respon-
sible for the preparations as well as for the carrying out
of Operation Overlord.

Churchill: We fully agree with what Marshal Stalin has
said and I think the President will agree with me if I say
that we shall appoint a commander-in-chief in a fortnight,
and shall communicate his name. One of the tasks of the
conference is to appoint a commander-in-chief.

Stalin: I have no questions in connection with the reports
of Brooke and Marshall.

Churchill: | am somewhat worried by the number and
complexity of the problems facing us. This conference is
unique. Millions of people look to this conference and place

28

their hopes on it, and I very much wish that we should not
part until we have reached agreement on political and milit-
ary questions we have been trusted to solve. Today, I want
to indicate several points requiring study in a subcommit-
tee. The British Staff and I have long been studying the
situation in the Mediterranean, where we have quite a big
army. We want this army to be in action there in the course
of the whole year and to be independent of factors that
would force it to be idle. In this connection we ask our
Russian allies to examine the whole problem and the various
alternatives we shall propose to them as to the best use of
our available forces in the Mediterranean area.

There are three questions which require detailed study.

The first of these is, of course, the assistance that can
be given to Operation Overlord with the use of the forces
in the Mediterranean area. What I mean is the scale of the
operations which are to be carried out in Southern France
from Northern Italy. The President and I spoke of this
yesterday. I do not think the matter has been studied suf-
ficiently to allow a final decision. I should welcome a study
of this question by our staffs from the standpoint of its
urgency. In this connection Marshal Stalin correctly stressed
the importance of a flanking movement in Southern
France. The date is important. If operations with smaller
forces are started at one point and with bigger forces at
another, the first operation will be a failure. Our staffs
should discuss the operations on a broader plane. I should
like to have enough landing facilities in the Mediterranean
to transfer two divisions. If these two divisions are avail-
able we could undertake an operation to help the advance
of the Anglo-American troops along the Italian Peninsula
in order to destroy the enemy forces there. There is another
possibility of using these forces. They would be sufficient
for the capture of the island of Rhodes in the event Turkey
entered the war. The third possibility of using these forces
is that, minus their losses, they could be used in Southern
France in six months to support Operation Overlord. None
of these possibilities is excluded. But the matter of the date
is important. The use of these two divisions, no matter for
which of the three operations I have indicated they might
be used in the Mediterranean, cannot be carried out
without deferring Operation Overlord, or without diverting
a part of the landing facilities from the area of the Indian

29

Ocean. There is our dilemma. In order to decide which way
to choose we should like to hear the view of Marshal Stalin
concerning the over-all strategic situation, because we are
delighted and inspired by the military experience of our
Russian allies. I should like to propose that the study of
the question I have raised be continued by our military
committee tomorrow.

The next problem I want to speak of is political rather
than military, because the military forces we intend to set
aside for its solution are insignificant. | have in mind the
Balkans. In the Balkans there are 21 German divisions apart
from garrison troops. Of this number, i.e., of the 21 divi-
sions, 54,000 German troops are concentrated in the Aegean
islands. In addition, there are not less than 12 Bulgarian
divisions in the Balkans. Altogether, there are 42 enemy
divisions in the Balkans. If Turkey should enter the war the
Bulgarians would be forced to withdraw their troops to the
front in Thrace against Turkey. This will result in an in-
creased danger to the German divisions in the Balkans. I
give these figures to show the enormous importance of this
factor in the Balkans, where we do not intend to send our
regular divisions and where we intend to limit ourselves to
raids by combined detachments. In the Balkans we have
neither interests nor ambitions. All we want to do is to tie
down the 21 German divisions in the Balkans and to
destroy them, if possible. I propose, therefore, that a meeting
should be held today of the two Foreign Ministers and a
representative appointed by the President to discuss the
political aspect of this question. We want to work concert-
edly with our Russian allies. If there are any difficulties,
they can be cleared up between ourselves. The military
questions could be discussed later.

] pass now to the next question, the question of Turkey.
We British are Turkey’s allies, and we have assumed the
responsibility of trying to convince or make Turkey enter
the war before Christmas. If the President should like to
join us or to assume the leadership, that will be acceptable
to us, but we shall need the full help of Marshal Stalin in
implementing the decision adopted at the Moscow Confer-
ence. On behalf of the British Government I can say that
it is prepared to warn Turkey that if Turkey does not
accept the proposal of entering the war this may have the
most serious political consequences for Turkey and have an

80

effect on her rights in respect of the Bosporus and the Dar-
danelles. This morning, the military committee composed of
our generals discussed the military aspect of the Turkish
problem, but the problem of Turkey is a political rather
than a military problem. We intend to set aside not more
than two or three divisions for operations in the area of
Turkey if she enters the war, apart from the air force that
we Shall also make available.

I have raised several questions which are mainly polit-
ical, for example, the question of what the Soviet Govern-
ment thinks about Bulgaria, whether it is inclined, in the
event that Turkey declares war on Germany and Bulgaria
attacks Turkey, to tell the Bulgarians that it will regard
Bulgaria as its enemy. This will have a great effect on Bul-
garia. There are other political problems as well. | propose
that the two Foreign Ministers and a representative appoint-
ed by the President should study this question and advise
us on how to make Turkey enter the war and what the
results of this will be. I think these results will be enor-
mous with decisive possibilities. If Turkey declares war on
Germany it will be a great blow for the German people.
If we manage to make good use of this fact it should neu-
tralise Bulgaria. As for the other countries in the Balkans,
Rumania is already looking for a country to which she can
capitulate. Hungary is also in confusion. It is time for us
to reap the harvest. Now we must pay the price for this
harvest, if we consider it expedient. | propose that these
questions should be discussed by our three representatives,
who, as a result of their discussion, may tell us what can
be done to lighten Russia’s burden, and to ensure the suc-
cess of Operation Overlord.

Stalin: As for the two divisions which Mr. Churchill
proposes to set aside for help to Turkey and the partisans,
we have no disagreements on this question. We regard the
assignment of two divisions and help to the partisans as
important. But if we are prevailed upon here to discuss
military questions, we regard Operation Overlord as the
main and decisive question.

I should like the military committee to have a definite
task. I propose that the committee be given a definite direc-
tive within whose framework it could work. Of course, the
Russians are in need of help. I should like to state that if
the question is one of aid to us, we do expect aid from

31

those who carry out the operations planned, and we expect
real aid.

What should our directives to the military committee be?
They should stipulate that the date of Operation Overlord
should not be postponed, and that May should be the time
limit for carrying out this operation. Our second directive
should stipulate, in conformity with the desires of the Rus-
sians, support of Operation Overlord by a landing in the
south of France. If it is impossible to land a force in South-
ern France two or three months before the start of Oper-
ation Overlord, it would be worth while doing this
simultaneously with Operation Overlord. If transport dif-
ficulties do not allow a landing in Southern’ France
simultaneously with Operation Overlord, the operation in
Southern France could be undertaken some time after the
start of Operation Overlord. I think that a landing in
Southern France would be an auxiliary operation in respect
of Overlord. This operation would ensure the success
of Operation Overlord. Meanwhile, the operation to take
Rome would be of a diverting nature. The third directive
would instruct the committee to hurry the appointment of
the commander-in-chief for Operation Overlord. It would
be best to settle these matters during our stay here, and I
see no reason why this cannot be done. We believe that
until a commander-in-chief is appointed Operation Over-
lord cannot be expected to be a success. The appointment
of a commander-in-chief is the task of the British and the
Americans, but the Russians would like to know who is going
to be the commander-in-chief. Those are the three direc-
tives to the military committee. If the committee works
within the framework of these directives its work can be
successful and can be finished earlier. I ask the conference
to take account of the considerations I have put forward.

Roosevelt: I listened with interest to everything that was
said, beginning from Operation Overlord and ending with
the question of Turkey. I attach great importance to dates.
If there is agreement on Operation Overlord, there is need
to come to agreement on the date of this operation.

Operation Overlord can be carried out in the first week
of May or it may be postponed somewhat. The postpone-
ment of Overlord would result from our carrying out one
or two operations in the Mediterranean, which would require
landing facilities and planes. If an expedition is carried

32

out in the eastern part of the Mediterranean and fails it
will be necessary to transfer additional materiel and troops
to that area. In that case Overlord will not be carried out
in time.

Stalin: Against Yugoslavia the Germans have eight divi-
sions, of which five are in Greece. In Bulgaria, there are
three or four German divisions, and nine in Italy.

Churchill: Our figures differ from these.

Stalin: Your figures are wrong. In France, the Germans
have 25 divisions.

Roosevelt: Our staffs must work out plans in order to
tie down the German divisions in the Balkans. These plans
must be worked out in such a way that the operations we
undertake for that purpose should not prejudice Overlord.

Stalin: That is right.

Churchill: Speaking of measures with respect to the Bal-
kans, I did not mean the use of large forces for these pur-
poses.

Stalin: If possible it would be good to carry out Opera-
tion Overlord in May, say the 10th, 15th, or 20th of May.

Churchill: | cannot undertake such an obligation.

Stalin: If Overlord is carried out in August, as Churchill
said yesterday, nothing will come of the operation because
of the unfavourable weather in that period. April and May
are the best months for Overlord.

Churchill: | do not think that we differ in our views, as
it may seem. I am prepared to do everything that is within
the power of the British Government to carry out Opera-
tion Overlord at the earliest possible date. But I do not think
that the many possibilities available in the Mediterranean
should be coldly rejected as being of no importance, just
because their use will hold up Operation Overlord for two
or three months.

Stalin: The operations in the Mediterranean of which
Churchill speaks are merely diversional. I do not deny the
importance of these diversions.

Churchill: In our opinion the numerous British troops
must not be idle for six months. They should carry on
operations against the enemy, and with the help of our
American allies we hope to destroy the German divisions
in Italy. We cannot remain passive in Italy, for that will
spoil our whole campaign there. We must extend assist-
ance to our Russian friends.

3-876 38

Stalin: According to Churchill it would appear that the
Russians want the British to be idle.

Churchill: If the vessels are withdrawn from the Mediter-
ranean, this will considerably reduce the scale of operations
in that area. Marshal Stalin will recall that at the Moscow
Conference conditions were specified under which Operation
Overlord can be a success. These conditions stipulate that
by the time of the invasion there should be not more than
12 German mobile divisions in France, and that in the
course of 60 days the Germans should be unable to transfer _
more than 15 divisions to reinforce their troops in France.
There is no mistake here, for these conditions are the basis
of Overlord. We must tie down as many German divisions
as possible in Italy, the Balkans, and in the area of Turkey,
if she enters the war. German divisions transferred from
France are fighting us at the front in Italy. If we are pas-
sive on the front in Italy, the Germans will be able to
transfer their divisions back to France to the prejudice of
Overlord. That is why we must tie up the enemy by action
and keep our front in Italy in an active state so as to
pin down a sufficient number of German _ divisions
there.

As for Turkey, I agree to insist on her entry into the war.
If she refuses to do this, nothing can be done about it. If
she does agree we must make use of the Turkish air bases
in Anatolia and take Rhodes. One assault division will be
enough for this operation. Subsequently, the garrison in the
island will be able to defend it. Having received Rhodes
and the Turkish bases we shall be able to expel the German
garrisons from the other islands of the Aegean Sea and
open up the Dardanelles. That is not an operation that will
require a great force. It is a limited operation. If Turkey
enters the war and we take Rhodes we shall have secured
superiority in this area and the time will come when all the
islands in the Aegean Sea will be ours. If Turkey does not
enter the war we shall not grieve over the matter and I
shall not ask for troops to take Rhodes and the islands of
the Aegean Sea. But in that case Germany will not grieve
either, for she will continue to dominate the area. If Turkey
enters the war, our troops stationed in Egypt for the pur-
poses of defence, and our air force there also defending
Egypt, could be advanced to the fore. After the taking of
the Aegean Islands these forces could be used in areas north

34),

of Egypt. I suggest a thorough discussion of this question.
It will be a great misfortune for us, if Turkey does not join
the war, from the standpoint of Germany’s continued domi-
nation of that area. I want the troops and planes now idle in
Egypt to be used as soon as possible if Turkey enters the
war. Everything depends on the landing facilities. The dif-
ficulty lies in the transportation of troops across the sea.
I am always prepared to discuss all details with our Allies.
But everything depends on the availability of landing facil-
ities. If these landing facilities are left in the Mediterra-
nean or in the Indian Ocean to the prejudice of Overlord,
then the success of Overlord and the success of the opera-
tion in Southern France cannot be guaranteed. The opera-
tions in Southern France will require a great quantity of
landing facilities. J ask this to be taken into consideration.

Finally, I consider acceptable and, on behalf of the
British Government, agree to the working out of directives
for the military committee. 1 suggest that we work out our
own directives to the committee together with the Ameri-
cans. I think that our views coincide more or less.

Stalin: How long do we intend to stay at Tehran?

Churchill: 1 am prepared to stop eating until these direc-
tives are worked out.

Stalin: What I mean is when shall we end our confer-
ence?

Roosevelt: | am prepared to stay at Tehran as long as
Marshal Stalin remains at Tehran.

Churchill: If it is necessary I am prepared to stay in
Tehran for good.

Stalin: | should like to know how many French divisions
there are at present.

Roosevelt: The plan is to arm 11 French divisions. But
of this number only five are ready now, and another four
divisions are to be equipped shortly.
ae Are these French divisions in action or are they
idle?

Roosevelt: One division is fighting in Italy, one or two
divisions are in Corsica and Sardinia.

Stalin: How does the command intend to use these French
divisions?

Marshall: The plan is to merge the French Corps with
the Fifth Army operating on the left flank in Italy. One
division is now being transferred to the front in Italy where

35

it will be tested in action. After this a decision will be taken
on the most expedient use of the French divisions. The time
required to equip another four French divisions depends
on the time it will take to train the personnel of these
divisions.

Stalin: Are these divisions of the French type?

Marshall: These divisions are of the American type and
consist of 15,000 men each. Most of the soldiers are not
Frenchmen. In the armoured divisions, three-quarters of the
personnel are French and the rest are Africans.

Roosevelt: 1 should like to say a few words. I think that
if we three give instructions to our military committee it
will be able to discuss these questions.

Stalin: There is no need for any military committee. We
can solve all the questions here at the conference. We must
decide on the date, the commander-in-chief and the need
of an auxiliary operation in Southern France. We Russians
are limited in time of stay at Tehran. We could stay on
until December 1, but we have to leave on the 2nd. The
President will recall that we agreed on three or four days.

Roosevelt: 1 think that my proposal will simplify the
work of the staff. The military committee must take Opera-
tion Overlord as a basis. The committee must table its
proposals on the auxiliary operations in the Mediterranean.
It must also bear in mind that these operations may hold
up Overlord.

Stalin: The Russians would like to know the date on
which Overlord is to start in order to prepare their blow
at the Germans.

Roosevelt: The date of Operation Overlord was deter-
mined at Quebec. Only the most serious changes in the
situation can justify any changes in the date determined
for this operation.

Churchill: | have just heard the directive which the
President proposed to give the committee. I should like to
have the opportunity of considering the President’s proposals.
I have no objections to this in principle, but I should like
to have time to examine the President’s proposals. I am
very pleased to spend December | at Tehran, and to leave
on December 2. It is not clear to me whether or not the
President proposes the establishment of a military commit-
tee, for Marshal Stalin suggests that we do without a com-
mittee. Personally, I want such a committee.

36

As for determining the date of Operation Overlord, if
it is decided to have an examination of strategic questions
in the military committee. ...

Stalin: We are not demanding any examination.

Roosevelt: We are all aware that the contradictions
between us and the British are small. I object to the
postponement of Operation Overlord, while Churchill Jays
emphasis on the importance of operations in the Medi-
terranean. The military committee could clear up these
questions.

Stalin: We can solve these problems ourselves, because
we have more rights than the military committee. If I may
permit myself an incautious question, I should like to know
whether the British believe in Operation Overlord or simply
speak of it to reassure the Russians.

Churchill: Given the conditions which were indicated at
the Moscow Conference, I am quite sure that we shall have
to transfer all our available forces against the Germans
when Operation Overlord is launched.

Roosevelt: We are very hungry now, and I propose that
we adjourn to attend the dinner given for us today by
Marshal Stalin. I propose that our military committee should
continue its conference tomorrow morning.

Stalin: There is no need for the meeting of a military
committee. That is superfluous. Only we ourselves can speed
up our work.

Churchill: Would it be better for the President and
myself to co-ordinate our views and then report to you our
common standpoint?

Stalin: This would accelerate our work.

Churchill: And what about the committee consisting of
Hopkins and the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs?

Stalin: This committee is not required either. But if Mr.
Churchill insists, we do not object to its formation.

Roosevelt: Tomorrow, Hopkins, Molotov and Eden could
have talk with each other at luncheon.

Stalin: What are we going to do tomorrow? Will the
proposals of Churchill and Roosevelt be ready?

Roosevelt: The proposals will be ready, and I suggest that
Churchill, Marshal Stalin and I have luncheon at one-
thirty and discuss all questions.

Churchill; That will be our programme for tomorrow.

Stalin: I agree.

37

The Third Sitting of the Conference
of the Heads of Government of the U.S.S.R.,
the United States and Great Britain

Tehran, November 30, 1943
Opened: 16.30; Closed: 17.20

Roosevelt: The decision of the British and American
staffs was communicated to Marshal Stalin and has satis-
fied him. It would be desirable for General Brooke to an-
nounce this decision to the conference if Marshal Stalin has
no objections.

Stalin: I agree.

Churchill: General Brooke will make this announcement
on behalf of both the Americans and the British.

Brooke: The chiefs of the Joint Staffs have advised the
President and the Prime Minister to inform Marshal Stalin
that Operation Overlord will be started in May. This oper-
ation will be supported by an operation against Southern
France, with the scale of this operation depending on the
number of landing craft available at the time.

Churchill: Needless to say the Joint British and American
Staffs will be in close contact with Marshal Stalin in order
to permit the co-ordination of operations by all the allies,
so that a blow is dealt at the enemy simultaneously from
both sides.

Stalin: I am aware of the importance of the decisions
adopted by the staffs of our allies, and the difficulties in
implementing these decisions. There may be a danger not
at the start of Overlord but when the operation is unfold-
ed, when the Germans try to transfer a part of their troops
from the Eastern Front to the Western to hamper Over-
lord. In order to prevent the Germans from manoeuvring
their reserves and transferring any sizable forces from the
Eastern Front to the West, the Russians undertake to organ-
ise a big offensive against the Germans in several places
by May, in order to pin down the German divisions on the
Eastern Front and to prevent the Germans from creating
any difficulties for Overlord. I informed President Roose-
velt and Prime Minister Churchill of this today, but I wish
to repeat my statement before the conference.

Roosevelt: I am highly satisfied with Marshal Stalin’s

38

statement that steps will be taken to co-ordinate the blows
at the enemy. I hope that our nations have now realised
the need of joint action, and that the forthcoming opera-
tions of our three countries will show that we have learned
to act together.

The United States has not yet appointed a commander-
in-chief for Operation Overlord, but I am sure that a com-
mander-in-chief will be appointed in the next three or four
days, as soon as we return to Cairo.

I have only one proposal to make, namely, that our staffs
should without delay start elaborating the proposals adopt-
ed here. That is why I suppose they could return to Cairo
tomorrow, if Marshal Stalin has no objections to this.

Stalin: I agree with this.

Churchill: I want to say that today we adopted a serious
decision. Now the President and I and our staffs must work
out this question in detail and decide where we are to find
the necessary landing craft. We have ahead of us five
months, and I think that we shall be able to obtain the
required number of landing craft. I have already given an
assignment to study this matter and a detailed report will
be submitted as soon as our staffs return home. For Opera-
tion Overlord to succeed we must have a considerable su-
periority of forces, and I hope that our staffs will be able
to assure this. By June, we shall already be in bitter action
against the enemy. I believe that we have finished discuss-
ing military matters. We could now discuss political ques-
tions. For this we could use December 1 and 2, and could
leave on December 3. We have scored a great success and
it would be well if we left after solving all questions, and
announced to the public that we have reached complete
agreement. I hope that the President can stay until Decem-
ber 3, as I can, if Marshal Stalin agrees to stay.

Stalin: I agree.

Roosevelt: | am very happy to hear that Marshal Stalin
has agreed to stay for another day. I also wanted to say
about the communiqué: our staffs could give us a draft of
this communiqué.

Stalin: In the part relating to military matters?

Churchill: Of course. The communiqué must be brief and
mystifying.

Stalin: But without any mysticism.

Churchill: 1 am sure that the enemy will shortly learn

39

of our preparations because he will be able to discover them
by the great accumulation of trains, by the activity of our
ports, etc.

Stalin: A big operation cannot be hidden in a sack.

Churchill: Our staffs will have to think how to camou-
flage these preparations and to mislead the enemy.

Stalin: In such cases we mislead the enemy by building
dummies of tanks, planes, and mock airfields. Then we set
the dummies of the tanks and planes in motion with the aid
of tractors. Intelligence reports on these movements to the
enemy, and the Germans believe that the blow is being
prepared in that very place. Meanwhile, there is absolute
quiet where the offensive is really being staged. All trans-
portation takes place at night. We set up in several places
from 5,000 to 8,000 dummies of tanks, up to 2,000 dummies
of planes, and a great number of dummy airfields. In addi-
tion, we mislead the enemy with the aid of the radio. In
areas where no offensive is planned, radio stations exchange
messages. These stations are monitored by the enemy, and
he receives the impression that a great force is deployed
there. Enemy planes often bomb these places night and day
although they are absolutely empty.

Churchill: Sometimes truth has to be safeguarded with the
aid of untruth. In any case, steps will be taken to mislead
the enemy.

The Fourth Sitting of the Conference
of the Heads of Government of the U.S.S.R.,
the United States and Great Britain

Tehran, December 1, 1943

1, SITTING DURING LUNCHEON
Opened: 13.00; Closed: 15.00

Hopkins: The question of inviting Turkey to enter the
war is connected with the question of how much support
Turkey can get from Great Britain and the United States.
In addition, it is necessary to co-ordinate Turkey’s entry
into the war with the over-all strategy.

40

=

Roosevelt: In other words, Inonti is going to ask us wheth-
er we shall support Turkey. I think this question must be
further worked out.

Stalin: Churchill said that the British Government was
making available 20 or 30 squadrons and 2 or 3 divisions
for aid to Turkey.

Churchill: We gave no consent in respect of two or three
divisions. In Egypt, we have 17 squadrons which are not
used at present by the Anglo-American command. These
squadrons, in the event of Turkey’s entry into the war,
would serve for the purpose of her defence. In addition,
Britain agreed to make available to Turkey three anti-air-
craft defence regiments. That is all the British promised
Turkey. The British did not promise Turkey any troops.
The Turks have 50 divisions. The Turks are good fighters,
but they have no modern weapons. As for the two or three
divisions mentioned by Marshal Stalin the British Govern-
ment has set these divisions aside for the capture of the
Aegean Islands in the event Turkey enters the war, and not
for aid to Turkey.

Roosevelt: (addressing Churchill): Isn't it a fact that the
operation against Rhodes will require a great quantity of
landing facilities.

Churchill: This operation will require no more facilities
than are available in the Mediterranean.

Roosevelt: My difficulty is that the American Staff has
not yet studied how many landing craft will be required by
the operations in Italy, the preparations of Overlord in
Britain, and for the Indian Ocean. That is why I must be
careful in respect of promises to Turkey. I’m afraid these
promises may hamper the fulfilment of our agreement of
yesterday.

Stalin: Apart from entering the war, Turkey will also
make her territory available to the allied air force.

Churchill: Of course.

Stalin: I think that we have finished with this question.

Churchill: We have not offered anything we are unable
to give. We offered the Turks three new squadrons of
fighters to bring the total number of squadrons, including
those in Egypt, up to 20. Perhaps, the Americans could add
anything to this number? We promised the Turks some
anti-aircraft defence units, but we did not promise them
any troops, for we haven’t any. As for landing facilities,

41

these will be needed in March, but I believe we shall be able
to find them in the period between the taking of Rome and
the start of Operation Overlord.

Roosevelt: | want to consult with the military. I hope
Churchill is right, but my advisers say that there may be
difficulties in the use of landing craft between the taking
of Rome and the start of Overlord. They believe that it is
absolutely necessary to have the landing craft for Opera-
tion Overlord by April 1.

Churchill: 1 do not see any difficulties. We have not
made any proposals to Turkey, and I don’t know if Inonii
will accept them. He will be in Cairo and will acquaint
himself with the situation. I can give the Turks 20 squad-
rons. I won’t give the Turks any troops. Besides, I don’t
think they need troops. But the point is that I don’t know
whether or not Inonii is coming to Cairo.

Stalin: He might fall ill?

Churchill: Easily. If Indnii does not agree to go to Cairo
to meet the President and myself, I am prepared to go on
a cruiser to see him in Adana. Inonii will go there, and I
shall paint for him the unpleasant picture that will face
the Turks if they refuse to enter the war, and the pleasant
picture in the opposite case. I shall then inform you of the
results of my talks with Inénii.

Hopkins: The question of supporting Turkey in the war
was not discussed by the American military, and 1 doubt
the expediency of inviting Inonti to Cairo before the mili-
tary have studied this matter.

Stalin: Consequently, Hopkins proposes not to invite
TInonii.

Hopkins: 1 am not proposing not to invite Inoni, but I
stress that it would be useful to receive information before-
hand on the aid we could give the Turks.

Churchill: I agree with Hopkins. We must agree on the
possible aid to the Turks.

Stalin: Can’t this be done without the military?

Churchill: Together with the military we must study the
question of landing facilities. We may be able to get more
than we hope by taking them from the Indian or Pacific
oceans or building them. If that is impossible we should
abandon the idea. However, in any case, it has been decid-
ed that Overlord must not suffer.

Roosevelt: | think that it would be useful if I outlined the

42

situation in the Pacific in connection with the possible with-
drawal of landing facilities from there, as Churchill sug-
gests. J must point out, first, that the distance from the
Pacific to the Mediterranean is enormous. Second, in the
Pacific we are moving northwards so as to cut Japanese
communications, and we need landing facilities in that area.

Hopkins: Is it true that Churchill and Eden have not
spoken to the Turks about the taking of the Aegean Islands?

Eden: No, I have not spoken of this. I only asked the
Turks to make available air bases and did not touch upon
the question of landing facilities.

Roosevelt: If I see the Turkish President I shall make
the offer to take Crete and the Dodecanese Islands because
they are rather close to Turkey.

Churchill: I want the Turks to give us air bases in the
area of Smyrna, which the British helped the Turks to
build. When we get these air bases we shall expel the
German air force from the Islands. For this purpose we are
prepared to pay with one of our planes for every destroyed
German plane. The task of expelling the German garrisons
from the Islands will be feasible if we ensure air superiority
in that area. There is no need to storm the island of Rhodes
where there are 8,000 Italians and 5,000 Germans. They
can be starved out. If we get bases in Turkey our ships
with air support will be able to cut German communica-
tions and the goal will be reached.

Stalin: That is correct. It seems that the 20 squadrons
now in Cairo are idle. If they go into action nothing will
be left of the German air force. But a certain number of
bombers should be added to the fighter squadrons.

Roosevelt: | agree with Churchill’s proposal to make
available for Turkey’s defence 20 squadrons with a certain
number of bombers.

Churchill: We are offering Turkey limited air cover and
anti-aircraft defence. It is winter now, and an invasion of
Turkey is improbable. We intend to continue supplying
Turkey with arms. Turkey is receiving mainly American
weapons. At the present time we are offering Turkey the
invaluable opportunity of accepting the Soviet Govern-
ment’s invitation to take part in a peace conference.

Stalin: What kind of weapons is Turkey short of?

Churchill: The Turks have rifles, pretty good artillery, but
they have no anti-tank artillery, no air force, no tanks.

43

We organised military schools in Turkey, but attendance is
low. The Turks have no experience in handling radio
equipment. But the Turks are good fighters.

Stalin: It is quite possible that if the Turks give airfields
to the allies, Bulgaria will not attack Turkey, and the Ger-
mans will be expecting Turkey’s attack. Turkey will not
attack the Germans, but will simply be in a state of war
with them. But this will give the allies airfields and ports
in Turkey. If events took such a turn, that would not be
bad either.

Eden: | told the Turks that they could make air bases
available to the allies without fighting, for Germany would
not attack Turkey.

Roosevelt: In this respect Portugal could serve as an
example for Turkey.

Eden: Numan would not agree with my standpoint. He
said Germany would react, and that Turkey prefers to enter
the war of her own free will, instead of being dragged in.

Churchill: That is true. But I must say the following.
When you ask Turkey to stretch her neutrality by giving
us air bases, the Turks reply that they prefer a war in
earnest; when you tell the Turks about entering the war
in earnest, they reply that they have not got the arms. If
the Turks give a negative reply to our proposal we must
let them know our serious considerations. We must tell them
that in that case they will not participate in the peace con-
ference. As for Britain, we shall tell them on our part that
we are not interested in Turkish affairs. In addition, we
shall stop supplying Turkey with arms.

Eden: | should like to specify the demands we are to
present to Turkey in Cairo. J understand that we must de-
mand of the Turks entry into the war against Germany.

Stalin: Precisely, against Germany... .

Il. ROUND-TABLE SITTING
Opened: 16.00; Closed: 19.40
Roosevelt: At this sitting I should like us to discuss the
questions of Poland and Germany.
Stalin: And also the question of a communiqué.

Roosevelt: The Communiqué is already being prepared.

44

Molotov: Can we receive an answer now concerning the
transfer to us of a part of the Italian merchant fleet and
navy?

Roosevelt: The answer to this question is very simple. We
have received a great number of Italian ships. They should,
1 think, remain in the temporary use of the United Nations
and should be used in the best way. After the war they
should be distributed among the United Nations.

Molotov: If these ships cannot be conveyed into our
ownership we ask that they be given to us for temporary
use. We shall use them in the interests of the allies and
all the United Nations.

Stalin: If Turkey does not enter the war, the Italian ships
transferred to us cannot be sailed into the Black Sea, and
we should then like to have them in the North Sea. We are
aware that Great Britain and the United States are in need
of ships, but we are not asking for many.

Churchill: | am for it.

Roosevelt: J am also for it.

Churchill: 1 should like to see these ships in the Black
Sea.

Stalin: We also prefer to have them in the Black Sea.

Churchill: It may be well to send the Italian ships handed
over to the Soviet Union into the Black Sea with the British
ships to help the Soviet Navy.

Stalin: All right, please.

Churchill: We must settle the matter of transferring the
ships with the Italians, because they are helping us with
their fleet. Some Italian ships are fighting, others are patrol-
ling. The submarines are being used for supply. Of course,
it is desirable to put the Italian fleet to the best possible
use instead of having it against us. That is why I request
two months in which to settle with the Italians the question
of transferring the Italian ships to the Soviet Union. This
is a delicate matter and it is necessary to go about it like
a cat with a mouse.

Stalin: Can we then receive these ships by the end of
January of next year?

Roosevelt: J agree.

Churchill: 1 agree.

Stalin: Our crews will man these ships.

Churchill: We should like to help the Russian Navy in
the Black Sea with our own ships. In addition, we should

45

be happy to help in repairing the Soviet naval bases in the
Black Sea, for instance, Sevastopol. We should also be
happy if the Soviet Government considers it useful to send
four or five submarines into the Black Sea to sink the
Rumanians and Germans there. I must say that we have
neither claims nor interests in the Black Sea.

Stalin: Very well, we shall be grateful for any assistance
extended to us.

Churchill: There is one point we could make use of in
the event Turkey joins the war. If Turkey is afraid to enter
the war but will agree to stretch her neutrality, Turkey may
permit several submarines to pass through the Bosporus and
the Dardanelles into the Black Sea with supply ships for
them. American submarines are sinking many Japanese
ships in the Pacific Ocean; our submarines sank a great
number of German and Italian ships in the Mediterranean;
now our submarines could help in the Black Sea.

Stalin: Have we finished with this question?

Churchill: Yes.

Roosevelt: I should like to discuss Poland. I wish to ex-
press the hope that the Soviet Government will be able to
start talks and restore its relations with the Polish Govern-
ment.

Stalin: The agents of the Polish Government, who are in
Poland, are connected with the Germans. They are killing
partisans. You cannot imagine what they are doing there.

Churchill: That is a big issue. We declared war on Ger-
many because Germany attacked Poland. I was surprised
when Chamberlain failed to fight for the Czechs in Munich,
but suddenly in April 1939 gave Poland a guarantee. I was
surprised when he rejected more favourable opportunities
and returned to the policy of war. But at the same time I
was also pleased with this fact. For the sake of Poland and
in pursuance of our promise we declared war on Germany,
although we were not prepared, with the exception of our
naval forces, and played a big part in inducing France to
enter the war. France has collapsed. But we turned out to
be active fighters thanks to our insular position. We attach
great importance to the reason for which we entered the
war. I understand the historical difference between ours
and the Russian standpoint on Poland. But at home we pay
a great deal of attention to Poland, for it was the attack on
Poland that prompted us to undertake the present effort. I

46

a

was also very well aware of the Russian position at the start
of the war, and considering our weakness at the beginning
of the war, and the fact that France went back on the guar-
antees she gave in Munich, I understand that the Soviet
Government could not at the time risk its life in that strug-
gle. But now the situation is different, and I hope that if we
are asked why we entered the war we shall reply that it
happened because we gave Poland a guarantee. I want to
return to my example of the three matches, one of which
represents Germany, another Poland, and the third, the
Soviet Union. All these three matches must be moved to
the West in order to settle one of the main problems
facing the allies: to ensure the Soviet Union’s Western
borders.

Stalin: Yesterday there was no mention of negotiations
with the Polish Government. Yesterday it was said that the
Polish Government must be directed to do this, and that.
I must say that Russia, no less than the other Powers, is
interested in good relations with Poland, because Poland is
Russia’s neighbour. We stand for the restoration and strength-
ening of Poland. But we draw a line between Poland and
the emigre Polish Government in London. We broke off
relations with that Government not out of any whim on
our part, but because the Polish Government joined Hitler
in slandering the Soviet Union. All that was published in
the press. What are the guarantees that the emigre Polish
Government in London will not do the same thing again?
We should like to have a guarantee that the agents of the
Polish Government will not kill partisans, that the emigre
Polish Government will really call for struggle against the
Germans, instead of engaging in machinations. We shall
maintain good relations with any Government that calls for
active struggle against the Germans. But I am not at all
sure that the present emigre Government in London is such
as it should be. If it sides with the partisans and if we are
given a guarantee that its agents will not have ties with the
Germans in Poland, we shall be prepared to start talks
with it.

Churchill mentioned three matches. I should like te ask
him what it means.

Churchill: It would be a good thing now at the round table
to hear the views of the Russians on Poland’s borders. |
think Eden or I could then make them known to the Poles.

47

We believe that Poland unquestionably should be satisfied
at the expense of Germany. We are prepared to tell the
Poles that this is a good plan, and that they cannot expect
a better one. After this we could raise the question of restor-
ing relations. But 1 should like to emphasise that we want
a strong independent Poland, friendly to Russia.

Stalin: The question is that the Ukrainian lands should
go to the Ukraine, and the Byelorussian, to Byelorussia, 1.e.,
the 1939 border established by the Soviet Constitution should
exist between us and Poland. The Soviet Government stands
for this border and considers that this is correct.

What other questions are there for discussion?

Roosevelt: The question of Germany.

Stalin: What are the proposals on this matter?

Roosevelt: The partition of Germany.

Churchill: | am for partitioning Germany. But | should
like to consider the question of partitioning Prussia. I am
for separating Bavaria and the other provinces from
Germany.

Roosevelt: In order to stimulate our discussion on this
question, I want to set forth a plan for partitioning Ger-
many into five states, which I personally drew up two
months ago.

Churchill: | should like to stress that the root of evil in
Germany is Prussia.

Roosevelt: 1 should like us to have a picture of the whole
before we speak of the separate components. In my opinion,
Prussia must be weakened as far as possible, and reduced
in size. Prussia should constitute the first independent part
of Germany. The second part of Germany should include
Hannover and the north-western regions of Germany. The
third part—Saxony and the Leipzig area. The fourth part
—Hessen Province, Darmstadt, Kassel and the areas to the
south of the Rhine, and also the old towns of Westphalia.
The fifth part—Bavaria, Baden, Wurttemberg. Each of these
five parts would be an independent state. In addition, the
regions of the Kiel Canal and Hamburg should be separat-
ed from Germany. These regions would be administered
by the United Nations, or the four Powers. The Ruhr and
the Saar must be placed either under the control of the
United Nations or under the trusteeship of the whole of
Europe. That is my proposal. I must add that it is merely
exploratory.

48

Churchill: You have said a mouthful. | think there are
two questions: one—destructive, the other—constructive. I
have two ideas: the first is to isolate Prussia from the rest
of Germany; the second is to separate Germany’s southern
provinces—Bavaria, Baden, Wurttemberg, the Palatinate,
from the Saar to Saxony inclusive. I would keep Prussia in
strict conditions. I think it would be easy to sever the south-
ern provinces from Prussia and include them in a Danu-
bian federation. The people who live in the Danube basin
are not the cause of war. At any rate, I would give the
Prussians harsher treatment than the other Germans. The
southern Germans will not start a new war.

Stalin: I do not like the plan for new associations of
states. If it is decided to partition Germany no new asso-
ciations need be set up. Whether it is five or six states, and
two regions into which Roosevelt proposes to divide Ger-
many, this plan of Roosevelt’s to weaken Germany can be
examined. Like us, Churchill will soon have to deal with
great masses of Germans. Churchill will then see that it is
not only the Prussians who are fighting in the German Army
but also Germans from the other provinces of Germany.
Only the Austrians, when surrendering, shout “I’m Aus-
trian”, and our soldiers accept them. As for the Germans
from Germany’s other provinces they fight with equal dog-
gedness. Regardless of how we approach the partitioning
of Germany there is no need to set up some new association
of Danubian states lacking vitality. Hungary and Austria
must exist separately. Austria existed as a separate state
until it was seized.

Roosevelt: | agree with Marshal Stalin, in particular, that
there is no difference between Germans from the various
German provinces. Fifty years ago there was a difference
but now all German soldiers are alike. It is true that this
does not apply to the Prussian officers.

Churchill: I should not like to be understood as not
favouring the partition of Germany. But I wanted to say
that if Germany is broken up into several parts without
these parts being combined then, as Marshal Stalin said,
the time will come when the Germans will unite.

Stalin: There are no steps that could exclude the possibil-
ity of Germany’s unification.

Churchill: Does Marshal Stalin prefer a divided Europe?
Stalin: Europe has nothing to do with it. I don’t know

4-876 49

that there is need to set up four, five or six independent
German states. This question must be discussed.

Roosevelt: Should a special committee be set up to study
the question of Germany, or should it be referred to the
London Commission?

Stalin: This question could be referred to the London
Commission, in which there are representatives of our three
states.

Churchill: I should now like to return to the Polish ques-
tion, which appears to me to be more urgent because the
Poles can make a great deal of noise. I should like to read
out my following proposals on the Polish question. I am not
asking you to agree with it in the form in which I have
drawn it up, because I have not yet taken a final decision
myself.

My proposal says:

“It was agreed in principle that the hearth of the Polish
state and people must be situated between the so-called Cur-
zon Line and the line of the Oder River, including Eastern
Prussia and the Oppeln Province as part of Poland. But
the final drawing of the boundary line requires thorough
study and possible resettlement in some points.”

Stalin: The Russians have no ice-free ports on the Baltic.
That is why the Russians would need the ice-free ports of
Konigsberg and Memel and the corresponding part of the
territory of Eastern Prussia, particularly since these are age-
old Slav lands. If the British agree to the transfer of the
said territory to us, we shall agree to the formula proposed
by Churchill.

Churchill: This is a very interesting proposal which I will
make a point of studying.

COMMUNIQUE ON THE CONFERENCE OF THE HEADS
OF GOVERNMENT OF THE ALLIED COUNTRIES—
THE U.S.S.R., THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN—
HELD IN TEHRAN

The Conference of the Heads of Government of the three
Allied Powers was held in Tehran from November 28 to
December 1. J. V. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Peo-
ple’s Commissars of the U.S.S.R., F. D. Roosevelt, President
of the United States of America and W. Churchill, Prime
Minister of Great Britain, took part in its work.

The Conference adopted the Declaration on the joint
action in the war against Germany and the post-war co-
operation of the three Powers and also the Declaration
Regarding Iran. The texts are published below.

DECLARATION OF THE THREE POWERS

We—the President of the United States, the Prime Min-
ister of Great Britain, and the Premier of the Soviet Union,
have met these four days past, in this, the capital of our
Ally, Iran, and have shaped and confirmed our common
policy.

We express our determination that our nations shall work
together in war and in the peace that will follow.

As to war—our military staffs have joined in our round
table discussions, and we have concerted our plans for the
destruction of the German forces. We have reached com-
plete agreement as to the scope and timing of the operations
to be undertaken from the east, west and south.

The common understanding which we have here reached
guarantees that victory will be ours.

And as to peace—we are sure that our concord will win
an enduring peace. We recognise fully the supreme respon-

* 51

sibility resting upon us and all the United Nations to make
a peace which will command the good will of the overwhelm-
ing mass of the peoples of the world and banish the scourge
and terror of war for many generations.

With our diplomatic advisers we have surveyed the prob-
lems of the future. We shall seek the co-operation and
active participation of all nations, large and small, whose
peoples in heart and mind are dedicated, as are our own
peoples, to the elimination of tyranny and slavery, oppres-
sion and intolerance. We will welcome them, as they may
choose to come, into a world family of democratic nations.

No power on earth can prevent our destroying the Ger-
man armies by land, their U-Boats by sea, and their war
plants from the air.

Our attack will be relentless and increasing.

Emerging from these cordial conferences we look with
confidence to the day when all peoples of the world may live
free lives, untouched by tyranny, and according to their
varying desires and their own consciences.

We came here with hope and determination. We leave
here, friends in fact, in spirit and in purpose.

Signed in Tehran
on December 1, 1943
ROOSEVELT, STALIN, CHURCHILL

DECLARATION REGARDING IRAN

The President of the United States of America, the Pre-
mier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, having consulted
with each other and with the Prime Minister of Iran, de-
sire to declare the mutual agreement of their three Gov-
ernments regarding their relations with Iran.

The Governments of the United States of America, the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United King-
dom recognise the assistance which Iran has given in the
prosecution of the war against the common enemy, particu-
larly by facilitating transportation of supplies from over-
seas to the Soviet Union.

The three Governments realise that the war has caused
special economic difficulties for Iran and they are agreed

52

that they will continue to make available to the Govern-
ment of Iran such economic assistance as may be possible,
having regard to the heavy demands made upon them by
their world-wide military operations and to the world-wide
shortage of transport, raw materials and supplies for civil-
ian consumption.

With respect to the post-war period, the Governments of
the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and the United Kingdom are in accord with the
Government of Iran that any economic problem confronting
Iran at the close of hostilities should receive full considera-
tion along with those of the other members of the United
Nations by conferences or international agencies held or
created to deal with international economic matters.

The Governments of the United States of America, the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United King-
dom are at one with the Government of Iran in their desire
for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Iran. They count upon the partici-
pation of Iran together with all other peace-loving nations
in the establishment of international peace, security and
prosperity after the war in accordance with the principles
of the Atlantic Charter, to which all four Governments have
subscribed.

December 1, 1943
CHURCHILL, STALIN, ROOSEVELT

THE CRIMEA CONFERENCE
(February 4-11, 1945)

First Sitting at Livadia Palace
February 4, 1945

Stalin asked Roosevelt to open the sitting.

Roosevelt said that neither law nor history envisaged that
he should open conferences. It was pure chance that he had
opened the Conference at Tehran. He, Roosevelt, considered
it a great honour to open the present Conference. He would
like to start by expressing his gratitude for the hospitality
accorded him.

The leaders of the three Powers, said Roosevelt, already
understood each other well and their mutual understanding
was growing. They all wanted an early end of the war and
stable peace. That was why the participants in the Confer-
ence were able to start their unofficial talks. He, Roosevelt,
believed the talks should be frank. Experience showed that
frankness in talks made for an early achievement of good
decisions. The participants in the Conference would have the
maps of Europe, Asia and Africa before them. The day’s sit-
ting, however, was to be devoted to the situation on the
Eastern front, where the troops of the Red Army had been
advancing with such success. He, Roosevelt, asked someone
to report on the situation at the Soviet-German front.

Stalin replied that he could offer a report by Army Gen-
fe Antonov, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red

rmy.

Antonov: “1. On January 12-15, the Soviet forces went
over to the offensive on a 700-kilometre front between the
Niemen River and the Carpathians.

“General Chernyakhovsky’s troops were advancing on
Konigsberg.

“Marshal Rokossovsky’s troops were advancing along the
northern bank of the Vistula, cutting off East Prussia from
Germany’s central areas.

‘Marshal Zhukov’s troops were advancing south of the
Vistula towards Poznan.

“Marshal Konev’s troops were advancing on Czestochowa
and Breslau.

“General Petrov’s troops were advancing on Nowy Targ
in the area of the Carpathians.

“The main blow was struck by the forces under Rokos-
sovsky, Zhukov and Konev on a 300-kilometre front between
Ostroleka and Krakow.

“9, Because of the unfavourable weather conditions, the
operation had been planned for the end of January, when
an improvement in the weather had been expected.

“Since the operation had been regarded and prepared as
one with decisive aims, the intention had been to conduct it
in more favourable conditions.

“However, in view of the alarming situation that had de-
veloped on the Western front, in connection with the German
offensive in the Ardennes, the High Command of the So-
viet forces ordered the offensive to be started not later than
mid-January, without waiting for the weather to improve.

“3. When the Soviet forces reached the Narew and the
Vistula, the enemy grouping was most solid in the central
sector of the front, because a strike from that sector would
take our troops to Germany’s vital centres along the shortest
route.

“In order to create the most advantageous conditions for
the offensive, the Soviet High Command decided to thin out
this central grouping of the enemy.

“With that end in view, it conducted a supporting opera-
tion against East Prussia and continued the offensive in
Hungary in the direction of Budapest.

“Both these directions were highly sensitive for the Ger-
mans, and they quickly reacted to our offensive by moving
some forces from the central sector of the front to the flanks;
thus, of the 24 tank divisions on our front, which constituted
the Germans’ main striking force, 11 tank divisions were
moved to the Budapest direction, and 6 tank divisions, to
East Prussia (3 tank divisions were in Kurland), thus leav-
ing only 4 tank divisions in the central sector of the front.

“The objective set by the High Command has been at-
tained.

“4. The balance of forces in the direction of the main
attack:

55

“On the front between Ostroleka and Krakéw, that is, the
direction of our main attack, the enemy had up to 80 divi-
sions; we created a grouping with a view to obtaining the
following superiority over the enemy:

“Infantry—more than double (up to 180 divisions).

“Artillery, tanks and aviation—overwhelming.

“In the break-through sectors, the artillery density creat-
ed was 220-230 pieces (from 76 mm and greater) per kilo-
metre of front.

“5, The offensive was started in highly unfavourable weath-
er conditions (low clouds and fog), which absolutely ruled
out air force operations and limited artillery observation to
a hundred metres.

“Thanks to the good preliminary reconnaissance and pow-
erful artillery offensive, the enemy’s fire system was sup-
pressed and his fortifications destroyed. This enabled our
troops to advance 10-15 kilometres on the first day of the
offensive, that is, to break through the whole tactical depth
of the enemy’s defences.

“6. Results of the offensive:

“(a) By February 1, that is, in 18 days of the offensive,
the Soviet forces had advanced up to 500 kilometres in the
are of the main attack, averaging 25-30 kilometres a

ay.

“(b) The Soviet forces have reached the Oder in the sec-
tor from Kistrin (north of Frankfort) and to the south, and
occupied the Silesian industrial area.

“(c) The main routes linking the enemy’s East Prussian
grouping with the central areas of Germany have been cut.

“Thus, in addition to the Kurland grouping (26 divisions),
the enemy’s grouping in East Prussia has been isolated (up
to 27 divisions); a number of isolated groupings of Germans
(in the area of Lédz, Thorn, Poznan, Schneidemihl, etc., a
total of up to 15 divisions) have been encircled and are
being destroyed.

“(d) Permanent-type defence positions of the Germans in
East Prussia—in the Konigsberg and Letzen directions—have
been broken through.

“(e) Forty-five German divisions have been routed, with
the enemy suffering the following losses:

about 100,000 prisoners
about 300,000 dead
a total of up to 400,000 men

56

“7. The enemy’s probable operations:

“(a) The Germans will defend Berlin, for which purpose
they will try to hold back the advance of the Soviet forces
on the Oder line, organising defence there with the help of
retreating troops and reserves transferred from Germany,
Western Europe and Italy.

“The enemy will try to use his Kurland grouping for the de-
fence of Pomerania, transporting it by sea beyond the Vistula.

“(b) The Germans will cover the Vienna direction as
solidly as possible, reinforcing it up with troops operating
in Italy.

“8. Movement of enemy troops:

“(a) The following have already made their appearance
on our front:

9 divisions from the central areas of Germany

6 divisions from the West European front

i division from Italy

16 divisions

“(b) On the way:

4 tank divisions

1 motorised division

5 divisions

“(c) Up to 30-35 divisions more will probably be moved
(from the West European front, Norway and Italy, and
reserves in Germany).

“Thus, an additional 35-40 divisions may appear on our
front.

“9. Our wishes:

“(a) Speed up the offensive by the Allied forces on the
Western front, for which the situation now is very favour-
able, namely:

(1) Defeat of the Germans on the Eastern front;

“(2) Defeat of the German grouping which had attacked
in the Ardennes;

(3) Weakening of the German forces in the West in view
of the transfer of their reserves to the East.

“It is desirable that an offensive should be started in the
first half of February.

“(b) Prevent the enemy from transferring his forces to the
East from the Western front, Norway and Italy, by air
strikes against his communications; in particular, paralyse
the Berlin and Leipzig junctions.

57

“(c) Prevent the enemy from withdrawing his forces from
Italy.”

(The written text of Antonov’s report was handed to
Roosevelt and Churchill.)

Stalin asked whether there were any questions.

Roosevelt said he would like to know what the Soviet
Government intended to do with the German locomotives,
rolling stock and railways. He asked whether the Soviet
Government intended to widen the gauge of the German
railways.

Antonov replied that since the locomotives and the roll-
ing stock abandoned by the Germans were of little use,
the gauge of the German railways would have to be altered
in several key directions.

Roosevelt stated that, in his opinion, it would be well for
the Allied staffs to jointly discuss this question as the Allied
forces were rapidly approaching each other.

Antonov said the Soviet command was altering the gauge
on a minimum number of directions needed to ensure the
supply of the Soviet forces.

Stalin said the bulk of the railways remained unaltered.
The Soviet command had been changing the gauge of the
railways none too eagerly.

Churchill declared that he had several questions to ask.
He believed there were a number of questions which it would
be expedient for the three staffs to discuss. For example,
the question of time. It should be determined how much
time the Germans would need to transfer eight divisions
from Italy to the Soviet front. What should be done to pre-
vent such a transfer? Should not a part of the Allied forces
be transferred through the Ljubljana corridor to join up
with the Red Army? It would also be necessary to deter-
mine the time that would take, and whether it might not be
too late to do it.

He, Churchill, had indicated only one of the questions
which could be discussed by the staffs. He proposed that
General Marshall should make a report on the operations at
the Western front whose conduct would be of assistance to
the Soviet armies.

Roosevelt agreed with the Prime Minister. He said the
Allies had been fighting at a great distance from each other.
Germany had shrunk, and that was why closer contact be-

58

tween the staffs of the three countries was of special im-
portance.

Stalin said that was right.

General Marshall declared that the consequences of the
German offensive in the Ardennes had been eliminated. In
the previous few weeks, General Eisenhower had regrouped
his divisions. At the same time, General Eisenhower had
continued to exercise pressure on the enemy in the area of
the German counter-offensive. As a result of the operations
he had conducted, General Eisenhower had discovered that
the Germans had rather big forces in the Ardennes. That
was why General Eisenhower had begun to concentrate his
forces in the north.

In the southern sector of the front, i.e., to the north of
Switzerland, the objective of the planned operation was to
throw back the Germans into the area of Muhthausen and
Colmar. The objective of the operations being conducted to
the north of Strasbourg was to liquidate the bridgehead on
the left bank of the Rhine. At the time, the 25th Army group
and the U.S. 9th Army, which were under the command of
Montgomery, were preparing for an offensive in the north-
ern sector. The U.S. 9th Army would attack in the north-
eastern direction.

The Allied command hoped to start the first of these oper-
ations on February 8. The second operation was to start in
a week or possibly somewhat earlier. The Allies expected the
Germans to retreat to Dusseldorf, after which the Allied
troops would move on to Berlin. As many forces were to be
moved into this offensive as allowed by the supply facilities.
Paratroops would be used. The crossing of the Rhine in the
north was expected to be possible in early March. In the
north, there were three suitable places for forcing the
Rhine.

For a certain time, the operations on the Western front
had developed slowly because of the lack of tonnage. Then,
following the opening of Antwerp, things were livening up,
and the Allies were able to bring in from 70,000 to 80,000
tons of dry cargo a day, and 12,000 tons of liquid fuel. The
Germans were trying to hamper the Allied supply and con-
tinued to bombard Antwerp with flying bombs. Information
received that day showed that 60 flying bombs and 6 rockets
had fallen in the Antwerp area in the previous 24 hours.

Stalin said bombs and rockets rarely hit the target.

59

Marshall remarked that there was always the possibility
of bombs hitting vessels in the port.

He stated that the Allied air force had always been active
when the weather permitted. Great destruction had been
inflicted by fighters and light and heavy bombers. Infor-
mation received that day indicated that troop trains on their
way to the Soviet-German front had been attacked from
the air. Great destruction had been done on the railways
north of Strasbourg. Heavy bombers had attacked mainly
plants producing fuel to deprive Germany of the possibility
of supplying her tanks with fuel. Fuel production in Ger-
many had fallen by 60 per cent. The air force had also been
raiding communication lines. Tank works had been heavily
raided.

As for the situation in Italy and to the south of Switzer-
land, he, Marshall, had the following to report. To the south
of Switzerland, Germany had one or two divisions, and in
Italy, 27 divisions. In Italy, the Allies had a force equal to
that of the Germans. In addition, the Allies had an air force
in Italy which was destroying the Germans’ rolling stock,
railways and bridges.

The Germans, Marshall declared, would probably soon
resume their submarine offensive because they had produced
an improved submarine. The Germans had at the time about
30 submarines at their disposal. Despite the small number
of submarines, they could present a serious threat to Allied
shipping because the devices developed by the Allies were
unable to detect submarines of the improved type. That was
why the operations of heavy bombers were directed against
the shipyards where submarines were being built. The bomb-
er operations had not detracted from the air force strikes
oe Germany’s industry, in particular, plants making
uel.

Churchill said he would like to hear Field-Marshal Brooke
and Admiral Cunningham. The speed of the Soviet advance
was at the time highly important, because Danzig was one
of the places where many submarines were concentrated.

Stalin asked where else submarines were concentrated.

Churchill replied that it was at Kiel and Hamburg.

Brooke stated that, in his opinion, the Allied plans and
operations on the Western front had been given a full ex-
position.

Churchill said that before the participants in the Con-

60

ns

ference passed on to other, non-military, questions, he would
like to mention one matter relating to the forcing of rivers.
The Allies had a special centre for the study of forced river
crossings. The officer in command of that centre was then in
Yalta. Churchill said they would be grateful if the officer
could contact the Soviet military for the purpose of obtain-
ing information on the forcing of rivers. The Russians were
known to have great experience, especially in the forcing of
ice-bound rivers.

Stalin said he had a number of questions to ask. He would
like to know the length of the front on which the break-
through was to be made.

Marshall replied that the break-through was to be made
on a front between 50 and 60 miles long.

Stalin asked whether the Germans had any fortifications
on the front where the break-through was being planned.

Marshall replied that the Germans had built heavy-type
fortifications in that sector of the front.

Stalin asked whether the Allies would have the reserves
to exploit the success.

Marshall replied in the affirmative.

Stalin said he had asked the question because the Soviet
command was aware of the great importance of reserves.
That had become especially clear during the winter cam-
paign. He would like to ask how many tank divisions the
Allies had concentrated in the sector of the planned break-
through. During the winter break-through, the Soviet com-
mand had concentrated about 9,000 tanks in the central
sector of the front.

Marshall replied that he did not know that, but there
would be one tank division for three infantry divisions, i.e.,
about 10-12 tank divisions for 35 divisions.

Stalin asked how many tanks there were in an Allied divi-
sion.

Marshall replied: 300 tanks.

Churchill noted that on the entire West European theatre
the Allies had 10,000 tanks.

Stalin said that was a great deal. On the front of the main
attack the Soviet command had concentrated between 8,000
and 9,000 planes. He asked how many planes the Allies had.

Portal replied that the Allies had nearly as many planes,
including 4,000 bombers, each of which was capable of car-
rying a bomb-load of from 3 to 5 tons.

61

Stalin asked what superiority the Allies had in infantry.
On the front of the main attack the Soviet command had a
superiority in infantry of 100 divisions to the Germans’ 80.

Churchill declared that the Allies had never had any
great superiority in infantry, but the Allies had at times had
very great superiority in the air.

Stalin said the Soviet command had great superiority in
artillery. He asked whether the Allies were interested to
learn how Soviet artillery operated. Stalin said that the
Soviet people, being the Allies’ comrades-in-arms, could
exchange experience with them. A year before, the Soviet
command had established a special break-through artillery
force. It had produced good results. An artillery division had
from 300 to 400 guns. For example, on a front of 35-40
kilometres Marshal Konev had had six artillery break-
through divisions supplemented with corps artillery. As a
result, there had been almost 230 guns per kilometre of the
break-through. After an artillery barrage, many Germans
had been killed, others had been stunned and could not come
to for a long time. That had opened the gates for the Red
Army. From then on the advance had not been difficult.

He, Stalin, was sorry to have taken up time in relating
the above. Stalin said he had expressed the wishes in respect
of how the Allied armies could help the Soviet forces. He
would like to know what wishes the Allies had in respect of
the Soviet forces.

Churchill stated that he would like to take the opportunity
to express his profound admiration for the might the Red
Army had demonstrated in its offensive.

Stalin said that was not a wish.

Churchill declared that the Allies were aware of the dif-
ficulty of their task and did not minimise it. But the Allies
were confident they would cope with their task. All the Al-
lied commanders were confident of that. Although the attack
was to be made against the Germans’ strongest point, the
Allies were sure that it would be a success and would be of
benefit to the operations of the Soviet forces. As for any
wishes, the Allies wanted the offensive of the Soviet armies
to continue just as successfully.

auc declared that he was in agreement with Chur-
chill.

Stalin said the Red Army’s offensive, for which Churchill
had expressed his gratitude, was in fulfilment of a comrade-

62

z.

ly duty. According to the decisions adopted at the Tehran
Conference, the Soviet Government had been under no obli-
gation to launch a winter offensive.

The President had asked him whether he, Stalin, could
receive a representative of General Eisenhower. He, Stalin,
had naturally given his consent. Churchill had sent him a
message, asking him whether he, Stalin, was planning to
start an offensive in January. He, Stalin, had realised that
neither Churchill nor Roosevelt were asking him outright
for an offensive; he had appreciated this tact on the part of
the Allies, but he had seen that such an offensive had been
necessary for the Allies. The Soviet command had started
its offensive even before the planned date. The Soviet Gov-
ernment had considered that to be its duty, the duty of an
ally, although it was under no formal obligation on this
score. He, Stalin, would like the leaders of the Allied Pow-
ers to take into account that Soviet leaders did not merely
fulfil their obligations but were also prepared to fulfil their
moral duty as far as possible.

As for the wishes, he asked about them because Tedder
had expressed the wish that the Soviet forces should not
stop their offensive until the end of March. He, Stalin, un-
derstood this to be possibly the wish not only of Tedder, but
also of other Allied military leaders. Stalin said that the
Soviet forces would continue their offensive, if the weather
permitted and the roads were passable.

Roosevelt stated that he was in complete agreement with
the opinion of Marshal Stalin. At the conference in Tehran
it had been impossible to draw up a common plan of opera-
tions. He, Roosevelt, took it that each Ally was morally
bound to advance with the utmost possible speed. At the
time of the Tehran Conference there had been a great dis-
tance between the Allied forces moving from the East and
the West. But the time had come when it was necessary to
ee more thoroughly the operations of the Allied

orces.

Churchill declared that he welcomed the words of Mar-
shal Stalin. He, Churchill, believed he could say the fol-
lowing on behalf of the President and himself. The reason
why the Allies had not concluded at Tehran any agreement
with the Soviet Union on future operations, was their con-
fidence in the Soviet people and its military.

63

Roosevelt replied that the Tehran Conference had been
held before his re-election. It had been still unknown wheth-
er or not the American people would be on his side. That
was why it had been hard to draw up any common military
lan.

P Churchill said the question raised by Tedder in his talk
with Marshal Stalin could subsequently be discussed by the
Allied staffs. Churchill said that the three leaders could, of
course, be criticised for failing to co-ordinate the Allied
offensives. If the weather hampered the operations of the
Soviet forces, perhaps the Allies would then attack on their
front. But that question must be decided by the staffs.

Stalin said there was lack of co-ordination. The Soviet
forces had stopped their offensive in the autumn. Just then
the Allies started their offensive. At the time, it was the
other way round. In future, that should be avoided. Stalin
asked whether it was expedient for the Allied military to
discuss plans for summer operations.

Churchill said that might possibly have to be done. The
Allied military could deal with the military questions while
the leaders dealt with the political ones.

Stalin replied that that was right.

Cunningham said that he would like to supplement Gen-
eral Marshall’s report. The threat of a fresh outbreak of
submarine warfare on the part of the Germans was potential
rather than actual. The Germans had achieved great success
in improving their submarines. But that was not so impor-
tant. What was important was that the Germans were already
building new-type submarines. The submarines would be fit-
ted out with the latest technical devices, and would have a
great speed under water. The naval forces would, there-
fore, find it very hard to fight them. The German submarines
were being built at Bremen, Hamburg and Danzig. If he,
Cunningham, could express one wish, it was that, as a repre-
sentative of the naval department, he would like to ask the
Soviet forces to take Danzig as soon as possible, because 30
per cent of submarine construction was concentrated there.

Roosevelt asked whether Danzig was within the range of
Soviet artillery.

Stalin replied that Danzig was not yet within the range
of Soviet artillery. The Soviet command hoped soon to ap-
proach Danzig to within the range of artillery fire.
Churchill said the military could meet the next morning.

64

Stalin said he was in agreement with that. He proposed
that the meeting be set for 12 o’clock.

Churchill declared that at the meeting the military should
discuss not only the situation on the Eastern and Western
fronts, but also on the Italian front, and also the question
how best to use the available forces. He, Churchill, also pro-
posed that a meeting be fixed for the next day to discuss
political questions, namely, the future of Germany, if she
had any.

Stalin replied that Germany would have a future.

Second Sitting at Livadia Palace
February 5, 1945

Roosevelt stated that the sitting would be devoted to po-
litical affairs. Questions pertaining to Germany ought to be
selected. The questions of a world character—such as those
of Dakar and Indochina—could be postponed. One of the
questions that had already come up before the Allied Gov-
ernments was that of occupation zones. It was a matter not
of permanent but of temporary occupation. The question
was becoming more and more urgent.

Stalin said that he would like the sitting to discuss the
following questions. First, the proposals to dismember Ger-
many.! There had been an exchange of opinion on the point
at Tehran, and then between him, Stalin, and Churchill, in
Moscow in October 1944. No decisions had been adopted
either in Tehran or Moscow. Some opinion should be arrived
at on the question at the Conference.

There was also another question relating to Germany:
should Germany be allowed any central government, or
should the Allies confine themselves to the establishment
of an administration in Germany or, if it was decided, after
all, to dismember Germany, should several governments be
established there, depending on the number of parts into
which Germany would be split up? These points had to be
cleared up.

! Proposals on the dismemberment of Germany were first submitted
at meetings of the heads of the Three Powers by the United States
and Britain at the Tehran Conference.—Ed.

5-876

65

The third question related to unconditional surrender.
They all stood on the basis of the unconditional surrender
of Germany. But he, Stalin, would like to know whether or
not the Allies would leave the Hitler Government in power
if it surrendered unconditionally. The one excluded the
other. But if that was so, as much should be said. The Allies
had the experience of the surrender of Italy, but there they
had had the concrete demands which constituted the content
of the unconditional surrender. Weren't the three Allies
going to determine the concrete content of the uncondition-
al surrender of Germany? That question too should be
cleared up.

Finally, there was the question of reparations, Germany’s
compensation for losses, and the question of the amount of
the indemnity. .

He, Stalin, raised all those questions in addition to the
questions put forward by the President.

Roosevelt declared that, as he saw it, the questions raised
by Marshal Stalin referred to a permanent state of affairs.
However, they flowed from the question of occupation zones
in Germany. The zones might prove to be the first step in
the dismemberment of Germany.

Stalin declared that if the Allies intended to dismember
Germany they should say so. There had been two exchanges
of opinion between the Allies on the dismemberment of
Germany after her military defeat. The first time at Tehran,
when the President had proposed that Germany should be
divided into five parts. At Tehran the Prime Minister too
had stood for a dismemberment of Germany, although he
had hesitated. But that had been only an exchange of
opinion.

The second time the question of Germany’s dismember-
ment had been discussed between him, Stalin, and the Prime
Minister in Moscow the previous October. Under discussion
had been the British plan for the division of Germany into
two states: Prussia with her provinces and Bavaria, with
the Ruhr and Westphalia being placed under international
control. But no decision had been taken in Moscow, nor had
it been possible to take one, because the President had not
been present in Moscow.

Churchill declared that he agreed in principle to the dis-
memberment of Germany, but the method of demarcating the
frontiers of the separate parts of Germany was too compli-

66

cated for the question to be settled there in a matter of five
or six days. It would take a very thorough study of the
historical, ethnic and economic factors, and weeks of dis-
cussions of the question in a subcommittee or committee
which would be set up for a detailed elaboration of the
proposals and submission of recommendations in respect of
the mode of action. The talks the heads of the three Gov-
ernments had had on the question at Tehran, and the subse-
quent unofficial talks he, Churchill, had had with Marshal
Stalin in Moscow, had been a most general approach to the
question, without any precise plan.

He, Churchill, would be unable to give an immediate an-
swer to the question as to how to divide Germany. He could
merely hint at what he thought would be the most expedient
way of doing it. But he, Churchill, would have to reserve
the right to modify his opinion when he received the recom-
mendations of commissions studying the matter. He, Chur-
chill, had in mind the strength of Prussia, the tap-root of
all evil. It was quite understandable that if Prussia were
separated from Germany, her capability for starting a new
war would be greatly restricted. He personally believed
that the establishment of another big German state in the
south, with a capital at Vienna, would provide a dividing
line between Prussia and the rest of Germany. The popula-
tion of Germany would be equally divided between those
two states.

There were other questions which had to be examined.
First of all, they agreed that Germany should lose a part
of the territory most of which had already been captured
by the Russian forces, and which should be given to the
Poles. There were also questions relating to the Rhine val-
ley, the frontier between France and Germany, and the
question of possession of the industrial areas of the Ruhr
and the Saar, which had a war potential (in the sense of a
possible manufacture of weapons there). Were the areas to
be handed over to countries, such as France, or were they
to be left under a German administration, or was control
over them to be set up by a world organisation in the form
of a condominium over a long but specified period? All that
required examination. He, Churchill, had to say he was
unable to express any definite ideas on the question on behalf
of his Government. The British Government must co-ordi-
nate its plans with those of the Allies.

= 67

Finally, there was the question of whether Prussia was
to be subjected to an internal fragmentation after she was
isolated from the rest of Germany. Talks on the matter had
been held at Tehran. It appeared that one question could
be decided very swiftly, namely, the establishment of an
apparatus to examine all the questions. Such an apparatus
would have to submit reports to the Governments before
the Governments took any final decisions.

He, Churchill, would like to say that the Allies were rath-
er well prepared to accept an immediate surrender of Ger-
many. All the details of such a surrender had been worked
out and were known to the three Governments. There
remained the question of reaching official agreement on the
zones of occupation and on the control machinery in Ger-
many. Assuming that Germany would surrender within a
month, or six weeks, or six months, the Allies would only
have to occupy Germany by zones.

Stalin said that was not clear. Some group, like Badoglio
in Italy, might say it had overthrown the Government.
Would the Allies be prepared to deal with such a govern-
ment?

Eden said the group would be presented with the terms
of surrender which had been agreed upon by the European
Advisory Commission.

Churchill stated that he would like to project the possible
course of events. Germany was no longer able to wage the
war. He proposed to assume that Hitler or Himmler made
a proposal of surrender. It was clear that the Allies would
tell them that they would not negotiate with them because
they were war criminals. If they were the only men in Ger-
many, the Allies would continue the war. It was more prob-
able that Hitler would try to hide or would be killed as a
result of a coup in Germany, and another government would
be set up there which would propose surrender. In that case,
the Allies must immediately consult with each other on
whether or not they could talk with those men in Germany.
If they decided that they could, those men should be told
the terms of surrender. Should the Allies decide that that
group of men was unfit to negotiate with, they would con-
tinue the war and occupy the whole country. If those new
men made their appearance and signed an unconditional
surrender on the terms dictated to them, there would be no
need to tell them of their future. Unconditional surrender

68

would give the Allies the opportunity to present addi-
tional demands to the Germans on the dismemberment of
Germany.

Stalin declared that the demand for dismemberment was
not an additional, but a highly essential one.

Churchill said it was, of course, an important demand. But
he, Churchill, did not believe it must be presented to the
Germans at the first stage. The Allies should come to a
precise agreement on this point.

Stalin said that that was why he had raised the question.

Churchill said that although the Allies could study the
question of dismemberment, he did not think it would be
possible to reach a precise agreement on it just then. The
matter required study. In his, Churchill’s, opinion, that kind
of question was more suitable for examination at a peace
conference.

Roosevelt declared that it seemed to him Marshal Stalin
had not received an answer to his question of whether or
not they were going to dismember Germany. He, Roose-
velt, believed that the question should be decided in prin-
ciple, and the details could be left for the future.

Stalin remarked that that was right.

Roosevelt continued that the Prime Minister had said that
at the time it was impossible to determine the frontiers of the
separate parts of Germany and that the whole question
required study. That was right. But the most important
thing was still to decide at the Conference the main question
whether or not the Allies agreed to dismember Germany.
Roosevelt believed it would be well to present the Germans
with the terms of surrender and, in addition, to tell them that
Germany was to be dismembered. At Tehran, Roosevelt had
spoken in favour of a decentralised administration in Ger-
many. During his stay in Germany 40 years before, decen-
tralised administration had still been a fact: Bavaria or Hes-
sen had had a Bavarian or Hessen Government. They had
been real Governments. The word “Reich” had not yet
existed. But over the previous 20 years, the decentralised
administration had been gradually abolished. The whole of
the administration had been concentrated at Berlin. It was
utopian to talk of plans for a decentralised Germany. That
was why, under the conditions, Roosevelt saw no other way
out except dismemberment. How many parts were there to
be? Six, seven or less? He would not venture to say anything

69

definite on the score. The question had to be studied. But
there, in the Crimea, agreement should be reached on
whether the Allies were going to tell the Germans that Ger-
many was to be dismembered.

Churchill stated that, in his opinion, there was no need to
inform the Germans of the future policy to be conducted in
respect of their country. The Germans should be told they
would have to await further Allied demands after they sur-
rendered. These further demands would be made on the
Germans by mutual agreement between the Allies. As for
dismemberment, he, Churchill, believed that such a deci-
sion could not be adopted in a matter of a few days. The
Allies were dealing with an 80-million people and it would
certainly take more than 30 minutes to settle the question of
their future. A commission might take a month to work out
the question in detail.

Roosevelt said that the Premier introduced the time factor
into the question. If the question of dismemberment were
to be publicly debated, there would be hundreds of plans.
That was why he, Roosevelt, proposed that within the next
24 hours the three Ministers of Foreign Affairs should draw
up a plan of procedure to study the dismemberment of Ger-
many and then a detailed plan for the dismemberment of
Germany could be drawn up within 30 days.

Churchill declared that the British Government was pre-
pared to accept the principle of Germany’s dismemberment
and to set up a commission to study the procedure of dis-
memberment.

Stalin said he had raised the question to clarify what the
Allies wanted. Events would develop towards Germany’s
disaster. Germany was losing the war, and her defeat would
be hastened as a result of an early Allied offensive. In addi-
tion to a military catastrophe, Germany might suffer an
internal catastrophe, because she would have neither coal
nor grain. Germany had already lost the Dabrowa coal basin,
and the Ruhr would soon be under Allied gun fire. With
events developing as rapidly as that, he, Stalin, would not
like the Allies to be caught unawares. He had raised the
question so that the Allies should be prepared for the events.
He fully understood Churchill’s considerations that it was
hard to draw up a plan for the dismemberment of Germany
at the time. That was correct. Nor did he propose that a
concrete plan should be drawn up immediately. But the mat-

70

ter should be settled in principle and recorded in the terms
of the unconditional surrender.

Churchill declared that an unconditional surrender
precluded any armistice agreement. Unconditional surrender
was the terms on which military operations were to be ter-
minated. Those who signed the terms of an unconditional
surrender submitted to the will of the victors.

Stalin said that terms of surrender were nonetheless
signed.

Churchill replied in the affirmative and called attention
to Article 12 of the terms of Germany’s unconditional sur-
render worked out by the European Advisory Commission.

Roosevelt noted that the article said nothing at all about
Germany’s dismemberment.

Stalin said that that was right.

Churchill asked whether the terms of the armistice were
to be published.

Stalin replied that the terms would not be made public
for the time being, they existed for the Allies and would
be presented to the German Government when the time
came. The Allies would decide when they were to be made
public. The Allies were doing the same thing with Italy,
whose terms of surrender would be made public when they
deemed it necessary.

Roosevelt asked whether the Germans would be given a
government or an administration by the Allies. If Germany
was dismembered, each of her parts would have an adminis-
tration subordinate to the corresponding Allied command.

Churchill said that he did not know that. He, Churchill,
found it hard to go beyond the statement made that the
British Government was prepared to accept the principle of
Germany’s dismemberment and the establishment of a com-
mission to work out a plan of dismemberment.

Roosevelt asked whether Churchill was prepared to sup-
plement Article 12 with words about the dismemberment
of Germany.

Churchill replied that he was prepared to have the three
Ministers of Foreign Affairs examine Article 12 for the pur-
pose of determining the possibility of including the words
“dismemberment of Germany” or some other formulation
in the Article.

{A decision was taken to instruct the Ministers of Foreign
Affairs to examine the question.)

Churchill said the question of a government in Germany
could be discussed.

Stalin stated that he preferred to discuss the question of
reparations.

Roosevelt agreed and said there were two sides to the
reparations question. First, the small countries, like Den-
mark, Norway and Holland, would also want to receive
reparations from Germany. Secondly, the question arose of
making use of German manpower. He, Roosevelt, wanted to
ask what quantity of German manpower the Soviet Union
would like to have. As for the United States of America, it
needed neither German machinery nor German manpower.

Stalin replied that the Soviet Government had a plan for
material reparations. As for the use of German manpower,
the Soviet Government was not yet prepared to discuss that
question.

Churchill asked whether he could have some information
about the Soviet reparations plan.

Stalin said he would let Maisky speak on the question.

Maisky stated that the material reparations plan was based
on several key principles.

The first principle was that the reparations were to be
received from Germany not in money, as had been the
case after the previous world war, but in kind.

The second principle was that Germany was to make its
payments in kind in two forms, namely, (a) lump with-
drawals from Germany’s national wealth, both on the terri-
tory of Germany proper and outside, at the end of the war
(factories, machine tools, ships, rolling stock, investments in
foreign enterprises, etc.), and (b) annual goods deliveries
after the end of the war.

The third principle was in short that by way of repara-
tions payments Germany was to be economically disarmed,
as otherwise security in Europe could not be ensured. Con-
cretely this meant the removal of 80 per cent of the equip-
ment from Germany’s heavy industry (steel, engineering,
metalworking, electrical engineering, chemistry, etc.). Air-
craft factories and plants producing synthetic fuel were to be
removed 100 per cent. All specialised military enterprises
(arms factories, munitions plants, etc.) which had existed
before the war or had been built during the war, were
equally to be removed 100 per cent. The Soviet Government
believed that the 20 per cent of Germany’s pre-war heavy

72

industry which was to remain, would be quite sufficient to
cover the country’s actual economic requirements.

The fourth principle was that the reparations period was
set at 10 years, with removals from national wealth to be
made within two years after the end of the war.

The fifth principle was that for the purpose of precise
fulfilment by Germany of her reparations obligations, and
also in the interests of security in Europe, strict Anglo-Soviet-
American control must be established over the German
economy. The forms of control were to be worked out later.
But in any case, provision was to be made that the indus-
trial, transport and other enterprises remaining in Germany
which constituted the greatest danger from the standpoint
of a possible revival of Germany’s war potential were to be
internationalised, with the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A. and Great
Britain participating in their administration. Control over
the German economy was to be maintained after the expiry
of the period of the reparations payments, i.e., after the
first 10 years following the end of the war.

The sixth principle was that in view of the unprecedented
immensity of the damage caused by the German aggression,
it would be impossible to make it good fully even with
the strictest exaction of reparations from Germany. The
Soviet Government had tried to make a rough estimate of
the scale of the damage—the figures obtained were quite
astronomical. That was why the Soviet Government had
arrived at the conclusion that if the Allies were to be realis-
tic, only that type of damage should be subject to indem-
nification which could be characterised as direct material loss
(destruction of or damage to houses, plants, railways,
research institutions; confiscation of cattle, grain, private
property of citizens, etc.). But since Soviet preliminary esti-
mates, under the head of direct material losses alone, had
yielded a total amount of damage in excess of the amount
of possible reparations by way of direct removal and annual
post-war deliveries, it would apparently be necessary to
establish a certain priority in the receipt of compensation by
countries which had the right to it. That priority was to be
based on two indicators: (a) the size of the country’s con-
tribution to the victory over the enemy, and (b) the amount
of direct material losses suffered by that country. Countries
having the highest indicators under both heads were to
receive reparations first, and the rest, later.

73

The seventh principle was that the U.S.S.R. considered it
fair to receive at least $10,000 million in compensation for
its direct material losses, through removals and annual deliv-
eries. That was, of course, only a very insignificant por-
tion of the total amount of direct material losses suffered
by the Soviet Union, but in the circumstances the Soviet Gov-
ernment was ready to be satisfied with that figure.

Finally, the eighth principle was that a special Repara-
tions Commission, consisting of representatives of the
U.S.S.R., the U.S.A. and Great Britain should be set up,
with headquarters in Moscow, to work out a detailed Allied
reparations plan on the basis of the principles set forth
above.

Such, in brief outline, was the material reparations plan
which the Soviet Government placed before the Conference
for discussion and approval.

Churchill said he well remembered the end of the pre-
vious war. Although he, Churchill, had not directly partici-
pated in framing the peace terms, he had access to all the
conferences. The reparations had proved to be highly dis-
appointing. Only £1,000 million had been with great effort
got out of Germany. But even that amount would not have
been obtained but for U.S. and British investments in Ger-
many. Britain had taken from Germany a few old ocean
liners, and with the money Germany got from Britain, she
built herself a new fleet. He, Churchill, hoped that Britain
would not face similar difficulties again.

Churchill had no doubt at all that Russia’s sacrifices were
greater than those of any other country. He had always
believed that the removal of plants from Germany would
be a correct step. But he was also quite sure it would be
impossible to receive from a defeated and destroyed Ger-
many the quantity of values which would compensate for
the losses sustained by Russia alone. He doubted that £250
million a year could be extracted from Germany. At the
end of the previous war, the British had also dreamed of
astronomical figures—but what had been the result?

Great Britain had suffered very heavily in the current
war. A great part of her houses had been destroyed or dam-
aged. Britain had sold all her investments abroad. Britain
had to export goods to import foodstuffs; she had to buy
abroad half of the food she needed. Fighting for the com-
mon cause, Britain had run into heavy debt, apart from

74

Lend-Lease. Britain’s total debt was £3,000 million. No other
country among the victors would find herself in such a dif-
ficult economic and financial position at the end of the war
as Great Britain. If he, Churchill, saw the possibility of
maintaining the British economy through the exaction of
reparations from Germany, he would resolutely take that
way. But he was doubtful of success.

Other countries had also suffered great destruction. Hol-
land was flooded. Norway had suffered heavily. True, their
population was not big.

Moreover, what was going to happen to Germany? Chur-
chill saw the spectre of a starving Germany with her 80
million population. Who was going to feed her? Who was
going to pay for that? Wouldn’t the Allies eventually have
to cover a part of the reparations from their own pocket?

Stalin remarked that all those questions would certainly
come up sooner or later.

Churchill said if one wanted to ride a horse one had to
feed it with oats and hay.

Stalin replied that the horse should not charge at one.

Churchill admitted his metaphor was not very happy, and
said that if one put a car in place of the horse one would
still have to fill it up with petrol to use it.

Stalin replied that there was no analogy there. The Ger-
mans were men and not machines.

Churchill agreed with that too. Returning to the repara-
tions, Churchill spoke in favour of setting up a Reparations
Commission which would deliberate in secret.

Roosevelt declared that he, too, well remembered the
previous war, and recalled that the United States had lost
a great deal of money. It had loaned Germany more than
$10,000 million, but it would not repeat its old mistakes.
The United States had no intention of using German man-
power. The United States did not want any German machine
tools. At the end of the previous war, there had been many
German assets and German property in the United States.
All that had been returned to the Germans.

He, Roosevelt, believed that things would be different
after the current war. A special law might have to be issued
under which all German property in the United States would
remain in American hands. Roosevelt agreed with Chur-
chill that some thought should be given to Germany’s future.
But despite the generosity of the United States, which was

75

helping other countries, the United States was unable to
guarantee the future of Germany. The United States did not
want German living standards to be higher than those in
the U.S.S.R. The United States wanted to help the Soviet
Union to obtain everything necessary from Germany. The
Americans wanted to help the British to increase their
exports and find new market outlets to replace Germany.

Roosevelt believed that the time was ripe to set up a
Reparations Commission to study the needs of the U.S.S.R.
and the other European countries. He agreed to have the
Commission work in Moscow. Roosevelt very much hoped
that everything destroyed in the Soviet Union could be made
good. But he was also sure that it would be impossible to
cover everything by reparations. Germany should be left
with enough industry to keep the Germans from dying of
starvation.

Churchill declared that he had no objections to the Repa-
rations Commission being in Moscow.

Maisky said that he would like to reply briefly to Chur-
chill and Roosevelt. In his remarks he intended to deal with
three main points.

First, the question on which Churchill had dwelt specif-
ically—the failure of reparations after the previous war.
Indeed, that experience had proved to be extremely unsatis-
factory. But why? The reason had not been that the total
amount of reparations levied on Germany had been exces-
sive. Actually, the amount had been very modest: $30,000
million spread over a period of 58 years. Was that a great
deal? According to the state of her national wealth and
national income, Germany could have very easily paid
such a sum. The trouble had been, however, that the Allies
had wanted Germany to pay reparations chiefly in money,
and not in kind. Germany had had to find ways of obtain-
ing the necessary amount of foreign exchange. That, for
various reasons, had turned out to be a very difficult task.
There would have been no complications at all if the Allies
had been prepared to receive reparations in kind. But the
Allies had not wanted that. As a result there had arisen an
insoluble transfer problem, i.e., the conversion of German
marks into pounds, dollars and francs, and that problem
had killed the reparations after the previous war.

There was another factor which had greatly contributed
to the failure of reparations after 1914-1918; it had been the

76

policy of the United States, Britain and France. They had
invested large amounts of capital in Germany, thereby
encouraging the Germans not to fulfil their reparations obli-
gations. Eventually, Germany has repaid, in the form of
reparations, only about one-fourth of the amount the British,
Americans and French had loaned Germany in the first years
after the 1914-1918 war.

That was the root cause of the failure of the previous
reparations. To avoid the difficulties of transfer, it was
proposed that all reparations should be paid in kind. It was
also hoped that the United States and Britain would not
again finance Germany after the end of the war. (Roosevelt
and Churchill indicated by gestures and exclamations that
they intended to do nothing of the sort.) In the circumstances,
there was no reason to draw pessimistic conclusions for
the new reparations from the unfortunate experience of the
old.

Secondly, Churchill had indicated that the reparations
figure claimed by the U.S.S.R. would be excessive for Ger-
many. That was hardly fair. In effect, what did the figure
of $10,000 million represent? It constituted only 10 per cent
of the Federal budget of the United States for 1944/45.
(Stettinius: “Absolutely correct”.) It was also equal to
one and a quarter of the U.S. Federal peacetime budget (for
example, in the period between 1936 and 1938). As to Brit-
ain, the same figure of $10,000 million was equal to no
more than Great Britain’s war spending over a period of
six months, or two and a half times her national peacetime
budget (1936-1938).

In that case, was it right to say that the Soviet Union’s
claims were excessive? It was not. Rather, they were much
too modest. But that modesty sprang from the Soviet Gov-
ernment’s desire to have no illusions and keep both feet on
the ground.

Thirdly, Roosevelt and Churchill had stressed the need to
prevent a famine in Germany. The Soviet Government had
no intention at all of stripping and starving Germany. On
the contrary, in working out its reparations plan, the Soviet
Government had always had in mind the creation of condi-
tions in which the German people in the post-war years
could exist on the basis of the average European living
standard, and the Soviet reparations plan ensured such a
possibility. Germany had every chance of building her post-

77

war economy on the basis of an expanding agriculture and
light industries. There were all the conditions for it. The
Soviet reparations plan provided no special restrictions in
respect of the two branches of the German economy just
named.

Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that post-war
Germany would be entirely free from arms expenditure,
because she would be completely disarmed. This would yield
a great saving: after all, pre-war Germany had spent, in
various forms, up to $6,000 million a year on armaments.
(Churchill exclaims: “Yes, that is a very important con-
sideration!) That was why the Soviet Government was
convinced that even if the Soviet reparations plan was
implemented in full the German people would be ensured
a decent life.

Both Churchill and Roosevelt could see from the above
that the Soviet reparations plan was thoroughly conceived
and based on quite sober and realistic calculations.

Churchill stated that in his opinion all these questions
should be examined in commission.

Stalin asked where.

Churchill said a secret commission should be set up, and
nothing of its deliberations should be made public.

Stalin replied that nothing would be published about the
work of the commission. But the question was where Chur-
chill wanted to set up such a commission. Was it at the
Conference?

Churchill replied that there was no need for that at the
time. The Conference should merely adopt a decision on the
establishment of a Reparations Commission, which would
subsequently examine the claims and the assets at Germany’s
disposal, and also establish the priority in their allocation.
It would be desirable to fix the priority with an eye not
only to a nation’s contribution to the cause of victory, but
also the suffering it had gone through. The U.S.S.R. headed
the list, whatever the criterion. Any contradictions that
might arise in the Commission should be settled by the
Governments. As for the Russian reparations plan, it
would take time to examine it. It could not be accepted
at once.

Roosevelt said that the Reparations Commission should
consist of representatives of the three Powers.

Churchill supported Roosevelt’s proposal.

78

Stalin stated that the setting up of a Reparations Commis-
sion in Moscow, something all those present had accepted,
was a very good thing. But that was not enough. Even the
best of commissions could not do much unless it had the
proper guide lines for its work. The guide lines should be
laid down there, at the Conference.

He, Stalin, believed that the main principle underlying
the allocation of reparations should be the following: the
states which had borne the main burden of the war and
organised the victory over the enemy should be the first to
receive reparations. Those states were the U.S.S.R., the
United States and Great Britain. Compensation must be
received not only by the Russians, but also by the Americans
and the British, and to the greatest possible extent. If the
United States, as Roosevelt said, was not interested in
obtaining machinery or manpower from Germany, other
more suitable forms of reparations could be found, for
example, raw materials, etc. At any rate, it should be firmly
established that those who had made the greatest contribu-
tion to the enemy’s defeat had a prior right to reparations.
Stalin asked whether Roosevelt and Churchill agreed with
that.

Roosevelt declared that he agreed.

Churchill did not object either.

Stalin then said that in estimating the assets available in
Germany for the payment of reparations, it was not the
obtaining situation that should be taken as a starting point
but the resources Germany would have after the end of the
war, when all her population returned home, and the fac-
tories started operating. Germany would then have more
assets than she had at the time, and the states of which he
had spoken could expect to have very considerable com-
pensation for their damage. The three Ministers of Foreign
Affairs would do well to discuss all that and then report
to the Conference.

Churchill agreed that the Conference should indicate the
main points of the directives for the Commission.

Stalin replied that he considered that to be correct.

Churchill said half in jest that if he seemed to be recal-
citrant in discussing the question of reparations it was only
because at home he had a Parliament and a Cabinet. If
they refused to accept what Churchill had accepted at the
Crimea Conference they might drive him out.

Stalin replied, in the same vein, that that was not so easy:
victors were not driven out.

Churchill remarked that the three Ministers of Foreign
Affairs could discuss the question of reparations the next
day and later report to the Conference. He, Churchill, liked
the principle: to each according to his needs, and from Ger-
many according to her abilities. That principle should be
made the basis of the reparations plan.

Stalin replied that he preferred another principle: to each
according to his deserts.

Third Sitting at Livadia Palace
February 6, 1945

[...) Roosevelt declared that a discussion of the question
of an international security organisation could be started that
day. Roosevelt believed it was their task to ensure peace
for at least 50 years. In view of the fact that neither he,
Roosevelt, nor Marshal Stalin, nor Churchill, had been
present at Dumbarton Oaks, it would be a good idea for
Stettinius to report on the question.

Stettinius said that an agreement had been reached at
Dumbarton Oaks to leave certain questions for further
examination and future solution. Of those questions the
principal one was that of the voting procedure to be applied
in the Security Council. At Dumbarton Oaks, the three
delegations had had a thorough discussion of that question.
Since then it had been subjected to continued and intensive
study on the part of each of the three Governments.

On December 5, 1944, the President had sent Marshal
Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill a proposal to have the
question decided by setting forth Section C of Chapter VI
of the proposals, adopted at Dumbarton Oaks, in the fol-
lowing manner:

“C. Voting.

“1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one
vote.

“9, Decisions of the Security Council on procedural mat-
ters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

“3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters
shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members

80

including the concurring votes of the permanent members:
provided that in decisions under Section A of Chapter VIII
and under the second phrase of the first paragraph of Sec-
tion C, Chapter VIII, a party to a dispute shall abstain from
voting.”

The text which he, Stettinius, had just read out, contained
minor drafting amendments made in accordance with the
Soviet and British remarks on the initial text proposed by
the President.

The American proposal was in complete accord with the
special responsibility of the Great Powers for the mainten-
ance of universal peace. In effect, the American proposal
demanded unqualified unanimity of the permanent members
of the Council on all key issues relating to the maintenance of
peace, including economic and military enforcement measures.

At the same time, the American proposal recognised the
desirability of a direct declaration on the part of the per-
manent members that the pacific settlement of any dispute
that might arise was a matter of general concern, a matter
on which the sovereign states which were not permanent
members had the right to set forth their views without any
limitations whatsoever. Unless such freedom of discussion
was ensured in the Council, the establishment of a world
organisation, which they all wanted, might be seriously
hampered or even made altogether impossible. Without the
right of free and full discussion of such matters in the
Council, an international security organisation, even if
established, would differ greatly from what had been origi-
nally intended.

The document which the American delegation had _pre-
sented to the two other delegations set forth the text of the
provisions which he, Stettinius, had read out and a special
list of decisions of the Council which, according to the
American proposal, would demand unqualified unanimity,
and a separate list of matters (in the sphere of disputes and
their pacific settlement) on which a party to the dispute must
abstain from voting.

From the standpoint of the Government of the United
States, there were two important elements in the question
of voting procedure.

The first was that for the maintenance of universal peace,
which he, Stettinius, had mentioned, unanimity of the per-
manent members was needed.

6-876 81

The second was that for the people of the United States
it was of exceptional importance that fair treatment for all
the members of the Organisation be provided for.

The task was to reconcile those two main elements. The
proposals made by the President to Marshal Stalin and
Prime Minister Churchill on December 5, 1944, provided a
reasonable and just solution and combined the two elements
satisfactorily.

Roosevelt declared that in his opinion it would be well
to have Stettinius list the types of decisions which were to
be adopted in the Security Council on the unanimity
principle.

Stettinius said that, according to the formula proposed
by the President, the following decisions would require an
affirmative vote of seven members of the Security Council,
including the votes of all the permanent members:

(I) Recommendations to the General Assembly on:

1. Admission of new members;

2. Suspension of a member;

3. Expulsion of a member;

4. Election of the Secretary-General.

(II) Restoration of the rights and privileges of a suspended
member.

(III) Elimination of a threat to the peace and suppression
of breaches of the peace, including the following questions:

1. Is the peace endangered as a result of non-settlement
of a dispute between the parties by means of their own
choice or in accordance with the recommendations of the
Security Council?

2. Is there a threat to the peace or breach of the peace
from any other action on the part of one or another country?

3. What are the measures to be taken by the Council for
the maintenance or restoration of the peace and how are
these measures to be implemented?

4. Should not the implementation of enforcement measures
be entrusted to a regional body?

(1V) Approval of special agreement or agreements on the
provision of armed forces and facilities.

(V) Formulation of plans for a general system of arms
regulation and presentation of such plans to the member
states.

(VI) Decision on the question whether the nature and
activity of a regional body or regional measures for the

82

as oe

maintenance of peace and security are compatible with the
aims and purposes of the world organisation.

An affirmative vote of seven members of the Security
Council, including the votes of all the permanent members,
provided, however, that a member of the Council abstained
from voting on any decision relating to a dispute to which
he was a party, should be required for the following deci-
sions relating to the pacific settlement of a dispute:

(1) Is the dispute or situation brought to the notice of the
Council of such a nature that its continuance may endanger
the peace?

(If) Should the Council call upon the sides to settle or
adjust the dispute or situation by means of their own choice?

(III) Should the Council give recommendations to the
sides in respect of the methods and procedures of settlement?

(IV) Should the legal aspects of the matter before the
Council be referred to the International Court of Justice
for an advisory opinion?

(V) In the event there is a regional body for the pacific
settlement of local disputes, should the body be requested to
deal with the disputes?

Roosevelt believed the question could be discussed and
settled. Big and small nations had one and the same pur-
pose, namely, the preservation of peace, and procedural
issues should not hamper the attainment of that aim.

Stalin asked what was new in the proposals set forth by
Stettinius as compared with what the President had com-
municated in his message of December 5.

Roosevelt replied that those proposals were similar, with
only minor drafting amendments.

Stalin asked what drafting amendments had been made.

Stettinius set forth these drafting amendments.

Molotov declared that the Soviet delegation also attached
great importance to the questions raised and would like to
study Stettinius’s proposal. That was why he proposed that
the discussion of the question be postponed until the next
day’s sitting.

Churchill remarked that he agreed with that. There
should be no undue haste in the study of such an important
inatter. Its discussion could be postponed until the next day.
He had not been quite satisfied with the initial proposals
worked out at Dumbarton Oaks, because he had not been
quite sure that those proposals had taken full account of

6*

83

the real position of the three Great Powers. After studying
the President’s new proposals, Churchill’s doubts had disap-
peared, at any rate, as far as the British Commonwealth of
Nations and the British Empire were concerned. That also
applied to the independent dominions of the British Crown.

Churchill recognised that the question of whether the
peace would be built on sound foundations depended on the
friendship and co-operation of the three Great Powers;
however, the Allies would be putting themselves in a false
position and would be unfair to their intentions, if they did
not provide for the possibility of the small states freely ex-
pressing their claims. Otherwise it would appear that the
three chief Powers claimed to rule the world. As it was
what they actually wanted was to serve the world and
safeguard it from the horrors that had hit most of the na-
tions in the current war. That was why the three Great
Powers should show a readiness to submit to the interest of
the common cause.

He, Churchill, was naturally thinking primarily of the
effect the new situation would have on the future of the
British Commonwealth of Nations. He would like to give
a concrete example, an example which was a difficult one
for Britain—Hong Kong. If the President’s proposal was
adopted, and China requested the return of Hong Kong,
Great Britain would have the right to express her point of
view and defend it; however, Great Britain would not be
able to take part in voting on the five questions set out at
the end of the American document. For her part, China
would have the right fully to express her view on the ques-
tion of Hong Kong, and the Security Council would have
to decide on the issue, without the British Government
taking part in the voting.

Stalin asked whether Egypt was to be a member of the
Assembly.

Churchill replied that Egypt would be a member of the
Assembly but not of the Council.

Stalin declared that he would like to take another
example, that of the Suez Canal, which was situated on the
territory of Egypt.

Churchill asked that his example be examined first. As-
suming that the British Government could not agree to the
examination of one of the questions dealt with in Para-
graph 3, because it considered .that the question infringed

84

the sovereignty of the British Empire. In that case, the
British Government would be assured of success, because,
in accordance with Paragraph 3, every permanent member
would have the right to veto the actions of the Security
Council. On the other hand, it would be unfair for China
not to have the possibility of expressing her view on the
substance of the case.

The same applied to Egypt. In the event Egypt raised a
question against the British pertaining to the Suez Canal,
he, Churchill, would allow the discussion of the question
without any apprehension, because British interests were
ensured by Paragraph 3, which provided for the right of
veto. He also believed that if Argentina made a claim
against the United States, the United States would submit to
the established procedure of examination, but the United
States would have the right to object and veto any decision
by the Security Council. It could apply the Monroe Doctrine.

Roosevelt said that in the Tehran Declaration the three
Powers had announced their readiness to accept responsibil-
ity for the establishment of a peace that would receive the
approval of the peoples of the world.

Churchill stated that for the reasons which he had set
forth the British Government did not object to the adoption
of the U.S. proposals. Churchill believed it would be un-
desirable to create the impression that the three Powers
wanted to dominate the world, without letting the other
countries express their opinion.

Stalin declared that he would first of all ask that the
Soviet delegation be handed the document which Stettinius
had read out, because it was hard to study the proposals it
contained by ear. To him, Stalin, it seemed that the said
document was a commentary on the President’s proposals.

Referring to the interpretation of the American proposals
made at the sitting, Stalin said it seemed to him the Dum-
barton Oaks decisions had aimed to ensure various coun-
tries not only the right to voice their opinion. That right
was not worth much. No one denied it. The matter was
much more serious. If any nation raised a question of great
importance to it, it would do so not only to have the op-
portunity to set out its view, but to obtain a decision on
it. None of those present would dispute the right of nations
to speak in the Assembly. But that was not the heart of the
matter. Churchill apparently believed that if China raised

85

the question of Hong Kong, her only desire would be to
speak out. That was not so. China would demand a decision.
In much the same way, if Egypt raised the question of a
return of the Suez Canal she would not be content with
voicing her opinion on the matter. Egypt would demand a
solution of the question. That was why the question was not
just of ensuring the possibility of voicing one’s opinions, but
of much more important things.

Churchill expressed the apprehension that there might be
an impression that the three Great Powers wanted to domi-
nate the world. But who was contemplating such domina-
tion? Was it the United States? No, it was not thinking of
that. (The President laughed and made an eloquent gesture.)
Was it Britain? No, once again. (Churchill laughed and made
an eloquent gesture.) Thus, two Great Powers were beyond
suspicion. That left the third—the U.S.S.R. So it was the
U.S.S.R. that was striving for world domination? (General
laughter.) Or could it be China that was striving for world
domination? (General laughter.) It was clear that the talk
of striving for world domination was pointless. His friend
Churchill could not name a single Power that wanted to
dominate the world.

Churchill interposed that he himself did not, of course,
believe in the striving for world domination on the part of
any of the three Allies. But the position of those Allies was
so powerful that others might think so, unless the appro-
priate preventive measures were taken.

Stalin, continuing his speech, declared that so far two
Great Powers had adopted the charter of an international
security organisation, which, in the opinion of Churchill,
would protect them from being charged with a desire to
rule the world. The third Power had not yet given its con-
sent to the charter. However, he would study the proposals
formulated by Stettinius, and would possibly see the point
more clearly. He believed, however, that the Allies were
faced with much more serious problems than the right of
nations to express their opinion or the question of the three
chief Powers striving for world domination.

Churchill said there was no reason to fear anything
undesirable even in the event of the American proposals
being adopted. Indeed, so long as they were all alive, there
was nothing to fear. They would not allow any dangerous
divergences between them. They would not permit another

86

aggression against anyone of their countries. But 10 years
or possibly less might pass, and they would be gone. There
would be a new generation which had not gone through
what they had, and which would possibly view many ques-
tions in a different light. What would happen then? They
seemed to be setting themselves the task of ensuring peace
for at least another 50 years. Or was that the impression he,
Stalin, had got because of his naivete?

The unity of the three Powers was the most important
requisite for the preservation of a lasting peace. If such
unity was preserved, there was no need to fear the German
danger. Thought should, therefore, be given to how best to
ensure a united front between the three Powers, to which
France and China should be added. That was why the ques-
tion of the future charter of an international security organ-
isation acquired such importance. It was necessary to create
as many obstacles as possible to any divergence between the
three chief Powers in future. A charter should be framed
that would make it as difficult as possible for conflicts to
arise between them. That was the main task.

On the more concrete question of the voting in the
Security Council, Stalin asked the conference to excuse him
for not having had the time to study the Dumbarton Oaks
documents in every detail. He had been very busy with
some other matters and hoped to have the indulgence of
the British and American delegations.

Roosevelt and Churchill indicated by gestures and excla-
mations that they were well aware of what Stalin had been
doing.

Stalin, continuing, said that, as far as he understood, all
conflicts which might be brought up for examination by the
Security Council fell into two categories. The first included
disputes whose settlement demanded the application of
economic, political, military or other kinds of sanctions. ‘The
second category included disputes which might be settled
by peaceful means, without the application of sanctions.
Stalin asked whether his understanding was correct.

Roosevelt and Churchill replied that it was correct.

Stalin then declared that, as far as he had understood it,
there was to be freedom of discussion in the examination
of conflicts of the first category, but the unanimity of the
permanent members of the Council was required in the adop-
tion of a decision. In that case, all the permanent members

87

of the Council should take part in the voting, i.e., the Power
which was a party to a dispute would not be asked to leave.
As for conflicts of the second category which were to be
settled by peaceful means, another procedure was proposed
in that case: the Power which was a party to a dispute
(including permanent members of the Council) should not
take part in the voting. Stalin asked whether his understand-
ing of the provision was correct.

Roosevelt and Churchill again confirmed that Stalin had
a fully correct understanding of the provision.

Stalin, concluding, said the Soviet Union was being ac-
cused of putting too much emphasis on the question of the
voting in the Security Council. The Soviet Union was being
reproached for making too much ado on the point. Indeed,
the Soviet Union did pay great attention to the voting
procedure, because the Soviet Union was most of all interest-
ed in the decisions to be adopted by the Security Council.
After all, the decisions would be adopted by a vote. Dis-
cussions could go on for a hundred years, without deciding
anything. But it was the decisions that mattered for the
Soviet Union. And not only for it.

He, Stalin, asked those present to return for a moment
to the examples given at the sitting. If China demanded the
return of Hong Kong or Egypt the return of the Suez Canal,
the question would be up for a vote in the Assembly and
in the Security Council. Stalin could assure his friend
Churchill that China and Egypt would not be alone in that.
They would have their friends in an international organi-
sation. That had a direct bearing on the question of voting.

Churchill stated that if the said countries demanded the
satisfaction of their claims, Great Britain would say “no”.
The authority of an international organisation could not be
used against the three great Powers.

Stalin asked whether that was in fact the case.

Eden replied that countries might talk and argue but no
decision could be adopted without the consent of the three
chief Powers.

Stalin asked once again whether that was actually the

case.
Churchill and Roosevelt replied in the affirmative.
Stettinius declared that no economic sanctions could be
applied by the Security Council without the unanimity of
the permanent members.

88

Molotov asked whether the same applied to recommen-
dations.

Churchill replied that that applied only to those recom-
mendations which were mentioned in the five points formu-
lated at the end of the American document. The interna-
tional security organisation did not exclude diplomatic rela-
tions between the great and the small countries. Diplomatic
procedures would continue to exist. It would be wrong to
exaggerate the power or to abuse it or to raise questions that
could divide the three chief Powers.

Stalin said there was another danger. His colleagues
surely remembered that during the Russo-Finnish war the
British and the French had roused the League of Nations
against the Russians, isolated the Soviet Union and expelled
it from the League of Nations, by mobilising everyone
against the U.S.S.R. A repetition of such things in future
must be precluded.

Eden declared that that could not happen if the American
proposals were adopted.

Churchill confirmed that in the said case that kind of
danger would be ruled out.

Molotov said that was the first time the Soviet side heard
of that.

Roosevelt declared that there could be no recurrence of
a case similar to the one mentioned by Marshal Stalin,
because the expulsion of a member required the consent of
all the permanent members.

Stalin pointed out that even if the adoption of the Ameri-
can proposals made it impossible to expel a member, there
still remained the possibility of mobilising public opinion
against any one member.

Churchill said he could allow a case when a broad cam-
paign was started against a member, but then diplomacy
would be operating at the same time. Churchill did not
think that the President would want to come out against
Britain or support any action against her. He was confident
that Roosevelt would want to stop such attacks. Churchill
was also confident that Marshal Stalin would not want to
come out against Britain, without having a talk with Britain
beforehand. He, Churchill, was confident that a way to settle
disputes could always be found. At any rate, he could
vouch for himself.

89

Stalin declared that he, too, could vouch for himself; (half
in jest) perhaps Maisky over there would start attacking
Britain?

Roosevelt noted that the unity of the Great Powers was
one of their aims. He, Roosevelt, believed that the American
proposals promoted the attainment of that aim. If any
contradictions should unfortunately arise between the Great
Powers, they would be known to all the world, despite any
voting procedure. At any rate, it was impossible to elimi-
nate the discussion of contradictions in the Assembly. The
American Government believed that by allowing freedom
of discussion in the Council, the Great Powers would dem-
onstrate to the world the confidence they had in each
other.

Stalin replied that that was correct and proposed that the
discussion of the question be continued the next day.

Churchill asked whether they could pass on to the Polish
question.

Stalin and Roosevelt agreed with Churchill’s proposal.

Roosevelt stated that the United States was far away from
Poland, and he, Roosevelt, would ask the other two partic-
ipants in the Conference to set forth their considerations.
There were five or six million persons of Polish origin in the
United States. His, Roosevelt's, position, like that of the
majority of the Poles resident in the United States, coincid-
ed with the position he had set forth in Tehran. He, Roose-
velt, stood for the Curzon line. That, in essence, was
accepted by most Poles, but the Poles, like the Chinese,
were always worried about “losing face”.

Stalin asked which Poles were meant, the real ones or
the émigrés? The real Poles lived in Poland.

Roosevelt replied that all Poles wanted to get something
to “save face”. His position as President would be eased if
the Soviet Government allowed the Poles the possibility
of “saving face”. It would be well to examine the question
of concessions to the Poles on the southern sector of the
Curzon line. He, Roosevelt, did not insist on his proposal,
but wanted the Soviet Government to take it into consid-
eration.

The establishment of a permanent government in Poland
was the most essential part of the Polish question. Roosevelt
believed that public opinion in the United States was op-
posed to America’s recognition of the Lublin Government,

90

because the people of the United States had the impression
that the Lublin Government represented only a small part
of the Polish people. As far as he was aware, the American
people would like to see in Poland a government of national
unity, including representatives of all Polish parties: the
Workers’ or Communist Party, the Peasant Party, the
Socialist Party, the National Democratic Party and the
others. He, Roosevelt, was not personally acquainted with
any member of the Lublin Government or any member of
the Polish Government in London. He personally knew only
Mikolajcezyk. During his visit to Washington, Mikolajczyk
gave Roosevelt the impression of being a decent man.

He, Roosevelt, believed it was important to set up a
government in Poland that would represent the mass of the
people in the country and enjoy their support. It might be
only a provisional government. There were many methods
of forming such a government and it did not matter which
one was chosen. He, Roosevelt, had a proposal to establish
a Presidential Council, consisting of a small number of
outstanding Poles. That Presidential Council would be
entrusted with the task of forming a provisional govern-
ment of Poland. That was the only proposal he had brought
with him from the United States three thousand miles away.
Roosevelt added, he hoped, of course, that Poland would
have the most friendly relations with the Soviet Union.

Stalin said Poland would have friendly relations not only
with the Soviet Union but with all the Allies.

Roosevelt said he would like to hear the opinion of Mar-
shal Stalin and Churchill concerning his proposal. Solution
of the Polish question would be of great help to the Allied
cause.

Churchill said he was authorised to express the British
Government’s positive attitude to the President’s proposal.
He had always spoken publicly in Parliament and _ else-
where about the British Government’s intention to recog-
nise the Curzon line as it was interpreted by the Soviet
Government, i.e., with Lvov remaining in the Soviet Union.
He, Churchill, and Eden had been much criticised for that,
both in Parliament and in the Conservative Party, but he
had always believed that after the tragedy Russia had gone
through in defending herself against the German aggression,
and after the efforts Russia had exerted in the liberation of
Poland, the Russian claims to Lvov and the Curzon line

91

were not based on might but on right. Churchill still con-
tinued to hold that view.

But Churchill was much more interested in the question
of Polish sovereignty and the freedom and independence
of Poland than the specification of her frontiers. He wanted
the Poles to have a homeland, where they could live as
they thought best. He had heard Marshal Stalin announce
the same aim several times with the greatest firmness. Since
he, Churchill, had always had trust in Marshal Stalin’s
statements on the sovereignty and independence of Poland,
he did not think the question of frontiers was very impor-
tant.

Great Britain had no material interest in Poland. She had
entered the war to defend Poland from the German aggres-
sion.! Great Britain was concerned with Poland because it
was a matter of honour for her. Great Britain could never
be satisfied with a solution which did not ensure Poland a
position in which she could be master of her own house. But
he, Churchill, made one reservation: the freedom of Poland
should not mean allowing any hostile intentions or intrigues
against the Soviet Union on her part. Churchill said
Great Britain would not ask to have Poland free if
she had any hostile intentions in respect of the Soviet
Union.

Churchill hoped that the participants in the Conference
would not leave without taking practical measures on the
Polish question. There were now two Polish Governments
in respect of which the Allies had differing opinions. He,
Churchill, had not had any direct contact with the members
of the Polish Government in London. Despite the fact that

1 Here Churchill obviously erred against the truth. When Hitler
Germany attacked Poland on September 1, 1939, Britain, formally
declaring war on Germany, did nothing to implement her guarantees
given Poland earlier. Churchill himself wrote in his memoirs:

“Astonishment was world-wide when Hitler’s crashing onslaught
upon Poland and the declarations of war upon Germany by Britain
and France were followed only by a _ prolonged and _ oppressive
pause.... We contented ourselves with dropping pamphlets to rouse
the Germans to a higher morality. This strange phase of the war on
land and in the air astounded everyone. France and Britain remained
impassive while Poland was in a few weeks destroyed or subjugated
by the whole might of the German war machine. Hitler had no reason
to complain of this.” (W. Churchill, The Second World War. The
Gathering Storm, Boston, 1948, pp. 422-423.)—Ed.

92

ea

—

the British Government recognised the Polish Government
in London, it did not deem it necessary to meet with mem-
bers of that Government. But Mikolajczyk, Romer and
Grabski were intelligent and honest men, and the British
Government had friendly relations with them.

He, Churchill, asked whether it was possible there to set
up a Polish Government like that the President had spoken
about, until the time the Polish people could freely elect
a government which would be recognised by the Soviet
Union, Great Britain, the United States and the other United
Nations recognising the Polish Government in London.
Churchill believed the establishment of the body of which
the President had spoken would pave the way for the elabo-
ration by the Polish people of their constitution and the
election of their administration. If that could be done, a
great step would be made towards peace and welfare in
Central Europe. Churchill supported the President’s propos-
al. But, of course, Churchill added, the Red Army’s
communication lines had to be ensured in all circum-
stances.

Stalin said that as Churchill had just stated, for the British
Government the question of Poland was one of honour.
Stalin understood that. For his part, however, he had to say
that for the Russians the question of Poland was not only
one of honour but of security as well. It was a question of
honour because in the past the Russians had greatly sinned
against Poland. The Soviet Government was trying to atone
for those sins. It was a question of security because the most
important strategic problems of the Soviet state were con-
nected with Poland.

The point was not only that Poland was a neighbouring
country. That, of course, was important, but the essence of
the problem lay much deeper. Throughout history, Poland
had always been a corridor for an enemy attacking Russia.
Suffice it to recall only the previous 30 years: in that period,
the Germans twice went across Poland to attack Russia.
Why had the enemies crossed Poland so easily until then?
Chiefly because Poland has been weak. The Polish corri-
dor could not be closed mechanically only by Russian forces
on the outside. It could be reliably locked only from the
inside, by Poland’s own forces. For that Poland must be
strong. That was why the Soviet Union had a stake in
creating a powerful, free and independent Poland. The

93

question of Poland was a question of life and death for the
Soviet state.

Hence the sharp turn from the policy of tsarism the Soviet
Union had made in respect of Poland. The tsarist Govern-
ment was known to have tried to assimilate Poland. The
Soviet Government had absolutely changed that inhuman
policy and had taken the road of friendship with Poland
and of safeguarding her independence. That was where the
reasons lay for the Russian desire to have a strong, independ-
ent and free Poland.

Then about some of the specific questions which had been
dealt with during the discussion and on which there were
differences.

First of all, about the Curzon Line. He, Stalin, felt bound
to remark that the Curzon Line had not been invented by
the Russians. It had been produced by Curzon, Clemen-
ceau, and the Americans who had taken part in the Paris
Conference of 1919. The Russians had not been present at
that conference. The Curzon Line had been adopted on the
basis of ethnic data, contrary to the will of the Russians.
Lenin had not accepted that Line. He had not wanted to
give Poland Belostok and Belostok Region, which in accord-
ance with the Curzon Line had had to be handed over to
Poland.

The Soviet Government had already deviated from
Lenin’s position. Stalin asked whether the Allies wanted the
Soviet leaders to be less Russian than Curzon and Clemen-
ceau. In that case they would disgrace them. What would
the Ukrainians say if they accepted the Allies’ proposals?
They might say that Stalin and Molotov had turned out to
be less reliable defenders of the Russians and the Ukrainians
than Curzon and Clemenceau. In what light would Stalin
appear then on his return to Moscow? No, it was better to
let the war against the Germans go on a little longer, but
the Soviet Union had to be in a position to compensate
Poland in the west at Germany’s expense.

During Mikolajczyk’s visit to Moscow he had asked
Stalin which frontier for Poland in the west the Soviet
Government would recognise. Mikolajczyk had been very
pleased to hear that the Soviet Union recognised the line
along the Neisse River as Poland’s western frontier. By way
of explanation it should be said that there were two Neisse
rivers: one of them ran nearer east, by Breslau, and the

94

other farther west. Stalin believed that Poland’s western
frontier should run along the Western Neisse, and he asked
Roosevelt and Churchill to support him in that.

Another question on which Stalin would like to say a few
words was that of the establishment of a Polish Govern-
ment. Churchill proposed the establishment of a Polish
Government there, at the Conference. Stalin hoped that was
a slip of the tongue on Churchill’s part: how could a Polish
Government be set up without the participation of the
Poles? Many people called him, Stalin, a dictator, and did
not believe he was a democrat, but he had enough demo-
cratic feeling to refrain from setting up a Polish Govern-
ment without the Poles. A Polish Government could be set
up only with the participation and consent of the Poles.

A suitable moment for that had been Churchill’s visit to
Moscow the previous autumn, when he had brought Miko-
lajczyk, Grabski and Romer along with him. At that time
representatives of the Lublin Government had also been
invited to Moscow. A meeting had been arranged between
the London and the Lublin Poles. There had even been in-
dications of some points of agreement. Churchill should
recall that. Afterwards Mikolajczyk had gone to London
with the aim of returning to Moscow soon to take the last
steps in organising a Polish Government. Instead, however,
Mikolajczyk had been dropped from the Polish Govern-
ment in London for insisting on an agreement with the
Lublin Government. The Polish Government in London,
headed by Arcyszewski and led by Razkewicz, was opposed
to any agreement with the Lublin Government. What was
more, it took a hostile attitude to such an agreement. The
London Poles called the Lublin Government an assem-
blage of criminals and bandits. Naturally, the former Lublin
Government and later the Warsaw Government paid them
in kind, and called the London Poles traitors and turncoats.
How were they to be united in the circumstances? He, Sta-
lin, did not know.

The leading members of the Warsaw Government—Bie-
rut, Osobka-Morawski and Rola-Zymierski—did not even
want to hear of any unity with the Polish Government in
London. Stalin had asked the Warsaw Poles what conces-
sions they could make. He had got the following answer:
the Warsaw Poles could stand in their midst such persons
from among the London Poles as Grabski and Zeligowski,

95

but they would not hear of Mikolajczyk being Prime Min-
ister. Stalin was prepared to make every effort to unite the
Poles, but only if it had any chance of success. What was
to be done? Perhaps the Warsaw Poles should be invited
to the Conference? Or perhaps they should be invited to
Moscow to talk things over?

In conclusion, Stalin would like to deal with yet another
question—a very important one—on which he would be
speaking as a military man. What would he, as a military
man, want of the Government of a country liberated by the
Red Army? He wanted only one thing: that the Government
ensured law and order in the Red Army’s rear, and that it
prevented civil war breaking out behind its front lines.
After all, the military did not care much about the kind of
government; what was important was that they should not
be shot at from behind. There was the Warsaw Government
in Poland. In Poland, there were also agents of the London
Government who were connected with underground circles
styling themselves ‘forces of internal resistance”. As a mili-
tary man, Stalin compared the activity of the two groups
and inevitably arrived at the following conclusion: the
Warsaw Government was doing a fair job of ensuring law
and order in the Red Army’s rear, whereas there was
nothing but harm from the “forces of internal resistance’’.
Those “forces” had already managed to kill 212 Red Army
men. They were attacking Red Army depots to seize arms.
They violated orders on the registration of radio transmit-
ters on the territory liberated by the Red Army. The “forces
of internal resistance” were violating all the laws of war.
They complained that the Red Army was arresting them.
Stalin stated flatly that if those “forces” continued their
attacks on Soviet soldiers, they would be shot.

In the final analysis, from the purely military stand-
point, the Warsaw Government turned out to be useful, and
the London Government and its agents in Poland—harm-
ful. Of course, military men would always support a govern-
ment which ensured law and order in their rear, without
which the Red Army could not continue its successes. Law
and order in the rear was one of the conditions of Soviet
successes. That was understood not only by the military, but
by the non-military as well. That was how matters stood.

Roosevelt proposed that the discussion of the Polish ques-
tion be postponed until the next day.

96

Churchill said that the Soviet Government and the British
Government had different sources of information. The
British Government did not believe that the Lublin Govern-
ment represented even a third of the Polish people. That
was the opinion of the British Government. Of course, there
might be a mistake in that. Clearly, one could not believe
every story told by people returning from Poland. The
British Government wanted an agreement because it was
afraid that clashes between the Polish underground army
and the Lublin Government might lead to bloodshed and
numerous arrests. The British Government recognised that
attacks on the Red Army in the rear were inadmissible. But
the British Government did not believe the Lublin Govern-
ment had any ground to consider itself as resting on a broad
basis, insofar, at least, as could be judged from the informa-
tion at the British Government’s disposal, which, of course,
might not be quite faultless.

Roosevelt pointed out that the Polish question had been
giving the world a headache over a period of five centuries.

Churchill stated that an effort should be made to stop the
Polish question from giving mankind a headache.

Stalin replied that that must certainly be done.

Fourth Sitting at Livadia Palace
February 7, 1945

Roosevelt said that Marshal Stalin’s statement on the
Polish question had been heard the day before. He, Roose-
velt, was most interested in the question of a Polish Govern-
ment. He was not so much concerned with this or that Polish
frontier. He was not interested in the legitimacy or perma-
nency of a Polish Government, for it was known that Poland
had not had any Government at all over a period of several
years. He believed, however, that the United States, the
Soviet Union and the United Kingdom could help the Poles
to set up a Provisional Government until they had the op-
portunity of staging a free election in the country. There
was need to do something new in this sphere, something
that would look like a breath of fresh air in this dismal
question [.. .}.

7-876 97

Stalin said that about an hour and a half before he had
received a message from Roosevelt setting forth the follow-
ing propositions: summon two men from the Lublin Govern-
ment in Poland and two representatives of the social forces
of the other camp (out of a list of five named in the Presi-
dent’s letter) and in the presence of these four Poles settle
the question of a new Polish Government. In the event of
the successs of such a step, the new Government should
stage free elections in Poland.

Besides, Roosevelt’s message expressed the wish to include
representatives of certain other circles in the Polish
Government. The message named Mikolajczyk and Grabski.
He would like to know where the persons who were named
in Roosevelt’s message were to be found and who, according
to his information, were in Poland. If these men were found
it could be ascertained how soon they would arrive. If Win-
centy Witos or Sapieha were to come, their arrival would
facilitate matters. But he had no knowledge of their ad-
dresses and feared the participants in the Conference would
be unable to await the arrival of the Poles in the Crimea. The
Soviet delegation had worked out a project meeting Roose-
velt’s proposals. The project had not yet been printed. That
is why he proposed that in the meanwhile they should deal
with some other matter, say, the question of Dumbarton
Oaks.

Roosevelt and Churchill agreed.

(The Soviet delegation then expressed its satisfaction with
Stettinius’s report and Churchill’s explanations on the ques-
tion of setting up an international security organisation.
The Soviet delegation expressed the view that the unity of
the three Powers in ensuring post-war security could be
attained and that the proposals worked out at Dumbarton
Oaks, and the additional proposals made by Roosevelt, could
serve as a basis for future co-operation between big and
small Powers in matters of international security.

Considering these proposals acceptable, the Soviet delega-
tion then returned to a question which had been raised at
Dumbarton Oaks but had not been resolved there, namely,
the question of the participation of Soviet Republics as
foundation members of the international security organisa-
tion. The Soviet delegation raised the question not in the
form in which it had been raised at Dumbarton Oaks, but
proposed that three, or at least two, of the Soviet Republics

98

should be among the sponsors of the international organisa-
tion (the reference was to the Ukraine, Byelorussia and
Lithuania). The Soviet delegation believed that these three
Soviet Republics or two, at any rate, ought to be recognised
as foundation members.}

Roosevelt declared that he was happy to hear of the Soviet
Government’s acceptance of his proposals. Consequently,
great progress had been reached.

The next question to be solved pertained to which of the
countries from among the participants in the war against
Germany were to be invited to attend the conference insti-
tuting the international organisation. Everyone in the United
States wanted the conference to be held as soon as possible.
Its convocation at the end of March was said to be desirable.
It was physically possible for the representatives of the
United Nations to meet within a month. He, Roosevelt, per-
sonally believed that the sooner the decision to convoke the
conference was adopted, the sooner there could be a start
in the examination of the questions raised by the Soviet
side, which were of great interest. After the establishment
of the organisation the question of its initial members could
be tackled.

There was now one important practical point: was an
invitation to attend the conference to be issued, alongside
the countries fighting against Germany, also to the “asso-
ciated countries”, such as Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Chile,
Egypt, Iceland, which had broken off relations with Germa-
ny but had not declared war on her?

The question of the Ukraine, Byelorussia and Lithuania
was a highly interesting one. The participants might take
different views of it, for their countries had different state
structures and traditions. The British Empire, for instance,
consisted of dominions: Canada, Australia, etc. The U.S.S.R.
had many Republics. The United States, on the contrary,
was a homogeneous country, without any colonies. It had
one language. The constitution of the United States provid-
ed for only one minister of foreign affairs. That was why
the question raised by the Soviet side required study. It was
closely bound up with this other question: were the big
Powers to have more than one vote in the international
organisation? If one country were to be given more than
one vote that would be a violation of the rule that each
member of the organisation was to have one vote only.

7 99

Roosevelt proposed that the Foreign Ministers should
be entrusted with the study of the question of the organisa-
tion’s initial members and also of the time and place of the
conference.

Churchill declared that he wanted to express his deep
gratitude to the Soviet Government for the great stride it
had taken to meet the common views worked out at Dum-
barton Oaks. Churchill was sure that the agreement of the
three Great Powers on this crucial question would make all
thinking men happy.

The question of the number of members of the Assembly
had been raised by the Russian Ally in a new form. Every-
one would feel that in that respect a great stride had been
made towards agreement. Churchill agreed that the United
States and the British Empire were in different positions.
There were self-governing dominions in the British Empire
which had, for a quarter of a century, played a notable
part in the international security organisation, which had
collapsed on the eve of the current war. All the dominions
had worked for the cause of peace and democratic progress.
All the dominions had, without hesitation, entered the war
against Germany, although they had been aware of Britain’s
weakness. Britain had had no means of forcing the domin-
ions to follow her or right to urge them to do so, but all
the dominions had entered the war of their own accord.

He, Churchill, had heard the Soviet Government’s pro-
posal with a feeling of profound sympathy. His heart was
touched and turned to great Russia, which was bleeding but
smiting the tyrant on her path. Churchill felt that such a
great nation as Russia, with her 180-million population,
might have reasons to look askance at the British Common-
wealth of Nations if she had only one vote, despite the fact
that the population of Russia greatly exceeded the white
population of the British Empire.

Churchill would be very happy to have the President give
the Soviet delegation an answer that could not be considered
negative. Churchill himself was unable to exceed his
powers. He would like to have time to exchange opinion
on the Soviet proposal with the Foreign Minister and the
war cabinet in London. Churchill, therefore, begged to be
excused for being unable to give an answer to the Soviet
delegation’s proposal on behalf of the British Government
right away.

100

Roosevelt repeated his proposal to have the Foreign
Ministers discuss the question of the Soviet Republics and
also of the time and place of the conference, and the coun-
tries to be invited to attend. The decision at Dumbarton
Oaks had been to convoke the conference as soon as pos-
sible. An early convocation of the conference was also im-
portant for Roosevelt from the standpoint of domestic
politics.

Churchill declared that he would be glad to have the
three Foreign Ministers examine the three points proposed
by the President. As for the conference, Churchill doubted
that it could be called in March. In March, fighting on all
the fronts would be at its height. More forces than ever
before would be taking part in the battles. The domestic
problems in the various countries were highly complicated.
Britain, in particular, suffered from a shortage of housing
and had to maintain supplies for the fronts. Besides, Britain
had a Parliament which was very active and demanded
a great deal of time and attention of the ministers, notably
the Foreign Minister. A quarter of February was over.
Churchill, therefore, asked himself this question: would the
state of Europe and the world allow the convocation of a
conference in March? And if the conference were called in
March would the delegations of the various countries really
be headed by their leaders? Wasn’t it better to postpone the
convocation of the Assembly for some time?

Roosevelt explained that it was not a matter of convok-
ing the Assembly but of a conference to institute the inter-
national security organisation. The first Assembly would
probably be called within three to six months.

Churchill declared that some of the countries to be rep-
resented at the conference would still be under the German
yoke at the time of its convocation. There was no saying
to what extent their delegations would really be represent-
ative of their peoples. Other countries at the time would
be starving and suffering from the aftermath of war. In that
connection, Churchill named Holland and France. Along-
side those unfortunate countries at the conference there
would be nations which had in no way suffered from the
war and had not taken part in it. Churchill believed that
in the circumstances the conference could easily become
chaotic. Some peoples would be suffering the tortures of
agony, while others would be calmly discussing the problems

10l

of the future. For all those reasons, Churchill anticipated
difficulties in the convocation of the conference, at any rate,
insofar as Great Britain was concerned.

Roosevelt said that it had been decided at Dumbarton
Oaks to set up the international organisation as soon as
possible. Roosevelt, like the Prime Minister, had domestic
political difficulties. However, he would find it easier to
secure a two-thirds majority in the Senate if the Plan for
establishing the international security organisation went
through during the war.

Churchill declared that Great Britain’s constitution had
an effect on her attitude. A Parliamentary election was likely
to be held in Britain soon, and if the Government remained
in power it would have to lead the new Parliament. That
had to be taken into account. Of course, Great Britain
would do everything she could to satisfy Roosevelt’s desire.
However, Churchill still considered it necessary to make a
frank statement about the practical difficulties which, he
anticipated, would arise in the realisation of the President’s
intention. Personally, Churchill would regret deferring the
settlement of the question of the organisation’s initial mem-
bers until the convocation of the United Nations confer-
ence.

Roosevelt said that he wanted to reiterate his earlier
proposal, namely, that the Foreign Ministers should look into
the question of the membership, time and place of the con-
ference and then report to the heads of the three Govern-
ments on their results.

Stalin expressed agreement with that.

Churchill did not object to the three Foreign Ministers’
discussing the question referred to, but emphasised that the
question was not at all a technical one. Churchill was not
sure that such an examination would be a success but in
view of the President’s request was prepared to accept his
proposal.

Stalin declared that the three Foreign Ministers would
meet and then report to the Heads of Government on the
results of their work [...}.

The Soviet delegation then tabled the following propos-
als on the Polish question:

“1. To accept that Poland’s border in the East should
run along the Curzon Line with deviations at some points
of 5 to 6 kilometres in favour of Poland.

102

Oa

“9. To accept that Poland’s western border should run
from the town of Stettin (for the Poles) southward along the
Oder River, and then on along the Neisse River (Western).

“3. To recognise as desirable to enlarge the Provisional
Polish Government through the inclusion of some democrat-
ic leaders from among the émigré Polish circles.

“4. To consider desirable that the Allied Governments
should recognise the enlarged Provisional Polish Govern-
ment.

“5. To recognise as desirable that the Provisional Polish
Government, enlarged in the manner specified in Paragraph
3, should, within the shortest possible period, call on the
population of Poland to take part in a general election to
set up permanent organs of state administration in Poland.

“6. To authorise V. M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Mr.
Kerr to discuss the question of enlarging the Provisional
Polish Government together with representatives of the
Provisional Polish Government and to submit their propos-
als for the consideration of the three Governments.”

Roosevelt declared that the Soviet proposals constituted
a certain progress. He wanted to have the opportunity of
studying them with Stettinius. All he could say at the mo-
ment was that he did not like the expression “émigré Polish
circles” used in the Soviet proposals. As Roosevelt had said
the day before he was not acquainted with any of the
exiles, with the exception of Mikolajczyk. Furthermore, he
believed that it was not at all necessary to invite specifi-
cally persons from abroad to take part in the Polish Govern-
ment. Suitable men could be found inside Poland herself.

Stalin noted that was, of course, true.

Churchill said he shared Roosevelt’s doubts on the word
“émigrés”. The fact was that the word had first been used
during the French Revolution to designate persons expelled
from France by the French people. The Poles who were
abroad had not been expelled by the Polish people but by
Hitler. Churchill proposed that the word “émigrés” should
be substituted by the words “Poles abroad”.

Stalin agreed to Churchill’s proposal.

Churchill, continuing, said that the second paragraph of
the proposals spoke of the Neisse River. On the question of
the displacement of Poland’s border to the west, the British
Government wanted to make this reservation: Poland must
have the right to take a territory which she wanted and

103

which she was able to administer. It would hardly be the
proper thing to have the Polish goose so stuffed with Ger-
man viands that it died of indigestion. In addition, there
were circles in Britain who were apprehensive of the idea
of expelling a great number of Germans. Churchill himself
was not at all afraid of such a prospect. The results of the
resettlement of Greeks and Turks after the previous world
war had been quite satisfactory.

Stalin said there was almost no German population in
the parts of Germany occupied by the Red Army.

Churchill remarked that that naturally made things easier.
Moreover, 6 or 7 million Germans had already been killed,
and at least 1 or 1.5 million more would probably be killed
before the end of the war.

Stalin replied that Churchill’s figures were on the whole
correct.

Churchill declared that he was not at all proposing to stop
destroying the Germans.

Churchill proposed that the words “and from Poland
hae should be inserted in Paragraph 3 of the Soviet
draft.

Stalin replied that that was acceptable.

Churchill said that the Soviet proposals should be studied
and then discussed at the following sitting. He considered
the proposals a step forward.

Fifth Sitting at Livadia Palace
February 8, 1945

Roosevelt declared that he believed the Foreign Ministers
had done a good job of what they had been entrusted to
do, and invited Eden to report on their results.

Eden said that the Foreign Ministers had examined the
question of the date of the conference, the membership of
the international organisation, the granting of the rights
of foundation members to two or three Soviet Republics, and
also the question of the countries to be invited to attend the
inaugural conference. It had been decided to recommend the
calling of the conference in the United States on April 25,
1945. A tentative decision had been adopted to invite to
the conference members of the United Nations, that is, the

104

eS —— . = -

countries signing the declaration of the United Nations by
a specified day of February 1945. The conference was to
draw up a list of the initial members of the international
organisation. The delegates of Great Britain and the United
States would support the U.S.S.R. in having two Soviet Re-
publics among the initial members of the organisation. The
examination of all the details of the invitation had been
entrusted to a special sub-committee.

Stalin declared that he had a list of states which had
declared war on Germany. Did that mean that all of them
were to be included among the members of the Assembly?
Ten of these countries had no diplomatic relations with the
Soviet Union.

Roosevelt replied that there were several countries which
were eager to establish relations with the Soviet Union but
had not yet done so. There were others which were not
establishing relations with the U.S.S.R., because of the strong
influence there of the Catholic Church. But it should be
borne in mind that states which had not established rela-
tions with the Soviet Union had attended the conferences
at Bretton Woods and Atlantic City with it.

Stalin said that it would be hard to build security with
states which had no relations with the Soviet Union.

Roosevelt declared that the best way of making these
countries establish relations with the U.S.S.R. was to invite
them to attend the conference.

Roosevelt then referred to a question which, he said, had
a history of its own. Three years previously, Sumner Welles,
the then acting Secretary of State, had advised some South
American Republics not to declare war on Germany, but
merely to break off relations with her. The Republics had
followed the American advice. They had _ subsequently
helped the United States a great deal (for instance, by
supplying raw materials). They had a good reputation. A
month earlier, Roosevelt had sent a letter to six presidents of
South American Republics saying that if they wanted to be
invited to the conference they had to declare war on Germany.
Ecuador had already done so, but had not yet had time to
sign the U.N. Declaration. Paraguay was to declare war on
Germany in 10 days, and Peru and Venezuela were to fol-
low suit shortly. It would be embarrassing for the American
Government to fail to invite these countries to the con-
ference after they had taken the American Government’s

105

advice, although, to be quite honest, the advice had been a
mistake.

Stalin asked how things stood with Argentina.

Roosevelt replied that Argentina was not on the list sub-
mitted by the U.S. delegation.

Stalin said that Argentina had, after all, also broken off
relations with Germany.

Roosevelt declared that Argentina was not recognised as
one of the United Nations.

Stalin replied that he wanted to call attention to the fact
that if invitations to attend the conference were issued not
only to countries which had declared war but also to those
which had “associated themselves”, the countries which had
actually fought against Germany would resent sitting next
to those who had wavered and cheated during the war.

Churchill said he believed the countries of that category
should declare war on Germany before they got an invita-
tion to attend the conference. He agreed that some of these
countries had played a rather sad part, biding their time
to see who would win. However, it should not be forgot-
ten that if another group of Powers were to declare war on
her the impression on Germany would be unnerving. The
other enemy countries would find the whole world fighting
against them, and that could have a strong impact on them.

Roosevelt declared that he wanted to add Iceland to the
list of those to be invited.

Churchill remarked that His Majesty’s Government felt
a special responsibility in respect of Egypt, because Egypt
had twice expressed the desire to declare war on Germany
and Italy. However, the British Government had advised
Egypt not to do that, as Egypt’s continued neutrality had
helped to prevent aerial bombardments of Cairo. Moreover,
the British found Egypt’s neutrality advantageous from
various other angles. When the enemy had been within
30 miles of Alexandria, the Egyptian Army had helped the
Allies by guarding the bridges and communication lines.
Egypt had been of greater use as a neutral than if she had
declared war on Germany and Italy. Of course, if Egypt
wanted to declare war at that time the British Government
would not object. Iceland had also played a useful role in
the period before the United States had entered the war.
Iceland had allowed American troops into the country,
thereby violating her neutrality. Iceland had ensured Allied

106

communication lines. Churchill thought both those countries
had grounds to participate in the conference if they were to
declare war. The Allies ought to give them that opportuni-
ty. Churchill wanted to know whether there was the inten-
tion to admit to the conference all Powers declaring war
by March 1.

Stalin gave a positive reply to Churchill’s question.

Churchill said that Eire would not be among the invited
either, because she had a German and Japanese missions.
Upon the other hand, he, Churchill, had to speak in favour
of inviting Turkey, although the proposal might not meet
with universal approval. Turkey had concluded an alliance
with Britain before the outbreak of war, at a very danger-
ous time. When the war started, the Turks believed that
their army was not adequately armed for a modern type of
war. Nevertheless, Turkey’s position was friendly and use-
ful in many respects. The Turks had even offered aid to
the British, although the British did not take up their offer.
Churchill was asking himself: ought not the Turks to be
given a chance to repent on their deathbed?

Stalin replied that Turkey ought to be invited if she
declared war on Germany before the end of February.

Roosevelt and Churchill voiced their agreement with that.

Roosevelt said that Denmark had been occupied by the
Germans in 24 hours, the King had been taken prisoner, and
Parliament had been dissolved. Denmark was at the moment
under German control. Only one man claiming to represent
Denmark had not recognised the new Danish Government.
He was the Danish Envoy in Washington. He had been
unable to declare war on Germany but he had repudiated
the acts of the German-sponsored government. What was
to be done with Denmark? There was no doubt that had the
Danes been free, they would have sided with the Allies.

Churchill asked whether the Danes had recognised the
independence of Iceland.

Stalin replied in the negative.

Churchill did not believe there would be any difficulties
between Iceland and Denmark. He agreed with Marshal
Stalin and the President that all those who declared war by
the end of February should be allowed to attend the con-
ference. Denmark would take part in the security organisa-
tion when she got the opportunity to speak on her own

behalf.

107

_

Roosevelt proposed the approval of the report of the
Foreign Ministers in toto, with an amendment in the sense
that United Nations declaring war on the common enemy
by March 1 were to be invited to the conference. Roosevelt
said that Turkey could be added to the list provided she
declared war on the common enemy before the first of
March.

Stalin asked about the opinion of the Conference concern-
ing the signing by Byelorussia and the Ukraine of the
U.N. Declaration by March 1.

Roosevelt declared that the Conference had already
adopted the point of the Foreign Ministers’ decision which
said that at the U.N. Conference the three Powers would
recommend inclusion of the Soviet Republics among the
sponsors.

Churchill remarked that it appeared to him to be not
entirely logical to invite to the conference all the small
countries which had done next to nothing for victory and
had declared war only at that last moment, while postpon-
ing the invitation of the two Soviet Republics. The sacri-
fices made by Byelorussia and the Ukraine were well known.
He, Churchill, believed that if those two Republics signed
the U.N. Declaration they should be invited.

Stalin said that it could happen that when the conference
met and heard the recommendation to invite the Soviet
Republics someone might get up and say that they had not
signed the U.N. Declaration. That is why it would be better
for the Soviet Republics to sign the Declaration then. Other-
wise how were they to be recommended? He did not want
to inconvenience the President but would still ask him to
explain what the matter was.

Roosevelt replied that that was a technical matter but
an important one none the less. It was a question of agree-
ing to give the Soviet Union three votes.

Stalin asked if the invitation of the Ukraine and Byelo-
russia would not be hampered by the fact that they had not
signed the U.N. Declaration by March 1.

Roosevelt answered in the negative.

Stalin declared that in that case he withdrew his proposal.
He would only like to insert the names of the Republics—
the Ukraine and Byelorussia—in the text of the decisions
of the Foreign Ministers.

Roosevelt and Churchill indicated their consent.

108

The Dumbarton Oaks question was considered settled,
and Roosevelt went on to the Polish question.

Churchill said that with their permission he wanted to say
beforehand that he had studied the results of yesterday's
conference of the Foreign Ministers and approved of them.

Roosevelt declared that on the question of Polish borders
the U.S. delegation had no objections to the first paragraph
of the Soviet proposals. The U.S. delegation also agreed
that Poland should be given compensation at Germany’s
expense, namely, East Prussia south of Konigsberg and
Upper Silesia up to the Oder. However, Roosevelt thought
that there was little justification for displacing the Polish
border to the Western Neisse.

As for the question of a Polish Government, Roosevelt
would like to propose that the Soviet Foreign Minister and
the Ambassadors of the United States and Britain to the
U.S.S.R. should be authorised to negotiate in Moscow with
Bierut, Osébka-Morawski, Sapieha, Witos, Mikolajcezyk and
Grabski on the formation of a new Government on the fol-
lowing basis: a Presidential Council should first be set up to
consist of three persons, possibly Bierut, Grabski and Sa-
pieha. The Presidential Council would be representative of
the power of the President in Poland. That Presidential
Council would deal with the formation of a Government
consisting of men in the Warsaw Government, democratic
elements in Poland and abroad. The Provisional Government
thus formed would undertake to stage an election to the
Constituent Assembly, which would then elect a permanent
Government of Poland. When the Provisional Polish Gov-
ernment of national unity was set up the three Governments
would recognise it.

Stalin asked whether in that case the London Govern-
ment was to be disbanded.

Churchill and Roosevelt replied in the affirmative.

Churchill said that when the Provisional Polish Govern-
ment of national unity was set up, the British Government
would withdraw recognition from the Polish Government in
London and would accredit its ambassador to the new Gov-
ernment.

Stalin asked whether in that case the national property
of Poland which was then at the disposal of the Polish Gov-
ernment in London would remain in Arcyszewski’s hands or
would be handed over to the new Polish Government.

109

Roosevelt replied that Poland’s property abroad would
automatically pass to the new Polish Government.

Churchill remarked that he was not aware of the legal
aspect of the matter, but he thought the President was right.

Churchill then declared that the British delegation had
drawn up an alternative document on the Polish question
which had been handed to the Russian friends. But since the
discussion had been started on the President’s proposal,
Churchill was prepared to continue it in that plane.

Churchill said that he had some amendments to Roose-
velt’s proposals. He believed that the Conference had reached
its crucial point. He was referring to the question whose
solution was being awaited by the whole world. If they
diverged, continuing to recognise different Polish governments,
everyone would take that as a sign of basic contradictions
between Great Britain and the United States, on the one
hand, and the Soviet Union, on the other. That would have
rather deplorable consequences throughout the world, and
would lay the stamp of bankruptcy on the Conference. At
the same time, it had to be stated that they took differing
views of the basic facts or, at any rate, of some of the basic
facts. According to the information at the disposal of the
British Government, the Lublin, and then the Warsaw, Gov-
ernment was not the kind that could be recognised by the
bulk of the Polish people. If they were to renounce the
Polish Government in London and back the Lublin Govern-
ment there was every indication that that would arouse the
protest of the world, and of all Poles abroad, without ex-
ception.

They had a Polish Army consisting of Poles outside Po-
land. It had fought gallantly. Churchill did not believe that
that Polish Army would be reconciled with the Lublin Gov-
ernment. That Polish Army would regard the British Gov-
ernment’s recognition of the Lublin Government and refusal
of continued recognition of the Polish Government in Lon-
don as a betrayal.

The Soviet Government was very well aware that he,
Churchill, was not in agreement with the views of the
Polish Government in London and considered its actions un-
wise. However, formal recognition of the new Polish Gov-
ernment set up a year earlier would generate a great deal
of criticism of the British Government’s actions. People
would assert that the British Government had earlier given

110

in to the Soviet Union on the question of Poland’s eastern
border and had again capitulated to it on the question of the
character of the Polish Government. As a result, the British
Government would be subjected to accusations in Parlia-
ment. The debate that would be started in that connection
would be highly regrettable and would have a_ negative
effect on Allied unity.

In Churchill’s opinion, the Soviet proposals did not go
far enough. Before His Majesty’s Government could aban-
don its position, namely, recognition of the Polish Govern-
ment in London, and recognise the new Polish Government,
it had to be convinced that the new Polish Government was
sufficiently representative of the Polish people. Of course,
the British Government's difficulties would all disappear once
a free election was held in Poland on the basis of universal
suffrage. The British Government would welcome any Polish
Government that emerged as a result of the election, and
would turn its back on the London Government. However,
the British Government was highly apprehensive of develop-
ments in the interim, before an election was possible.

Roosevelt declared that as a visitor from another hemi-
sphere he stated the existence of a common view shared by
the conferees: a general election ought to be held in Poland
as soon as possible. What Roosevelt was concerned about,
however, was how Poland would be run in the interim,
before the staging of a free election.

Stalin said that Churchill complained about the absence
of information on Poland and the impossibility of receiv-
ing any from there.

Churchill replied that he had some information.

Stalin stated that although Churchill did have some in-
formation it did not coincide with that of the Soviet Gov-
ernment.

Churchill replied in the affirmative.

Stalin declared that, in his view, Great Britain and the
United States could have informants in Poland. Referring
to the leaders of the Warsaw Government, he said that the
popularity of Bierut, Osobka-Morawski and Rola-Zymierski
among the Polish people was truly tremendous. What was
the basis of their popularity? It was above all that they had
not left their country during the occupation. They had
remained in German-occupied Warsaw, they had worked in
the underground and had emerged from the underground.

111

This commanded respect among the Polish people, who
naturally sympathised with men who had not abandoned
them in their hour of need. The Polish people did not like
Arcyszewski’s men, because they did not see them in their
midst in the arduous years of the occupation. The people’s
mentality had to be taken into account.

The second important fact making for the popularity of
the Warsaw Government leaders sprang from the Red
Army’s victories. The Soviet forces were advancing and
liberating Poland. This was creating a great revolution in
the Polish people’s mind. The Poles were known not to
like the Russians, because the Russians had thrice taken part
in the division of Poland. However, the Red Army’s offensive
and its liberation of the Polish people from Hitler occupation
had reversed the Polish mood entirely. Their hostility for
the Russians had disappeared and had been replaced by a
feeling of quite another order: the Poles were happy to see
the Russians drive the Germans before them and liberate
the Polish population, and this kindled a warm feeling among
them for the Russians.

The Poles believed they were celebrating a grand national
festival in their history. And the Poles were surprised to see
the men from the Polish Government in London refuse to
take part in this celebration. The Poles were asking them-
selves why they saw the members of the Provisional Polish
Government at the festivities, but not any of the London
Poles? That naturally tended to detract from the prestige of
the Polish Government in London.

Those were the two factors which lay at the source of the
great popularity enjoyed by the members of the Provisional
Polish Government. Could they ignore these facts? Of course,
they could not, if they wanted to reckon with the people’s
will. Such were the considerations he had wanted to express
in connection with the question of the prestige of the men
from the Warsaw Government.

Concerning Churchill’s apprehensions that the conferees
could leave without reaching any agreement on the Polish
question. What was to be done in that case? They had dif-
ferent information and different conclusions. Perhaps they
should summon Poles from the different camps and hear
them? Would that increase their information? Churchill was
dissatisfied with the fact that the Provisional Polish Gov-
ernment had not been elected. Of course, it was better to

1k2

have an elected government, but that had been prevented
until then by the war. He believed the time was not far off
when the election could be held in Poland.

But then, the de Gaulle Government in France had not
been elected either, and consisted of diverse elements. Never-
theless, they were willingly dealing with de Gaulle and
had concluded agreements with him. Why -couldn’t the same
thing be done with the Provisional Polish Government after
it is enlarged? Why was more to be demanded of Poland
than of France? He was sure that if the Polish question
were approached without bias, it could be solved success-
fully. The situation was not as tragic as Churchill had
depicted it. A way out could be found if they concentrated
on the main thing and did not attach too much importance
to secondary things. It was easier to reconstruct the existing
Provisional Polish Government than to set up an entirely
new one. As for the question of the Presidential Council, the
matter should be discussed with the Poles themselves.

Roosevelt asked when it would be possible to stage free
elections in Poland.

Stalin replied that the elections could be held within a
month, unless there was some disaster at the front, unless
the Germans beat the Allies, but he hoped that the Germans
would not beat the Allies.

Churchill declared that a free election would, of course,
set minds at rest in Britain. The British Government would
support the new Government and all the other questions
would disappear. Of course, they could not ask for anything
that would hamper the operations of the Soviet forces.
Those operations had priority. But if it proved possible to
stage the election within two months, a new situation would
be created, and no one could question that.

Roosevelt recommended that the question under discus-
sion should be referred to the Foreign Ministers.

Churchill agreed to that and added that he wanted to
raise one small question. It would be highly useful to have
an agreement on regular meetings between the three For-
eign Ministers for consultations every three or four months,
on a rota basis in each of the capitals.

Stalin said that that would be right.

Roosevelt declared that that was a good proposal. How-
ever, Stettinius was also busy with South American affairs.
That was why Roosevelt believed that the Foreign Ministers’

8-876 113

meetings could be held as the need arose, without fixing
specified dates.

Churchill proposed that the first meeting should be held
in London.

Stalin signified agreement (. . .).

Sixth Sitting at Livadia Palace
February 9, 1945

Roosevelt proposed that Stettinius should report on the
conference of the three Foreign Ministers.

Stettinius declared that on behalf of the Foreign Ministers
he wished to make the following brief report on the results
of their work. The Foreign Ministers had had a detailed dis-
cussion of the Polish question on the basis of the memoran-
dum of the American delegation. The memorandum, in con-
formity with the proposal of the Soviet delegation, left out
the question of the Presidential Council. As for the formula
on the creation of a Polish Government, it had been decided
to continue discussion of the question and to report that the
three Foreign Ministers had not yet reached an agreement.
The Ministers’ conference had also discussed the question
of reparations.

Churchill said that perhaps the Polish question should
be discussed first.

Roosevelt agreed.

(Setting forth its view of the memorandum of the U.S.
delegation on the question of the Polish Government, the
Soviet delegation declared that, being desirous without any
further delay to work out a common stand, it was adopting
the American proposal as a basis, but was putting forward
some amendments to it. The Soviet delegation proposed the
following wording for the first clause of the American for-
mula for the creation of a Polish Government: “The present
Provisional Polish Government should be reorganised on
the basis of a broader democratism through the inclusion of
democratic leaders in Poland and abroad. This Government
is to be called the National Provisional Government.”

At the end of the paragraph, the Soviet delegation pro-
posed the addition of the following words: “non-fascist and
anti-fascist parties”, with the whole reading thus: “All non-

114

fascist and anti-fascist democratic parties must have the
right to participate in these elections and nominate candi-
dates.”

The Soviet delegation also considered it necessary to add
the following sentence: “When the Polish Government of
National Unity is formed in the specified manner, the Three
Governments will recognise it.” Finally, the Soviet delega-
tion proposed the exclusion of the last clause of the American
proposal—concerning the duty of the ambassadors of the
Three Powers in Warsaw to observe and report on the ful-
filment of the obligation on the staging of free elections—
on the ground that the ambassadors of the Three Powers
accredited to the Polish Government had full possibility of
observing developments in Poland, that being their imme-
diate duty. The Soviet delegation indicated that with these
amendments it considered the American proposal accept-
able.]

Churchill declared that he was glad that a great step
had been made towards agreement on the Polish question.
But he wished to make a few general remarks before its
discussion was continued. Churchill was of the opinion that
it should not be decided in haste. The possibility of agree-
ment was already in the air, but there was a danger of every-
thing being spoiled by undue haste. It was better to give a
little more thought to the proposal of the Soviet delegation.
It was true that there remained only 48 hours for their
meetings. However, Churchill did not wish to ruin the whole
thing because of the Conference wanting some 24 hours. If
those 24 hours were needed to reach agreement, they had
to be found. One thing should not be forgotten: if the par-
ticipants in the Conference left without reaching agreement
on the Polish question, the whole Conference would be
regarded as a failure.

Roosevelt proposed that Stettinius should complete his
report, after which they would adjourn for half an hour to
study the proposals of the Soviet delegation.

Churchill stressed once again that the participants in the
Conference had a very valuable prize almost in their grasp.
They must not let the prize be broken because of undue haste.
They must have a little time for thought. However, Churchill
did not object to Roosevelt’s proposal.

Stalin also accepted Roosevelt’s proposal.

Stettinius, continuing his report, said that he would go on

oF 115

to the question of reparations. The American delegation had
submitted its project of the principles of levying reparations
on Germany. The delegations were unanimous on Points
1 and 2 of the American draft.! On Point 3 they had reached
a compromise, namely: the Moscow Reparations Commis-
sion would take as a basis for its work the total amount of
reparations of $20,000 million, by way of lump withdrawals
and annual goods deliveries, of which 50 per cent were
earmarked for the Soviet Union.

On this point, Eden had made a reservation to the effect
that he had not yet received instructions from London. The
Soviet delegation declared that the reparations would be
calculated on the basis of 1938 prices, with increases be-
tween 10 and 15 per cent, depending on the nature of the
object.

Stettinius then dealt with the forthcoming conference of
the United Nations. The American delegation, he said,
proposed that before the conference the future permanent
members of the Council should have consultations with each
other through diplomatic channels concerning the trusteeship
over colonial and dependent peoples.

Churchill [in great agitation) resolutely protested against
any discussion of the question. Great Britain had been car-
rying on a hard struggle for so long to preserve the integrity
of the British Commonwealth of Nations and the British
Empire. He was sure that the struggle would end in com-
plete success, and while the British flag flew over the terri-
tories of the British Crown, he would not allow any piece

{ Points 1 and 2 of the American draft read as follows:

“1, Reparations are to be received in the first place by countries
which had borne the main burden of the war, had suffered the great-
est losses and had organised the victory over the enemy.

“9. Leaving aside the question of the use of German manpower
in the form of reparations, a question to be examined later, repara-
tions in kind must be levied on Germany in the following two forms:

“a) Lump withdrawals at the end of the war from Germany’s
national wealth, both on the territory of Germany proper and outside
(equipment, machine-tools, ships, rolling stock, German investments
abroad, shares of industrial, transport, shipping and other enterprises
in Germany, etc.), with these withdrawals being aimed chiefly to effect
the military and economic disarmament of Germany.

“These withdrawals should be completed within two years after
the war.

“b) Annual goods deliveries over a period of 10 years after the
end of the war.” (Retranslated from the Russian.—Ed.)

116

of British soil to be put up for auction before 40 states. The
British Empire would never be placed in the dock of an
international court on the question of “trusteeship” over
under-age nations.

Stettinius reassured Churchill that it was not a question
of the British Empire. The American delegation wanted the
world organisation to establish trusteeship, in case of neces-
sity, over territories which would be taken away from the
enemy.

Churchill declared that he had no objections if the ques-
tion was of enemy territories. It might be the appropriate
thing to establish trusteeship over these territories.

Stettinius added that the conference of the Three Minis-
ters recognised it as desirable to have a discussion of the
trusteeship question at the United Nations Conference.

Churchill insisted on a qualification in the text of the deci-
sion that the discussion of the trusteeship question in no sense
related to the territory of the British Empire. Turning to
Stalin, Churchill asked what his feelings would have been
if an international organisation had offered to place the
Crimea under international control as an international holi-
day resort.

Stalin replied that he would willingly make the Crimea
available for Three-Power conferences.

Stettinius declared that the sub-commission set up to work
out the question of invitations to the United Nations Confer-
ence continued its work and would report that day on the
results to the Foreign Ministers.

(Jt was then decided, on the proposal of Stettinius, that
the persons appointed by the British and the Soviet sides,
should prepare a report on the Yugoslav question.)

Churchill remarked that there were no considerable dif-
ferences on the Yugoslav question.

Stettinius declared that it had been decided to put the
Tito-Subasié agreement into effect before the conclusion of
the Crimea Conference, in spite of “King Peter’s
whims”.

Churchill declared that the British delegation had two
highly valuable amendments to the Tito-Subasi¢é agreement.
They had been handed to the Russian friends. If the parti-
cipants in the Conference decided the amendments to be
appropriate, they could be recommended to Subasié and Tito
for acceptance.

117

Stalin remarked that the Soviet side could also make its
own amendments. The British delegation would then pro-
pose something else. The question was being dragged out,
while the situation in Yugoslavia remained unstable.

Churchill declared that Tito was a dictator in his coun-
try. They could ask him to accept the amendments.

Stalin replied that Tito was not a dictator at all. The
situation in Yugoslavia remained indefinite.

Eden declared that there was no question of changing the
Tito-Subasi¢ agreement. The question was only of the two
assurances which Subasi¢é would ask of Tito in any case.

Stalin said that the amendments tabled by the British
boiled down to having the deputies of the SkupStina who had
not compromised themselves by collaboration with the Ger-
mans included in the Anti-Fascist Vece. The second amend-
ment consisted in the proposal that the legislative acts adopt-
ed by the Anti-Fascist Vece should be subsequently con-
firmed by the Constituent Assembly. The Soviet delegation
was essentially in agreement with those amendments. They
were correct. But he considered that they should in no way
delay the formation of a new Government.

Eden declared that the British Government wanted an
immediate implementation of the Tito-Subasi¢ agreement.
Later, Tito could be asked to accept the amendments in
question.

Stalin agreed.

Churchill also expressed agreement.

Eden said that Subasi¢ was to have left London for Yugo-
slavia on February 7.

Churchill remarked that information on whether he had
left or not would be available the next day. At any rate,
Subasié would leave as soon as the weather permitted.

Stalin declared that before they left the Crimea, the Three
Powers should recommend that the Tito-Subasi¢ agreement
be put into effect immediately and a single Yugoslav Gov-
ernment formed on the basis of the agreement, regardless
of any of the fantastic ideas Peter might have in his head.

Churchill proposed the insertion of a corresponding clause
in the communiqué. In that connection, Churchill asked
whether there was agreement that the said amendments
should be subsequently recommended to Tito.

Stalin replied that he never made empty statements. He
always kept his word.

118

|

(After the break.)

Roosevelt declared that he had made a closer study of the
proposals of the Soviet delegation on the Polish question and
had exchanged opinions with the British side. He felt the
whole thing now turned on a certain difference in the word-
ing. The participants in the Conference were close to agree-
ment. Great progress had indeed been achieved in this
question. But the phrase, “The present Provisional Polish
Government should be reorganised on the basis of a broader
democratism”, would embarrass the position of those Gov-
ernments which recognised the Polish Government in London.
Roosevelt wanted to have the expresssion “the present
Provisional Polish Government” substituted by the words
“the Polish Government now functioning in Poland”.

Furthermore, said Roosevelt, the Soviet delegation had
proposed the deletion of the final phrase concerning the
duty of the ambassadors of our three states to observe the
free elections in Poland. It was better not to do that. In that
connection, Roosevelt wanted to recall that there were six
million Poles in the United States. In respect of them, some
sort of gesture should be made to reassure them that the
elections in Poland would be fair and free. Roosevelt believed
that, considering that the participants in the Conference
were so close to agreement, it would be advisable for the
Foreign Ministers to work a little that night and report the
next day on the results of their work to the Conference.

Churchill agreed with the President that great progress
had been made that day towards a joint statement by the
Allied Powers on the Polish question. Churchill had no
objections to have the matter finally elaborated by the three
Foreign Ministers. But at the moment he wanted to dwell
on two small points which flowed from what Marshal Stalin
had said the previous day. Marshal Stalin had told how
Poland had been liberated and how the enemy had been
expelled from the country by the Red Army. That was a
new fact of very great significance. That is why Churchill
believed it would be advisable to emphasise the fact before
the whole world and to open the declaration on Poland with
something like the following words: “The Red Army has
liberated Poland. This makes it necessary to set up a fully
representative Polish Government, which can now be estab-
lished on a broader basis than was possible before the
liberation of Western Poland.”

119

The second point Churchill wanted to call attention to
was the concluding phrase of the American draft. The Brit-
ish Government was at a disadvantage in negotiations on
Polish affairs because it had little knowledge of what was
going on in Poland herself. At the same time, the British
Government had to take important decisions relating to
Poland. Churchill was aware that the relations between the
various groups of Poles were highly aggravated. Osobka-
Morawski, for instance, had not long before used rather
threatening language in respect of the London Government:
the Lublin Government intended to institute judicial pro-
ceedings against all soldiers of the Polish Army and mem-
bers of the Polish underground, as traitors. This had caused
the British Government serious apprehension.

Of course, it was necessary above all to remove all the
obstacles in the way of the Red Army’s operations. Never-
theless, Churchill wanted to request Marshal Stalin to take
account of the British Government’s difficult position. The
British Government really had no knowledge of what was
going on inside Poland, because the only way it could obtain
information was to drop parachutists in Poland from time to
time or talk with people, members of the underground
movement, who arrived from Poland. That was a highly
unsatisfactory situation.

How was it to be altered without at the same time creat-
ing difficulties for the Red Army’s operations? Churchill
reiterated that he placed the interests of the operations of
the Soviet forces above all else. Still: couldn’t the British
be given the corresponding opportunities, which, Churchill
believed, would also be readily used by the Americans, to
see for themselves how the existing dissensions were being
settled in Poland? That was why the British delegation
thought the final phrase in the American draft was so im-
portant.

When elections were held in Yugoslavia, Marshal Tito,
as he had understood it, would not object to the presence of
Soviet, American and British observers, so that these observ-
ers could assure the whole world that the elections were
conducted the right way. As for Greece, the British would
welcome the presence of Soviet, American and British observ-
ers, when the elections took place there. The same applied
to Italy. When Northern Italy was liberated, a sharp change
would take place in Italy’s internal situation, and elections

120

to a constituent assembly or a parliament would have to be
held. The British Government believed that a Soviet, Amer-
ican and British observers must have the possibility of at-
tending the elections in Italy so as to assure the Great Powers
of their normal conduct.

The considerations expressed by Churchill had real
grounds. In Egypt, for instance, victory always went to the
Government staging the election. Nahas Pasha had quarrelled
with the King and wanted to stage an election. The King
said that so long as Nahas Pasha remained a member of the
Government, there would be no election. And naturally when
Nahas Pasha was expelled from the Government, the King’s
men won the election and took his place.

Stalin remarked that no real election could be held in
Egypt. Bribery there was still widespread. Stalin asked what
the literacy percentage in Egypt was. (None of the British
delegation was able to answer the question.) In Poland,
literacy was as high as 70-75 per cent. Those were peo-
ple who read the papers and could voice their opinion.
There could be no comparison between Egypt and
Poland.

Churchill replied that he had no intention of making a
comparison between Poland and Egypt. He merely wanted
to say that the elections must be free and just. He was inter-
ested, for instance, in whether Mikolajczyk would be al-
lowed to take part in the election.

Stalin replied that the question had to be discussed with
the Poles.

Churchill asked whether the ambassadors should discuss
the question during their negotiations with the Poles in
Moscow.

Stalin replied that this had to be done in accordance with
the decision which they were going to adopt.

Churchill replied that he had no desire to continue dis-
cussing the matter, but he wished to have the possibility of
informing Parliament that the elections would be free, and
that justice in their conduct had been guaranteed.

Stalin said that Mikolajczyk was a representative of the
peasant party. It was not a fascist party. It would, of course,
be allowed to take part in the election. Some of the candi-
dates from the peasant party would enter the Government.
But he thought the solution of the question should be left
until its discussion with the Poles. They would arrive and

121

could be heard. There were men with different views among
the Poles.

Churchill declared that the only thing he wanted was,
upon his return to Britain, to get the question of Poland’s
eastern border through Parliament. Churchill believed that
to be possible if the Poles could decide between themselves
the question of a Government. He, Churchill, did not have
too high an opinion of the Poles.

Stalin remarked that there were very good men among
the Poles. The Poles were brave fighters. The Polish people
had produced some outstanding scientists and artists.

Churchill said that the only thing he wanted was for all
the sides to have equal opportunities.

Stalin remarked that all non-fascist and anti-fascist sides
would have equal opportunities.

Churchill said that he did not consider it quite right to
have the watershed run between fascist and non-fascist. He
preferred the term “democrats”.

Stalin said that he had before him the draft Declaration
on Liberated Europe proposed by the American delegation.
The draft contained the following sentence: “The establish-
ment of order in Europe and the reconstruction of national
economic life should be achieved in a way that would allow
the liberated peoples to obliterate the last traces of fascism
and Nazism, and to create democratic institutions of their
own choice.” (Retranslated from the Russian.—Ed.) Those
were good words! There the distinction between fascism
and anti-fascism was clearly drawn. Those words showed
that there could be no unity between democracy and
fascism.

Churchill confirmed that no such unity could or would
exist.

Roosevelt said that, in his view, Poland would provide
an example of the practical implementation of the principles
of the Declaration on Liberated Europe. The sentence read
out by Marshal Stalin was of great significance, because
it gave them the opportunity to obliterate all traces of fas-
cism. The following paragraph of the Declaration said that
the peoples could establish provisional government authori-
ties representing all democratic sections of the population,
and subsequently to set up permanent ones through free
and just elections. Roosevelt would like the Polish elections
to be, like Caesar’s wife, above suspicion.

122

Stalin remarked that Caesar’s wife only had that kind of
reputation. Actually, she wasn’t all that lily-white.

Roosevelt said that the elections in Poland had to be abso-
lutely “pure”, so pure that no one could cast any doubt on
them, and that the Poles themselves—very hot-headed
people—could accept the elections without any reservations.
Roosevelt summed up by saying that the Foreign Ministers
were well aware of the views of their Heads of Government
concerning the Polish elections. They should deal with the
question that night and report on the results of their work
the following day.

Stalin said that he agreed with Roosevelt’s amendment:
the substitution of the words “the present Provisional Gov-
ernment” by the words “the Provisional Government now
functioning in Poland”.

Roosevelt went on to the next question, the Declaration
on Liberated Europe.

Churchill said that Eden wanted to make a remark on the
draft Declaration. Churchill himself agreed with the Decla-
ration; he considered it necessary to note in the record that
Great Britain followed the principles of the Atlantic Charter
in the sense which Churchill had given it in Parliament
upon his return from Newfoundland. Churchill would pre-
sent the text of his Parliamentary statement at the next sit-
ting (...).

Roosevelt proposed that the sitting be closed.

Churchill said that he wanted to discuss the question of
war criminals. What he meant was war criminals whose
crimes were not connected with definite geographical places.

Roosevelt declared that the question of war criminals
was a complicated one. It was impossible to examine it dur-
ing the current Conference. Wouldn't it be better to refer
the question to the three Foreign Ministers? Let them sub-
mit a report within three or four weeks.

Churchill said that he had drawn up a draft declaration
on war criminals for the Moscow Conference of 1943. At
the time, Churchill had made a proposal, which had been
adopted, on the handing over of criminals to the countries
where they had committed their crimes. The said declaration
also made mention of the chief criminals whose crimes were
not connected with any specific geographical place. What
was to be done with these chief criminals? Churchill thought
the first thing to do was to draw up a list of such persons,

128

with the right of adding to it in the future. That would
isolate them from their peoples. Churchill believed that the
best thing would be to shoot the chief criminals as soon as
they were caught.

Stalin asked: What was to be done with criminals who,
like Hess, had been caught already? Would he be included
in the list which Churchill proposed to draw up? Could
prisoners of war be included in the list of criminals? The
old view had been that prisoners of war could not be tried.

Churchill replied that, of course, prisoners of war who had
violated the laws could be put on trial. Otherwise war crim-
inals would start surrendering in order to avoid punishment.
However, Churchill had understood Marshal Stalin to mean
that before the chief criminals were shot they should be
tried.

Stalin replied in the affirmative.

Churchill asked what the court procedure was to be:
juridical or political?

Roosevelt declared that the procedure should not be too
juridical. At all events, correspondents and photographers
should not be admitted to the trial.

Churchill said that, in his view, the trial of the chief
criminals should be a political and not a juridical act.
Churchill would like the Three Powers to be clear on this
question. However, nothing should be published on the sub-
ject to prevent the chief criminals from revenging themselves
on Allied prisoners of war.

Roosevelt proposed that the question of the war criminals
should be referred for study to the Foreign Ministers of the
Three Powers.

(That was accepted.)

Stalin asked whether the offensive on the Western front
had started.

Churchill replied that a 100,000-strong British Army had
started an offensive in the Nijmegen area at 10 o’clock the
previous morning. The troops had advanced 3,000 yards on
a five-mile front. They had reached the Siegfried Line. The
defences were not particularly strong, with the exception of
two villages. Several hundred prisoners had been taken. The
second wave of the offensive was due to start the following
day. The U.S. Ninth Army was extending the front of its
offensive. The offensive would be continuous and would
steadily grow.

124

Seventh Sitting at Livadia Palace

February 10, 1945

Eden read out the text of the Statement on Poland agreed
at the conferences of the Foreign Ministers on the night of
February 9 and the morning of February 10.

Roosevelt declared that he agreed with the text of the
Statement on Poland read out by Eden.

Churchill said that an agreement had been reached on
Poland’s eastern border, and there was agreement that the
Poles should be given East Prussia and the territory up to
the Oder. However, Churchill had some doubts about wheth-
er the Poles should have their border run along the Neisse
River (Western). Churchill added that he had received a
cable from the War Cabinet which set out the apprehensions
concerning the difficulties involved in resettling large num-
bers of people into Germany.

Roosevelt remarked that it would be desirable to have the
opinion of the new Polish Government on the western
border.

Stalin said that the Statement should say something definite
about the border.

Churchill believed it was important to issue a statement
on the agreement reached on the question of the eastern
border (Curzon Line). But then if nothing were said there
and then about the western border, people would at once
ask where Poland’s border in the west was to run. Churchill
believed that the opinion of the Poles themselves on the
question of the western border should be taken into account
and that this question should be settled at the peace con-
ference.

Roosevelt thought that it would be better to say nothing
about Poland’s borders, because the question still had to be
discussed in the Senate, and he, Roosevelt, was not author-
ised to take any decisions on it.

Churchill declared that something still had to be said
about the western border. He thought a suitable formula
could be found, since the Three Governments were agreed
that Poland was to receive an accession of territory to the
west and the north, and that the opinion of the Polish
Government was to be taken into account in deciding the
question.

125

Stalin also considered it necessary to have the decision
refer to Poland’s borders.

Roosevelt agreed with that in principle and proposed that
the three Foreign Ministers should be asked to examine
the question and add another paragraph on borders to the
text of the Statement on Poland.

(The Conference adopted the proposal and went on to
the Declaration on Liberated Europe.

The Soviet delegation proposed the following addendum
to the third paragraph from the end:

“They will immediately consult with each other on the
necessary measures in exercising the joint responsibility
established in the present Declaration.”

The proposal of the Soviet delegation was adopted.)

Eden declared that there was another addendum concern-
ing the French. The text of the addendum was as follows:

“In issuing the present Declaration, the Three Powers
express the hope that the Provisional Government of the
French Republic may join them in the proposed procedure.”

Roosevelt declared that after some thought he had arrived
at the conclusion that de Gaulle could join in the Declara-
tion, if the French took part in the Allied control mechan-
ism in Germany. He, Roosevelt, had previously been against
France taking part in the Control Council in Germany, but
he now favoured French participation in it.

Stalin declared that he had no objection to the French
participating in the Control Council, and that he favoured
their joining in the Declaration.

Churchill said that that should be said in the communiqué.

Stalin and Roosevelt agreed with Churchill’s proposal.

(The Conference went on to the question of Yugoslavia.)

Eden proposed the dispatch of a cable to Tito and Subasic.

Stalin proposed that the text of the cable should speak of
the immediate entry into force of the Tito-Subasi¢ agreement,
the inclusion of the members of the Skup3tina into the body
of the Vece, and the approval by the new parliament of the
laws adopted by the Vece. He proposed that Point 3 of the
cable—saying that the Government was merely a provisional
one until the free expression of the people’s will—be
dropped and the whole text of the cabled message incorpo-
rated in the communique.

Roosevelt and Churchill agreed with Stalin’s proposal.

(The Conference then adopted a decision to entrust the

126

working out of the text of the cable to the three Foreign
Ministers.|

Eden reported that everything had been agreed on the
question of the international security organisation.

(The Conference went on to the question of reparations.)

Churchill said that the amount of reparations should not
be specified.

Roosevelt agreed that perhaps nothing should be said at
that time about amounts of money. It would be better to
authorise the Reparations Commission to make a study of
the question and then to determine the amount of repara-
tions.

Stalin declared that it would be wrong to create the
impression that they intended to levy reparations in the
form of money. It was not a question of money but of goods
worth $20,000 million. There were already three agree-
ments—with Hungary, Finland and Rumania—which stated
the amount of reparations levied in kind, and until then
they had not had any misunderstandings on that score. Or
was it the wish of the Conference that the Russians should
not receive any reparations at all?

Churchill said: Not at all, on the contrary. He wanted
to propose that the Commission should study the question of
reparations and draw up a report on the levy of reparations.

Stalin raised the question: Was there agreement that
goods should be taken from Germany to cover the losses?
They had not yet taken any decision on the question of
reparations, and even the principles of levying reparations
had not been adopted. He proposed the adoption of the fol-
lowing decision: “The Three Powers are in agreement that
Germany must compensate in goods (or in kind) the most
substantial damage inflicted by her on the Allied nations in
the course of the war. The Reparations Commission is to
discuss the question of the amounts of compensation for the
losses, taking the Soviet-American formula as a basis, and
is to report on the results to the Governments.” Stalin fur-
ther pointed out that the American side had agreed to accept
the figure of $20,000 million as a basis for discussion, natur-
ally assuming that the compensation of losses was to be in
kind. The Soviet side was not proposing the publication of
the decision just then. That could be done when all the
Three Powers would deem such a step necessary.

Roosevelt declared that he agreed with Stalin’s proposals.

127

Churchill reiterated that the Conference would not bind
itself by any figures until the Reparations Commission had
made a study of the question and had arrived at definite
conclusions.

Stalin replied that they were not obliging the Conference
to adopt any figures, but were merely asking the Commis-
sion to take the said figure as material for discussion.

Churchill announced that he had received a cable from
the War Cabinet and wanted to read out an extract from it.
Churchill then declared that the British considered it abso-
lutely impossible to name any amount of reparations just
then. Churchill pointed out that the British attached special
importance to the capacity of the Germans to pay for their
imports. Otherwise, they would find themselves in the posi-
tion, said Churchill, when they would have to pay Germany,
while others received the reparations.

Stalin asked Churchill to name his figure of reparations.
The Soviet side did not consider its figure invariable and
merely offered it for discussion. He proposed the adoption
of a decision on reparations in the following form:

1) The Heads of the Three Governments agreed that Ger-
many must compensate in kind the damage inflicted by her
on the Allied nations in the course of the war.

2) To authorise the Moscow Reparations Commission to
discuss the question of the amounts of losses subject to com-
pensation and report its conclusions to the Governments.

Roosevelt and Churchill declared that they agreed with
Stalin’s proposal.

Stalin asked ironically: You will not go back on_ this
tomorrow? [...]}

(The Conference went on to the question of Poland’s
borders.)

Eden read out the British draft of the addendum to the
Statement on Poland concerning her borders.

Roosevelt said that on the question of Poland’s borders
he had an amendment to the text: instead of the words “the
Three Governments” insert ‘the Heads of the Three Govern-
ments”. Roosevelt explained that if it said “the Three Gov-
ernments’, he, as President, would have to take the question
to Congress, something that it was desirable to avoid. In
the second phrase, the words “the Three Governments”
should be deleted and the word “recognised” written instead.
In the last phrase, the words “they agree” should be sub-

128

stituted by “they consider”. Roosevelt accepted the text of the
addendum to the Statement on Poland with the said amend-
ments.

(The text of the addendum on Poland’s borders was
adopted with Roosevelt's amendments.)

Eighth Sitting at Livadia Palace
February 11, 1945

Roosevelt opened the sitting and proposed to start a dis-
cussion of the draft Communiqué.

Stalin proposed that the American draft Communiqué
should be taken as a basis for discussion.

Churchill agreed with that.

(The Conference adopted the American draft as a basis
and went on to discuss Section I of the Communiqué: The
Defeat of Germany.)

Churchill proposed the deletion in the second phrase of
the word “jointly”.

(Churchill's proposal was adopted.)

Stalin remarked that the first section of the Communiqué
was well drafted, and proposed that they go on to a dis-
cussion of the second section.

(Stalin’s proposal was adopted.)

Eden proposed that the following words should be added
concerning the French zone: “The limits of the French zone
will be agreed by the four Governments concerned through
their representatives on the E.A.C.”

[Eden’s addendum was adopted. The Conference went
on to a discussion of Section III on Reparation by Germany.)

Churchill asked that he be shown the draft of the special
protocol on reparations from Germany proposed that morn-
ing by the Soviet delegation.

After studying the text of the protocol, Churchill remarked
that in English “reparation” sounded better and was more im-
pressive than “reparations”.

Churchill agreed to leave, in Section III of the Communi-
que, the general reference to Germany’s reparation of the
damage inflicted by her on the Allied countries.

Roosevelt agreed with the text of Section III and Chur-
chill’s remarks on it.

9-876 129

Eden did not object to the text of the Soviet protocol on
reparations, but proposed that the final discussion of it should
be postponed until the entire text of the Communique was
reviewed.

(The Conference went on to discuss Section IV on the
United Nations Conference.)

The Soviet delegation proposed the addition of a new pa-
ragraph following the first two with this wording: “It was
also decided to recommend to the Conference that it should
invite the Ukraine and Byelorussia as original members of
the international security organisation.”}

Roosevelt declared that the publication of that decision at
that time would create political difficulties for him at home,
and proposed that they confine themselves to the agreement
reached at the Conference to the effect that the Americans
would support the proposal to invite the two Soviet Republics
as original members of the organisation.

Churchill also believed that great difficulties and disputes
could arise in the event of publication of the decision on the
Soviet Republics. The British dominions could lodge protests
against one state having more than one vote. Churchill needed
to contact the dominions and prepare them on the question
of the Ukraine and Byelorussia participating as original mem-
bers in the international security organisation. That is why
he proposed that the agreement on the Ukraine and Byelo-
russia should be written into the decisions of the Conference.

Stalin said that in that case the Soviet delegation could
withdraw its proposal, and proposed that they should go on.

Roosevelt declared that Stalin’s agreement to withdraw
the Soviet proposal would help Roosevelt to avoid a war with
the Irish in the United States.

(The Conference went on to discuss Section V on the Dec-
laration on Liberated Europe.)

Churchill declared that he had no remarks or amendments.

Roosevelt and Stalin declared that they did not have any
amendments either.

(The text of Section V was adopted. The Conference went
on to discuss Section VI on Poland. The Declaration on
Poland was adopted without amendments.)

Churchill remarked, with reference to that section, that
he anticipated great criticism of the British Government,
especially by the London Poles, and accusations that it had
surrendered its positions to the U.S.S.R.

130

ey

Roosevelt declared that he has ten times as many Poles
in the United States as Churchill had in Britain, but he
would nevertheless back the Declaration on Poland in every
way.

(The Conference went on to discuss Section VII on Yugo-
slavia. The text of Section VII was adopted. The Conference
went on to discuss Section VIII on the Meetings of the
Foreign Secretaries.)

Stalin proposed the adoption of the British text.

(All agreed. The Conference went on to discuss the sec-
tion of the British draft which dealt with prisoners of war.)

Stalin proposed that the section on prisoners of war should
not be included in the Communiqué, but that its text should
be adopted as a special decision.

Churchill asked whether they could publish the agreement
on prisoners of war which was to be signed that day after
the morning sitting.

Stalin replied that the agreement could be published.

(Ihe Conference went on to discuss Section 1X on Unity
for Peace as for War. The text of the Anglo-American draft
of the section was adopted by all without any objections or
remarks. The Conference went on to discuss the last section
of the American draft Communiqué: Summary.}

Stalin tabled the proposal: was it not better to exclude the
Summary, because it was weaker than the content of the
Communiqué itself?

Roosevelt and Churchill agreed with that.

(Discussion of the Communiqué was ended.)

Roosevelt said that the Communiqué should be signed by
the Heads of Government and he, Roosevelt, proposed that
Stalin’s signature should be affixed first.

Stalin objected by saying that there was a sharp-tongued
press in the United States, which could give the impression
that Stalin had had the President and the Prime Minister
on a lead. That was why he proposed that the Communiqué
should be signed in alphabetical order, that is, with Roose-
velt’s first, Stalin’s second, and Churchill’s third.

Churchill declared that according to the English alpha-
bet his signature would be first.

Stalin replied that he was prepared to accept Churchill’s
proposal.

(Ihe Heads of Government agreed to sign the Communi-
qué after luncheon, when the Foreign Ministers had made

$i 131

the amendments in accordance with the results of the dis-
cussion of the text of the Communiqué at that day’s sitting.)

Returning to the question of the protocol on reparations
from Germany, Roosevelt said that the draft protocol pro-
posed by the Soviet delegation was acceptable to him.

Churchill declared that he wanted to read the text of
the draft protocol once again, as, he thought, it would
require some stylistic editing, without however any changes
in the content of the protocol. Having read it, Churchill
declared that, apart from some stylistic changes, he agreed
with the draft protocol.

Churchill proposed that they discuss the time of publica-
tion of the Communiqué.

Early proposed that the Communiqué should be published
at 8.00 a.m. Washington time on February 13.

[As a result of the discussion of the question, the Heads
of Government agreed to broadcast the text of the Commu-
niqué simultaneously in Moscow, London and Washington,
at 23.30 Moscow time on Monday, February 12.)

COMMUNIQUE

ON THE CRIMEA CONFERENCE OF THE HEADS
OF GOVERNMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION,
THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN

For the past eight days, Winston S. Churchill, Prime Min-
ister of Great Britain, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of
the United States of America, and Marshal J. V. Stalin,
Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have met with the
Foreign Secretaries, Chiefs of Staff, and other advisers in
the Crimea.

The following statement is made by the Prime Minister
of Great Britain, the President of the United States of
America, and the Chairman of the Council of People’s
Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
the results of the Crimea Conference:

I
THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY

We have considered and determined the military plans
of the Three Allied Powers for the final defeat of the com-
mon enemy. The military staffs of the three Allied Nations
have met in daily meetings throughout the Conference.
These meetings have been most satisfactory from every point
of view and have resulted in closer co-ordination of the
military effort of the Three Allies than ever before. The
fullest information has been interchanged. The timing, scope,
and co-ordination of new and even more powerful blows
to be launched by our Armies and Air Forces into the heart
of Germany from the east, west, north, and south have been
fully agreed and planned in detail.

Our combined military plans will be made known only
as we execute them, but we believe that the very close work-
ing partnership among the three staffs attained at this Con-
ference will result in shortening the war. Meetings of the

133

three staffs will be continued in the future whenever the need
arises.

Nazi Germany is doomed. The German people will only
make the cost of their defeat heavier to themselves by at-
tempting to continue a hopeless resistance.

THE OCCUPATION AND CONTROL
OF GERMANY

We have agreed on common policies and plans for en-
forcing the unconditional surrender terms which we shall
impose together on Nazi Germany after German armed re-
sistance has been finally crushed. These terms will not be
made known until the final defeat of Germany has been ac-
complished. Under the agreed plan, the forces of the Three
Powers will each occupy a separate zone of Germany. Co-
ordinated administration and control has been provided for
under the plan through a Central Control Commission, con-
sisting of the supreme commanders of the Three Powers,
with headquarters in Berlin. It has been agreed that France
should be invited by the Three Powers, if she should so
desire, to take over a zone of occupation, and to participate
as a fourth member of the Control! Commission. ‘The limits
of the French zone will be agreed by the four Governments
concerned through their representatives on the European Ad-
visory Commission.

It is our inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism
and Nazism and to ensure that Germany will never again
be able to disturb the peace of the world. We are determined
to disarm and disband all German armed forces; break up
for all time the German General Staff that has repeatedly
contrived the resurgence of German militarism; remove or
destroy all German military equipment; eliminate or control
all German industry that could be used for military pro-
duction; bring all war criminals to just and swift punish-
ment and exact reparation in kind for the destruction
wrought by the Germans; wipe out the Nazi Party, Nazi
laws, organisations, and institutions, remove all Nazi and
militarist influences from public office and from the cultur-
al and economic life of the German people; and take in

134

ET

harmony such other measures in Germany as may be neces-
sary to the future peace and safety of the world. It is not
our purpose to destroy the people of Germany, but only
when Nazism and militarism have been extirpated will there
be hope for a decent life for Germans, and a place for them
in the comity of nations.

HT
REPARATION BY GERMANY

We have considered the question of the damage caused
by Germany to the Allied Nations in this war and recognised
it as just that Germany be obliged to make compensation
for this damage in kind to the greatest extent possible.

A commission for the compensation of damage will be
established. The commission will be instructed to consider
the question of the extent and methods for compensating
damage caused by Germany to the Allied countries. The
commission will work in Moscow.

IV
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE

We are resolved upon the earliest possible establishment
with our Allies of a general international organisation to
maintain peace and security. We believe that this is essen-
tial, both to prevent aggression and to remove the political,
economic, and social causes of war through the close and
continuing collaboration of all peace-loving peoples.

The foundations were laid at Dumbarton Oaks. On the
important question of voting procedure, however, agreement
was not there reached. The present Conference has been
able to resolve this difficulty.

We have agreed that a Conference of United Nations
should be called to meet at San Francisco in the United
States on April 25, 1945, to prepare the Charter of such an
organisation, along the lines proposed in the informal cen-
versations at Dumbarton Oaks.

The Government of China and the Provisional Govern-
ment of France will be immediately consulted and in:ited to
sponsor invitations to the Conference jointly with the Gov-

135

ernments of the United States, Great Britain, and the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. As soon as the con-
sultation with China and France has been completed, the
text of the proposals on voting procedure will be made
public.

Vv
DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE

We have drawn up and subscribed to a Declaration on
Liberated Europe. This Declaration provides for concerting
policies of the Three Powers and for joint action by them
in meeting the political and economic problems of liberated
Europe in accordance with democratic principles. The text
of the Declaration is as follows:

“The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and the Presi-
dent of the United States of America have consulted with
each other in the common interests of the peoples of their
countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly de-
clare their mutual agreement to concert during the tempo-
rary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies
of their Three Governments in assisting the peoples liberated
from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of
the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by demo-
cratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

“The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding
of national economic life must be achieved by processes
which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last ves-
tiges of Nazism and fascism and to create democratic insti-
tutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlan-
tic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of
government under which they will live—the restoration of
sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who
have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor na-
tions.

“To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples
may exercise these rights, the Three Governments will
jointly assist the people in any European liberated state
or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judge-
ment conditions require (a) to establish conditions of in-
ternal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the

136

relief of distressed people; (c) to form interim governmental
authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements
in the population and pledged to the earliest possible estab-
lishment through free elections of governments responsible
to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where neces-
sary the holding of such elections.

“The Three Governments will consult the other United
Nations and provisional authorities or other Governments
in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under
consideration.

“When, in the opinion of the Three Governments, con-
ditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis
satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they
will immediately consult together on the measures neces-
sary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this
declaration.

“By this Declaration we reaffirm our faith in the prin-
ciples of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declara-
tion by the United Nations, and our determination to build
in co-operation with other peace-loving nations world order
under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom, and gen-
eral well-being of all mankind.

“In issuing this Declaration, the Three Powers express
the hope that the Provisional Government of the French
Republic may be associated with them in the procedure sug-
gested.”

vi
POLAND

We came to the Crimea Conference resolved to settle our
differences about Poland. We discussed fully all aspects of
the question. We reaffirm our common desire to see estab-
lished a strong, free, independent and democratic Poland.
As a result of our discussions we have agreed on the condi-
tions in which a new Polish Provisional Government of
National Unity may be formed in such a manner as to com-
mand recognition by the three major Powers.

The agreement reached is as follows:

““A new situation has been created in Poland as a result
of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for

187

the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which
can be more broadly based than was possible before the
recent liberation of western Poland. The Provisional Gov-
ernment which is now functioning in Poland should there-
fore be reorganised on a broader democratic basis with
the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and
from Poles abroad. This new Government should then
be called the Polish Provisional Government of National
Unity.

“Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman, and Sir A. Clark Kerr are
authorised as a commission to consult in the first instance
in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Gov-
ernment and with other Polish democratic leaders from
within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorzan-
isation of the present Government along the above lines.
This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall
be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections
as soon as possible, on the basis of universal suffrage and
secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-
Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put
forward candidates.

“When a Polish Provisional Government of National
Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the
above, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics, which now maintains diplomatic relations with the
present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Gov-
ernment of the United Kingdom, and the Government of
the United States of America, will establish diplomatic re-
lations with the new Polish Provisional Government of Na-
tional Unity, and will exchange ambassadors by whose re-
ports the respective Governments will be kept informed
about the situation in Poland.

“The Three Heads of Government consider that the
eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon
line with digressions from it in some regions of 5 to 8 kilo-
metres in favour of Poland. They recognised that Poland
must receive substantial accessions of territory in the north
and west. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish
Provisional Government of National Unity should be
sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and
that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland
should thereafter await the peace conference.”

138

Vil
YUGOSLAVIA

We have agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and
Dr. Subasié that the Agreement between them should be put
into effect immediately, and that a new Government should
be formed on the basis of that Agreement.

We also recommend that as soon as the new Government
has been formed it should declare that:

1) the Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation
(Avnoj) should be extended to include members of the last
Yugoslav Parliament (SkupStina) who have not compromised
themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming
a body to be known as a temporary parliament; and,

2) legislative acts passed by the Anti-Fascist Assembly
of National Liberation will be subject to subsequent rati-
fication by a Constituent Assembly.

There was also a general review of other Balkan ques-
tions.

Vill
MEETINGS OF FOREIGN SECRETARIES

Throughout the Conference, besides the daily meetings
of the Heads of Government and the Foreign Secretaries,
separate meetings of the three Foreign Secretaries, and their
advisers have also been held daily.

These meetings have proved of the utmost value and the
Conference agree that permanent machinery should be set
up for regular consultation between the three Foreign Secre-
taries. They will, therefore, meet as often as may be neces-
sary, probably about every 3 or 4 months. These meetings
will be held in rotation in the three capitals, the first meet-
ing being held in London, after the United Nations Con-
ference on World Organisation.

IX
UNITY FOR PEACE AS FOR WAR

Our meeting here in the Crimea has reaffirmed our com-
mon determination to maintain and strengthen in the peace
to come that unity of purpose and of action which has made

139

victory possible and certain for the United Nations in this
war. We believe that this is a sacred obligation which our
Governments owe to our peoples and to all the peoples of
the world.

Only with the continuing and growing co-operation and
understanding among our three countries and among all the
peace-loving nations can the highest aspiration of humanity
be realised—a secure and lasting peace which will, in the
words of the Atlantic Charter, “afford assurance, that all
the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom
from fear and want”.

Victory in this war and establishment of the proposed
international organisation will provide the greatest oppor-
tunity in all history to create in the years to come the essen-
tial conditions of such a peace.

February 11, 1945

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
J. U. STALIN

Protocol of Proceedings of the Crimea Conference

The Crimea Conference of the Heads of Government of
the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which took place from
February 4th to 11th came to the following conclusions.

WORLD ORGANISATION

It was decided:

(1) that a United Nations Conference on the proposed
World Organisation should be summoned for Wednesday,
25th April, 1945, and should be held in the United States
of America;

(2) the nations to be invited to this Conference should be:

(a) the United Nations as they existed on the 8th Febru-
ary, 1945 and

(b) such of the Associated Nations as have declared war
on the common enemy by Ist March, 1945. (For this pur-
pose by the term “Associated Nations” was meant the eight
Associated Nations and Turkey.) When the Conference on

140

World Organisation is held, the delegates of the United
Kingdom and United States of America will support a pro-
posal to admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist
Republics, i.e., the Ukraine and White Russia;

(3) that the United States Government on behalf of the
Three Powers should consult the Government of China and
the French Provisional Government in regard to the deci-
sions taken at the present Conference concerning the pro-
posed World Organisation;

(4) that the text of the invitation to be issued to all the
nations which would take part in the United Nations Con-
ference should be as follows:

Invitation

“The Government of the United States of America, on
behalf of itself and of the Governments of the United
Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the
Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of
the French Republic, invite the Government of ... to send
representatives to a Conference of the United Nations to be
held on 25th April, 1945, or soon thereafter, at San Fran-
cisco in the United States of America to prepare a Charter
for a General International Organisation for the mainte-
nance of international peace and security.

“The above-named Governments suggest that the Con-
ference consider as affording a basis for such a Charter the
Proposals for the Establishment of a General International
Organisation, which were made public last October as a
result of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, and which have
now been supplemented by the following provisions for
Section C of Chapter VI:

“C. Voting

“1, Each member of the Security Council should have
one vote.

“2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural mat-
ters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven
members.

“3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters
should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members,
including the concurring votes of the permanent members;
provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A

141

and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Section C,
Chapter VIII, a party to a dispute should abstain from
voting.

“Further information as to arrangements will be trans-
mitted subsequently.

“In the event that the Government of ... desires in
advance of the Conference to present views or comments
concerning the proposals, the Government of the United
States of America will be pleased to transmit such views
and comments to the other participating Governments.”

Territorial Trusteeship

It was agreed that the five Nations which will have per-
manent seats on the Security Council should consult each
other prior to the United Nations Conference on the ques-
tion of territorial trusteeship.

The acceptance of this recommendation is subject to its
being made clear that territorial trusteeship will only apply
to (a) existing mandates of the League of Nations; (b) ter-
ritories detached from the enemy as a result of the present
war; (c) any other territory which might voluntarily be
placed under trusteeship; and (d) no discussion of actual
territories is contemplated at the forthcoming United Na-
tions Conference or in the preliminary consultations, and it
will be a matter for subsequent agreement which territories
within the above categories will be placed under trusteeship.

ZONE OF OCCUPATION FOR THE FRENCH AND CONTROL
COUNCIL FOR GERMANY

It was agreed that a zone in Germany, to be occupied by
the French Forces, should be allocated to France. This zone
would be formed out of the British and American zones and
its extent would be settled by the British and Americans in
consultation with the French Provisional Government.

It was also agreed that the French Provisional Govern-
ment should be invited to become a member of the Allied
Control Council for Germany.

142

REPARATIONS

The following protocol has been approved.

Protocol
On the Talks Between
the Heads of Three Governments
at the Crimea Conference
on the German Reparations in Kind

The Heads of the three Governments have agreed as
follows:

1. Germany must pay in kind for the losses caused by her
to the Allied nations in the course of the war.

Reparations are to be received in the first instance by
those countries which have borne the main burden of the
war, have suffered the heaviest losses and have organised
victory over the enemy.

2. Reparation in kind is to be exacted from Germany in
three following forms:

a) Removals within 2 years from the surrender of Ger-
many or the cessation of organised resistance from the na-
tional wealth of Germany located on the territory of Ger-
many herself as well as outside her territory (equipment,
machine-tools, ships, rolling stock, German investments
abroad, shares of industrial, transport and other enterprises
in Germany, etc.), these removals to be carried out chiefly
for purpose of destroying the war potential of Germany.

b) Annual deliveries of goods from current production
for a period to be fixed.

c) Use of German labour.

3. For the working out on the above principles of a
detailed plan for exaction of reparation from Germany an
Allied Reparation Commission will be set up in Moscow. It
will consist of three representatives—one from the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, one from the United Kingdom
and one from the United States of America.

4. With regard to the fixing of the total sum of the rep-
aration as well as the distribution of it among the coun-
tries which suffered from the German aggression the Soviet
and American delegations agreed as follows:

“The Moscow Reparation Commission should take in its

143

initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the
Soviet Government that the total sum of the reparation in
accordance with the points (a) and (b) of the Paragraph 2
should be 20 billion dollars and that 50 per cent of it should
go to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.”

The British delegation was of the opinion that pending
consideration of the reparation question by the Moscow
Reparation Commission no figures of reparation should be
mentioned.

The above Soviet-American proposal has been passed to
the Moscow Reparation Commission as one of the proposals
to be considered by the Commission.

MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS

The Conference agreed that the question of the major war
criminals should be the subject of enquiry by the three For-
eign Secretaries for report in due course after the close of
the Conference.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE ALLIED STATES RELATING TO
PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIANS OF THESE STATES

Negotiations have taken place at the Crimea Conference
between the British, American and Soviet delegations on the
conclusion of a comprehensive agreement concerning meas-
ures for the protection, maintenance and repatriation of
prisoners of war and civilians of Great Britain, the Soviet
Union and the United States of America liberated by the
Allied forces now invading Germany. The texts of the
Agreements signed on February 11 between the U.S.S.R.
and Great Britain and between the U.S.S.R. and the United
States of America are identical. The Agreement between
the Soviet Union and Great Britain was signed by
V. M. Molotov and Mr. Eden. The Agreement between the
Soviet Union and the United States of America was signed
by Lieut.-Gen. Gryzlov and General Deane.

Under these Agreements, each ally was to provide food,
clothing, medical attention, and other needs for the nation-
als of the others until transport is available for their re-

144

patriation. Soviet officers were to assist British and Ameri-
can authorities in their task of caring for Soviet citizens
liberated by the British and American forces during such
time as they were on the continent of Europe or in the
United Kingdom, awaiting transport to take them home.

British and American officers were to assist the Soviet
Government in its task of caring for British subjects and
American citizens.

With the achievement of agreement, the Three Govern-
ments were pledged to give every assistance consistent with
operational requirements to help to insure that all these
prisoners of war and civilians were speedily repatriated.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE THREE GREAT POWERS ON QUESTIONS
OF THE FAR EAST

The leaders of the Three Great Powers—the Soviet
Union, the United States of America and Great Britain—
have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has
surrendered and the war in Europe has terminated, the
Soviet Union shall enter into the war against Japan on the
side of the Allies on condition that:

1. The status quo in Outer-Mongolia (the Mongolian
People’s Republic) shall be preserved;

2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacher-
ous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz.:

a) the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands
adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union,

b) the commercial port of Dairen shall be international-
ised, the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union in this
port being safeguarded and the lease of Port Arthur as a
naval base of the U.S.S.R. restored,

c) the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South-Manchur-
ian Railroad which provides an outlet to Dairen shall be
jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-
Chinese Company, it being understood that the pre-eminent
interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that
China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria;

3. The Kuril Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet
Union.

It is understood that the agreement concerning Outer-
Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will

10-876 145

require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The
President will take measures in order to obtain this concur-
rence on advice from Marshal Stalin.

The Heads of the Three Great Powers have agreed that
these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably
fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.

For its part the Soviet Union expressed its readiness to
conclude with the National Government of China a pact of
friendship and alliance between the U.S.S.R. and China in
order to render assistance to China with its armed forces
for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

February 11, 1945
J. VU. STALIN
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

THE POTSDAM CONFERENCE
(July 17-August 2, 1945)

First Sitting
July 17, 1945

Churchill: Who is to be chairman at our Conference?

Stalin: 1 propose President Truman of the United States.

Churchill: The British delegation supports this proposal.

Truman: I accept the chairmanship of this Conference.

Let me put before you some of the questions that have
accumulated by the time of our meeting and that require
urgent examination. We can then discuss the procedure of
the Conference.

Churchill: We shall have the right to add to the agenda.

Truman: One of the most acute problems at present is to
set up some kind of mechanism for arranging peace talks.
Without it, Europe’s economic development will continue to
the detriment of the cause of the Allies and the whole
world.

The experience of the Versailles Conference after the
First World War showed that a peace conference can have
very many flaws unless it is prepared beforehand by the
victor Powers. A peace conference without preliminary prep-
arations takes place in a tense atmosphere of contending
sides, which inevitably delays the working out of its deci-
sions.

That is why I propose, considering the experience of the
Versailles Conference, that we should here and now set up
a special Council of Foreign Ministers, consisting of the
Ministers of Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., the United States,
France and China, that is, the permanent members of the
Security Council of the United Nations set up at the San
Francisco Conference. This Council of Foreign Ministers
for preparing a peace conference should meet as soon as

10*

147

possible after our meeting. It is in this spirit and on these
H lines that I have drawn up a draft for the setting up of a
Council of Foreign Ministers for preparing a peace confer-
ence which I now put before you. |
Churchill: 1 propose that we refer the matter for consid- |
eration to our Foreign Ministers, who will report to us at our |
next sitting.
Stalin: I agree, but I am not quite clear about the partic-
ipation of China’s Foreign Minister in the Council. After
all, this is a question of European problems, isn’t it? How
appropriate is the participation of China’s representative?
Truman: We can discuss this question after the Foreign
Ministers report to us.
Stalin: All right.
Truman: About a Control Council for Germany. This
Council should start its work as soon as possible, in accord-
ance with the agreement reached. With that end in view I
submit for your consideration a draft containing the prin-
ciples which, in our opinion, should govern the work of this
Control Council.
Churchill: I have had no chance to read this document,
but I shall read it with full attention and respect, and it
then could be discussed. This question is so broad that it
should not be referred to the Foreign Ministers, but we
should study and discuss it ourselves, and then, if need be,
refer it to the Ministers.
Truman: We could discuss this matter tomorrow.
Stalin: Indeed, we could discuss the question tomorrow.
The Ministers could acquaint themselves with it before-
hand; that would be advisable, because we ourselves will be
studying the question at the same time.
Churchill: Our Ministers already have enough to do on
the first document. Tomorrow we could refer this second
question to them as well, couldn’t we?
Stalin: Good, let’s do that tomorrow.
‘Truman reads the content of a memorandum which says
that under the decisions of the Yalta Declaration on Liber-
ated Europe the three Powers undertook certain obliga-
tions in respect of the liberated peoples of Europe and Ger-
many’s former satellites. These decisions provided for an
agreed policy of the three Powers and their joint action in
the solution of the political and economic problems of
liberated Europe in accordance with democratic principles.

148

Since the Yalta Conference, the obligations undertaken
by us in the Declaration on Liberated Europe remain un-
fulfilled. In the opinion of the U.S. Government, continued
failure to fulfil these obligations will be regarded all over
the world as indicating lack of unity between the three Great
Powers and will undermine confidence in the sincerity and
unity of purpose among the United Nations. That is why
the U.S. Government proposes that the fulfilment of the
obligations of this Declaration should be fully co-ordinated
at this Conference.

The three great Allied states must agree to the need for
an immediate reorganisation of the present Governments
of Rumania and Bulgaria in strict conformity with Para-
graph 3, Point “c” of the Declaration on Liberated
Europe. Consultations must be held immediately to work out
the procedure necessary for the reorganisation of these Gov-
ernments so that they include representatives of all impor-
tant democratic groups. After these Governments are reor-
ganised, there may be diplomatic recognition of them on the
part of the Allied Powers and conclusion of corresponding
treaties.

In conformity with the obligations of the three Powers,
set forth in Paragraph 3, Point ‘“d” of the Declaration on
Liberated Europe, the Governments of the three Powers
must discuss how best to help the work of the provisional
Governments in holding free and fair elections. Such help
will be required in Rumania, Bulgaria, and, possibly, in
other countries too.

One of the most important tasks facing us is to determine
our attitude to Italy. In view of the fact that Italy recently
declared war on Japan, I hope that the Conference will
deem it possible to agree to support Italy’s application to
become a member of the United Nations. The Foreign Min-
isters could work out an appropriate statement on this mat-
ter on behalf of the United Nations Governments.

Is it necessary to read the whole of this document? Do
we have the time?

Churchill: Mr. President, these are very important prob-
lems and we must have time to discuss them. The point
is that our positions on these issues differ. We were attacked
by Italy at the most critical moment, when she stabbed
France in the back. We had been fighting Italy in Africa for
two years, before America entered the war, and we suffered

149

great losses. We even had to risk the forces of the United
Kingdom, and to reduce our defences in the United King-
dom in order to send troops to Africa. We had big naval
battles in the Mediterranean. We have the best of intentions
in respect of Italy, and we have proved this by letting them
keep their ships.

Stalin: That is very good, but today we must confine our-
selves to drawing up an agenda with the additional points.
When the agenda is drawn up any question can be dis-
cussed on its merits.

Truman: | fully agree.

Churchill; | am very grateful to the President for having
opened this discussion, thereby making a big contribution
to our work, but I think that we must have time to discuss
these questions. This is the first time I see them. I am not
saying that I cannot agree with these proposals, but there
must be time to discuss them. I propose that the President
should complete making his proposals, if he has any more,
so that afterwards we could draw up the agenda.

Stalin: Good.

Truman: The aim of the three Governments in respect
of Italy is to promote her political independence ‘and eco-
nomic rehabilitation and to ensure the Italian people the
right to choose their form of government.

The present position of Italy, as a co-belligerent and as
a Power that had surrendered unconditionally, is anoma-
lous and hampers every attempt both of the Allies and of
Italy herself to improve her economic and political position.
This anomaly can be finally eliminated only through the
conclusion of a peace treaty with Italy. The drafting of
such a treaty should be one of the first tasks set before the
Council of Foreign Ministers.

At the same time, an improvement of Italy’s internal sit-
uation can be achieved by creating an atmosphere in which
Italy’s contribution to the defeat of Germany will be rec-
ognised. That is why it is recommended that the brief terms
of Italy’s surrender, and the comprehensive terms of Italy’s
surrender should be annulled and replaced by the Italian
Government’s obligations flowing from the new situation in
Italy.

These obligations must stipulate that the Italian Govern-
ment refrains from hostile action against any member of
the United Nations; the Italian Government must not have

150

any naval or air forces and equipment, except those that
will be established by the Allies, and will observe all the
instructions of the Allies; pending the conclusion of a peace
treaty, control over Italy should be exercised as the need
arises; simultaneously, there must be a decision on how long
the Allied armed forces are to remain on the territory of
Italy; finally, a fair settlement of territorial disputes must
be ensured.

Because I was unexpectedly elected Chairman of this
Conference, I was unable to express my feelings at once. I
am very glad to meet you, Generalissimo, and you, Mr. Prime
Minister. I am well aware that I am now substituting for
a man whom it is impossible to substitute, the late Presi-
dent Roosevelt. I am glad to serve, even if partially, the
memory which you preserve of President Roosevelt. I want
to consolidate the friendship which existed between you.

The matters which I have put before you are, of course,
highly important. But this does not exclude the placing of
additional questions on the agenda.

Churchill: Do you have anything to say, Generalissimo,
in reply to Mr. President, or will you allow me to do so?

Stalin: Please do.

Churchill: On behalf of the British delegation I should
like to voice our sincere gratitude to the President of the
United States for having accepted the chairmanship of this
Conference, and I thank him for having expressed the views
of the great republic which he represents and of which he
is the head, and wish to tell him: I am sure the Generalissi-
mo will agree with me that we welcome him very sincerely
and it is our desire to tell him at this important moment
that we shall have the same warm feelings for him that we
had for President Roosevelt. He has come at a_ historic
moment, and it is our desire that the present tasks and the
aims for which we had fought should be attained now, in
peacetime. We have respect not only for the American peo-
ple but also for their President personally, and I hope this
feeling of respect will grow and serve to improve our
relations.

Stalin: Let me say on behalf of the Russian delegation
that we fully share the sentiments expressed by Mr. Chur-
chill.

Churchill: 1 think we should now pass on to the ordinary
items of the agenda and elaborate some kind of programme

Ll

for our work to see whether we are able to cope with this
agenda ourselves, or whether we should refer a part of the
items to the Foreign Ministers. I do not think we should
lay down the whole of the agenda at once, but can confine
ourselves to an agenda for each day. For instance, we should
like to add the Polish question.

Stalin: Still it would be well for all the three delegations
to set forth all the questions they consider necessary to put
on the agenda. The Russians have questions on the divi-
sion of the German navy and others. On the question of the
navy the President and I had an exchange of letters and
had reached an understanding.

The second question is that of reparations.

Then we should discuss the question of trust territories.

Churchill: Do you mean the territories in Europe or all
over the world?

Stalin: We shall discuss that. I do not know exactly what
these territories are but the Russians would like to take part
in the administration of trust territories.

We should like to raise as a separate question the resump-
tion of diplomatic relations with Germany’s former satel-
lites.

It is also necessary to examine the question of the regime
in Spain. We Russians consider that the present Franco re-
gime in Spain was imposed on the Spanish people by Ger-
many and Italy. It is fraught with grave danger for the
freedom-loving United Nations. We think it would be good
to create conditions for the Spanish people to establish a
regime of their choice.

Churchill: We are still discussing the items to be put on
the agenda. I agree that the question of Spain should be
put on the agenda.

Stalin: I was mcrely explaining the idea behind the ques-
tion.

Then we should also raise the question of Tangiers.

Churchill: Mr. Eden has told me that if we got to the Tan-
giers question we could reach only a temporary agreement
because of the absence of the French.

Stalin: Still it is interesting to know the opinion of the
three Great Powers on this matter.

Then there should be a discussion of the question of Syria
and the Lebanon. It is also necessary to discuss the Polish
question with a view to solving the questions which arise

_

from the fact that the Government of National Unity has
been formed in Poland and the consequent necessity to dis-
band the émigré Polish Government.

Churchill: I consider it necessary to discuss the Polish
question. The discussion of this question which took place
after the Crimea Conference undoubtedly resulted in a sat-
isfactory solution of the Polish question. I quite agree to
have the question examined as also the corollary question of
the disbandment of the Polish Government in London.

Stalin: That’s right, that’s right.

Churchill: I hope that the Generalissimo and the Presi-
dent will understand that we have the London Polish Gov-
ernment which had been the basis for the maintenance of
the Polish Army which fought against Germany. This pro-
duces a number of secondary questions connected with the
disbandment of the Polish Government in London. I think
that our aims are similar, but we certainly have a more dif-
ficult task than the other two Powers. In connection with
the disbandment of the Polish Government we cannot fail
to provide for the soldiers. But we must solve these questions
in the spirit and in the light of the Yalta Conference. In
connection with the Polish question we attach very great
importance, in Poland’s interests, to the matter of elections,
which should be an expression of the Polish people’s sincere
desire.

Stalin: For the time being, the Russian delegation has
no more questions for the agenda.

Churchill: We have already presented our agenda to you.
If you will allow me, Mr. President, I should like to make
a proposal concerning the procedure to be followed at the
Conference. I propose that the three Foreign Ministers
should meet today or tomorrow morning to select the ques-
tions which could best be discussed by us here tomorrow. We
could follow the same procedure for the subsequent days
of the Conference. The Ministers could draw up a better
agenda by selecting three, four or five items. They could
meet tomorrow morning and draw up an agenda for us.

Stalin: I have no objections.

Truman: Agreed.

Churchill: I think we have a general outline of our task
and an idea of the volume of our work. I think the Foreign
Ministers should now make their choice and put it before
us, and then we can start working.

153

Stalin: J agree. What shall we do today? Shall we con-
tinue our sitting until the Ministers let us have five or six
questions? I think we could discuss the setting up of the
Council of Foreign Ministers as a preparatory institution
for the coming peace conference.

Truman: All right.

Churchill: All right.

Stalin: We should discuss the question of the participation
of China’s representative in the Council of Foreign Min-
isters, if the idea is that the Council will deal with European
questions.

Truman: China will be one of the permanent members of
the Security Council set up at San Francisco.

Stalin: Is the decision of the Crimea Conference, under
which the Foreign Ministers are to meet periodically to exam-
ine various questions, to be dropped?

Truman: We propose to set up the Council of Foreign
Ministers for a definite purpose: to work out the terms of a
peace treaty and to prepare a peace conference.

Stalin: It was established at the Crimea Conference that
the Foreign Ministers are to meet every three or four months
to discuss separate questions. This seems to be no longer
necessary, doesn’t it? In that case, the European Advisory
Commission seems to be no longer necessary either? That
is how I see it, and I should like to know whether or not
I am taking the correct view.

Truman: The Council of Foreign Ministers is being set
up only for a definite purpose—to work out the terms of
the peace treaty.

Stalin: I have no objection to setting up the Council of
Foreign Ministers, but then the meetings of Ministers laid
down by the decision of the Crimea Conference are appar-
ently called off and one should think that the European
Advisory Commission is also no longer necessary. Both these
institutions will be replaced by the Council of Foreign Min-
isters.

Churchill: The three Foreign Ministers, as was laid down
at the Crimea Conference, were to meet every three or four
months in order to give us advice on a number of important
questions relating to Europe. I think if we add the repre-
sentative of China to the Council of Foreign Ministers of the
three Great Powers, this will only complicate matters, be-
cause the Council is to discuss questions relating to European

154

countries. When we discuss the peace treaty relating to the
whole world, and not only to Europe, the representative of
China can be invited. Our three Ministers will be able to
do their work more fruitfully and with greater ease. The par-
ticipation of China’s representative in the day-to-day activ-
ity of the Council would merely complicate its work. It
is very easy to create organisations on paper, but if they
produce nothing in reality, I think they are superfluous. In
fact, are we not able to solve the question of the future
administration of Germany without the participation of
China? Let us confine ourselves to the three Ministers in the
Council of Foreign Ministers.

Truman: I propose that we should postpone the discus-
sion of the question of terminating the periodic meetings of
the Ministers as laid down by the decision of the Yalta Con-
ference. We are now discussing the setting up of a Council
of Ministers to draft a peace treaty, and this is quite a dif-
ferent matter. I should like to submit to you the U.S. draft
on the Council of Foreign Ministers setting forth the prin-
ciples of its organisation.

This draft calls for a Council of Foreign Ministers con-
sisting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.,
the United States, Great Britain, China and France. The
Council is to meet periodically, and its first meeting is to
take place on such and such a date.

Each of the Foreign Ministers is to be accompanied by a
high-ranking deputy duly authorised and able to work 1n-
dependently in the absence of the Foreign Minister. He
should also be accompanied by a limited staff of technical
advisers. A joint secretariat is also to be set up.

The Council is to be empowered to draw up, with the aim
of submitting to the Governments of the United Nations,
peace treaties with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary.
The Council is also to propose ways of settling territorial
questions remaining open since the end of the war in Europe.
The Council is to prepare comprehensive terms for a
peace treaty with Germany which are to be accepted by the
future Government of Germany, when a German Govern-
ment suitable for that purpose is set up.

When the Council of Foreign Ministers deals with mat-
ters having a direct bearing on a state not represented on
the Council, that state is to be invited to attend the
Council meetings to take part in discussing the given ques-

155

tion. That does not mean that invariable rules are being laid
down for the work of the Council. The Council shall lay
down a procedure in conformity with a given problem. In
some cases the Council may be convened for preliminary
discussion with the participation of other interested states;
in other cases it may be desirable to convene the Council
before inviting interested sides.

Stalin: Will it be a Council preparing questions for the
future international peace conference?

Truman: Yes.

Churchill: The peace conference which will end the war.

Stalin: In Europe the war is over. The Council will de-
termine and suggest the date for the convocation of a
peace conference.

Truman: We think the conference should not be called
before we are duly prepared for it.

Churchill: It seems to me there is no difficulty in concert-
ing the aim we are striving for. We must set up a Council
of Foreign Ministers to draft a peace treaty. But this Coun-
cil should not substitute the organisations which already
exist and deal with day-to-day matters—the regular meet-
ings of the three Ministers and the European Advisory Com-
mission, in which France is also taking part. The Council
of Foreign Ministers is a broader organisation. There one
can establish to what extent the European Advisory Com-
mission and the regular meetings of the Ministers may deal
with the questions of the peace treaty.

Stalin: Who in that case is to be subordinate to whom?

Churchill: The Council of Foreign Ministers is to exist
parallel to the Security Council, in which China is also
taking part, and parallel to the regular meetings of Foreign
Ministers and the European Advisory Commission. Until
victory over Japan, China will find it hard to take part in
discussing European questions. We cannot benefit in
any way from China’s taking part in discussing European
questions at present. Europe has always been a great
volcano, and its problems should be regarded as being
highly important. It is possible that at the time when
the peace conference will be convened we shall have
better news from the Far East and we could then invite
China too.

I propose that in principle the peace treaty should be
drafted by the five principal Powers, but as for Europe,

156

its problems should be discussed only by the four Powers
which have a direct interest in these matters. In this way
we shall not disrupt the work of the European Advisory
Commission and the regular meetings of Foreign Ministers.
Both these organisations will be able to continue their work
simultaneously,

Stalin: Perhaps we should refer this question to the
Ministers for discussion?

Truman: | agree and do not object to China being ex-
cluded from the Council of Foreign Ministers.

Churchill: 1 think it would be possible to arrange things
in such a way that some members would not take part in
all the sittings, although they would enjoy full rights, as
all the other members, but they would attend the sittings
only when there was an examination of questions they were
interested in.

Truman: As | see it, this question should be referred to
the Foreign Ministers for discussion.

Stalin: Yes, that’s right.

Truman: Can we discuss anything more today?

Stalin: Since all the questions are to be discussed by the
Foreign Ministers, we have nothing else to do today.

Churchill: I propose that the Foreign Ministers should
examine the question of whether there should be four or
five members. But that this Council should deal exclusively
with preparations for the peace treaty first for Europe and
then for the whole world.

Stalin: A peace treaty or a peace conference?

Churchill: The Council will prepare a plan which it will
put before the Heads of Government for examination.

Stalin: Let the Foreign Ministers discuss how necessary
it is to keep alive the European Advisory Commission in
Europe and how necessary it is for the regular meetings of
the three Ministers, established in accordance with the Yal-
ta decision, to continue their functions. Let the Ministers
also discuss these questions.

Churchill: That depends on the situation in Europe and
on what headway these organisations make in their work.
I propose that the three Foreign Ministers should continue
their regular meetings and that the European Advisory
Commission should also continue its work.

Truman: We must specify the concrete questions for
discussion at tomorrow’s sitting.

157

Churchill: We should want to have something definite in
the bag every night as we return home.

Truman: | should like the Foreign Ministers to give us
something definite for discussion every day.

Stalin: I agree.

Truman: 1 also propose that we should start our sittings
at four o’clock instead of five.

Stalin: Four? Well, all right.

Churchill: We submit to the Chairman.

Truman: If that is accepted, let us postpone the examina-
tion of questions until 4.00 p.m. tomorrow.

Stalin: Yes, let’s do that. There is only one other ques-
tion: why does Mr. Churchill deny the Russians their share
of the German navy?

Churchill: | have no objections. But since you have asked
me this question, here is my answer: this navy should be
either sunk or divided.

Stalin: Do you want it sunk or divided?

Churchill: All means of war are terrible things.

Stalin: The navy should be divided. If Mr. Churchill pre-
fers to sink the navy, he is free to sink his share of it; I
have no intention of sinking mine.

Churchill: At present, nearly the whole of the German
navy is in our hands.

Stalin: That’s the whole point. That’s the whole point.
That is why we need to decide the question.

Truman: Tomorrow the sitting is at 4 o’clock.

Second Sitting
July 18, 1945

Truman opens the sitting.

Churchill: 1 should like to mention one question outside
the agenda which is not especially important from the stand-
point of international relations and which is of temporary
significance. During our meeting at Tehran, members of
the press found it very hard to obtain any information on
the work of the Conference, and altogether impossible at
the Yalta Conference. There are almost 180 correspondents
in Berlin who are roaming the environs in a state of fury
and indignation.

158

Stalin: That’s a whole company. Who let them in?

Churchill: They are not here, in the zone, of course,
but in Berlin. Of course, we can work calmly only if there
is secrecy, and we are duty bound to ensure this secrecy.
If both my colleagues agree with me, I could, as an old
journalist, have a talk with them and explain to them the
need for secrecy at our meeting; I could tell them that we
sympathise with them, but are unable to tell them what is
going on here. I think we should stroke their wings to calm
them.

Stalin: What do they want, what are their demands?

Truman: Each of our delegations has special press of-
ficers, and it is their duty to protect us from the claims of the
correspondents. Let them do their job. We can authorise
them to talk to the journalists.

Churchill: Of course, I don’t want to be a lamb led to the
slaughter. I could talk to them if the Generalissimo guar-
antees to rescue me with troops in case of need.

Truman: Today our Foreign Ministers have prepared an
agenda and recommend it for our consideration. By agree-
ment between the Ministers, Byrnes is to report on the
agenda.

Byrnes: Our Foreign Ministers have agreed to propose
the following items for inclusion in today’s agenda:

1. The question of the procedure and mechanism for
peace negotiations and territorial claims.

2. The question of the powers of the Control Council in
Germany in the political sphere.

3. The Polish question, specifically, the disbandment of
the émigré Polish Government in London.

As for the first item, the procedure and mechanism for
peace negotiations and territorial claims (the establishment
of a Council of Foreign Ministers), the draft proposed by the
U.S. delegation was in principle approved by the Foreign
Ministers’ conference. The conference adopted a new read-
ing of Clause 3 of the draft on setting up the Council of
Foreign Ministers. The first and most important task of the
Council of Ministers is to draft peace treaties with Italy,
Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, and also to pre-
pare a peace treaty with Germany.

An equally important task of the Council is to prepare
and submit to the Governments of the United Nations de-
tailed terms of organisation and holding of the peace confer-

159

ence. The Council must also be used for preparing the ques-
tion of a peaceful settlement of territorial disputes. For the
fulfilment of all these tasks, the Council shall consist of
the same members who are permanent members of the
Security Council.

When the Council of Foreign Ministers examines ques-
tions which have a direct bearing on the interests of states
not represented on the Council, these states shall be invited
to send their representatives to take part in the discussion
of the matter. In some cases, the Council could have a pre-
liminary discussion of the question by itself, before inviting
representatives of the interested states.

The Soviet delegation has made the reservation that it
retains the right to introduce an amendment and make re-
marks on Clause 1 of the draft of the U.S. delegation on the
establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers.!

The conference agreed that the periodic conferences of
the three Ministers established by the decision of the Cri-
mea Conference would not be affected by the work of the
Council of Foreign Ministers.

As for the powers of the European Advisory Commission,
the conference of Ministers decided to transfer these pow-
ers to the Allied Control Councils for Germany and Aus-
tria. Thus, the draft proposed by the American delegation
for the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers
was in the main approved, with the exception of the Soviet
delegation’s reservation on Clause 1.

Stalin: The Soviet delegation withdraws its reservation
on Clause 1 of the draft. As for the rest, the Soviet delega-
tion is in agreement and accepts the draft.

Truman: Consequently, the draft on the institution of the
Council of Foreign Ministers is adopted without objections.

Stalin: It is possible to accept this text: the three Great
Powers represent the interests of all the United Nations and
they can take the responsibility upon themselves.

‘Truman: Let us pass to the second item.

Churchill: Our Foreign Ministers have worked well.

Stalin: To be sure, to be sure.

Truman: The next question is on the political powers of
the Control Council in Germany.

1 Clause 1 envisaged that there should be set up a Council con-

sisting of the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, China, France and the United States.

160

Byrnes: The Foreign Ministers discussed the question of
the political powers of the Control Council in Germany and
of its economic powers. Some of the differences which arose
in the discussion of this matter were referred to sub-com-
missions which were set up. These sub-commissions have not
yet completed their work, but the Ministers have agreed
that it would be desirable for the Heads of Government to
have a preliminary discussion of the political powers of the
Control Council in Germany at today’s sitting. The Minis-
ters also agreed that the economic questions connected with
Germany are so difficult and complicated that they must
be referred to a sub-commission of experts. These sub-com-
missions will report to the Ministers on the matters on which
they fail to reach agreement. The Foreign Ministers will
then decide which of these questions are to be submitted for
the examination by the Heads of Government.

The Foreign Ministers have also agreed that although
they would not recommend today a discussion on the ques-
tion of the German navy and merchant marine, this ques-
tion would be discussed somewhat later.

Churchill: 1 want to raise only one question. I note that
the word “Germany” is being used here. What is now the
meaning of “Germany”? Is it to be understood in the same
sense as before the war?

Truman: How is this question understood by the Soviet
delegation?

Stalin: Germany is what she has become after the war.
There is no other Germany. That is how I understand the
question.

Truman: Is it possible to speak of Germany as she had
been before the war, in 1937?

Stalin: As she is in 1945.

Truman: She lost everything in 1945; actually, Germany
no longer exists.

Stalin: Germany is, as we say, a geographical concept.
Let’s take it this way for the time being. We cannot abstract
ourselves from the results of the war.

Truman: Yes, but there must be some definition of the
concept of “Germany”. I believe the Germany of 1886 or
of 1937 is not the same thing as Germany today,
in 1945.

Stalin: She has changed as a result of the war, and that
is how we take her.

11-876

Truman: 1 quite agree with this, but some definition of
the concept of “Germany” must be given.

Stalin: For example, is there any idea of establishing a
German administration in the Sudeten part of Czechoslo-
vakia? That is an area from which the Germans had ex-
pelled the Czechs.

Truman: Perhaps we shall speak of Germany as she had
been before the war, in 1937?

Stalin: That could be taken formally, but actually that
is not so. If a German administration should put in an ap-
pearance at Konigsberg, we shall expel it, we shall most
certainly expel it.

Truman: It was agreed at the Crimea Conference that
territorial questions should be settled at a peace confer-
ence. How are we then to define the concept of “Germany”?

Stalin: Let us define the western borders of Poland, and
we shall then be clearer on the question of Germany. I find
it very hard to say what Germany is just now. It is a coun-
try without a Government, without any definite borders, be-
cause the borders are not formalised by our troops. Ger-
many has no troops, including frontier troops, she is broken
up into occupation zones. Take this and define what Ger-
many is. It is a broken country.

Truman: Perhaps we could take Germany’s 1937 bor-
ders as the starting point?

Stalin: We can start anywhere. We have to start some-
where. In that context, we could take 1937 too.

Truman: That was the Germany after the Versailles
Treaty.

Stalin: Yes, we could take the Germany of 1937, but only
as a point of departure. It is merely a working hypothesis
for the convenience of our work.

Churchill: Only as a starting point. That does not mean
that we shall confine ourselves to this.

Truman: We agree to take the Germany of 1937 as a
starting point.

We have not yet finished with the second question but
shall agree on that.

Stalin: Is the political aspect prepared?

Byrnes: The political aspect is prepared and can be dis-
cussed.

Stalin: The Russian delegation in the main accepts all the
clauses of the political section of this question. There is

162

only one amendment to Clause 5: it would be well to delete
the last four lines, for they leave a loophole for the Nazis
which they can use.

Truman: | agree that these four lines should be deleted.

Stalin: Very good. We are agreed on all the rest. I should
like the drafting commission to edit this text.

Byrnes: A special sub-commission has been appointed for
this purpose at the Foreign Ministers’ meeting.

Stalin: Good. There are no objections.

Eden: It would be good if the Ministers once again went
over this document at their meeting tomorrow morning,
after it is submitted by the drafting commission.

Stalin: That will, of course, be better.

Churchill: This draft, Clause 2 (b), speaks of the destruc-
tion of armaments and other instruments of war, and of
all specialised means for their manufacture. However, there
are several highly valuable experimental installations in
Germany. It would be undesirable to destroy these installa-
tions.

Stalin: The draft says: to seize or destroy.

Churchill: We could use them all together or divide them
among ourselves.

Stalin: Yes, we could.

The Soviet delegation has a draft on the Polish question
in Russian and in English. I would ask you to study this draft.

Truman: | propose that we should hear out Byrnes’s
report on the meeting of the Foreign Ministers and then
acquaint ourselves with your draft.

Byrnes: The Foreign Ministers agreed to recommend to
the Heads of Government that they should discuss the Polish
question from two aspects: the disbandment of the émigré
Polish Government in London and the fulfilment of the Cri-
mea Conference decisions on Poland in the part relating to
the holding of free and unhindered elections in Poland.

(The draft of the Soviet delegation on Poland is then
read out:

STATEMENT OF THE HEADS
OF THE THREE GOVERNMENTS
ON THE POLISH QUESTION

“In view of the setting up on the basis of the decisions
of the Crimea Conference of the Provisional Polish Govern-
ment of National Unity and in view of the establishment

11* 163

by the United States of America and by Great Britain of
diplomatic relations with Poland, which previously already
existed between Poland and the Soviet Union, we agreed
that the Governments of Great Britain and the United States
of America should sever all relations with the Govern-
ment of Arciszewski and render to the Provisional Polish
Government of National Unity the necessary assistance in
the immediate transmission to it of all stock, assets and all
other property belonging to Poland, which still is at the
disposal of the Government of Arciszewski and of its organs,
in whatever form this property may be and no matter where
or at whose disposal this property may prove to be at the
present moment.

“We also found it necessary that the Polish armed forces,
including the navy and merchant marine, now subor-
dinated to the Government of Arciszewski, should be subor-
dinated to the Provisional Polish Government of National
Unity, which will determine the further measures to be taken
in respect of these armed forces, men of war and merchant
ships.”]

Churchill: Mr. President, I should like to explain that
the burden in this matter falls on the British Government,
because when Hitler attacked Poland we welcomed the
Poles and gave them sanctuary. The London Polish Govern-
ment has no assets to speak of, but there is £20 million
worth of gold in London which we have blocked. This gold
is an asset of the Central Polish Bank. The question of where
the gold is to be blocked, and its transfer to some other
central bank should be settled in the ordinary way. But this
gold does not belong to the London Polish Government.

Stalin: Did you say £ 20 million sterling?

Churchill: Approximately. I must add that the Polish
Embassy in London has now been vacated and the Polish
Ambassador no longer lives there. That is why the Embassy
is open and can accommodate an Ambassador of the Pro-
visional Polish Government, and the sooner it appoints one,
the better.

The question arises, how the Polish Government in Lon-
don had been financed for five and a half years? It was
financed by the British Government. We let them have
about £120 million in that period to enable them to main-
tain their army, maintain diplomatic relations and exercise
other functions and also maintain a considerable number of

164

Poles who had found refuge from the Germans on our shores,
the only refuge that was at their disposal.

When the London Polish Government was disavowed, it
was decided to pay all employees a three-month salary and
then dismiss them. We believed it would be unjust to dis-
miss them without giving them some compensation.

Mr. President, this is a very important matter, and | ask
you to allow me to speak on it. Our position is an exception-
al one. We now have to engage in disbanding or transfer-
ring the Polish troops who had fought against the Germans
by our side. These troops made their appearance from France
in 1940. Some of them got to Italy via Switzerland, and
continued to trickle in in small parties. We evacuated the
Poles who had found themselves in France when she sur-
rendered. They numbered 40,000 or 50,000.

Thus, we set up a Polish Army, consisting of five divisions,
which was based in Britain. About 20,000 Poles are now in
Germany and are highly alarmed. There is a Polish Corps
of three divisions in Italy, which is also in great agitation.

Altogether, the Polish Army consists of 180,000 to
200,000 men.

Our policy is to induce the greatest number of Poles to
return to Poland. That is why I was very angry when I read
the statement of General Anders, whom the Generalissimo
knows. Anders told his troops in Italy that if they returned
to Poland they would be sent to Siberia. We have taken
disciplinary measures against this general, to prevent him
from making such statements in the future.

It will take time to overcome all these difficulties. But it
is our policy to induce the greatest possible number of Poles
to return to Poland. This also applies to the civilians.
Of course, the better the state of things in Poland, the soon-
er will the Poles return there. I should like to take this op-
portunity to say that J am glad the situation in Poland has
improved in the last two months.

I should like to express my wishes of further success to
the new Polish Government which will play its positive part,
and although it does not give everything we should like to
see, it signifies progress thanks to the patient efforts of the
Governments of the three Powers. Mikolajczyk should also
be given credit for his part in improving the situation in
Poland.

I hope that as the situation in Poland improves, an ever

165

growing number of Poles will return home. I have promised
Parliament that Polish soldiers who do not wish to return
to Poland would be given British citizenship and enrolled
into the army. It would be desirable that the new Polish
Government of National Unity should give assurances that
the Poles returning to Poland would have complete free-
dom and economic security. Such an assurance of the Pol-
ish Government would considerably promote the return of
the Poles home, to the land liberated by the Red Army.

Stalin: Have you read the draft of the Russian delega-
tion on Poland?

Churchill: Yes, 1 have. My speech is a reply to the draft
of the Russian delegation in proof of the fact that I am fun-
damentally in agreement, provided what I have just said is
taken into account.

Stalin: I realise the difficulty of the British Government’s
position. I know it gave sanctuary to the Polish emigre Gov-
ernment. I know that in spite of this, the former Polish
rulers have caused the Government of Great Britain much
trouble. I understand the British Government's difficult po-
sition. But I ask you to bear in mind that our draft is not
designed to complicate the British Government’s position
and takes account of the difficulty of its position. Our draft
has only one purpose: to put an end to the indefinite situa-
tion which still continues to exist in this question, and to dot
all the “1’s.

In practice, the Arciszewski Government exists, it has its
ministers, and continues its activity, it has its agents and
has its base and its press. All this creates an unfavourable
impression. Our draft is designed to put an end to this in-
definite situation. If Mr. Churchill points out the clauses in
this draft which tend to complicate the British Government’s
position, I am prepared to delete them. Our draft is not
aimed at making the British Government’s position more
difficult.

Churchill: We quite agree with you. We want to elimi-
nate this question, but when a Government is no longer
recognised and is not given any grants, it no longer has any
possibility for existence. At the same time, you cannot pre-
vent individuals, in Britain at any rate, from living and
talking. These people meet with members of Parliament and
have their supporters in Parliament. But we, as Govern-
ment, have no relations with them at all. Mr. Eden and I

166

myself have never met them, and since Mr. Mikolajczyk
left, I do not even know what to do with them, and never
meet them. I don’t know what to do when Arciszewski
walks about London and chats with journalists. As for us,

we consider them to be non-existent and eliminated in the
diplomatic sense, and I hope that they will be completely
ineffective soon. But, of course, we must be careful in respect
of the army.

The army may mutiny and we may suffer losses as a re-
sult. We have a sizable Polish army in Scotland. But our
aim is similar to those of the Generalissimo and the Pres-
ident. We merely ask for trust and time and also your help
in creating conditions in Poland which would attract these
Poles. We would agree to refer the draft of the Soviet del-
egation for examination by the three Foreign Ministers, with
an eye to the discussion that has taken place today, and to

the document which had been presented by our Foreign
Minister. But I think we have one and the same aim, and
the sooner we finish with this question, the better.

Truman: I do not see any essential differences between
the Generalissimo and the Prime Minister. Mr. Churchill
merely asks for trust and time to eliminate all the difficul-
ties of which he spoke here. That is why I think it will not

be too hard to settle this question, especially in view of the
fact that Mr. Stalin has said that he is prepared to delete
all the controversial points. The Yalta Conference decisions
provided that after the establishment of the new Govern-
ment general elections on the basis of universal suffrage
should be held as soon as possible.

Churchill: Perhaps the Foreign Ministers would examine
the whole question, including elections?

Stalin: The Government of Poland does not refuse to hold
unhindered elections. Let us refer this draft to the Foreign
Ministers.

Truman: That is all Mr. Byrnes had to place before the
Heads of Government for discussion today. Am I to ask
the Foreign Ministers to prepare an agenda for tomorrow?

Stalin: That would be fine.

Churchill: 1 realise the great importance of the question
of political principles to be applied in respect of Germany.

I realise that we are unable to discuss this question today,
/

but I hope we shall discuss it tomorrow. The main principle
which we should examine is whether we should apply a
| 167

uniform system of control in all the four zones of occupa-
tion of Germany or whether different principles are to be
applied to the different zones of occupation.

Stalin: This is the very question that is dealt with in the
political part of the draft. It is my impression that we stand
for a single policy. ;

Truman: Quite right.

Churchill: I should like to emphasise this, because it is
highly important.

Stalin: That’s right.

Truman: Tomorrow we meet at 4 o’clock.

Third Sitting
July 19, 1945

Truman opens the sitting.

Churchill: At the very beginning of yesterday’s sitting, the
Generalissimo raised the question of the incident on the
Greco-Albanian border. We have made due inquiries but
have not heard of any fighting there. There may have been
small exchanges. There’s no love lost between the peoples
there.

There is no Greek field division in that area. We know
this because our men are there. There are 7,000 men of the
National Guards, which are on the border with Albania
and Yugoslavia. They are armed and equipped for the pur-
poses of internal protection. On the other side of the border
there are 30,000 Albanian troops, 30,000 Yugoslav troops
and 24,000 Bulgarian.

I mention this because I believe the Great Power Con-
ference must insist that no such attacks should take place
across the borders of any Power. The frontiers will be laid
down at a peace conference, and we must let it be known
that those who try to determine their frontiers beforehand
may find themselves worse off.

Stalin: There is some misunderstanding here. We must
not discuss this question here, at this Conference. I did not
raise it at the Conference, but spoke of it privately.

Churchill: I agree with the Generalissimo that the ques-
tion was not raised at a sitting, but if it is placed on the
agenda we are prepared to discuss it.

168

eee eee ee

Lr

Truman: We are not going to discuss this question but
will go on to a discussion of those which will be reported to
us on behalf of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

(The British delegation then reported that in view of the
fact that the American delegation had made an amendment
in Article 3 of, the draft to set up a Council of Foreign Min-
isters, the Ministers agreed to refer the article to the draft-
ing committee.

The Foreign Ministers then examined the political sec-
tion of the agreement on political and economic principles
which are to serve as a guide in dealing with Germany in the
initial control period. The British delegation recalled that
the Heads of Government had examined the draft agree-
ment the previous day and had instructed the Ministers to
present their report that day.

The delegation said that the Foreign Ministers had exam-
ined the draft, and had made some additions to it, and
were now submitting the new draft of the political section
of the agreement for the consideration of the Heads of
Government. It said the Foreign Ministers believed that
when the discussion and co-ordination of the economic
section of the draft was over, the Conference would
have to consider the publication of the agreement as a
whole.

The British delegation then said that the Ministers had
gone into the question of Poland; they had a very impor-
tant and useful discussion of the question, which was then
referred to the drafting committee. The Ministers expressed
the hope that it would be possible to report to the Confer-
ence on the question the next day if the drafting committee
was ready.

The Ministers also agreed to submit for the consideration
of that day’s plenary sitting the questions of the German
Navy and merchant fleet, Spain, the fulfilment of the Yalta
Declaration on Liberated Europe, Yugoslavia, etc.]

Truman: The first question is that of the German Navy.
I think that before tackling this question it is necessary to
solve another one, namely, what is to be regarded as the
spoils of war and what as reparations. If the merchant ma-
rine is an object of reparations, the question should be
solved when the question of reparations is considered. We
should ask the Reparations Commission to define the range
of values that are to be classed as reparations. I show a spe-

169

cial interest in Germany’s merchant fleet because it might
be used in the war against Japan.

Stalin: The Navy, like any other armament, must be
taken as spoils of war. Troops laying down their arms must
hand in their armaments to those to whom they surrender.
The same may be said of the Navy. The proposals of the
military representatives of the three Powers make it ex-
plicit that the Navy must be disarmed and surrendered.
Those are the terms of Germany’s surrender. In respect of
the merchant fleet it may be asked whether it is to be
classed as spoils of war or as reparations; as for the Navy it
is part of the spoils of war and is subject to surrender. If you
recall the case of Italy you will see that both the Navy and
the merchant marine fell into the class of spoils of war.

Churchill: 1 should not like to take a purely legalistic
attitude to this question and use precise terminology. But I
want to have a fair and amicable solution of the question,
and reach an agreement between the three Great Powers as
a part of the general agreement on all questions arising from
this Conference. At this point, I should like to consider
only the German Navy. In effect, we have all the seaworthy
German ships in our hands. I think a general amicable
solution of the questions arising from this Conference will
be reached—I am sure of this—and that is why we have
no objection in principle to a division of the German Navy.

I am not now speaking of the Italian Navy. I think we
should discuss this question separately, having in mind our
general policy on Italy. Of course, there also arises the
question of indemnification. As for Great Britain, she has
suffered very heavy losses, she has lost about 10 capital
ships, that is, battleships, heavy cruisers and aircraft car-
riers and besides, at least 20 cruisers and several hundred
destroyers, submarines and small craft.

I think submarines should be classed in another category
than the rest of the German Navy. These submarines have
a special part to play; according to the convention signed
also by Germany they were to be used on a limited scale.
However, Germany violated the convention and made use
of submarines on a rather extensive scale, that is, Germany
made illegal use of them, and so during the war we too were
forced to abandon the legitimate use of submarines. It is
my opinion that these submarines should be either destroyed
or scuttled.

170

I am aware, however, that the latest German submarines,
especially the best of them, are of definite scientific and
technical interest, and they should be left for study. Infor-
mation about these submarines must be made available to
all three Great Powers. I do not view this matter from
the purely naval standpoint and fully recognise the losses
suffered by the Red Army during the war. I do not think
we should take any final decision here, but after the Con-
ference most of these vessels should be destroyed, while a
part may be equally divided between us all.

As for surface ships, they should be divided equally be-
tween us provided we reach a general agreement on all other
questions and leave here on the best of terms. I have no
objection to Russia’s receiving one-third of the German
Navy, but only with the proviso I have just mentioned. |
recognise that such a great and mighty nation as the Rus-
sians, who have made such a great contribution to the com-
mon cause, must be given a warm reception on the high
seas. We shall welcome the appearance of the Russian flag
on the seas. I am aware that it is very hard to build a great
fleet in a short time. That is why these German ships may
be used for study and the creation of a Russian fleet. There
is nothing more | can add.

If it is desirable to speak of the merchant marine, I could
say a few words here.

Truman: Please.

Churchill: I feel that so long as the war against Japan
continues, the German merchant navy could play a consid-
erable part in that war. The possibility of cutting short
the war largely depends on the merchant navy. We have
all the men we need for the Army, Air Force and the Navy.
But we are short of the means of conveyance for these men,
and for the transfer of materiel.

Besides, the merchant navy is needed for supplying the
British Isles with food, and also for supplying food to the
liberated European countries which cannot be fully supplied
as it is. Every ton is of great value. America and we have
given all our merchant navy to the common effort. I should
be very sorry if the 1.2 million tons of Germany’s mer-
chant navy did not go into this common effort so as to end
the war against Japan as soon as possible.

I should also like to mention the following. Finland has
a merchant navy consisting of about 400,000 tons. This navy

171

has passed into the hands of our Russian Ally. The Russian
Ally has also taken over some Rumanian ships, including
two important transports, which are very necessary for
troop transportation. If there is to be a division of the navy
into three parts between the Powers, I think the merchant
navies of Rumania and Finland should also go into the
pool for distribution.

Stalin: We have taken nothing from Finland’s merchant
navy, and only one vessel from Rumania.

Churchill: 1 should only like to mention the principles
on which we could have a distribution of the merchant navy.

Finally, we should bear in mind that there are other
countries besides our three Powers. Norway, for instance,
has suffered very heavy losses in her merchant fleet. Nor-
wegian tonnage, especially Norwegian tankers, was a great
force. They put their whole navy at our disposal, and it has
suffered great damage. Other countries have also lost a
great part of their navies. I think it is necessary to raise the
question of dividing the merchant navy into four instead
of three parts, to set aside the fourth part to satisfy the
interests of certain other countries which are not represent-
ed here. I merely propose the question for examination and
discussion.

Truman: For my part, I want to make a remark on this
question. I should be very glad to divide the German Navy
into three parts, with the exception of the submarine fleet.
But I want the solution of this question to be postponed in
the interests of the war against Japan. We would find all
these ships very useful, because we shall use them not only
for troop transportation but also for the supply of Europe.
The present situation is such that we find the available ships
altogether inadequate. That is why I very much want to
retain all this German surface fleet for the war against Japan.
I think it right to say here that when the war against Japan
is over, we in the United States will have a great number
not only of warships but a great number of merchant ships
which could be sold to interested countries. I would be very
glad if all the ships of the German merchant navy were
made available for the conduct of the war against Japan.

Stalin: What if the Russians fight Japan?

Truman: It goes without saying that the Russians could
claim one-third of the fleet, which would then be handed
over to them. An agreement could be reached on this.

172

Stalin: It is the principle we think important.

Churchill: Mr. President, I think we can reach an agree-
ment. I suppose these ships could now be earmarked for
each participant, and when the war against Japan is over,
these ships could be handed over where they belong.

Stalin: Which ships?

Churchill: | mean the merchantmen. But I think the prin-
ciple is the most important thing here. It should be borne
in mind that the Red Army’s offensive along the Baltic
coast forced the Germans to abandon their ports, so that
the German fleet was expelled from the Baltic Sea. I must
admit that I am a supporter of Generalissimo Stalin’s pro-
posal concerning the Russian desire to obtain a part of Ger-
many’s Navy and merchant fleet, and believe that the only
alternative would be to sink the whole navy, but that would
be unwise, considering that our Ally wants to have a part
of this navy.

Stalin: The Russians should not be depicted as people
who are intent on hampering the successful operation of the
Allied navy against Japan. But this should not lead to the
conclusion that the Russians want to receive a present from
the Allies. We want no gifts, but wish to know whether or
not the principle is recognised, whether or not the Russian
claim to a part of the German navy is considered legitimate.

Churchill: I said nothing of gifts.

Stalin: I did not say you did.

I want a clarification of the question of whether the Rus-
sians have a right to one-third of Germany’s Navy and mer-
chant marine. I think the Russians have this right and what
they will receive they will receive by right. I only want
clarity in this matter. If my colleagues think differently I
should like to know what they actually think. We shall be
satished if there is recognition of the principle that the
Russians have a right to receive one-third of Germany’s
Navy and merchant fleet.

As for the use of Germany’s merchant fleet, specifically
that third which would be recognised as being Russia’s by
right, we shall of course have no objections to that third
being put to the best use by the Allies in their struggle
against Japan. I also agree that this question should be set-
tled at the end of the Conference.

I should like to deal with yet another question. Our men
have been deprived of access to Germany’s Navy and mer-

173

chant fleet, they were prevented from inspecting the ships.
The bulk of the navy is known to be in the hands of our
Ally, but our men were deprived of access to these ships
and they have no possibility of inspecting the ships of that
navy. They should at least be given a chance to study the
list of these ships. Is it not possible to lift this ban and give
the members of the Russian naval commission an opportun-
ity to inspect the ships of this navy and to find out how
many ships there are.

Churchill: We are also in possession of facts when our
men were not allowed to inspect some war trophies on the
Baltic Sea.

Stalin: Only submarines were seized on the Baltic, but
that is an absolutely useless, destroyed submarine fleet. But
if there is a desire to inspect it, the opportunity can be given
at any time.

Churchill: Our principle is equality and fairness. There-
fore I consider your proposal acceptable, but we only ask
whether it could be arranged to give our men an opportunity
to inspect some highly interesting German property, for
instance, on the Baltic Sea, notably some submarines?

Stalin: You are welcome.

Truman: I want to say here on behalf of the United
States that you have access to all our zones and you can see
anything you want to. But we should like to obtain the
same possibility of inspecting what we may find of in-
terest.

Churchill: 1 spoke here of the difference between sub-
marines and surface ships. Generalissimo Stalin will under-
stand us when we say that as islanders we are highly sen-
sitive on this point. Our island provides us with less than
two-thirds of our food. During this war, we have suffered a
great deal from submarines. More, in fact, than anyone else.
Twice we stood on the brink of disaster. That is why the
submarine is not a popular type of warship in Britain. I
favour the sinking of the bulk of the submarines.

Stalin: I do too.

Churchill: And J want the rest of the submarines be
shared equally between us for scientific and technical pur-
poses, because they are of considerable interest. Twice we
stood on the brink of disaster because of the operations of
enemy submarines. I agree, therefore, that we should sink
the bulk of the submarines and divide the rest among the

174

eee

three Powers. I ask the Generalissimo and the President to
excuse me, but in this respect we are in a special position.
Our military might has suffered greatly from these subma-
rines. In accepting this principle I merely stipulate that the
question of the number of submarines to be sunk and the
number to be divided should be settled at the end of the
Conference.

Stalin: Good, I agree.

Truman: We have discussed this question sufficiently,
and can go on to the next one.

Eden: The next question deals with Spain.

‘Truman: Does the Generalissimo wish to speak on the
question?

Stalin: The proposals have been circulated. I have nothing
to add to what is said there.

Churchill: Mr. President, the British Government—the
present one and the previous one—have a feeling of hatred
for Franco and his Government. I have been misunderstood,
and it has been said that I take a friendly attitude to this
gentleman. All I said was that there is more to Spanish
politics than anti-Franco cartoons. | think that the continued
destruction of people thrown into prison for what they did
six years ago, and various other circumstances in Spain are,
by our British standards, totally undemocratic.

When Franco sent me a letter saying that he, I and cer-
tain other Western countries should unite against the threat
of the Soviet Union, I sent him, with the permission of my
Cabinet, a very cool reply. The Soviet Government may
remember this reply, because J sent it a copy of my letter,
as I did to the President. So there are no great differences
between us concerning the feelings we have for the present
regime in Spain.

Where I do see some difficulty in adopting the draft pro-
posed by the Generalissimo is in Point One, which speaks
of the rupture of all relations with the Franco Government,
which is the Government of Spain. I think that, consider-
ing that the Spaniards are proud and rather sensitive, such
a step by its very nature could have the effect of uniting
the Spaniards around Franco, instead of making them move
away from him. That is why I do not think that the rupture
of diplomatic relations with the Spanish Government would
be a satisfactory way of solving the question.

This may give us some satisfaction but we shall then be

175

deprived of any contact we may need in hard times. I be-
lieve such a step would only strengthen Franco’s position,
and if his positions are strengthened we shall have to stand
his abuse or use our forces against him. I am against the
use of force in such cases. I do not think we should interfere
in the internal affairs of a state with whom we differ in
views, with the exception of cases when this or that state
attacks us. Concerning the countries we have defeated, there
we should establish our own control. As for the countries
that have been liberated in the course of the war, we can-
not allow the establishment there of a fascist or a Franco
regime. But here we have a country which did not take
part in the war and that is why I am against interfering
in its domestic affairs. His Majesty’s Government will need
to have a long discussion of this question before it decides
to break off relations with Spain.

I think Franco’s power is now jeopardised and I hope
that his downfall may be speeded up by diplomatic means.
Rupture of relations is, in my opinion, a very dangerous
way of tackling the question. Besides, there is always the
danger of a possible resumption of the civil war in Spain,
which cost her 2 million dead out of a total population of
17 or 18 million. And it would be a pity to interfere actively
in this matter at this point, because I believe that there are
forces operating there to change the situation for the better.
That is my view of the question.

The world organisation set up at San Francisco takes a
negative attitude to interference in the affairs of other coun-
tries. It would therefore be wrong for us to take an active
part in settling this matter. This would run counter to the
Charter of the international organisation adopted at San
Francisco.

Truman: I have no sympathies for the Franco regime, but
I have no desire to take part in a Spanish civil war. I’ve
had enough of the war in Europe. We should be very glad
to recognise another government in Spain instead of the
Franco Government, but that I think is a question for Spain
herself to decide.

Stalin: Is that to say that there will be no change in
Spain? I personally think that the Franco regime is being
strengthened and it is a regime that fosters semi-fascist re-
gimes in certain other countries of Europe. It should be
borne in mind that the Franco regime was imposed on the

176

Spanish people from outside, and is not a regime that has
taken shape in internal conditions.

You are very well aware that the Franco regime was im-
posed by Hitler and Mussolini, and is their legacy. By
destroying the Franco regime we shall be destroying the
legacy of Hitler and Mussolini. Nor must we lose sight of the
fact that the democratic liberation of Europe implies certain
obligations.

I am not proposing any military intervention; I am not
proposing that we should unleash a civil war there. I should
only like the Spanish people to know that we, the leaders
of democratic Europe, take a negative attitude to the
Franco regime. Unless we declare this in one form or anoth-
er, the Spanish people will be justified in thinking that we
are not against the Franco regime. They may say that since
we have left the Franco regime alone, it means that we
support it.

What are the diplomatic means that could show the Span-
ish people that we are not on the side of Franco but of
democracy? Assuming that such a means as the rupture of
diplomatic relations is too strong, can’t we consider other,
more flexible means of a diplomatic order? This must be
done to let the Spanish people know that we sympathise
with them and not with Franco.

In my opinion it would be dangerous to leave the Franco
regime in its present state. The public opinion of the Euro-
pean countries, as the press shows, and also of America, has
no sympathy with the Franco regime. If we by-pass this
question, people will assume that we have sanctioned, or
given our tacit blessing to the Franco regime in Spain. That
is a great charge against us. I should not like to be among
the accused .

Churchill: You have no diplomatic relations with the Span-
ish Government, and no one can accuse you of this.

Stalin: But I do have the right and the possibility of rais-
ing the question and settling it. How will people know that
the Soviet Union sympathises or does not sympathise with
the Franco regime? It is the accepted view that the Big
Three can solve such questions. | am a member of the Big
Three, like the President and the Prime Minister. Do |
have the right to say nothing about what is going on in
Spain, about the Franco regime and the great danger it
presents to the whole of Europe? It would be a great mis-

12-876 177

take for us to ignore this question and say nothing about it.

Churchill: Every government is quite free to make
known its views individually. That is the freedom also en-
joyed by the press, as Generalissimo Stalin has mentioned
here. The Soviet and a part of the American press have
very freely expressed themselves on the state of affairs in
Spain. As for the British Government, although we have
frequently said this to Franco and his Ambassador, we
should not like to discontinue our relations with the Span-
ish Government.

We have long had trade relations with Spain, they supply
us with oranges, wine and certain other products, in exchange
for our own goods. If our interference does not bring the
desired results, I should not like this trade to be jeopardised.
But at the same time I fully understand the view taken by
Generalissimo Stalin. Franco had the nerve to send his
Blue Division to Russia, and I quite understand the Russian
view.

But Spain has not done anything to hinder us, she did
not do it even when she could have done so in the Bay of
Algeciras. There is no doubt in anyone’s mind that General-
issimo Stalin hates Franco, and I think that the majority of
Britons share his view, I merely wish to stress that we have
not suffered from him in any way.

Stalin: It is not a matter of injury. Incidentally, I think
that Britain has also suffered from the Franco regime. For
a long time Spain placed her coast at Hitler’s disposal for
use by his submarines. You can say, therefore, that Britain
has suffered from the Franco regime in one way or another.

But I should not want this matter to be viewed from the
standpoint of some injury. It is not the Blue Division that
matters but the fact that the Franco regime is a grave threat
to Europe. That is why I think that something should be
done against this regime. If rupture of diplomatic relations
is unsuitable, I do not insist on it. Other means can be found.
We have only to say that we do not sympathise with the
Franco regime and consider the Spanish people’s urge for
democracy just, we have only to say this and nothing will
be left of the Franco regime. I assure you.

I propose: the Foreign Ministers should discuss whether
some other, milder and more flexible, form could be found
to make it known that the Great Powers do not support the
Franco regime.

178

Truman: That suits me, I agree to refer the matter to the
Foreign Ministers.

Churchill: I should oppose this. I think that this is a mat-
ter that should be settled in this hall.

Stalin: Of course, we shall settle it here, but let the Min-
isters examine it beforehand.

Truman: I too have no objection to refer this matter for
a preliminary examination by our Foreign Ministers.

Churchill: I consider this to be undesirable because that
is a matter of principle, namely, interference in the domes-
tic affairs of other countries.

Stalin: This is not a domestic affair, the Franco regime is
an international threat.

Churchill: Anyone can say this of the regime of any
other country.

Stalin: No, there is no such regime in any other country
as the one in Spain; there is no regime like that left in any
country of Europe.

Churchill: Portugal could be condemned for having a
dictatorial regime.

Stalin: The Franco regime was set up from outside, by
way of Hitler’s and Mussolini’s intervention. Franco behaves
in a most provocative manner, and gives asylum to Nazis.
I raise no question about Portugal.

Churchill: 1 cannot advise Parliament to interfere in
Spain’s domestic affairs. That is a policy we have been con-
ducting for a long time. At the same time, I should be glad
to see a change of regime in Spain, but only in a natural
way. I should personally be very happy to see a revolution
in Spain, and, say, a constitutional monarchy established
there with an amnesty for political prisoners.

But I believe that if I or the British Government were to
exert an influence on Spain in that sense, the feelings of
the Spaniards would turn against us and in favour of Fran-
co. In my opinion, Franco is now on the way out.

If we here were to take any concerted action, we should
only be reinforcing his position. On the other hand, the
British Government will in no way support Franco, the
present Spanish Government, with the exception of contin-
ued trade with Spain, of which I have already spoken
here.

Truman: I should be very glad if we agreed to refer the
matter for preliminary examination by the Foreign Minis-

12* 179

ters so that they could find an acceptable formula on this
point.

Stalin: I am aware of the difficulties faced by Mr. Chur-
chill in connection with interpellations in Parliament. But
this matter can be toned down. What about settling the
question like this: no question of the Franco regime is to be
raised separately, it being agreed that the question never
came up and was never examined separately as a question
of the Franco regime.

The three Foreign Ministers are to be asked, considering
the exchange of opinion on the question of the Franco re-
gime, to find a suitable formula for the question, including,
in particular, Mr. Churchill’s formulation that the Franco
regime is on the way out and that his regime does not en-
joy the sympathies of the democratic Powers, that this
regime is not given a high rating by public opinion. Such
a formula could be inserted as a point in one of our declara-
tions on Europe. We shall of course have some general dec-
larations, and the formula worked out by the Foreign
Ministers could be inserted in there.

This will not put the British Government under any obli-
gation, but the point will contain a brief assessment of the
Franco regime, and this will let public opinion know that
we are not on the side of the Franco regime. I think we
should adopt such a decision. Let the Foreign Ministers give
some thought to the form in which it is to be clothed.

Churchill: 1 have not yet agreed in principle that we
should make such a joint declaration on this question.

Stalin: It’s not about Spain, but we shall be giving a
general evaluation on Europe, and this could be included
there as one of the points. Look at what happens: in all our
documents we speak of all countries with the exception of
Spain.

Churchill: The line I am adhering to is as follows: Spain
is a country which had not been involved in the war, and
is not a satellite country; nor was she liberated by the
Allies; that is why we cannot interfere in her domestic
affairs. That is a matter of principle.

Take Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and other countries: there are
many issues there which we do not like and which we could
criticise. But these countries were involved in the war and
were liberated by the Allies.

If you wish we could draw up a declaration on the gener-

180

—————

al principles underlying democratic governments. That is
something we could discuss. I have in mind, for instance,
the U.S. Constitution. Franco is undoubtedly a very far cry
from this Constitution. Countries differ from one another,
and that is why if we start interfering, we shall have no
end of trouble.

I don’t know the mind of the Spaniards, but I think that
some are of one mind, others of another; I am sure that
many Spaniards would like to be rid of Franco, but without
outside pressure. I don’t see what the Foreign Ministers
could do on the question. I feel that this would give them
a lot of hard work, while the discussion of the question
would prove to be fruitless.

Truman: I see very little likelihood of an agreement
being reached on this question at the present sitting.
Wouldn’t it be better to return to it later?

Stalin: Maybe, after all, we should refer this matter to
the Foreign Ministers so that they should try to find a suit-
able formula?

Churchill: That’s the very point on which we have failed
to agree.

Truman: | think we’d better pass on to the next question
and return to the question of Spain later.

Churchill: I do not propose a negative solution, I merely
propose that we now pass on to a discussion of other mat-
ters, and discuss this question later.

Truman: We pass on to the next question.

Eden: The Declaration on Liberated Europe.

Truman: I submitted a document on this question on
July 17.

Stalin: I propose that we should now postpone this ques-
tion, we may table another proposal on this question.

Truman: 1 have no objection to postponing this question
at this time.

Eden: The next question is that of Yugoslavia. We have
already submitted a small draft on this question.

Stalin: I think that we are unable to solve this question
without hearing representatives from Yugoslavia.

Eden: It should be noted that we reached an agreement
in respect of Yugoslavia at the Crimea Conference without
the presence of Yugoslav representatives.

Stalin: This is now an Allied country with a legitimate
government. The question cannot now be solved without the

181

participation of Yugoslav representatives. At that time,
there were two governments, and they could not come to
terms. We interfered in that matter. And now there is one
legitimate government there. Let us invite representatives
from Yugoslavia and hear them, and then adopt a decision.

Churchill: Is it to be Subasié and Tito?

Stalin: Yes.

Churchill: But they don’t see eye to eye, there are hard
feelings on both sides.

Stalin: I know nothing about this. Let’s verify this, let’s
invite them over here and let them speak their mind.

Truman: Is this matter serious enough for them to be
invited over here? I find this inconvenient.

Churchill: We put our signatures to the agreement at the
Crimea Conference, but we now find that this Declaration
on Yugoslavia is not being fulfilled: there is no election law.
the Assembly of the Council has not been enlarged, legal
procedure has not been re-established, the Tito administra-
tion is under the control of his party police, and the press
is also controlled as in some fascist countries.

We find that the situation in Yugoslavia does not justify
our hopes as expressed in the Declaration of the Crimea
Conference. We supplied Yugoslavia with a considerable
quantity of arms at a time when we ourselves were weak,
and that is why we are disappointed and regret that events
have taken such a turn there. Our proposal is a very modest
one, it is that what was said in the Yalta Declaration should
be fulfilled.

Stalin: Mr. Churchill has commenced the discussion in-
stead of answering the President’s question as to whether
the question is serious and important enough for us to dis-
cuss at the Conference and invite representatives from
Yugoslavia. If the President will allow me I will follow in
Mr. Churchill’s footsteps and also start discussing this
question.

You see, the information which Mr. Churchill has given
here concerning the violation of the well-known decisions
of the Crimea Conference, this information, according to
our sources, is unknown to us. I should think it right to hear
the Yugoslavs themselves and give them an opportunity of
refuting these charges or admitting that they are correct.

Churchill: 1 want you to substitute the word “complaint”
for the word “charge”.

182

Stalin: It is not a question of words, and I can, of course,
substitute “complaint” for “charge”. But it is not right to
judge a whole state without hearing its representatives.

Churchill: We have now had an opportunity of thinking
over this question, and | think it would be advisable for
the two sides, namely, Tito and Subasié¢, to meet here. These
difficulties could then be possibly obviated and we could
reach an agreed decision. But do you think Marshal Tito
will agree to come here?

Stalin: J don’t know, we should ask if they can come.

Truman: Before going on to the final stage I should like
to make a statement. I have come here as the representa-
tive of the United States, and I have come here to discuss
world problems with you. But I have not come here to judge
each separate country in Europe or examine the disputes
which should be settled by the world organisation set up at
San Francisco.

If we are going to examine political complaints against
anyone, we shall merely be wasting our time. Nothing good
will come of it if we start inviting Tito, Franco or other
leaders over here. We are not a judicial organ to look into
complaints against individual statesmen. We should deal
with questions on which we could reach agreement.

Stalin: That is a correct remark.

Truman: We should discuss questions which are of in-
terest to each of us.

Churchill: This, Mr. President, is a question which is also
of interest to the United States, because it involves the ful-
filment of the decisions which had been adopted at the
Crimea Conference. It’s a question of principle. Of course,
it is quite obvious that the situation in Yugoslavia, the posi-
tion of Marshal Tito, should be taken into account. Not much
time has passed since peace set in in the country. But all
we had in mind in our draft was the wish that what was
said at the Crimea Conference should be fulfilled.

Stalin: In my opinion, the decisions of the Crimea Con-
ference are being fulfilled by Marshal Tito in their
entirety.

Truman: It is true that not all the decisions of the Crimea
Conference are being fulfilled by Yugoslavia. We also have
complaints to make. This should be pointed out to the Yu-
goslav Government. But we could postpone this question to
the next sitting.

183

Churchill: 1 should like to thank Generalissimo Stalin
for his patience in discussing this question. If we cannot
speak of the differences which sometimes arise between
us, if we cannot discuss them here, where can they be
discussed?

Stalin: We are discussing them here. But the question
cannot be settled without the accused. You have accused
the head of the Yugoslav Government, I ask that he be
heard and a decision adopted after that. As for discussion
we can have any amount of it.

Churchill: 1 agree with this, but the President is opposed
to inviting Tito here.

Stalin: In that case the question will have to be with-
drawn.

[...] Truman: Today’s agenda has run out. Tomorrow’s
sitting is at 4.00.

Fourth Sitting
July 20, 1945

Truman opens the sitting.

(The Soviet delegation reported that that day’s meeting
of the three Foreign Ministers dealt with the following
questions.

1. Economic principles in respect of Germany.

It was stated that the commission entrusted with the prep-
aration of this question had not yet completed its work
and therefore the substance of the question had not been
discussed. It was decided to ask the commission to finish
its work by July 21.

2. The Polish question.

It was reported that the commission dealing with this
question had not yet completed its work, as a result of which
the substance of the question had not been discussed. It was
decided to ask the commission to finish its work by July 21.

3. On the peaceful settlement.

In view of the fact that the commission entrusted with
drafting the text on the question of a peaceful settlement
had been unable to fulfil its task because the members of
this commission had been busy in other commissions, it was
decided that the Foreign Ministers would meet additionally

184

at 15.45 that day to prepare the question for submission at
the sitting of the three Heads of Government. At their meet-
ing the Foreign Ministers adopted an amendment to Point 3
of the draft on this question, as a result of which the point
would read as follows:

“3. As its immediate important task, the Council would
be authorised to draw up, with a view to their submission
to the United Nations, treaties of peace with Italy, Ruma-
nia, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland and to propose settle-
ments of territorial questions outstanding on the termina-
tion of the war in Europe. The Council shall be utilised for
the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany to be
accepted by the Government of Germany when a govern-
ment adequate for the purpose is established.

“For the discharge of each of these tasks the Council will
be comprised of the members representing those States which
were signatory to the terms of surrender imposed upon the
enemy state concerned. For the purposes of the peace set-
tlement for Italy, France shall be regarded as a signatory
to the terms of surrender for Italy.

“Other members should be invited to participate when
matters directly concerning them are under discussion.”

4, The Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe.

The People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the
U.S.S.R. handed Soviet draft proposals on the question to
the Foreign Minister of Great Britain and the U.S. Secre-
tary of State. In connection with the submitted draft there
was a discussion of the question of the situation in Rumania
and Bulgaria on the one hand, and in Greece, on the other.
As a result of the discussion it transpired that the Foreign
Ministers took different views of the situation in these
countries.

In particular, the U.S. Secretary of State and the Foreign
Minister of Great Britain declared that there were restric-
tions on the press in Rumania and Bulgaria. The People’s
Commissar for Foreign Affairs pointed out that there had
been some inevitable restrictions on the press in wartime
conditions. At present, in view of the war being ended, the
possibilities for members of the press to work in these coun-
tries could be considerably extended.

The U.S. Secretary of State proposed the conclusion of
an agreement between the three Powers on the supervision
of elections by the three Powers in Italy, Greece, Rumania,

185

Bulgaria and Hungary and on free access to these countries
for members of the press of the U.S.A., U.S.S.R. and Great
Britain, and on the possibility for them to move freely about
and freely dispatch their reports. The People’s Commissar
for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. declared that he saw
no necessity for the dispatch of special observers to Ruma-
nia and Bulgaria. As for Greece, the Soviet Government’s
standpoint was set forth in the document submitted. If the
Foreign Ministers of Great Britain and the U.S.A. submit-
ted written proposals on this question, they could be dis-
cussed at a meeting of the three Ministers.

5. On Italy.

The US. Secretary of State submitted a draft decision of
the three Heads of Government saying that they would
support Italy’s entry into the United Nations, but that they
would not support Spain’s entry into the United Nations so
long as Spain remained under the control of the regime
existing in the country. The Foreign Minister of Great
Britain declared his support for this proposal and said that
if any declaration was drafted on this question he considered
it advisable to mention in it that the three Powers would
also support the admission to the United Nations of certain
neutral countries, such as Sweden, Switzerland and
Portugal.

The People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the
U.S.S.R. raised the question as to whether this proposal
could be applied to countries which had ceased to be hostile
and had become co-belligerents against Germany. The For-
eign Minister of Great Britain declared that the question
could be discussed, but that he personally thought that such
countries could be admitted to the United Nations after
peace treaties had been signed with them. A sub-commission
was set up to work out the question.

In this connection it was decided to ask the commission
dealing with guestions of reparations to study the question
of reparations from Italy and Austria.

6. On Poland’s western frontier.

The Foreign Ministers of the United States and Great
Britain were handed the Soviet Government’s proposals
concerning the establishment of Poland’s western frontiers,
together with the relevant map. It was decided to bring up
the question at the sitting of the three Heads of Govern-
ment on July 20.

186

7. On trust territories.

The Foreign Ministers of the United States and Great
Britain were handed the Soviet Government’s proposals
concerning measures for establishing territorial trusteeship.
It was decided to bring this question up at the sitting of the
three Heads of Government on July 20.

8. On the agenda of the sitting of the three Heads of
Government on July 20.

The Ministers agreed to recommend the following agenda
to the three Heads of Government:

1. On the peaceful settlement.

2. The U.S. President’s memorandum of July 17 on pol-
icy in respect of Italy.

3. The situation in Austria, particularly in Vienna (com-
munication by the Prime Minister of Great Britain).

4, On Poland’s western frontier.

5. On trust territories.)

Churchill: Allow me, Mr. President, to raise a small
question concerning the procedure of our work for the good
of the cause. Our Ministers have been meeting every day
to prepare an extensive programme for our afternoon sit-
tings. Today, for instance, they completed their work only
by 14.00. This leaves us very little time to go through and
discuss the documents they prepare. Wouldn’t it be better
for us to begin our afternoon sittings at 17.00?

Truman: | have no objection. We now go on to a discus-
sion of the items on the agenda. We discuss the first ques-

tion.

Churchill: I understand that the Soviet delegation has an
amendment to the draft on the establishment of a Council
of Foreign Ministers.

Truman: The amendment was read out. I agree with the
amendment.

Churchill: (Having read the text of the amendment.) I
also agree with this amendment.

Truman: It is necessary to establish the time and place
for a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. | am
prepared to let the Foreign Ministers decide this matter
themselves.

Churchill: 1 quite agree that the question should be dis-
cussed, but it is my opinion that London must be the place;
that is where the secretariat should have its permanent seat,
but sittings may also take place elsewhere, if that is desir-

Ee —

187

able. In confirmation of my view I should like to recall that
London is the capital which was under enemy fire during
the war more than the others. As far as I am aware, it is
the world’s biggest city and one of its most ancient. Besides,
it is mid-way between the United States and Russia.

Stalin: That is most important. [Laughter.]

Churchill: What is more, it is London’s turn.

Stalin: Right.

Churchill: I should only like to add that I flew across the
ocean six times to have the honour of conferring with the
President of the United States, and twice visited Moscow.
However, London is not being used at all as a place for our
meetings. There is strong feeling on this point in Britain,
and I think Mr. Attlee also has a few words to say about it.

Attlee: I quite agree with what the Prime Minister has
said here, and wish to add that our people have a right to
see these outstanding personalities visit them. They would
be very glad of this. They have gone through a great deal.
I think, moreover, that London’s geographical situation also
has a great part to play. I second the Prime Minister’s wish.

Truman: { also agree with the Prime Minister’s proposal
and agree that geographical location plays a big part.

Stalin: Good, I have no objection.

Truman: But I want to reserve the right to invite the
Heads of Government to visit the United States.

Churchill: May I express my gratitude to the President
and ue Generalissimo for their kind acceptance of our pro-
posal.

Truman: I think that in due time our three Foreign Min-
isters will be joined by the Foreign Ministers of China and
France. I also think that we could let the Foreign Ministers
decide on the date the Council is to meet.

(Stalin and Churchill agree with Truman’s proposals.)

Truman: The second question is on policy in respect of
Italy. Our proposals on policy in respect of Italy were sub-
mitted at the first sitting. The essence of my proposal is as
follows.

I believe that Italy’s position would be considerably im-
proved if we recognised her services as a participant in the
war against Germany. I propose that the terms of surrender
should be replaced by the following obligations on the part
of the Italian Government: 1) The Italian Government shall
refrain from any hostile action against any of the United

188

Nations until the conclusion of a peace treaty; 2) The Ital-
ian Government shall not maintain any army, naval or air
forces or equipment except what it is authorised by the Al-
lies, and shall abide by all the instructions concerning such
forces and equipment.

While this agreement is in force, control over Italy should
be retained only insofar as is necessary: a) to ensure Allied
military requirements so long as the Allied forces remain in
Italy or operate from there; and b) to ensure a just settle-
ment of territorial disputes.

Stalin: It would be well for the Ministers to discuss the
question of policy in respect of Italy. I have no objections
in principle, but some amendments in the drafting may be
necessary. It would be well to refer this memorandum to
the three Ministers for a final reading and to ask them, at
the same time, to discuss, along with the question of Italy,
the question of Rumania, Bulgaria and Finland.

There is no reason why we should set apart the question
of Italy from those pertaining to other countries. Italy was,
of course, the first to surrender, and subsequently helped in
the war against Germany. It is true that the force was small,
only 3 divisions, but she did help none the less. She is plan-
ning to enter the war against Japan. That is also a plus. But
there are similar pluses to the credit of such countries as
Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. They, these countries,
moved their troops against Germany on the next day after
surrender. Bulgaria had 8-10 divisions against Germany,
Rumania had about 9. These countries should also be given
some relief.

As for Finland she did not render any serious help in the
war, but she is behaving well, honestly fulfilling her obliga-
tions. Her position could also be eased.

That is why it would be well, while giving relief to Italy,
to give some to these countries as well and to examine all
these questions together. If my colleagues agree with my
proposal we could ask the three Foreign Ministers to ex-
amine these questions as one.

Truman: Italy was the first country to surrender, and, as
far as I] am aware, the terms of her surrender were some-
what harder than those of the other countries. But I agree
that the position of the other satellite states should also be
reviewed. I am in full agreement with Generalissimo Stalin
on this point.

189

Churchill: Our stand on the question of Italy is not quite
identical with that taken by my two colleagues. Italy at-
tacked us in June 1940. We had serious losses in the Mediter-
ranean and also during the defence of Egypt, which we had
to organise at a time when we ourselves were threatened
with invasion. We lost many warships and merchantmen in
the Mediterranean. We had heavy losses on land, on the
coast of North Africa. And these sacrifices increased when
Germany moved her troops to Africa. Without support from
anyone we had to undertake the campaign in Abyssinia,
which ended in the Emperor of Abyssinia being restored to
his throne. Special squadrons of Italian air force were dis-
patched to bomb London.

It should also be mentioned that Italy undertook an abso-
lutely unwarranted attack against Greece, and just before
the start of the war she made a similarly unwarranted at-
tack against Albania. All that took place when we were
absolutely alone.

I am saying all this because J think that all the losses that
we have suffered from Italy should not be forgotten. We
cannot justify the Italian people just as we do not justify
the German people because it was under Hitler’s yoke. In
spite of this we have tried to entertain the idea of restoring
Italy as one of the major Powers in Europe and the Medi-
terranean. When I was there a year ago I made a number
of proposals to President Roosevelt, and most of these pro-
posals were included in the declaration which was subse-
quently published.

I don’t want it to be thought that I have any feeling of
revenge in respect of Italy. I objected to reports appearing
in various newspapers saying that we were antagonistic to
Italy. I declared on behalf of His Majesty’s Government
that we viewed the matter with an open heart and wished
to obtain the best results. I should like all these considera-
tions to be taken into account.

I want to join the President and the Generalissimo in
principle in making a gesture in respect of the Italian peo-
ple, which suffered a great deal during the war and made
efforts to expel the Germans from its territory. That is why
the British delegation does not object in principle to con-
cluding peace with Italy. This work will undoubtedly re-
quire a few months for the preparation of the peace terms.

I also note that the present Italian Government has no

190

democratic basis arising from free and independent elec-
tions. It merely consists of political figures who call them-
selves leaders of various political parties. I understand that
the Italian Government intends to hold elections before the
winter. That is why, although I agree that the Council of
Foreign Ministers should start work on drafting the peace
treaty, 1 do not consider it desirable that it should com-
plete this work before the Italian Government is based on
democratic principles.

Meanwhile, I must say that I do not quite agree with
the U.S. memorandum concerning provisional terms under
which the existing armistice terms should be replaced by
certain undertakings on the part of the present Italian Gov-
ernment. | think that no Italian Government can give guar-
anteed assurances unless it rests on the Italian people. If
the existing rights stipulated by the surrender are abolished
and replaced by obligations on the part of the Italian Gov-
ernment—and it will be a considerable time before the peace
treaty is concluded—we shall be deprived of every possibil-
ity, except the use of force, to make Italy fulfil our terms.
As it is, none of us wants to use force to achieve such aims.

Take Point 1 of the American memorandum: it says
nothing about the future of the Italian fleet, Italian colonies,
reparations and other important matters. Thus we shall be
losing the rights we have under the surrender document.

Finally, 1 must say that the terms of surrender were signed
not only by Great Britain, but also by other states within
the British Empire; they were signed by the dominions—
Australia, New Zealand and others, who suffered losses
during the war. This question will have to be discussed with
them. Besides, Greece was the victim of an Italian invasion.
I do not want to go further today than to agree in principle
that the Council of Foreign Ministers should start to draft
the peace terms.

As for the other countries mentioned here, I must say
that Bulgaria has no right to make any claims on Great
Britain. Bulgaria dealt us a cruel blow and did everything
to harm us in the Balkans. Of course, it is not for me to
talk of Bulgaria’s ingratitude towards Russia. The Russian
Army once liberated Bulgaria from the Turkish yoke after
many years of savage oppression. In this war, Bulgaria
hardly suffered at all, she was Germany’s handmaiden, and
on her orders attacked Greece and Yugoslavia, doing them

19]

a great deal of damage. But nothing is said about disarming
Bulgaria. I think she is just as strong as before; she has
15 divisions. Nothing is said about reparations from Bul-
garia. I must admit that I am not greatly inclined to an
early conclusion of peace with Bulgaria, at any rate less so
than to a conclusion of such a peace with Italy.

I am very grateful to my colleagues for having listened
to my considerations with such patience. I must say in con-
clusion that on some points I differ with the President and
the Generalissimo.

Stalin: It seems to me that the question of Italy is one of
high politics. The task of the Big Three is to dissociate the
satellites from Germany, as the main force of aggression.
There are two ways of doing this. First, the use of force.
This method has been successfully applied by us, and the
Allied forces are in Italy, and also on the territory of other
countries. But this method alone is inadequate for dissociat-
ing Germany’s accomplices from her. If we continue to limit
ourselves to the use of force towards them, there is the
danger that we shall be creating an environment for future
German aggression. It is therefore advisable to supplement
the force method with that of easing the position of these
countries. This, I believe, is the only means, if we view the
question in perspective, of rallying these countries round us
and dissociating them from Germany for good.

Such are the considerations of high politics. All other
considerations, such as those of revenge and injury, no long-
er arise.

That is the standpoint from which I view the U.S. Presi-
dent’s memorandum. I believe it is in line with such a pol-
icy, the policy of finally dissociating Germany’s satellites
from her by easing their position. That is why I have no
objections in principle to the proposals put forward in the
President’s memorandum. They may require some drafting
improvements.

Now there is the other side of the question. I have in
mind Mr. Churchill’s speech. Of course, Italy has also
greatly wronged Russia. We had clashes with Italian troops
not only in the Ukraine, but also on the Don and the Volga,
that is how deeply they had penetrated into our country.
But I think it would be wrong to be guided by memories of
injury or feelings of retribution and to base one’s policy on
that. Feelings of revenge or hatred or a sense of compensa-

192

|

tion received for injury are very poor guides in politics. In
politics, | believe, one should be guided by an estimation of
forces.

This is how the question should be posed: do we want
to have Italy on our side so as to isolate her from the forces
which may once again rise against us in Germany? I
think we do, and that should be our starting point. We must
dissociate Germany’s former accomplices from her.

A great many hardships and sufferings were inflicted on
us by such countries as Rumania, which put many divisions
into the field against the Soviet forces, and Hungary, which
had 20 divisions against the Soviet troops in the final stages
of the war. Finland inflicted great damage on us. Without
Finland’s help, Germany could not, of course, have blockad-
ed Leningrad. Finland had 24 divisions against our troops.

Bulgaria has caused us fewer hardships and less injury.
She helped Germany to attack and conduct offensive opera-
tions against Russia, but she herself did not enter the war
against us and sent no troops against the Soviet troops. The
armistice agreement provides that Bulgaria is to make her
troops available for the war against Germany. This agree-
ment was signed by the representatives of the three Powers
—the United States, Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. The
agreement says that after the war against Germany ends,
Bulgaria’s army is to be demobilised and stepped down to
peace-time strength. This we shall have to do, and it will
be done. Bulgaria cannot resist fulfilment of the agreement,
she will have to fulfil it.

Such are the sins of the satellites against the Allies and

the Soviet Union in particular.
i If we begin to avenge ourselves on them for having caused
us great damage, that will be one kind of policy. I am
not a supporter of that policy. Now that these countries have
been defeated and the control commissions of the three Pow-
ers are there to see that they carry out the armistice terms,
it is time we went over to another policy, the policy of
easing their position. And easing their position means pry-
ing them away from Germany.

Now here is a concrete proposal. As far as I have under-
stood, President Truman does not propose the immediate
drafting of a treaty with Italy. President Truman merely
proposes that the way be paved for the conclusion of such
a treaty, in the near future; he proposes for the time being

13-876 193

the creation of some kind of intermediate state between the
surrender terms accepted by Italy and the future peace
treaty.

I think it is hard to object to such a proposal. It is quite
practicable, and it is timely. As for the other satellites, |
believe that we could start by re-establishing diplomatic
relations with them. There may be the objection that they
do not have freely elected government. But neither is there
such a government in Italy. However, diplomatic relations
with Italy have been restored. Nor are there such govern-
ments in France and Belgium. But there is no doubt in any-
one’s mind on the question of diplomatic relations with
these countries.

Churchill: They were Allies.

Stalin: | understand. But democracy is democracy every-
where, among allies as well as among satellites.

Truman: 1 understand the situation to be as follows. |
have made a concrete proposal concerning Italy. The ar-
mistice terms were signed by all three of our states.

Eden: We did not sign on behalf of the dominions.

Truman: The dominions did not sign in respect of the
other satellites either. But let us return to the question under
discussion. The question of policy in respect of Italy has
been placed on the agenda. The Soviet side raised the ques-
tion of Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. I under-
stand that the Generalissimo has proposed that the question
of Italy and of the other satellite countries should be
referred to our Foreign Ministers.

It is a matter of working out provisional terms before
the conclusion of a peace treaty. I fully agree with the
Generalissimo that these treaties must not be based on a
feeling of revenge, hatred or injury, but on a sense of jus-
tice, so as to create the possibility of peaceful existence for
all mankind. And I think that we can fully achieve this here.

I must say a few words on reparations from Italy. Italy’s
present position is such that we are faced with the question
of giving Italy assistance worth from $700 million to
$ 1,000 million. But I must say that we cannot render simi-
lar aid to other countries without getting anything in return.
I think that we should here try to prepare the conditions in
which these countries could live on their own resources.

I think that both these questions could be referred to the
Foreign Ministers, and that they will be able to find the

194

basis of an agreement to enable us to arrive at a common
view in respect of all these countries.

Churchill: 1 think that we are all agreed that the ques-
tion of Italy should be referred to the Foreign Ministers. |
only objected to the rescission of the existing surrender
terms, which would deprive us of very substantial rights. I
agree with the President that the terms must be eased and
that a corresponding gesture should be made in respect of
Italy. I have no objection to declaring here that a peace
treaty is being prepared for Italy.

I fully agree with everything said by the Generalissimo
and the President about it being wrong to determine the
future in the spirit of revenge for injuries caused. I heard
with great satisfaction this statement by the leaders of the
great peoples whom they here represent. | have great sym-
pathy for Italy, and the Government of Great Britain will
act in that spirit. I used the word “reparations” in respect
of Italy, but we do not of course seek any reparations for
ourselves; we had Greece in mind.

Truman: I would propose that the question of Italy and
the other countries should be referred to the three Foreign
Ministers.

Churchill: I agree that the preparatory work in drafting
the peace treaty with Italy should be referred to the Coun-
cil of Foreign Ministers.

Stalin: Which Council?

Churchill: The future Council of Foreign Ministers. I only
made a reservation concerning provisional measures. This
could be discussed at the daily conferences of our Foreign
Ministers.

Stalin: I would propose that the Foreign Ministers should
also discuss the question of Germany’s other accomplices. I
ask Mr. Churchill not to object to this. (General laughter.)
I ask that the three Foreign Ministers should discuss, along-
side the question of Italy, that of the other countries.

Churchill: I have never objected. (Laughter.]

‘Truman: | also agree.

Let us go on to the next question. It is the communication
of the Prime Minister concerning the situation in Austria,
particularly in Vienna.

Churchill: | very much regret that during today’s discus-
sion I have had to disagree with the opinion of the Soviet
delegation a number of times. But I consider that the situa-

13° 195

tion in Austria and in Vienna is unsatisfactory. It was agreed
that we were to have different sectors, different zones
in Austria. This business has been going on for a long time.

Over two months ago 1 asked that British officers be al-
lowed into Vienna to inspect the premises we shall need,
the airports, and the quarters for our troops. All this had
been agreed in principle beforehand. Our officers went to
Vienna but the results of their visit turned out to be unsat-
isfactory; our missions were forced to leave the city and
return empty-handed. We have now been prohibited not
only entry into Vienna but also the dispatch of our troops
into the zone on which agreement had been reached.

Three or four months have already passed since Austria’s
liberation by the Soviet troops. | don’t see why there are
such difficulties in this simple matter, and that after an
agreement had been concluded on this point. I have been
receiving unsatisfactory reports from Field-Marshal Alex-
ander. We still have no place where we could stay. I believe
that in view of the signed agreement we should be given
such permission.

Yesterday I was asked to find out whether a Russian
delegation could visit German ships in British hands. I replied
to this question as follows: meet us half-way. If German
ships in Britain can be inspected by Russian representatives,
I think we should be given access to enemy towns which
are under Russian occupation. We have withdrawn our
troops from the Russian Zone of Occupation in Northern
Germany, and the American troops have also withdrawn
from that zone; yet we have no right to send our troops to
our zone in Austria.

Stalin: There is an agreement on zones in Austria, but
there was no agreement on any zones in Vienna. Some time
was naturally required to implement the agreement. This
agreement has now been reached, it was reached yesterday.
An agreement had to be reached on which airfields were to
go to whom. This also takes time. An agreement on this
question has also been reached. We received the French
reply only yesterday. A day has now been set for the entry
of your troops into Vienna, and for the withdrawal of our
troops. This could begin today or tomorrow.

Mr. Churchill is highly indignant, but the case is not quite
like that. You should not say: they’re not letting us into our
zone, (Laughter.) That is not the expression to use. We were

196

kept out of our zone in Germany for a month. We did not
complain, we knew how hard it was to withdraw one’s
troops and to prepare everything for the entry of the Soviet
troops. The Soviet Government has no intention to violate
the agreement reached. If that is all there is to the question
of the situation in Austria, Vienna in particular, then it has
already been settled. The actions in the Berlin area were
more reasonable, and there the question was solved sooner.

Field Marshal Alexander is acting less skilfully, and this
has also been a factor of delay. He behaves as if the Rus-
sian forces were under his command. This has merely served
to retard the solution of the question. The British and
American military leaders in the zone of Germany did not
act that way. There are no obstacles at present to each army
entering its own zone, whether it is a question of Vienna
or Styria, and that is because an agreement has now been
reached.

Churchill: 1 am very happy that this business has finally
been settled and we shall be allowed to enter our zone. As
for Field Marshal Alexander, I don’t think there is any
cause to complain about him.

Stalin: There were no complaints about Eisenhower, no
complaints about Montgomery, but there are complaints
about Alexander.

Churchill: We beg you to let us have these complaints.

Stalin: 1 do not want to testify against Alexander, I was
not preferring a charge. (Laughter.]

Churchill: 1 feel bound to say that in view of the absence
of specific complaints against Alexander, the British Gov-
ernment will continue to have full confidence in him. We
shall support all the measures he undertakes.

Stalin: 1 personally have no complaints, I was merely
conveying what the commanders had reported, pointing to
this as one of the reasons for delay in the settlement of the
question.

Churchill: We are not alone in having an interest in this
matter. The American commanders also have an interest
in it.

Truman: 1 consider that complete agreement has been
reached on this question.

The next question is that of Poland’s western frontier.
I understand that the Soviet delegation has considerations
on this question.

197

Stalin: If my colleagues are not ready to discuss this
question, perhaps we could pass on to the next one, and dis-
cuss this question tomorrow?

Truman: It is better to discuss it tomorrow. This question
will be the first one on tomorrow’s agenda.

The next question is territorial trusteeship.

Stalin: Perhaps we shall discuss this question tomorrow
as well?

Truman: 1 agree. Our agenda has run out. Tomorrow’s
sitting is at 17.00.

Fifth Sitting
July 21, 1945

Truman: Mr. Byrnes will report on today’s sitting of the
Foreign Ministers.

Byrnes: The Foreign Ministers discussed the date of the
official establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers
and agreed that the Council should be set up not later than
September 1. They also agreed that telegrams should be
sent to the Government of China and the Provisional Gov-
ernment of France inviting them to take part in the work
of the Council before the public announcement of its estab-
lishment. At the request of the British delegation, the draft-
ing commission which is dealing with this question was
authorised to make certain small amendments to the text
of the proposal submitted.

The next question is that of the economic principles in
respect of Germany. Since the sub-commission’s report on
the question has just been submitted and our delegations
have not had the possibility of making a proper study of it,
they agreed to postpone discussion of this question until
tomorrow.

Next was the Polish question—the dissolution of the
London Government and the fulfilment of the Yalta Decla-
ration. A report on behalf of the sub-commission dealing
with the question was given by its chairman. In view of the
fact that the sub-commission was unable to reach complete
agreement, the outstanding questions were thoroughly dis-
cussed by the Foreign Ministers. They reached agreement
on some of these points, but the following are being referred

198

to the Heads of Government for a_ final decision. I
think that the differences referred to you for decision will
be clearer if you have before you the report of the sub-com-
mission’s chairman. The questions referred to you for deci-
sion are: (a) the point relating to the transfer of assets to
the Polish Government and the recognition by the Polish
Government of obligations towards the Governments of
Great Britain and the United States; (b) the point relating
to the holding of elections and freedom of the press.

Concerning the first point of the differences, regarding
the transfer of assets to the Polish Government and _ its
recognition of obligations towards the British and American
Governments, the chairman of the sub-commission reported
the following. The British Government and the Government
of the United States have already taken steps to prevent the
transfer of Polish property to third persons, property situat-
ed on the territory of Great Britain and the United States
and under the control of their Governments, whatever the
form of that property. They are prepared immediately to
take steps to transfer this property to the Polish National
Government in accordance with the requirements of the
law. For this purpose they are prepared to discuss means
and dates for the transfer of this property with the corre-
sponding representatives of the Polish Provisional Govern-
ment.

The wording of this proposal was the object of differences.
The U.S. Government’s stand is that the question of the
assets must be the subject of discussions between the Gov-
ernment of the Polish State and the Government of the
United States. At the same time, they should discuss the
question of the Polish Government’s obligations. The U.S.
Government is sure that the Polish Provisional Government
has no doubt that we are prepared to place at its disposal
all the property belonging to it, in accordance with our laws.

That is why we proposed the following formulation of
the point relating to this question: “The British and United
States Governments have taken measures to protect the in-
terests of the Polish Provisional Government as a recognised
government of the Polish State in the property belong-
ing to the Polish State located on their territory and under
their control, whatever the form of this property may be.
They have further taken measures to prevent alienation to
third parties of such property. All proper facilities will be

199

given to the Polish Provisional Government for the exercise
of the ordinary legal remedies for the recovery of any prop-
erty of the Polish State which may have been wrongfully
alienated.”

Shall we discuss these points of differences or shall we
go on?

Stalin: Let us first hear the report and then go on to the
discussion.

Byrnes: There were no differences on the following point:
“The Three Powers are anxious to assist the Polish Provi-
sional Government in facilitating the return to Poland, as
soon as practicable, of all Poles abroad who wish to go, in-
cluding members of the Polish Armed Forces and Merchant
Marine. They expect that those Poles who return home shall
be accorded personal and property rights on the same basis
as all Polish citizens.”

There are differences on the following point: “The Three
Powers note that the Polish Provisional Government in
conformity with the Crimea decisions has agreed to the
holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible
on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which
all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to
take part and to put forward candidates. It is the confident
hope of the Three Powers that the elections will be conduct-
ed in such a way as to make it clear to the world that all
democratic and anti-Nazi sections of Polish opinion have
been able to express their views freely and thus to play
a full part in the restoration of the country’s political
life.

“The Three Powers will further expect that representa-
tives of the Allied press shall enjoy full freedom to report
to the world upon the developments in Poland before and
during the elections.”

The difference is over the Soviet delegation’s proposal
to delete the last two sentences from the point. Mr. Eden
has agreed to this, provided the sentence on the free access
of members of the Allied press to Poland is retained.

Thus, the first point at issue is the one concerning the
transfer of assets without any mention of liabilities.

Truman: Under our laws it is impossible to speak of as-
sets without saying anything about liabilities. 1 said as much
yesterday. The United States has no intention of shoulder-
ing that kind of burden. We cannot undertake the obliga-

200

a ms

tion of handing over all the assets to the Polish Govern-
ment without a discussion of obligations on its part.

Churchill: We agree with the President’s proposal con-
cerning the transfer of assets to the Polish Government pro-
vided simultaneous mention is made of the obligations
undertaken by the Polish Government.

Byrnes: Our wording, which was proposed in the hope
of finding a compromise, says nothing either of assets or
liabilities. We say that the British Government and the US.
Government have already taken steps to protect the Polish
Government’s interests in respect of any property belonging
to the Polish State which is located on their territories,
whatever the form of that property. The draft also says
that both Governments have already taken steps to prevent
the transfer of this property to third persons. Besides, it also
says that the Polish Government will be given every op-
portunity to take the usual legal steps to restore any prop-
erty which may have been unlawfully alienated.

Churchill: Nothing is said here either of assets or of
liabilities.

Byrnes: I have already spoken of the points contained
in our draft.

Churchill: Nothing is said there of the transfer to the
Polish Provisional Government of obligations towards Great
Britain, namely, the £120 million which we advanced to the
former Polish Government in London. In other words, our
position is similar to yours.

Byrnes: If the Soviet Government had any property be-
longing to the Polish Government this question could also
be settled through diplomatic channels. I think there is no
need to make public mention of the fact that we are going
to transfer to the Polish Government the property belong-
ing to it and which is to be handed over as a result of the
U.S. Government’s recognition of the Government of
Poland.

Churchill: 1 understand that we now leave aside the idea of
assets and liabilities. This question is, of course, more im-
portant to us than to the United States owing to our having
given bigger advances to the former London Polish Govern-
ment.

Truman: 1 don’t like the idea being proposed here of

making a public announcement of the fulfilment of these
obligations.

201

Churchill: I agree with you.

Stalin: Does the British Government intend to make full
recovery from Poland of the advances which it made for
the maintenance of the Polish troops?

Churchill: No. That is something we shall discuss with
the Poles.

Stalin: We gave the Sikorski Government some funds and
also some for organising the army of the Provisional Na-
tional Government. But we believe that the Polish people
have redeemed this debt with their blood. I consider the
U.S. Government’s compromise proposal acceptable, with
the exception of that part of it which says that the Polish
Provisional Government will be given every opportunity to
take the usual legal steps. I propose that we say instead: The
Polish Provisional Government will be given every oppor-
tunity in accordance with the requirements of the law. With
this amendment, the compromise proposal of the American
delegation could be adopted.

Churchill: What’s the difference?

Stalin: The difference is that this will obviate the usual
red tape which is practised under “the usual legal steps”.
It will be simpler to say “on the basis of the law”. But that
is, after all, a small thing, and the proposal of the American
delegation can be adopted in its formulation.

Byrnes: The next point on which there were differences
regards the following formulation: “The Three Powers note
that the Polish Provisional Government in conformity with
the Crimea decisions has agreed to the holding...” etc.
Mr. Eden has objected to this formulation.

Eden: I proposed a compromise formula, against which
the Soviet delegation objected, namely, to delete everything
from the words “It is the confident hope of the Three Pow-
ers” to the words “their views freely”, leaving the last
sentence concerning access of members of the Allied press.

Stalin: It is a good thing that Mr. Eden has made a step
towards the interests and dignity of Poland. That is to be
welcomed. And if he makes another step in that direction,
I think we shall all agree with this proposal. (Laughter.]
The preceding line says that the Polish Government must
observe the Crimea Declaration. Why repeat the idea once
again? The foreign correspondents will be going to Poland,
and not to the Polish Government; they will enjoy com-
plete freedom, and there will be no complaints on their part

202

against the Polish Government. Why need this be repeated
again? The Poles will take offence at this, for they will see
it as a sign of suspicion that they may refuse to admit any
correspondents. Let us end this point on the words: “demo-
cratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part
and put forward candidates”, and delete the rest.

Churchill: There’s no compromise there. (Laughter.}

Stalin: That is a compromise in respect of the Polish
Government. (Laughter.}

Churchill: | half expected to have the formula strength-
ened rather than weakened.

Stalin: Why do that?

‘Truman: We are very much interested in the elections in
Poland because we have six million citizens of Polish origin
at home. If the elections in Poland are quite free and our
correspondents are quite free to send in their reports on the
holding and results of the election, this will be very im-
portant for me as President. I think that if the Polish Gov-
ernment is aware beforehand that the Three Powers expect
it to hold free elections and give free access to members of
the Allied press, the Polish Government will, of course,
quite painstakingly fulfil the demands contained in the de-
cisions of the Crimea Conference.

Stalin: | think—Mr. Eden, you will note that I am mak-
ing a compromise—of proposing the following: after the
words “put forward candidates” insert a comma, and then
go on to say “and representatives of the Allied press shall
enjoy full freedom to report to the world on the progress
and results of the elections”’.

Truman: That suits me.

Churchill: The word “note” at the beginning of the
paragraph is important in this case. I also agree.

Byrnes: The next question concerns the fulfilment of the
Yalta Agreement on Liberated Europe and the satellite
countries. The U.S. delegation has submitted two papers on
the question, but the Foreign Ministers decided to postpone
discussion in order to have the opportunity of studying them.
The Foreign Ministers agreed to pass these documents on
to the drafting commission. But differences arose on whether
the commission should deal with each of these documents
separately or as a single document. The Soviet delegation
favoured the single-document approach, and the American
delegation, the two-document approach. It was agreed that

in view of the fact that the question of the policy in respect
of Italy and the other satellites had been referred to the
Foreign Ministers by the Heads of Government, the Heads
of Government would be requested at today’s sitting to de-
cide on the instructions for the drafting commission: should
it draw up a single document for all these countries or two
documents on the basis of the American draft.

Truman: At the first sitting, the American delegation
submitted two documents: the first, on the policy in respect
of Italy (this question was discussed at length yesterday and
the day before), and the second, on the policy in respect of
Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. We think that
these two questions should be dealt with separately, because
Italy was the first country to surrender and then take part
in the war against Germany. Besides, there are diplomatic
relations between the U.S. Government and Italy, and none
between the U.S. Government and the Governments of the
above-mentioned countries. But that does not mean that we
think the question of Italy should be solved earlier than that
of the other countries. I repeat, we believe that these two
questions should be examined separately.

Stalin: I have an amendment to the American proposals
on the question of the policy in respect of Rumania, Bul-
garia, Hungary and Finland. I do not object to these pro-
posals in principle, but I want to make an addition to the
second point. It says: “The Three Governments will make a
statement” on so and so, and after that I propose to add the
following words: “And at the present moment they declare
that they consider it possible to re-establish diplomatic re-
lations with them.”

Truman: I cannot agree to this.

Stalin: Then the discussion of both drafts—on Italy and
on these countries—will have to be postponed.

Truman: We are not prepared to establish diplomatic
relations with the Governments of these countries. What is
more, we have never been in a state of war with Finland.
But, as I have said, when the Governments of these coun-
tries are transformed on the basis of free elections, we
shall be prepared to establish diplomatic relations with
them.

Stalin: 1 cannot agree without the addendum I have pro-

osed.

Churchill: Time is passing: we have been sitting here

204

for a week now, and have been putting off a great number
of questions.

On this question, the British Government's stand is simi-
lar to that of the US. Government.

Byrnes: The next question concerns the agenda for to-
day’s sitting of the Heads of Government. We have agreed
that the Foreign Ministers will recommend to the Heads of
Government the inclusion in today’s agenda of the two
above-mentioned questions which were earlier referred to the
Foreign Ministers by the Heads of Government and on
which the Foreign Ministers would now like to receive fur-
ther instructions, and also the three questions carried for-
ward from yesterday’s agenda of the Heads of Government
sitting. Accordingly the proposed agenda for today’s sit-
ting will be the following:

1. The Polish question: dissolution of the London Gov-
ernment and fulfilment of the Yalta Agreement.

2. The question of whether the drafting commission, in
working out the question of the policy in respect of Italy
and the other satellites, should draw up a separate recom-
mendation for Italy or prepare a single recommendation
for all the countries concerned.

3. Poland’s western border. The Soviet delegation sub-
mitted a document on the question yesterday.

4. Trusteeship. The Soviet delegation also submitted a
document on the question yesterday.

5. Turkey. It is considered that the British delegation
desires to raise this question orally.

Truman: Allow me to make a statement concerning Po-
land’s western border. The Yalta Agreement established
that German territory is to be occupied by the troops of
the four Powers—Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A.
and France—each of whom is to have its zone of occupa-
tion. The question of Poland’s borders was touched upon at
the conference, but the decision said the final solution of the
question was to be made at a peace conference. At one of
our first sittings we decided that as the starting point of a
discussion of Germany’s future borders we take Germany’s
borders as of December 1937.

We have delineated our zones of occupation and the
borders of these zones. We have withdrawn our troops to
our zones as had been established. But it now appears that
another Government has been given a zone of occupation

205

and that has been done without consulting us. If the inten-
tion was to make Poland one of the Powers which is to have
a zone of occupation, this should have been agreed upon be-
forehand. We find it hard to accept such a solution of the
question because we had not been consulted about the mat-
ter in any way. I take a friendly attitude to Poland and will
possibly fully agree to the Soviet Government’s proposals
concerning her western borders, but I do not want to do
this now, because there will be another place for doing
this, namely, the peace conference.

Stalin: The decisions of the Crimea Conference said that
the Heads of the Three Governments agreed that Poland’s
eastern border was to run along the Curzon line, which
means that Poland’s eastern border was established at the
conference. As for her western border, the conference de-
cisions said that Poland was to receive substantial accre-
tions to her territory in the north and the west. It was fur-
ther stated: they, that is, the Three Governments consider
that at the appropriate time the new Polish Government
of National Unity will be asked for its opinion on the ques-
tion of the size of those accretions and that the final deci-
sion on Poland’s western borders would then be put off
until the peace conference.

Truman: That is how I understood it myself. But we did
not have and do not have any right to give Poland a zone
of occupation.

Stalin: The Polish Government of National Unity has
expressed its opinion on the western border. Its opinion is
now known to all of us.

Truman: No official statement has ever been made on
this western border.

Stalin: 1 am now speaking of the Polish Government’s
opinion. Now we all know what it is. We can now agree on
Poland’s western border, and the peace conference is te take
the final formal decision on it.

Truman: Mr. Byrnes received the Polish Government’s
statement only today. We have not yet had any time to
study it.

Stalin: Our proposal boils down to expressing our opin-
ion concerning the Polish Government’s desire to have a
western border running along a certain line. It makes no
difference whether we express our opinion today or to-
morrow.

206

As for the question that we have granted the Poles an
occupation zone without having the consent of the Allied
Powers, it has not been stated correctly. In their notes,
the American Government and the British Government
have repeatedly suggested that we should not allow the
Polish administration to enter the western regions until the
question of Poland’s western border is finally settled. We
could not do this because the German population had gone
to the west in the wake of the retreating German troops. The
Polish population, for its part, advanced to the west, and
our army needed a local administration in its rear, on the
territory which it occupied. Our army cannot simultaneously
set up an administration in the rear, fight and clear the ter-
ritory of the enemy. It is not used to doing this. That is why
we let the Poles in.

That was the spirit in which we replied to our American
and British friends at the time. We were also inclined to
do this in the knowledge that Poland was getting an accre-
tion of land to the west of her former border. I don’t see
what harm there is for our common cause in letting the
Poles set up their administration on a territory which is to
be Polish anyway. I have finished.

Truman: I have no objections to the opinion expressed
concerning Poland’s future border. But we did agree that
all parts of Germany must be under the control of the four
Powers. And it will be very hard to agree to a just decision
of the question of reparations if important parts of Ger-
many are under an occupying Power other than one of these
four Powers.

Stalin: Is it for reparations that you are apprehensive?
In that case, we can waive reparations from these territo-
ries.

Truman: We have no intention of receiving them.

Stalin: As for these western territories, there has been
no decision on this, and it is a matter of interpreting the
Crimea decision. There has been no decision on the western
border, the question has remained open. There was only
the promise of extending Poland’s borders to the west and
north.

Churchill: 1 have quite a lot to say about Poland’s western
border line but, I understand, the time for it has not yet
come.

207

Truman: It is up to the peace conference to determine
the future borders.

Stalin: It is very hard to restore the German administra-
tion in the western strip, everyone has run away.

Truman: If the Soviet Government wants to have help
in re-establishing the German administration in these ter-
ritories, this question could be discussed.

Stalin: Our concept, the Russian concept during a war,
in the occupation of enemy territory, is as follows. The army
fights, it goes forward and has no worries except winning
the fighting. But if the army is to move on it must have a
tranquil rear. It cannot fight with the enemy at the front
and simultaneously in the rear. The army fights well if the
rear is tranquil and if the rear sympathises with it and
helps it. Consider for a moment the situation in which the
German population is either on the run behind the retreat-
ing troops, or is engaged in shooting our troops in the back.
Meanwhile, the Polish population follows in the wake of
our troops. In such a situation the army naturally desires
to have an administration in its rear which sympathises with
it and helps it. That is the whole point.

Truman: | understand this and sympathise.

Stalin: There was no other way out. This does not mean,
of course, that I lay down the borders myself. If you do
not agree to the line which the Polish Government has pro-
posed, the question will remain open. That is all.

Churchill: But can this question be left without solution?

Stalin: It has to be solved at some time.

Churchill: There is also the question of supplies. The
question of food supplies is a highly important one, because
these areas are the chief sources of foodstuffs for the Ger-
man population.

Stalin: Who in that case will work there and raise the
grain? There’s no one to do this except the Poles.

Truman: We can reach an agreement. I think the sub-
stance of the question before us, with which we are con-
cerned, is the kind of administration that will be set up
in these areas. We are also interested in whether these areas
are to be part of Germany or part of Poland in the period
of occupation. Here is the question. We have an occupation
zone. France has an occupation zone, the British and the
Soviet Union have an occupation zone each. I want to know
whether the areas now being dealt with are a part of the

208

Soviet zone of occupation. I think that at the appropriate
time we shall be able to reach agreement concerning Po-
land’s future borders, but now I am interested in the ques-
tion of these areas during the occupation period.

Stalin: On paper they are still German territory; actual-
ly, de facto, they are Polish territory.

Truman: What has happened to the local population?
There must have been some three million of it.

Stalin: The population has gone.

Churchill: If that is so, it means that they will have to
obtain food in the areas to which they have gone, if the
areas the Germans have abandoned are not handed over to
Germany and are not at Germany’s disposal. I understand
that according to the Polish Government’s plan, which I
understand is supported by the Soviet Government, a quar-
ter of all the cultivated land in 1937 Germany is to be taken
away from her.

As for the population, it turns out that three or four mil-
lion Poles are to be moved from the east to the western
areas. According to Russian data, Germany’s pre-war pop-
ulation in these areas totalled eight and a quarter million.
This means that apart from the serious hardships connected
with the displacement of such a great number of people, a
disproportional burden will be laid on other parts of Ger-
many, and still the food problem will not be solved.

Truman: France will want to have the Saar and the Ruhr,
and if we let France have the Saar and the Ruhr, what will
be left of Germany?

Stalin: There is no decision on this, but in respect of
Poland’s western border there is a decision, and it is that the
territory of Poland must receive an accretion in the north
and the west.

Churchill: There is another remark concerning Generalis-
simo Stalin’s statement that all Germans have left these
areas. There is other information to the effect that two or
two and a half million Germans have after all stayed be-
hind. Of course, these figures should still be checked.

Stalin: Of course, they should be checked. We have been
discussing the border question and have now come to the
question of Germany’s food supplies. If you want to discuss
the question, let’s do so, I don’t mind.

Churchill: That’s true; we were speaking of the border
and have now switched to the question of Germany’s food

14-876 209

supplies. But I only mentioned it because the border ques-
tion creates some great difficulties for us in the solution of
certain other questions.

Stalin: | agree that there are some difficulties with Ger-
many’s supply, but the Germans themselves are chiefly to
blame for it. The war has brought about a situation in which
virtually none of the 8 million Germans have remained
there. Take Stettin: It had a population of 500,000, but
when we entered Stettin, there were only 8,000 left.

In East Prussia the Germans did the following: the great-
er part went to the west, into the rear of their troops, and
the rest went to the Konigsberg area, to the Russians. When
we got to the zone earmarked for accretion to Polish terri-
tory, there were no Germans there, there were only Poles.
That is how things worked out.

In the area between the Oder and the Vistula, the Ger-
mans abandoned their fields, and the Poles are cultivating
and harvesting them. The Poles will hardly agree to give
the Germans what they have cultivated. That is the situation
that has arisen in these areas.

Truman: I wish to re-emphasise: in my opinion the zones
of occupation should be made available to the Powers on
which a decision had been reached. I have no objections
to a discussion of Poland’s borders, but I believe we cannot
solve the question here.

Churchill: We agreed to compensate Poland at Ger-
many’s expense for the territory which has been taken from
her east of the Curzon line. But the one must balance the
other. Poland is now demanding much more than she is
giving away in the east. I do not think this is being done for
the benefit of Europe, to say nothing of the Allies. If three
or four million Poles are moved from east of the Curzon
line, three or four million Germans could be moved to the
west to make place for the Poles. But the present displace-
ment of 8 million men is something I cannot support. Com-
pensation must be equal to the losses, otherwise it would not
be good for Poland herself either. If, as Generalissimo Stalin
has said, the Germans have abandoned the lands east and
west of the Oder, they should be encouraged to return
there.

At any rate, the Poles have no right to create a disas-
trous situation in the food supply for the German popula-
tion. I want to re-emphasise this standpoint. I want the

210

Generalissimo to understand our difficulties just as, I hope,
we shall understand his.

We don’t want to be saddled with a large German
population without any food resources. Take the vast popula-
tion of the Ruhr basin, in the area of the coal mines. This
population is in the British zone of occupation. Unless they
are provided with enough foodstuffs, the situation in our
own zone will be similar to that in the German concentra-
tion camps.

Stalin: Anyhow, Germany cannot do, and has never
done, without grain imports.

Churchill: Of course, but she will be even less able to
feed herself if the eastern lands are taken away from her.

Stalin: Let them buy grain from Poland.

Churchill: We do not consider this territory to be Polish
territory.

Stalin: The Poles live there, and they have cultivated the
fields. We can’t demand of the Poles that they should work
the fields and let the Germans have the grain.

Churchill: Besides, I must point out that the conditions
in the areas occupied by the Poles are very strange in gen-
eral. I have been told, for instance, that the Poles are sell-
ing Silesian coal to Sweden. They are doing this when we
in Britain have a shortage of coal and are faced with the
coldest and harshest winter without fuel. We start from the
general principle that the supply of Germany within her
1937 borders with foodstuffs and fuel must be shared pro-
portionally to the size of her population, regardless of the
zone in which this food and fuel is located.

Stalin: And who is to mine the coal? The Germans are
not doing it, it is the Poles who are, they are working.

Churchill: But they are working in Silesia.

Stalin: The masters have all run away from there.

Churchill: They have gone because they were afraid of
military operations, but now that the war is over they could
return.

Stalin: They don’t want to, and the Poles have not much
sympathy with the idea.

Churchill: Yesterday I was deeply touched by the Gen-
eralissimo’s words when he said that it was undesirable
to deal with current and future problems while being guided
by a sense of revenge. I believe therefore that what J am
saying today will meet with his sympathy because it would

14* 211

be unjust to send such a great number of Germans to us,
while Poles had all the advantages.

Stalin: | am speaking of the industrialists who have run
away from the coal basin. We ourselves are buying coal
from the Poles, like the Swedes, because we are also short
of coal in some areas, for instance, the Baltic area.

Truman: It seems to be a fait accompli that a consider-
able part of Germany has been handed over to Poland for
occupation. What in that case remains for the exaction of
reparations? Even we in the United States are short of coal.
However, in spite of this, we are sending 6.5 million tons
of coal to Europe this year. I think this part of Germany,
namely, the coal basin, should be regarded as remaining
with Germany both in respect of reparations and in respect
of food supplies. I think the Poles have no right to take
over that part of Germany. We are now discussing the
question of Poland’s future borders. But I believe we are
in no position to solve the question here and that it must
be settled at a peace conference.

Stalin: Who, in that case, is going to mine the coal there?
We, Russians, are short of hands for our own enterprises.
All the German workers went into the army, Goebbels’s
propaganda attained its aim. It remains either to stop all
production or to hand it over to the Poles. There is no other
way out. As for coal, 1 must say that within the old bor-
ders the Poles had their own coal basin, a very rich one.
To this coal basin has been added the Silesia coal basin,
which was in German hands. The Poles are working there.
We can’t take the coal mined by the Poles.

Churchill: The pits in Silesia, I understand, are being
worked by Polish workers. There is no objection to the pits
being operated as an agency of the Soviet Government in
the Soviet zone of occupation, but not of the Polish Govern-
ment in a zone that has not been granted to Poland for oc-
cupation.

Stalin: This would disrupt all relations between two
friendly states. I also ask Mr. Churchill to consider the fact
that the Germans themselves are short of manpower. The
greater part of the enterprises we found in the course of
our advance were manned by foreign workers—lItalians,
Bulgarians, Frenchmen, Russians, Ukrainians, etc. All of
these workers had been forcibly driven from their homeland
by the Germans. When the Russian troops arrived in these

212

areas, the foreign workers considered themselves free, and
went home. Where are the German workers? It turns out
that most of them were drafted into the German army and
were either killed during the war or taken prisoner.

This produced a situation in which the big German in-
dustry was operating with the most insignificant number of
German workers, and a great number of foreign workers.
When these foreign workers were liberated, they went away,
and the enterprises were left without workers. The situa-
tion today is such that either these enterprises have to be
closed down or the local population, that is, the Poles, must
be allowed to work there. You can’t drive out the Poles now.
This situation has taken shape spontaneously. There is sim-
ply no one to blame for this.

Attlee: I want to say a few words concerning the present
situation from the standpoint of the Powers occupying Ger-
many. Leaving aside the question of the final border between
Poland and Germany, we see before us a country which is
beset by chaos but which was once an economic entity. We
have before us a country which depended for its food and
partly its coal supplies on its eastern areas, partially settled
by the Poles. I believe the resources of the whole of 1937
Germany should be used to maintain and supply the whole
of the German population, and if a part of Germany is cut
off beforehand, this will create great difficulties for the
occupying Powers in the western and southern zones.

If there is need of manpower for the eastern areas, it must
be found among the population of the rest of Germany,
among the part of the German population which has been
demobilised or is exempt from work in military industry.
This manpower should be sent where it can do the most good
to prevent the Allies from being placed in a difficult situa-
tion over the next few months.

Stalin: Will Mr. Attlee also take into account the fact
that Poland is herself suffering from the aftermath of war
and is also an Ally?

Attlee: Yes, but she has found herself in a privileged po-
sition.

Stalin: Vis-a-vis Germany. That is how it should be.

Attlee: No, in respect of the other Allies.

Stalin: That is far from being the case.

Truman: | want to say frankly what I think on this ques-
tion. I cannot agree to the alienation of the eastern part of

213

1937 Germany in as far as it bears upon settling the repara-
tions question and supplies of food and coal for the whole
German population.

Churchill: We have not yet done with this question. Be-
sides, we do have, of course, much more pleasant questions.
(Laughter.)

Truman: | propose that we now adjourn and _ perhaps
think these questions over. That suits me.

Stalin: All right, that also suits me.

Truman: Tomorrow the sitting is at 5.00 p.m.

Sixth Sitting
July 22, 1945

Truman opens the sitting.

Stalin: | want to inform you that today the Soviet troops
in Austria started withdrawing, and in some places they
will have to withdraw 100 kilometres. The withdrawal is
to be completed by July 24. The advance units of the Al-
lied troops have already entered Vienna.

Churchill: We are very grateful to the Generalissimo for
having so swiftly started implementing the agreement.

Truman: The American Government also expresses its
gratitude.

Stalin: There is no cause for thanks; it is our duty to do
this.

(The British delegation then reported that the Foreign
Ministers, at their morning sitting, discussed the following
questions.

First question: the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe.
The Ministers examined a memorandum tabled by the
US. delegation on July 21. It dealt with three questions:
first, supervision of elections in some European countries;
second, creation of favourable conditions for members of
the world press in the liberated areas and the former satel-
lite countries; and third, procedures governing the work of
the control commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary.

The British delegation expressed agreement with the U.S.
memorandum. The Soviet delegation did not agree with the
proposal concerning supervision of the elections.

As for the second and third questions—concerning mem-
bers of the press and the procedures for the control com-
missions in Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary, it was decided

214

—

to refer these proposals for discussion to a subcommittee
composed as follows: Cannon and Russell from the United
States; Sobolev, from the U.S.S.R.; and Hayter, from Great
Britain.

The Soviet delegation decided to submit a memorandum
showing the recent improvements in the status of British and
American representatives in the control commissions in Ru-
mania, Bulgaria and Hungary. The Soviet delegation also
agreed to draw up a memorandum concerning the changes
it considered necessary and desirable in connection with
the procedure governing the work of the Allied commission
in Italy.

Second question: economic principles in respect of Ger-
many.

A report was submitted by the Economic Subcommittee.
The U.S. delegation asked for a postponement of the dis-
cussion of the reparations question until the next sitting. The
Soviet delegation proposed that there should be discussion
of the economic principles which had been agreed in the Sub-
committee. Accordingly, the Foreign Ministers decided to
discuss only the agreed principles and not to go into the
controversial principles or the reparations question. It was
decided that the reparations question would be the first
item on the agenda of the Foreign Ministers sitting on
July 23.

Paragraphs 11, 12, 14, 15 and 17 were adopted, subject to
agreement on the rest of the paragraphs which remain in
dispute.

As for the other paragraphs, it was agreed that the last
sentence in Paragraph 10 should be amended to read as
follows:

“Production capacity not needed for permitted production
shall be removed in accordance with the reparations plan
recommended by the Allied Commission on reparations and
approved by the Governments concerned, or if not removed,
shall be destroyed.”

Paragraphs 13, 16 and 18 were set aside for further dis-
cussion.

The Ministers decided to recommend the following agen-
da for the day’s sitting of the Heads of Government:

1. Poland’s western frontier—resumption of discussion.

2. Trusteeship—question carried over from the previous
day’s sitting of the Heads of Government.

215

3. Turkey—question also carried over from the previous
day’s sitting.

4. Partial alteration of the western frontier of the U.S.S.R.
—proposal of the Soviet delegation.

5. Iran—memorandum submitted by the United Kingdom
delegation on July 21.

It was decided to transfer several other questions to the
next day’s sitting of the Foreign Ministers. These questions
were the following:

1. Co-operation in solving urgent European economic
problems—proposal of the U.S. delegation.

2. Directive of the Heads of Government concerning con-
trol over Germany in accordance with the principles agreed
by them—proposal of the U.S. delegation.

3. Tangier—proposal of the Soviet delegation.

4. Syria and the Lebanon—proposal of the Soviet dele-
gation.)

Truman: Do you agree to refer these questions for dis-
cussion to the Foreign Ministers at their sitting of to-
morrow?

Churchill: 1 do not know what these proposals concerning
Syria and the Lebanon are. This question affects us more
than any other state. My colleagues are not affected by this
question because only British troops are involved there. Of
course, we had difficulties with France on this matter. We
are prepared to leave Syria and the Lebanon, we do not seek
anything there. But it is impossible to do so now, because
a British withdrawal would be followed by the killing of
Frenchmen. I should like to know what the matter is before
I can take any decision. Perhaps, this may be done here?

Stalin: Certainly. The matter is as follows. The Govern-
ment of Syria appealed to the Soviet Government to inter-
vene in this affair. It is known that at the time we addressed
a note on the question to the French, British and Amer-
ican Governments. We should like to receive the relevant
information on this matter, because we are also interested
in it. Of course, the question could be examined beforehand
at a sitting of the Foreign Ministers.

Churchill: 1 should prefer to have the first three ques-
tions referred for examination to the Foreign Ministers, but
to have the question of Syria and the Lebanon discussed
here.

Stalin: By all means.

216

Truman: My proposal is that the first three questions
should be referred to the Foreign Ministers and that the
question of Syria and the Lebanon should be examined by
the Heads of Government after we have discussed the ques-
tions on our agenda.

We go on to the first item of the agenda—Poland’s west-
ern frontier.

As for the U.S. Government’s view of this question, it
was set forth by me yesterday.

Churchill: I heard you say, Mr. President, that your stand-
point was set forth yesterday. I too have nothing to add to
the views I have already expressed.

Truman (to Stalin): Have you anything to add?

Stalin: Have you studied the Polish Government’s state-
ment?

Truman: Yes, I have read it.

Churchill: Is it Bierut’s letter?

Stalin: It is a letter from Bierut and Osébka-Morawski.

Churchill: Yes, I have read it.

Stalin: Are all the delegations of their old opinion?

Truman: That’s obvious.

Stalin: The question remains open.

Truman: Can we go on to the next question?

Churchill: What does it mean: remains open? Does that
mean that nothing will be done about it?

Truman: If a question remains open, we can discuss it
once again.

Churchill: It is to be hoped that the question will mature
for discussion before our departure.

Stalin: Possibly.

Churchill: It would be a pity for us to depart without
settling this question, which will surely be discussed in the
parliaments of the whole world.

Stalin: In that case let us comply with the Polish Govern-
ment’s request.

Churchill: That proposal is absolutely unacceptable to the
British Government. Yesterday, I gave a number of rea-
sons why the proposal is unacceptable. Having such a ter-
ritory will not benefit Poland. It will tend to undermine
Germany’s economic position and saddle the occupying
Powers with an excessive burden in respect of supplying the
western part of Germany with food and fuel. In addition,
we have some doubts of a moral order concerning the de-

217

sirability of such a great displacement of population. We
are in principle agreed to a resettlement but in the propor-
tion in which the population is resettled from east of the
Curzon Line. But when it comes to resettling 8 or 9 mil-
lion persons, we consider it incorrect. The information on
this question is highly contradictory. According to our date
there are 8 or 9 million persons; according to Soviet data,
all these people have gone from there. We believe that until
this information is verified we can adhere to our figures. So
far we have had no possibility of checking what is ac-
tually going on there. I could also give other reasons, but
should not like to bother the Conference.

Stalin: | do not undertake to object to the reasons given
by Mr. Churchill, but I have in mind a number of reasons
that are most important.

Concerning fuel. It is said that Germany is left without
fuel. But she still has the Rhineland and there is fuel there.
Germany will not experience any special difficulties if she
is deprived of Silesian coal; Germany’s principal fuel base
is situated in the west.

The second question, concerning the resettlement of the
population. There are no 8, or 6, or 3, or 2 millions of
population in these areas. The people there were either draft-
ed into the army and were killed or taken prisoner, or have
left these areas. Very few Germans remain on this territory.
But this can be verified. Is it possible to arrange to hear the
opinion of the Polish representatives concerning Poland’s
frontier?

Churchill: | am unable to support this proposal at the
present time, because of the view expressed by the President
concerning the invitation of Yugoslavia’s representatives.

Stalin: Let the representatives of Poland be invited to
the Foreign Ministers’ Council in London and be heard there.

Truman: | have no objections to that.

Churchill: But, Mr. President, the Foreign Ministers’
Council will meet only in September.

Stalin: Well, that’s when the Council will invite the Polish
Government’s representatives to London.

Churchill: In order to verify the information?

Stalin: By the time information will have been collected
by the three sides.

Churchill: But that will only mean transferring the diffi-
cult question from this Conference to the Foreign Ministers’

218

eee :

oe

Council, whereas this Conference is able to settle the ques-
tion.

Stalin: I, too, think that it is able to do so. On the strength
of the decisions of the Crimea Conference it is our duty to
hear the Polish Government’s opinion on the question of
Poland’s western frontier.

Truman: That is right. 1 think the Soviet proposal that
the Foreign Ministers’ Council invite the Polish Govern-
ment’s representatives to London should be adopted. But
that does not, of course, rule out the possibility of the ques-
tion being discussed at the present Conference.

Stalin: 1 propose that the Polish Government’s represent-
atives should be invited to the Foreign Ministers’ Council in
London in September and that their opinion should be heard
there.

Churchill: That is another question. I thought it was a
matter of verifying the data concerning the number of Ger-
mans in those areas.

Stalin: It is a matter of Poland’s western frontier.

Churchill: But how can the question of the frontier be
decided there when the question must be settled at a peace
conference?

Truman: I think it will be useful to hear the Poles at the
Foreign Ministers’ Council in London.

Stalin: That’s right.

Churchill: 1 regret that such an important and urgent
question is being referred for solution to a body with less
authority than the present Conference.

Stalin: In that case, let us invite the Poles over here and
hear what they have to say.

Churchill: 1 should prefer that because the question is
urgent. But it is not hard to foresee just what the Poles will
demand. They will, of course, demand much more than
we can agree to.

Stalin: But if we invite the Poles they will not accuse us
of having settled this question without hearing them. What
I want is that no such accusation should be levelled at us by
the Poles.

Churchill: But I have not made any accusations against
them.

Stalin: It is not you, but the Poles who will say: they
have settled the question of the frontier without having
heard us.

219

Churchill: | understand now.

Truman: Is it necessary to settle the question so urgently?
I repeat, I think that the final solution of this question
should be referred to a peace conference; we ourselves are
not able to solve this question. But I think that the discus-
sion of this question here was highly useful and it does not
rule out any further discussions. What I do not know is
how urgent the question is.

Stalin: If it is not urgent, let us refer the question to the
Foreign Ministers’ Council. That would not be superfluous.

Truman: But that does not exclude the possibility of fur-
ther discussing the question here.

Churchill: Mr. President, with all due respect to you,
I should like to note that there is a certain urgency about
the question. If the settlement of the question is deferred,
the status quo will be fixed. The Poles will start exploiting
this territory, they will settle down there, and if the process
continues, it will be very difficult to adopt any other decision
later. That is why I still hope that we shall come to some
agreement here, so as to know in what state the Polish ques-
tion is.

I do not imagine how this question can be settled by the
Foreign Ministers’ Council in London, when we over here
have failed to reach agreement. Unless we settle this ques-
tion, the problem of food and fuel remains open and the
burden of supplying the German population with food and
fuel will be imposed on us, above all the British, because
their zone of occupation has the smallest food resources. If
the Foreign Ministers’ Council, after hearing the Poles, also
fails to reach agreement, the question will be postponed
indefinitely. Meanwhile, winter will set in and there will
still be no agreement.

I should very much like to meet the Generalissimo Stalin
half way in solving the practical difficulties of which he
spoke yesterday, the difficulties which arose in the course
of events. We should be prepared to submit for your exami-
nation a compromise solution which would operate in the
intervening period—from the present time until the peace
conference. I propose that we draw a provisional line east
of which the territory would be occupied by the Poles as a
part of Poland until the final settlement of the question at
a peace conference; to the west of the line, the Poles, if they
find themselves there, could act as representatives of the

220

by eemammemmameasaaaes |

Soviet Government in the zone made available to the So-
viet Union.

1 have had several talks with the Generalissimo since the
Tehran Conference and I think we were agreed in general
terms that the new Poland should move her borders west
to the Oder River. But this is not such a simple question.
The difference in views between the Generalissimo and
myself is that the British Government, while allowing that
Poland should extend her territory, does not wish to go as
far as the Soviet Government does. When I speak of the
line along the Oder River I have in mind the line of which
we spoke two years ago at Tehran, when there was no ques-
tion of any precise demarcation of the frontier. We are now
prepared to propose that the Conference examine a provi-
sional Polish frontier line. If the question is postponed until
September, and the Foreign Ministers are made to discuss
it with the Poles, this will mean that the question will not be
settled before the winter. I shall be sorry if we do not reach
an agreement in principle on this question here. In my view,
if the question is postponed and referred for discussion by
the Foreign Ministers’ Council with the participation of the
Poles, we shall not benefit in any way from such a settle-
ment.

Our position in respect of the territory and the line is
quite clear. Here I should like to find a practical way out
of the situation. But if the question is referred to the For-
eign Ministers’ Council, its solution will be dragged out
far too long. I do not regard the question as being quite
hopeless of solution here. I am sure that we could find a
compromise solution. We could let the Poles have every-
thing that we decide to let them have, and the rest of the
territory would be left under the Soviet Government’s ad-
ministration.

I think there is no sense in leaving this question unsolved
until September. If we do not settle this question, it will
mean a failure for our Conference.

I repeat once again that when we used the expression
“the Oder line” we had in mind only an approximate line.
The line we propose should be traced on the map; in one
place it even goes across the Oder.

I appeal to the Conference to continue its efforts to reach
agreement on this question, if not today, then some other
day, because if the Foreign Ministers meet in September and

221

have a discussion with the Poles, say, in the course of
a fortnight, with the Soviet side again holding one view,
and the United States and Great Britain, another, the
question may again be left outstanding or we may achieve
its settlement far too late. What will be the position
of, say, Berlin? Berlin receives some of its coal from
Silesia.

Stalin: Berlin does not receive its coal from Silesia but
from Torgau (Saxony), as it did in the past.

Churchill: The question of coal for Berlin is very impor-
tant, because the city is under our common occupation.

Stalin: Let them take it from the Ruhr, from Zwickau.

Churchill: Is that so-called brown coal?

Stalin: No, it is good hard coal. Brown coal is good for
use in briquettes, and the Germans have good briquette fac-
tories. They have all sorts of possibilities.

Churchill: I merely say that part of the coal for Berlin
was received from Silesia.

Stalin: Before the British troops occupied the Zwickau
area the Germans got their coal for Berlin from there. Fol-
lowing the departure of the Allied troops from Saxony to
the west, Berlin got its coal from Torgau.

Truman: Allow me to restate the U.S. position on this
question.

Stalin: By all means.

Truman: 1 should like to give some extracts here from
the Crimea Conference decision.

“The three Heads of Government consider that the eastern
frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with some
digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometres
in favour of Poland. They recognise that Poland must re-
ceive substantial accessions of territory in the north and
west. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provision-
al Government of National Unity should be sought in due
course of the extent of these accessions and that the final
delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should there-
after await the peace conference.”

This agreement was reached by President Roosevelt, Gen-
eralissimo Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill. I agree with
this decision; I well understand the difficulties of which
Generalissimo Stalin spoke yesterday. I also well under-
stand the difficulties in respect of food and fuel supplies of
which Prime Minister Churchill spoke yesterday. But I think

222

that these difficulties do not in any way alter the substance
of the matter.

Stalin: If you are not bored with this question, I am pre-
pared to speak once again. I, too, start from the decision
of the Crimea Conference from which the President has just
quoted. It follows from the precise meaning of this decision
that with the formation of the Government of National
Unity in Poland, we should have obtained the opinion of the
new Polish Government on the question of Poland’s western
frontier. The Polish Government has communicated its opin-
ion. We now have two possibilities: either to endorse the
Polish Government’s opinion on Poland’s western frontier,
or, if we are not in agreement with the Polish proposals, to
hear the Polish representatives here and only then decide
the question.

I consider it expedient to settle the question at our Con-
ference and, since there is no unity of opinion with the Pol-
ish Government, to invite its representatives and hear them.
But the opinion was expressed here that the Poles should
not be invited to this Conference. If that is so, we can refer
this question to the Foreign Ministers’ Council.

I should like to remind Mr. Churchill and others who were
present at the Crimea Conference of the opinion which was
then expressed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister
Churchill and with which I did not agree. Mr. Churchill
spoke of Poland’s western frontier line along the Oder be-
ginning from its mouth, then running along the Oder all the
time, until the confluence of the Oder with the River Neisse,
east of it. I stood for a line west of the Neisse. Accord-
ing to the scheme of President Roosevelt and Mr. Chur-
chill, Stettin and also Breslau and the area west of the
Neisse were to remain with Germany. (Indicates on the
map.)

What we are examining here now is the question of fron-
tiers and not of a provisional line. This question cannot be
evaded. If you were in agreement with the Poles, it would
be possible to adopt a decision without inviting the Polish
Government’s representatives here. But since you are not in
agreement with the Polish Government’s opinion and wish
to make amendments, it will be well for us to invite the
Poles here and hear their opinion. This is a matter of prin-
ciple.

Churchill: On behalf of the British Government I should

223

like to withdraw my objection to inviting the Poles here, in
order to try to achieve the adoption of some kind of prac-
tical decision which would remain in force until the final
settlement of the question at the peace conference.

‘Truman: I have no objection to inviting the Polish Gov-
ernment’s representatives here. They could have talks here
with our Foreign Ministers.

Stalin: That’s right.

Churchill: And then the results of the talks with them
could be placed before the Heads of Government.

Stalin: That’s right. That’s right.

Churchill: Who is to send them an invitation?

Stalin: The Chairman, I think.

Truman: Good. We now pass to the next question. I think
that the Soviet delegation has proposals concerning trus-
teeship.

(Setting forth its proposals on the question of trusteeship,
the Soviet delegation declared that what had been formu-
lated in its proposals, submitted in written form, followed
from the decisions of the San Francisco Conference. It said
furthermore that inasmuch as the main question of trustee-
ship had been decided by the United Nations Charter, the
Conference of the Heads of Government was faced with the
concrete question of territories. The Soviet delegation ex-
pressed the opinion that the Conference could hardly expect
to examine the question in detail but it could, first, discuss
the question of Italy’s colonial possessions in Africa and the
Mediterranean, and second, discuss the question of the League
of Nations mandated territories. The Soviet delegation
pointed out that its proposals contain two variants of a pos-
sible solution of the question of former Italian colonies. It
has proposed that the question should be referred for exami-
nation to the Foreign Ministers’ meeting.}

Churchill: Of course, it is possible to have an exchange
of opinion on any question, but if it turns out that the sides
differ in their views, the only result will be that we shall
have had a pleasant discussion. I think the question of the
mandates was decided at San Francisco.

Truman: Allow me to read the article of the United Na-
tions Charter dealing with the question of trusteeship.

“|. The trusteeship system shall apply to such territories
in the following categories as may be placed thereunder by
means of trusteeship agreements:

224

(a) Territories now held under mandate;

“(b) Territories which may be detached from enemy
states as a result of the Second World War; and

‘“(c) Territories voluntarily placed under the system by
states responsible for their administration. _

“9. It will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to
which territories in the foregoing categories will be brought
under the trusteeship system and upon what terms.”

I believe the Soviet proposals apply to the second para-
graph of this article. | agree with the proposal of the Soviet
delegation that the question should be referred for discus-
sion to the Foreign Ministers.

Churchill: We agreed with what was adopted at San
Francisco but no more than that. Since the question of trus-
teeship is in the hands of an international organisation, |
doubt the desirability of an exchange of opinion on the
question here.

Truman: I think it will be quite in order to examine the
question here like the question of Poland or any other ques-
tion.

Churchill: The question of Poland has not been examined
by an international organisation.

We expressed our standpoint on the question of trustee-
ship secretly at Yalta and openly at San Francisco, Our
stand is clear and cannot be altered.

Truman: Great Britain’s stand is fully ensured by an-
other article of the United Nations Charter, and | see no rea-
son why this question cannot be examined here.

Stalin: We learn from the press, for instance, that Mr.
Eden, in a speech in the British Parliament, declared that
Italy has lost her colonies for ever. Who has decided that?
If Italy has lost them, who has found them? (Laughter.]
That is a very interesting question.

Churchill: | can answer it. By steady effort, at the cost of
great losses and through exceptional victories, the British
Army alone conquered these colonies.

Stalin: And the Red Army took Berlin. (Laughter.]

Churchill: 1 want to finish my statement, because Mr.
President has questioned the words “the British Army alone
conquered”. I have in mind the following Italian colonies:
Italian Somaliland, Eritrea, Cyrenaica and Tripoli, which we
conquered alone and in very difficult conditions.

However, we do not seek territorial gains. We do not want

15-876 295

to derive any advantages from this war, although we have
suffered great losses. Of course, as regards human losses
they are not as great as those suffered by the Soviet Union
and its gallant troops. However, we have emerged from
this war in great debt to the United States. We can never
expect to have the same strength at sea as the United States.
During the war we built only one battleship, and lost ten.
But despite all these losses we have no territorial claims.
That is why we approach the question of trust territories
without any ulterior motives.

Now about the statement made by Eden in Parliament, in
which he said that Italy has lost her colonies. This does
not mean that Italy has no right to claim these colonies.
This does not exclude any discussion, during the prepara-
tion of the peace treaty with Italy, of the question of whether
a part of her former territories should be returned to Italy.
I do not support such a proposal, but we do not object to
the question of colonies being discussed either in the Foreign
Ministers’ Council, when it deals with the preparation of
the peace treaty with Italy, or, of course, at a peace con-
ference on the final settlement.

I must say that when I visited Tripoli and Cyrenaica, I
saw the work that had been done by the Italians in ploughing
and cultivating the land; it was remarkable, in spite of the
difficult conditions. What I want to say is that although we
do not favour a return of her African colonies to Italy, we
do not, at the same time, rule out the possibility of dis-
cussing the question. At present, all these colonies are in
our hands. Who wants to have them? If there are any claim-
ants to these colonies round this table, it would be well
for them to speak out.

Truman: We have no use for them. We have enough poor
Italians at home who need to be fed.

Churchill: We examined the question as to whether some
of these colonies could be used to settle Jews. But we con-
sider that it would be inconvenient for the Jews to settle
there.

Of course, we have great interests in the Mediterranean
and any change in the status quo in that area would re-
quire a long and thorough study on our part.

We do not quite understand what our Russian Allies want.

Stalin: We should like to know whether you consider that
Italy has lost her colonies for good. If you consider that she

226

has lost those colonies, which states are we to hand them
over to for trusteeship? We should like to know that. If it
is too early to speak of this, we can wait, but it will have to
be said some time.

Churchill: Of course, we must decide the question of
whether we should detach her colonies from Italy, which we
have a perfect right to do.

Stalin: That is a question which still has to be decided.

Churchill: And if they are taken away, which we have
every right to do, we shall have to decide who is to have
trusteeship over them. It is up to the peace conference to de-
cide which colonies are to be taken away from Italy, but
the question of the further administration of those territories
is within the competence of an international organisation.

Stalin: Are we to understand Mr. Churchill in the sense
that the present Conference is not empowered to examine the
question?

Churchill; Our Conference cannot settle the question: it
must be settled by a peace conference. But, of course, if
this trotka reaches agreement, this will be of great impor-
tance.

Stalin: I do not propose to decide, but to examine the ques-
tion. I think that our Conference is, of course, empowered
to examine the question.

Churchill: We are examining the question just now. I
have no objection to the Generalissimo saying what he wants
and I agree to study the question immediately.

Stalin: It is not a matter of the Generalissimo but of the
fact that the question has not been examined and should be.

Churchill: Which question specifically?

Stalin: The question tabled by the Soviet delegation.

Truman: 1 agree with the proposal of the Soviet delega-
tion to refer the question for discussion by the Foreign Min-
isters.

Stalin: That’s another matter.

Truman: We have no objections to that proposal.

Churchill: We have no objections either, except that we
have been referring all the questions to our Ministers.

Truman: That is quite natural.

Churchill: J think there are many more urgent questions
which ought to be settled while we are here. We have decid-
ed that the question of a peace treaty with Italy will be
examined by the Foreign Ministers’ Council in September as

15° 227

a matter of first priority, and this will automatically raise
the question of what is to be done with these Italian colo-
nies. I am against burdening our Foreign Ministers with
this question as well. But the question could be placed on
the agenda if the Ministers find they have time to deal with
the question.

Stalin: Let’s refer it to the Ministers.

Truman: | support that proposal.

Churchill: Let us refer the question to the Foreign Min-
isters, provided that does not slow down their work on more
urgent matters.

Stalin: Now, let’s not have such reservations. You can’t
refer a question with that kind of reservation. Either we
refer it, or we do not.

Churchill: 1f you insist, I give in.

Truman: We refer the question for examination by the
Foreign Ministers. [. . .]

(The Soviet delegation then handed its proposals con-
cerning the Kénigsberg region to the delegations of the
United States and Britain.)

Truman: I should like to propose that we refer this ques-
tion for discussion by the Foreign Ministers.

I have one more question. We have already agreed on
inviting the Polish Government’s representatives over here.
I think the correspondents will want to know why the Polish
Government’s representatives are being summoned and I
think it would be proper to issue a communique on the
matter.

Stalin: Before the Poles arrive?

Truman: Yes, before their arrival.

Stalin: I suppose we could.

Churchill: That runs counter to the principle we have
adhered to until now.

Stalin: It’s all the same whether we issue a communiqué
or not. I don’t mind which way we have it.

Churchill: Shall we state the purpose of their coming
here?

Stalin: I don’t think we should state the purpose.

Churchill: I request that the purpose of their visit should
not be stated.

Truman: Accepted without statement of purpose.

Stalin: Good.

[The Soviet delegation then read a communication on

228

the Soviet POW camp in Italy. It said that this was Camp
No. 5 in the vicinity of the town of Celsinatica, under the
control of the British authorities, in which mainly Ukrain-
ians were kept. The Soviet delegation stated that initially
the British authorities said that the camp contained 150 men,
but when a Soviet representative visited the camp it proved
to contain 10,000 Ukrainians, of whom the British com-
mand had formed a whole division. Twelve regiments were
organised, including a signals regiment and a battalion of
engineers. The officer corps was made up chiefly of former
Petlyura men, who previously had commands in the Ger-
man Army. The Soviet delegation stated in conclusion that
when the Soviet officer made his appearance at the camp,
625 men at once declared their desire to return to the Soviet
Union.]

Churchill: We welcome every manner of observation on
your part. I shall demand a special report by telegraph.
There may be many Poles there.

Stalin: No, there were only Ukrainians, Soviet citizens.

Churchill: When approximately did all this happen?

Stalin: We got the telegram today, and it happened over
the last few months.

Churchill: ve not heard anything of this until now.

(Truman closes the sitting and sets the next one for 17.00
the next day.)

Seventh Sitting
July 23, 1945

Truman opens the sitting.

(Reporting on the Foreign Ministers’ sitting, the Soviet
delegation said the agenda of the day’s sitting of the
Ministers included the following questions:

1. Reparations from Germany, Austria and _ Italy.

The People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the
U.S.S.R. handed to the U.S. Secretary of State and the
Foreign Secretary of Great Britain the Soviet delegation’s
drafts on reparations from Germany and on advance deliv-
eries from Germany on account of reparations.

It was decided to instruct the Economic Commission to
make a preliminary examination of both drafts, and then

229

to discuss them at the next meeting of the three Foreign
Ministers.

2. Economic principles in respect of Germany.

There was a discussion of Clauses 13, 18 and the new
Clause 19, which was proposed by the Soviet delegation.
The Soviet delegation announced that it was withdrawing
its amendment to Clause 13, and proposed the removal of
Clause 18 so that the questions dealt with in the clause
would be discussed by the Allied agencies in Germany and
then settled by the Control Council, or, in the event of no
agreement being reached in the Control Council, by agree-
ment between the Governments. No agreement was reached
and it was decided to refer the question of Clause 18 for
settlement by the three Heads of Government.

As regards the new Clause 19, proposed by the Soviet
delegation, the U.S. Secretary of State declared it to be
unacceptable to the United States. The Soviet delegation
proposed an alternative draft of Clause 19, according to
which priority over all other deliveries was to be given to
exports from Germany, as approved by the Control Council,
to cover imports. In all other cases, priority was to be given
to reparations. No agreement was reached, and it was
decided to refer the question for settlement by the three
Heads of Government.

3. About the Council of Foreign Ministers.

The draft submitted by the Drafting Commission was
adopted without amendments.

4. About Trust Territories.

There was a discussion of the Soviet delegation’s draft.
The Foreign Secretary of Great Britain declared that the
first thing to be settled was whether any Italian colonies
were to be taken away from Italy, and which. The question
should be settled in drafting the peace treaty with Italy.
The question of who was to be given the trusteeship of all
the former Italian colonies which it might be decided to
take away from Italy should be settled by the international
United Nations organisation. The U.S. Secretary of State
proposed that the settlement of this question should be
postponed until the conclusion of a peace treaty with Italy,
when all the territorial questions relating to Italy would be
up for solution. The People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs
of the U.S.S.R. proposed that the Soviet memorandum
should be referred for examination by the first sitting of the

230

Council of Foreign Ministers in London this September.
The British Minister declared that he believed there was no
need to refer the Soviet memorandum to the Council of
Foreign Ministers, as the question of the Italian colonies
would automatically arise during the drafting of the peace
treaty with Italy. The People’s Commissar for Foreign
Affairs of the U.S.S.R. asked that it be noted that the Soviet
Government would raise the questions dealt with in the
Soviet memorandum at the September sitting of the Council
of Foreign Ministers in London.

5. About the directives to the Allied commanders-in-chief
in Germany.

It was decided to inform all commanders-in-chief of Al-
lied occupation troops in Germany of the relevant decisions
of the Conference, after these decisions had been agreed
with the Provisional Government of the French Republic.

For that purpose it was decided to set up a commission
consisting of: Murphy and Riddleberger of the United
States; Strang and Harrison of Great Britain, and Gusev
and Sobolev of the U.S.S.R.

6. About co-operation in settling urgent European eco-
nomic problems.

To examine the memorandum submitted by the US.
delegation it was decided to set up a commission consisting
of: Clayton and Pawley of the United States; Brand and
Cowlson of Great Britain, and Arutyunyan and Gera-
shchenko of the U.S.S.R.

7. About Tangier.

There was a discussion of the Soviet draft.

It was decided:

(1) To adopt the first paragraph of the Soviet delegation’s
draft, namely, the following:

‘Having examined the question of the Zone of Tangier,
the three Governments have agreed that this zone, which
includes the City of Tangier and the area adjacent to it,
in view of its special strategic importance, shall remain
international.”

(2) The whole question of Tangier is to be discussed at
a meeting of the representatives of the Four Powers—the
U.S.S.R., the United States, Great Britain and France—in
Paris in the near future.

8. Approval of the text of a message to the Governments
of China and France.

231

It was decided to send a message 48 hours before the
publication of the communiqué on the results of the Confer-
ence.

9. About the agenda for the sitting of the three Heads of
Government on July 23.

It was agreed to recommend to the three Heads of
Government the following agenda:

(1) About the Black Sea Straits and other international
inland waterways.

(2) About the Konigsberg area.

(3) About Syria and the Lebanon.

(4) About Iran.)

[...] Truman: Allow me to set forth my views on the
Black Sea Straits and international inland waterways in
general.

Our position on this question is as follows: We believe
that the Montreux Convention should be revised. We believe
the Black Sea Straits should become a free waterway open
to the whole world, and the right of free passage for all
ships through the Straits should be guaranteed by all of us.
I have thought a great deal about the question. What has
been the cause of all these wars? In the last 200 years, they
have all started in the area between the Mediterranean and
the Baltic Sea, between France’s eastern frontiers and
Russia’s western frontiers. The last time again peace was
broken above all by Germany. I think it is the task of this
Conference, and also of the coming peace conference, to
prevent a repetition of such events.

Stalin: That’s right.

Truman: | believe we shall be largely helping to achieve
this aim by establishing and guaranteeing that waterways
are free for all nations.

Stalin: Which, for instance?

Truman: 1 have a proposal on freedom of ways of
communication, and I think we should try to bring about a
situation in which Russia, Britain, and all other states have
free access to all the seas of the world. Here is the proposal.
{Hands in draft proposal.}

Our draft provides for the establishment of free and
unrestricted navigation along all the international inland
waterways. The U.S. Government believes that such
free and unrestricted navigation should be established for
internal waterways running through the territory of two

232

or more states, and that it should be regulated by
international agencies on which all the interested states
are represented.

We think that such agencies should be set up as soon as
possible. The first that should be set up are provisional
navigation agencies for the Danube and the Rhine. These
provisional agencies should have the functions of restoring
and developing the navigation facilities on the said rivers,
supervising river shipping to ensure equal opportunities for
the citizens of various nationalities and establishing stand-
ard rules for the use of these means, and also rules of
navigation, and customs and sanitary formalities and other
similar matters. Among the members of these agencies
should be the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet
Union, France and the sovereign littoral states recognised
by the Governments of these Powers.

I think the same procedure should be applied to the Kiel
Canal and that the Montreux Convention should be revised
in the same spirit. In that way we shall have free exchange
in these areas.

I have tabled these proposals because 1 do not want in
the next 25 years to take part in another war which may
break out over the Straits or the Danube.

Our desire is to see a free and economically viable Europe,
which would promote the prosperity of the Soviet Union,
Britain, France and all other states, and with which the
United States could trade on an equal footing and to mutual
advantage. I believe our proposal can be a step forward in
this direction.

Churchill: 1 vigorously support the proposal for a revision
of the Montreux Convention in order to assure Soviet Rus-
sia free and unhindered passage through the Straits for her
merchant fleet and Navy both in peace and wartime. | fully
agree with the President and with his proposal that the free
regime in these Straits should be guaranteed by all of us.
The guarantee of the Great Powers and the interested states
will undoubtedly be effective.

As for the other waterways mentioned by the President,
we in principle agree with the general lines of the Presi-
dent’s statement. We also agree with the President’s propo-
sal to have the Kiel Canal free and open and guaranteed
by all the Great Powers. We also attach great importance
to freedom of navigation along the Danube and the Rhine.

233

Truman: There is no doubt that we take a common view
on the question of amending the Montreux Convention.

Churchill: And also on the purposes for which it should
be amended.

Stalin: The President’s proposals should be given a closer
reading; it is hard to catch everything by mere listening.
Perhaps we could go on to other questions for the time
being?

Truman: The next question on the agenda is the question
of transferring the Konigsberg area in East Prussia to the
Soviet Union. The Soviet document on the question was
handed in yesterday.

Stalin: President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill gave their
consent to this at the Tehran Conference, and the question
was agreed between us. We should like this agreement to
be confirmed at this Conference.

Truman: I agree in principle. I merely ask to be allowed
to study the terms, but I am sure that there will be no
objections on our side. I agree that Russia should receive
certain areas in that territory.

Stalin: Good.

Churchill: The Generalissimo was quite right in noting
that the question was raised at the Tehran Conference, and
we discussed it again in October 1944.

Stalin: In Moscow.

Churchill: Yes, it was in Moscow, and it was in connec-
tion with the talk on the Curzon Line.

Stalin: That’s right.

Churchill: 1 addressed Parliament on this matter on
December 15, 1944. I explained that the British Government
sympathised with the Soviet standpoint. The only question
that arises is the legal side of the transfer of this area. The
Soviet draft tabled here seems to demand that we should
recognise that East Prussia no longer exists and that the
Konigsberg area is not under the control of the Allied
Control Council in Germany.

As for the British Government, we support the Soviet
Government’s desire to incorporate this territory into the
Soviet Union. I state this in principle. We have not yet,
of course, examined the exact line on the map. But I assure
the Soviet Government once again of our constant support
of the Russian position in that part of the world.

Stalin: We do not propose anything more than that. We

234

are satisfied if the American Government and the Govern-
ment of Great Britain approve the proposal in principle.

Churchill: 1 agree.

Truman: | agree.

Churchill: A slight amendment of the document will be
required. If it is to be a part of the communiqué at the end
of the Conference, I propose a more general wording of the
document.

Stalin: 1 do not object.

Truman: Thus, we are in principle agreed with the draft
proposal of the Soviet delegation.

The next item on the agenda is the question of Syria and
the Lebanon.

Churchill: At present the burden of maintaining law and
order in Syria and the Lebanon has fallen entirely on us.
We have neither the intention nor the desire to obtain any
advantages in these countries, with the exception of those
enjoyed by other countries. When we entered Syria and
the Lebanon to throw out the Germans and the Vichy
troops, we reached an agreement with France under which
we were to recognise the independence of Syria and the
Lebanon. In view of the long historical ties between France
and these countries, we declared that we would not object
to France having a preferential position there, provided
agreement was reached with the new independent Govern-
ments of these countries.

We informed de Gaulle that as soon as France concluded
with Syria and the Lebanon a treaty satisfactory to these
countries, we would withdraw our troops at once. If we
were to withdraw our troops now, there would be a massacre
of French citizens and the small number of French troops
now stationed there. We should not like that to happen, as
this would cause great unrest among the Arabs and would
probably upset law and order in Saudi Arabia and Iraq.
The outbreak of such disorders in that part of the world
would lead to disorders in Egypt as well. There could be no
worse moment for such disorders among the Arabs than the
present one, because the communication line with the Suez
Canal would be placed in jeopardy, and the arms and rein-
forcements for the war in the Far East are moving along
that line. The line of communication for conducting the war
against Japan is of great importance not only for Great
Britain but also for the United States.

General de Gaulle acted very unwisely in that area;
contrary to our advice and our requests, he sent a shipload
of 500 men to that area, and their appearance caused
disorders which have not stopped until now. How stupid
that was, for what could these 500 men have done. Howev-
er, their arrival sparked off disorders.

These disorders aimed against the French at once caused
unrest in Iraq, whose Government and people wanted to
come to the aid of Syria. The whole Arab world was agitated
over the event. However, General de Gaulle has now agreed
to transfer the so-called special troops to the Syrian
Government.

I hope that we shall reach, if not an agreement, at least
a settlement of this question with the French, which would
guarantee the independence of Syria and the Lebanon and
would assure France of some recognition of her cultural and
commercial interests.

Allow me to repeat once again here that Great Britain
has no desire to stay there a day longer than is necessary.
We shall be very glad to be rid of this thankless task, which
we undertook in the interests of the Allies.

In view of the fact that this question concerns France and
us only, and also, of course, Syria and the Lebanon, we do
not welcome the proposal for a conference which would be
attended by the United States and the Soviet Union, be-
sides Great Britain and France, and would adopt a_ joint
decision. The whole burden was on us, we acted on our own,
without any assistance, with the exception of some help
from France, but we acted in the interests of all. That is
why we should not like to have the question discussed at a
special conference. Of course if the United States wished to
take our place we should only welcome it.

Truman: No, thanks. (Laughter.]

When this dispute arose between France and Syria and
the Lebanon, the Prime Minister and I had an exchange of
letters on the question. When the Prime Minister informed
me that Great Britain had enough troops at her disposal to
maintain peace in that area, I asked him to do everything
he could to maintain peace because we are also interested
in the communication line with the Far East running through
the Suez Canal. We may have some slight difference with
the Prime Minister on this point.

We believe that no state should be given any privileges

236

in these areas. These areas should be equally accessible to
all states. We also believe that France should not have any
special privileges vis-a-vis other states.

Stalin: Do I understand that the United States does not
recognise any French privileges in Syria and the Lebanon?

Truman: Yes.

Churchill: Our position is such that we should like France
to have privileges there because we promised her that when
our state was weak and we had to fight the Germans there.
But that is our own business, and we do not, of course, have
any possibility or right to involve others. Besides, we did
not undertake to make any great efforts for France to retain
her privileges there. If France manages to obtain any privi-
leges we shall not object, and shall even look kindly on her
achievements.

Stalin: From whom can the French secure these privi-
leges?

Churchill: From the republics of Syria and the Lebanon.

Stalin: Only from them?

Churchill: Only from them. The French have their
schools, archaeological institutes, etc., there. Many French-
men have been living there for a long time, and they even
have a song, “Let’s Go to Syria”. They say that their claims
date back to the time of the Crusades. But we do not intend
to quarrel with the Great Powers on that account.

‘Truman: We want all states to have equal rights in these
areas.

Churchill: And you, Mr. President, will you prevent
Syria from granting any special rights to the French?

‘Truman: Of course | won’t prevent it if the Syrians want
to do so. But I doubt that they have such a desire.
(Laughter.)

Stalin: The Russian delegation thanks Mr. Churchill for
his information and withdraws its proposal.

Churchill: 1 thank the Generalissimo.

Truman: J am also grateful.

We now go on to the next question. It is the question
of Iran. Mr. Churchill has a proposal on the question.

Churchill: We have handed the delegations a document
on the question and would be glad to know the position of
the Great Powers.

Truman: We, for our part, have long been prepared to
withdraw our troops from Iran, but we have a great quantity

237

of various materials there which we would like to use for
conducting the war in the Pacific.

Stalin: The Russian delegation believes that Tehran, at
any rate, could be evacuated.

Churchill: 1 should also like to deal with the other two
points to have done with the draft altogether. About the
date specified in the treaty. The treaty says that the troops
are to be withdrawn from Iran not later than six months
after the end of hostilities. By now only two and a half
months have passed since the end of the war. But we
promised the Iranians to withdraw the troops as soon as
the war against Germany was over.

Here is what I propose: immediate withdrawal of the
troops from Tehran, and discussion of further troop with-
drawals at the Council of Foreign Ministers in September.

Stalin: I have no objection.

Truman: We shall continue withdrawing our troops from
Iran, because there are troops there that we are going to
need in the Pacific.

Stalin: That is, of course, your right. We, for our part,
promise that our troops will not undertake any action
against Iran.

Truman: | have no objection to referring the matter
for examination by the Council of Foreign Ministers in
London.

Churchill: We also have the question of Vienna. I should
like to speak here about the occupation zones, which have
been allotted to the British and American troops in Vienna.
As regards the British Zone, it turns out that it has a popu-
lation of 500,000, and because Vienna’s sources of food
supplies are to the east of the city, we are unable to under-
take the feeding of these half million persons. We propose
therefore that a provisional agreement be reached for the
Russians to supply this population with food pending a
permanent agreement. Field Marshal Alexander will make
a statement about the actual state of affairs.

Alexander: The situation is such as the Prime Minister
has just stated. There are half a million people in our zone.
I have no food to send over from Italy. There are small
stocks in Klagenfurt, but these would last for three weeks,
or a month at the outside. That is why if we undertook to
feed this population, the food would have to be brought
over from the United States.

238

Truman: There are about 375,000 people in our zone.
Our ships are now engaged in transporting cargos for mili-
tary operations against Japan, the delivery of food to Europe
and certain materials to the U.S.S.R. We are short of
transport facilities, so that we should find it hard to keep
even our own zone supplied.

Stalin: And what about the French Zone?

Alexander: That is something | don’t know.

Stalin: Let me speak to Marshal Konev. | think we could
postpone for a month the transfer to our Allies of respon-
sibility for supplying the Vienna population. For how long
will this supply need to be organised, till the new harvest,
or what?

Churchill: The difficulty is that these 500,000 people in
our zone and the 375,000 in the American Zone have always
received their foodstuffs from the country’s eastern areas.

Stalin: We have an agreement with the Austrian Govern-
ment under which we allow them some food in return for
goods until the new harvest. I think this could be extended
until September. But I must still have a preliminary talk
with Marshal Konev. Tonight or tomorrow morning I think
I shall be able to do that and shall give you my reply.

Churchill: The situation is that Field Marshal Alexander
has entered Styria with his troops but hesitates to enter
Vienna until the food supply question is settled.

Stalin: Is Vienna’s food situation as bad as that now?

Churchill: We don't know, we’ve not been there.

Stalin: The situation there for the population is not a
bad one.

Alexander: If you can help us in this matter we are, of
course, prepared to go forward and take over our share of
the work.

Stalin: 1 shall be able to tell you tomorrow.

Churchill: Thank you.

Stalin: It would be a good thing if the British and Amer-
ican authorities agreed to extend the agreement with the
Renner Government to their zones as well. That would not
signify recognition of the Renner Government or resump-
tion of diplomatic relations, but would put the Renner
Government in a position similar to that of the Government
of Finland. Its competence would be extended to these
zones as well, and that would facilitate the solution of the
question.

239

Truman: We are prepared to discuss this question as
soon as our troops enter Vienna.

Churchill: We also agree.

I should like to raise a question of procedure. Mr. Presi-
dent must be aware, like the Generalissimo, that Mr. Attlee
and I are interested in visiting London on the Thursday of
this week. (Laughter.| That is why we shall have to leave
here on Wednesday July 25, together with the Minister of
Foreign Affairs. But we shall be back by the afternoon
sitting on July 27, or at least some of us will. Laughter.)
For that reason, could we have our Wednesday sitting in
the morning?

Stalin: All right.

Truman: I think so.

Churchill: I propose that the Foreign Ministers should
continue to meet as usual, but in the absence of Mr. Eden
he would be replaced by Mr, Cadogan.

Stalin: All right.

Truman: Let’s agree to have the July 25 sitting at 11.00.

Tomorrow’s sitting is at 17.00.

Eighth Sitting
July 24, 1945

Truman opens the sitting.

(Reporting on the sitting of the Foreign Ministers of the
three Powers, the American delegation said the following:

It was established at the sitting of the three Foreign
Ministers that the commission dealing with economic matters
and questions of reparations had not yet prepared its report.
The Soviet delegation proposed that the question of repara-
tions from Italy and Austria should also be referred to this
commission. It handed in two short documents on repara-
tions from these two countries.

It was decided to postpone till tomorrow consideration of
the question of economic principles in respect of Germany
and reparations from Germany, and also of reparations
from Italy and Austria. The Foreign Ministers were informed
that the commission on economic questions would meet
that night to complete its work.

On July 20, the U.S. delegation handed in a document
concerning oil supplies for Europe. It was decided to refer

240

=

this question also to the commission on economic questions;
but in view of the fact that the commission had not dealt
with the question, the Foreign Ministers agreed to postpone
its discussion.

The next question the Foreign Ministers discussed was
that of fulfilling the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe
and the satellite states. It was admitted that the commission
dealing with this question had not yet completed its work,
and the discussion of the question was also postponed.

Next came the question of admitting Italy and other
countries to the United Nations Organisation. The U.S.
delegation suggested that, as the commission dealing with
the question had failed to reach agreement, the question
should be examined at a sitting of the Foreign Ministers on
the basis of the document on which the commission had
been working.

The Soviet delegation declared that it would not take part
in this discussion because the document did not contain any
mention of admitting Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and
Finland to the United Nations Organisation.

The British delegation suggested to omit the last sentence
in Clause 1 of the document. The U.S. delegation agreed
with this. The British delegation proposed a new wording
for Clause 2 of the document to take into account the inter-
ests of other Allied countries concerned with the peace
treaty with Italy. The American delegation agreed to
include the British proposal in the amended document on
the question of admission to the United Nations Organisa-
tion.

The US. delegation suggested including in the document
an additional clause to meet the desires of the Soviet dele-
gation. The clause reads: “The three Governments also hope
that the Council of Foreign Ministers may, without undue
delay, prepare peace treaties with Rumania, Bulgaria,
Hungary, and Finland. It is also their desire, on the conclu-
sion of the peace treaties with responsible democratic
governments of these countries, to support their application
for membership in the United Nations Organisation.”

The Soviet delegation insisted that Bulgaria, Rumania,
Hungary and Finland should not be placed in worse condi-

1 The sentence read: “She [Italy] gives promise of becoming a
firm supporter of a policy of peace and resistance to aggression.”

16-876 941

tions than Italy concerning the question of entering the
United Nations Organisation. The American delegation
expressed the hope that the additional clause proposed by
it would satisfy the Soviet delegation.

As the Foreign Ministers failed to reach complete agree-
ment on this question, it was decided to refer it for solution
to the Heads of Government. The question was included in
the agenda of the present sitting of the Heads of the three
Governments.

It was agreed to recommend to the Heads of Government
the following questions for discussion at the present sitting.

1. Admission to the United Nations Organisation. The
document submitted by the Foreign Ministers that morning
could serve as a basis for a discussion by the three Heads
of Government.

2. The Black Sea Straits and free and unrestricted
navigation on international inland waterways. The discus-
sion at the previous day’s sitting of the Heads of Govern-
ment was postponed to allow a study of the President’s
proposals.

The Foreign Ministers also agreed to recommend to the
Heads of the three Governments to include the following
questions in their agenda for next morning’s sitting:

1. The German Navy and merchant marine.

2. Reparations from Germany.

The American delegation then announced that a dele-
gation of representatives of the Polish Provisional Govern-
ment, led by President Bierut, had arrived at Potsdam in
response to an invitation of the U.S. President sent on July
22, in accordance with a decision of the three Heads of
Government. At the sitting of the Foreign Ministers the
Polish delegation expressed its opinion concerning Poland’s
western frontier, which can be reduced to the following.

The Polish delegation believes that Poland’s western
frontier should run from the Baltic Sea through Swinemiin-
de, including Stettin as a part of Poland, and further on
along the Oder River to the Western Neisse River and
along the Western Neisse to the Czechoslovak border.

Poland’s territory in its new form would allow her to
discontinue the expatriation of the Polish population to
other countries, and would permit full use to be made of the
labour of those Poles who had earlier been forced to go to
other countries.

242

——————ESSEE=

From the standpoint of security, great importance
attaches to the fact that the frontier line proposed by the
Polish delegation is the shortest possible frontier between
Poland and Germany and will be easier to defend.

The Germans tried to exterminate the Polish population
and destroy Polish culture. From the historical standpoint,
it would be fair to set up a powerful Polish state which
could defend itself against any German aggression.

These areas were one of the most powerful bases of
Germany’s arms industry and a base of German imperialism.
The proposed solution would deprive Germany of a stag-
ing area in the east and a base for the manufacture of
armaments.

Poland would become a state without any national minor-
ities.

Before the war, Poland had an excess of rural population,
which could not be used for work in industry because
industry was not sufficiently developed. Acquisition of these
territories would enable Poland to use her rural inhabitants
for work in the towns, and those who had emigrated from
Poland could return home and find work.

The Polish representatives further said that the Oder
River basin should be transferred to Poland in toto, for the
Oder River itself was not deep enough and drew on waters
in the area of the Western Neisse River.

The Polish delegation declared in conclusion that, in its
opinion, a decision should be taken and agreement on this
question reached as soon as possible to enable the Polish
Government to resettle the Poles from abroad as early as
possible, to give them an opportunity to take part in the
rehabilitation of Poland.)

Truman: The first question on the agenda is that of
admitting Italy and other satellite countries, including Fin-
land, to the United Nations Organisation.

Byrnes: The British and American delegations are agreed
on this point.

Eden: We fully agree with your initial document, but
we have some doubts as regards the second wording. The
new wording leaves the impression that we are demanding
that the Italian Government should be reconstructed before
we start concluding the peace treaty with Italy.

Byrnes: 1 proposed the new wording in the hope of find-
ing a compromise solution on this question, and also to meet

16*

243

the desire of the Soviet delegation that the other satellites
should not be placed in worse conditions as compared with
Italy on the matter of admission to the United Nations
Organisation. But | should like to draw the attention of the
British delegation to the fact that the new wording does not
raise any doubts concerning the present Italian Government.

The wording merely provides for the conclusion of peace
treaties with responsible democratic governments. That is
a matter of the future. The fact alone that the U.S. Govern-
ment had established diplomatic relations with the present
Italian Government is sufficient indication of our attitude
to this Government.

Eden: We feel that we have almost agreed with your
standpoint, and the question is only one of wording.

Stalin: If it is a matter of making things easier for the
satellite states, the present decision should mention that.
Things are made easier for Italy, and it is hard to object
to this. But at the same time this easing for Italy is not
accompanied by a simultaneous easing for the other coun-
tries, Germany’s former accomplices.

One gets the impression of an artificial division: on the
one hand, Italy, whose position is eased, and on the other,
Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, whose position
is not to be eased. There will be a danger of our decision
being discredited: in what way is Italy more deserving than
the other countries? Her only “merit” is that she was the
first to surrender. In all other respects Italy behaved
worse and inflicted greater harm than any other satellite
state.

There is no doubt that any of the four states—Rumania,
Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland—inflicted far less damage
on the Allies than did Italy. As regards the Government in
Italy, can it be said that it is more democratic than the
Governments in Rumania, Bulgaria or Hungary? Of course
not. Has Italy a more responsible Government than Ruma-
nia or Bulgaria? No democratic elections have been held
either in Italy or any of the other states. In this respect
they are equal. That is why I fail to see any reason for this
benevolent attitude to Italy and this negative attitude to
all the other states, Germany’s former accomplices.

Things were first made easier for Italy by the restoration
of diplomatic relations with her. A second step is now being
proposed, namely, Italy’s inclusion in the United Nations

244

Organisation. Good, let us take this second step in respect
of Italy, but then I propose that in respect of the other
mentioned countries we should also take the first step that
was made in respect of Italy some months ago, namely, that
we should restore diplomatic relations with them. This would
be just and the gradation would be observed: Italy in the
first place, and the rest in the second.

Otherwise, it turns out that in respect of Italy a first step
had been made and a second step is being proposed, all
because the Italian Government surrendered first, although
Italy inflicted more damage on the Allies than all the other
states, accomplices of Germany. That is the proposal of the
Soviet delegation.

Churchill: In the main lines we are in agreement with
the United States’ standpoint on this question.

Truman: 1 should like to say that the difference in our
views of the Government of Italy, on the one hand, and the
Governments of Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, on the
other, is due to the fact that our representatives have not
had an opportunity to obtain the necessary information in
respect of the latter countries. There was no such situation
in Italy, where all our Governments—the United States,
Great Britain and the Soviet Union—were given an oppor-
tunity of freely obtaining information.

We cannot say this about Rumania, Bulgaria and Hun-
gary, where we have not had an opportunity to obtain free
information. In addition, the nature of the present Govern-
ments of these countries does not allow us to establish
diplomatic relations with them at once. But in the document
submitted we have tried to meet the Soviet delegation’s
desire and not to place the other satellites in a worse posi-
tion than that of Italy.

Stalin: But you have diplomatic relations with Italy and
not with the other countries.

Truman: But the other satellites too can obtain our
recognition if their Governments satisfy our requirements.

Stalin: Which requirements?

Truman: Concerning freedom of movement and freedom
of information.

Stalin: None of these Governments hinders or can hinder
free movement and free information for members of the
Allied press. There must be some misunderstanding. With
the ending of the war the situation there has improved.

245

Restrictions were also introduced for Soviet representatives
in Italy.

Truman: We want these Governments reorganised, and
we shall give them our recognition when they become more
responsible and democratic.

Stalin: I assure you that the Government of Bulgaria is
more democratic than the Government of Italy.

Truman: To meet the Soviet desires we proposed the
same formulation in respect of Rumania, Bulgaria and
Hungary as in respect of Italy.

Stalin: But this proposal does not include the resumption
of diplomatic relations.

Truman: | have said many times already that we cannot
resume diplomatic relations with these Governments until
they are reorganised as we consider necessary.

Byrnes: The only thing we have proposed for easing
Italy’s position is support for her application for member-
ship of the United Nations Organisation. I should like to
draw your attention to the point of our proposal which
speaks in the same words about the other satellites. Thus,
the easing of Italy’s position will be accompanied by an
easing of the position of the other satellites. We have tried
here to meet the desires of the Sovict delegation.

Stalin: J propose that the word “responsible”, as used in
respect of the Italian Government, be deleted wherever it
is used. This word tends to belittle the Italian Government’s
position.

Truman: We are unable to support Governments’ appli-
cation for membership of the United Nations Organisation
if they are not responsible and democratic.

Stalin: In Argentina the Government is less democratic
than in Italy, but Argentina is nevertheless a member of
the United Nations Organisation. If it is a government, it
is a democratic government, but if you add “responsible”,
it turns out that this is some other kind of government. And
besides, there should be an addition concerning the resump-
tion of diplomatic relations.

I propose adding to the clause dealing with Rumania,
Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland a sentence to the effect that
in the near future each of our three Governments will
examine the question of resuming diplomatic relations with
these countries. That does not mean that they will do this
simultaneously and will resume diplomatic relations at one

246

and the same time, but that each of the three Governments
will examine the question of resuming diplomatic relations
sooner or later. Let me give an example. At present, there
are diplomatic representatives in Italy from the United
States and the Soviet Union, but no diplomatic representa-
tives either from Great Britain or from France; there are
no ambassadors there from these Governments.

Churchill: We consider that our representative in Italy
is fully accredited. In virtue of the fact that we are still
formally in a state of war with Italy, the status of that
representative cannot be fully equated with that of an
ambassador; under the British Constitution we cannot, in
these conditions, have normal diplomatic relations. But we
do call him ambassador.

Stalin: But not of the kind as those of the Soviet Union
and the United States.

Churchill: Not quite. About 90 per cent.

Stalin: Not quite, that’s true.

Churchill: But the reason is a formal and technical one.

Stalin: That’s the kind of ambassador that should be
sent to Rumania—such a not-quite ambassador. (General
laughter.)

Churchill: We have not done that yet.

Truman: We want to do everything we can to achieve a
situation in which we could resume diplomatic relations
with these Governments. I have already explained the
difficulties in solving this problem.

Stalin: The difficulties were there before, but they are
no longer there. We find it very hard to adhere to this
resolution in its present form. We do not want to adhere
to it.

Churchill: We do not want to use words which could
cast a shadow on any of us. I only wish to intercede for
Italy, and not just because she was the first to drop out of
the war. A great deal of time has passed since she dropped
out of the war, two years have passed already, if I’m not
mistaken. But only a short time—four or five months—has
passed since the other countries stopped fighting; Rumania
stopped fighting somewhat earlier.

Stalin: First Rumania, and then Finland. But diplomatic
relations were resumed with Italy some 7 or 8 months after
her surrender.

Churchill: Ytaly’s position is as follows. Two years ago

247

she dropped out of the war, and has since been fighting on
our side to the best of her abilities. Besides, it should be
borne in mind that we were in Italy and know everything
about the political conditions there. That cannot be said
of Bulgaria, Rumania and the other countries. In addition,
Italy was not a uniform country: the northern part of Italy
was under the yoke of the enemy and was liberated only
two months ago. There we fought side by side with Italy,
who gave us great support.

But it was always recognised that Italy could not have
a fully democratic government until her northern part was
liberated. Meanwhile we recognised the Italian Govern-
ment, we worked with it. I had an understanding with the
Soviet Government concerning support for the Government
of General Badoglio. At that time I disagreed with our
American friends, I wanted to support that Government
until the north was liberated, when it would have been
possible to form a Government of Italy on a broader base.
But the course of events entailed other actions.

We have established friendly relations with Italy. There
is no political censorship there. The Italian press frequently
attacked me only a few months after Italy’s unconditional
surrender. There is evidence of a considerable growth of
freedom in Italy. Now that the north has been liberated,
the Italians are getting ready to stage democratic elections.
That is why I see no reason why we should not now discuss
the question of a peace treaty with Italy.

I must say that we know nothing concerning Rumania,
not to mention Bulgaria. Our mission in Bucharest was
placed in conditions of isolation reminiscent of internment.

Stalin: How can you say such things without verifying
them?

Churchill: We know this from our own representative
there. I am sure the Generalissimo would be surprised to
learn of some of the facts which have taken place in respect
of our mission in Bucharest.

Stalin: Fiction!

Churchill: Of course, you are free to call our statement
fiction, but I have full confidence in our political represent-
ative and Air Force Marshal Stevenson. I have known him
personally for many years. The conditions for the work of
our mission were difficult. There were great delays with
planes for our mission. There were complaints from our

248

Soviet friends about the numerical strength of our mission,
which was not so great after all. The Control Commission,
which should have consisted of three members, nearly
always met as two. The Soviet Commander-in-Chief, who
is the chairman of the Control Commission, sometimes met
the American representative, and sometimes the British, but
rarely the two together. As for Italy, many Soviet represent-
atives have been there.

Stalin: Nothing of the kind, we have no rights in Italy.

Churchill: But at any rate the situation there is such that
you are quite free to come to Italy. That is why I don’t
think the situation in Italy can be compared with the situa-
tion in Rumania, Bulgaria and the other countries.

Truman: We must say that our missions in those countries
also came up against great difficulties. But we should not
like to speak of that here.

Byrnes: In the hope of reaching agreement, I propose
that the words “responsible government” should be replaced
by the words “recognised government”.

Stalin: That is more acceptable. But I think we should
also adopt a decision that the three Governments are will-
ing to examine the question of establishing diplomatic
relations with these four countries. I propose that at the end
of the clause proposed by Mr. Byrnes on the four countries,
we should add the following: “The three Governments agree
to examine, each separately, in the near future, the estab-
lishment of diplomatic relations with Rumania, Bulgaria,
Hungary and Finland.”

Churchill: But will that not clash with what we have
just said here?

Stalin: It will not clash because if we decide to prepare
the question of peace treaties with Rumania, Bulgaria and
the other countries—and we have not even recognised these
countries—it is clear that each Government takes up the
question of recognition on its own.

Truman: I have no objections.

Stalin: In that case, we have none either.

Churchill: 1 think there is a contradiction. I understood
the President to say here that he does not now want to
recognise the Governments of Rumania, Bulgaria and the
other satellite countries.

Truman: It says here that we undertake only to examine
the question.

249

Churchill: This tends to mislead public opinion.

Stalin: Why?

Churchill: Because it follows from the meaning of the
statement that we shall soon recognise these Governments;
as it is, I am aware that this does not reflect the stand either
of the Government of the United States or the Government
of the United Kingdom.

Stalin: 1 agree with the President and want to object to
Mr. Churchill. We have already all accepted that we instruct
the Council of Foreign Ministers to prepare peace treaties
with Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. We all
believe that a peace treaty can be concluded only with a
recognised government. Consequently, we must mention this
recognition in some way, and then there will be no contra-
diction. If we fail to say that the three Governments intend
to raise the question of recognition in the nearest future, we
shall have to delete the clause about preparing peace trea-
ties with these countries.

Churchill: I should like to ask the President whether he
believes that this autumn the representatives of the present
Governments of Rumania, Bulgaria and the others will come
to the Council of Foreign Ministers and that we shall discuss
the peace treaties with them there?

ruman: The only government that can send its repre-
sentatives to the Council of Foreign Ministers will be the
government which is recognised by us.

Stalin: That’s right.

Churchill: The present Governments will not be recog-
nised and that is why it will be impossible to prepare the
peace treaties with them.

Stalin: What makes you think so?

Churchill: It follows logically.

Stalin: No, it does not.

Churchill: I may be thinking on wrong lines, but it seems
to me that it does.

Stalin: These Governments may be recognised or may
not be recognised. No one knows whether they will or will
not be recognised. That is just how the wording should be
understood: “examine the question of recognition”. And
there will be a peace treaty with them when they are
recognised.

Churchill: Anyone reading this clause will not under-
stand that the U.S. Government does not wish to recognise

250

the present Governments of Rumania and Bulgaria. But if
other Governments we can recognise are formed, we shall
proceed to draw up peace treaties with them. You must
excuse me for insisting on the point in this way, but I ask
you to bear in mind that if the document is published, it
will have to be explained, especially by me, in Parliament.
We say that we shall conclude peace treaties with Govern-
ments to which we accord recognition, but we have no
intention of recognising these Governments. I find this
almost absurd.

Truman: I propose that we refer this question back to
the Foreign Ministers for a fresh examination.

Stalin: Mr. Churchill is not right; nothing is said here at
all about the conclusion of peace treaties; it says here about
preparation. Why cannot a treaty be prepared, even if the
government is not recognised?

Churchill: Of course, we can prepare the peace treaty
ourselves. In that case, I propose that we replace the prepo-
sition “with” by the preposition “for”, so that it should read
not “peace treaties with Rumania, Bulgaria’, etc., but “peace
treaties for Rumania, Bulgaria’, etc.

Stalin: I have no objection to “for”.

Churchill: Thank you.

Stalin: Don’t mention it. (General laughter.]

Churchill: It would be desirable for the Foreign Ministers
to go over the document once again.

Stalin: I have no objection.

Truman: They must take into account the discussion
which has taken place here today.

Stalin: Good.

Truman: The next question is the one of the Black Sea
Straits and free navigation on international inland water-
ways. The American delegation has tabled its proposals on
the question.

(...) Stalin: There are probably more urgent ques-
tions than that of the Straits, and this question could be
postponed.

Churchill: This question was raised by Great Britain as
flowing from the desire to amend the Montreux Convention.
I am willing to have it postponed if the Soviet delegation so
desires.

Stalin: It would be better to postpone this question. Tur-
key must be consulted.

251

Truman: Our proposal on international control means
that the Straits will not be in anyone’s hands. We shall try
to convince the Turks that we are taking a correct stand on
this question.

Stalin: All right, let’s do that.

Truman: { want to make a suggestion to the Conference.
I think it is time we thought about drawing up a communiqué
on the work of the Conference. I suggest, therefore, that we
appoint a special committee to draw up such a communique.

Stalin: All right.

Truman: We must come to an agreement on the mem-
bership of the committee.

Stalin: All right.

Truman: We shall ask the Foreign Ministers to submit
candidates for the committee.

Stalin: Good. Shall we have a sitting at 11.00 tomorrow?

Truman: Yes.

Stalin: Mr. Churchill expressed doubt on that point.

Eden: At lunch today we expressed the assumption that
there may not be enough questions for a sitting tomorrow.
But since today’s agenda is not exhausted, the undiscussed
items will be transferred to tomorrow’s sitting.

Truman: As soon as we find that we have no more work
we shall go home. (Laughter.] But so far we have work.

Churchill: Mr. Attlee and I must be back in London for
the opening of Parliament on August 8. At any rate, | am
unable to stay here until later than August 6.

Stalin: The question of Poland’s western frontier—the
last item on today’s agenda—has not yet been exhausted.

Churchill: Besides, there is the question raised by the
Soviet side concerning the camp in Italy. I should like to
give an explanation on this question now.

Stalin: Have we the time and the desire to discuss the
question of Poland’s western frontier now?

Churchill: We are meeting the Poles and shall have a
talk with Mr. Bierut tomorrow morning.

Stalin: Then let’s postpone it.

Churchill: In brief, the position in the camp is as follows.
In fact, there are 10,000 persons in that camp. But it should
be borne in mind that we have just taken 1,000,000 pris-
oners. A Soviet mission in Rome is now dealing with these
10,000 men, and this mission has free access to the camp.
It is reported that the persons in the camp are predomi-

252

nantly Ukrainians but not Soviet citizens. There are also
some Poles in the camp, who, as far as we could ascertain,
lived in Poland within her 1939 borders. Six hundred and
sixty-five persons wish to return to the Soviet Union at once,
and steps are being taken to send them. We are also pre-
pared to hand over all others who wish to return.

These 10,000 men surrendered to us almost as an entire
military unit, and we have retained it in that form, under
the command of its own officers, out of purely administra-
tive considerations. We should be glad if General Golikov
would address his complaints to Field Marshal Alexander
or his H.Q.

Alexander: 1 have little to add to what the Prime Min-
ister has said. I should like all those present here to know
that I have always given the Russian representatives in
Italy complete freedom of movement and also every
opportunity to see what they wished. And I think that it is
expedient to act in this way because in cases when large
numbers of Russian soldiers happen to fall into our hands,
the advice of responsible Russian representatives could prove
very useful to us. I think, if the Generalissimo agrees, I shall
go on acting in the spirit I had acted until now.

Stalin: In such cases we are duty bound by treaty to give
each other assistance and not to prevent citizens from return-
ing home, but, on the contrary, to help them return home.

Churchill: If your representative sends a general or goes
to the H.Q. himself in connection with this matter, every-
thing necessary will be done.

Stalin: All right. I consider the question settled.

I spoke to Marshal Konev in Vienna today. He has not
stopped issuing rations to the population of Vienna, irre-
spective of zones, and will go on doing so until the Ameri-
cans and the British find a possibility of undertaking
something else.

Truman and Churchill: We are very grateful.

Churchill: There was the question of extending the Ren-
ner Administration to the British and American zones.

Stalin: It would be good to extend his competence to all
the zones.

Churchill: We believe that is one of the first questions we
shall have to study when we enter Vienna. We agree in
principle that it is desirable to work with a single Austrian
administration.

Stalin: Of course, it is better.

Churchill: We have no intention of hampering the local
authorities.

Stalin: That will be better.

Truman: Until 11.00 tomorrow.

Ninth Sitting
July 25, 1945

Truman: There was a suggestion yesterday to continue
discussion of Poland’s western frontiers today.

Stalin: All right.

Truman: 1 remember that Mr. Churchill had an addition-
al proposal.

Churchill: I have nothing to add. I have had a talk with
the Polish delegation, and this morning had the pleasure
of meeting Mr. Bierut once again. Mr. Eden had a talk with
the Polish delegation yesterday. The Poles agree that there
are 1.5 million Germans in the area which they have
occupied in the west. I consider that this question is also
connected with that of reparations and also with the question
of the four Powers’ zones of occupation in Germany.

Truman: I consider Mr. Churchill’s remark correct. Mr.
Byrnes also met the Polish delegation and intends to do so
again. Allow me to make a suggestion on a point of proce-
dure. Since these talks of Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Eden will
continue, I think it will be better to postpone our discussion
on this question until Friday.

Stalin: All right.

Truman: The next question on our agenda is that of the
German Navy and merchant marine. | think we have al-
ready reached agreement on this question.

Churchill: Of course, concrete proposals on this question
must be considered. I think we could tackle these concrete
Ss legs

ruman: State Secretary Byrnes told me that Assistant
Secretary of State Clayton and Admiral Land have dealt
with this question, they have been working on concrete
proposals. | am prepared to examine the question at any
time, but would prefer to hear Mr. Byrnes first and study
the documents on this question which I have just received.

254

[Jt was decided to postpone discussion of this question.)

Churchill: There is another question which, while not
on the agenda, should be Jiscussed, namely, that of transfers
of population. There are a great number of Germans who
have to be resettled from Czechoslovakia to Germany.

Stalin: The Czechoslovak authorities have evacuated those
Germans, and they are now in Dresden, Leipzig and
Chemnitz.

Churchill: We think there are 2.5 million Sudeten Ger-
mans who must be resettled. In addition, the Czechoslovaks
are in a hurry to get rid of 150,000 German citizens, who
had earlier been resettled in Czechoslovakia from the Reich.
According to our information, only 2,000 of these 150,000
Germans have left Czechoslovakia. This is a great job, mov-
ing 2.5 million men. But where are they to be moved to?
To the Russian Zone?

Stalin: Most of them are going to the Russian Zone.

Churchill: We don’t want them in our zone.

Stalin: But that is not what we suggest. [Laughter.}

Churchill; They will bring their mouths with them. I
think the real resettlement has not yet started.

Stalin: From Czechoslovakia?

Churchill: Yes, from Czechoslovakia. So far the displace-
ment has been on a small scale.

Stalin: I have information that the Czechs warn the
Germans and then evict them. As for the Poles, they have
detained 1.5 million Germans to use them on the harvest-
ing. As soon as the harvesting is over in Poland, the Poles
will evacuate the Germans from Poland.

Churchill; 1 don’t think this should be done in view of
the problems of food supplies, reparations, etc., that is,
questions which are still to be settled. We now find ourselves
in a situation in which the Poles have the food and the fuel,
and we have the population. The supply of this population
falls as a heavy burden on us.

Stalin: You must see the Poles’ side of it. For five and a
half years the Germans made them suffer all sorts of
wrongs.

Truman: Yesterday, I listened very attentively to Presi-
dent Bierut’s statement on this question. I sympathise with
the Poles and the Russians and understand the difficulties

facing them. I have already set forth my position with
sufficient clarity.

255

I should like to explain to my colleagues what my powers
are in respect of the questions relating to a peaceful settle-
ment. When we discuss here questions which should go into
the peace treaty, I am sure everyone will understand that
under our constitution the treaty can be concluded only with
the consent of the U.S. Senate. There is no doubt that when
I support some proposal put forward at the Conference, this
means that I shall do everything I can to ensure that the
decision is sanctioned by the Senate. But there is of course
no guarantee that it will be adopted for sure.

I must tell you that political feelings in America are such
that I am unable to support here any proposals unless |
obtain support from our public opinion. I am not making
this statement in order to change the basis on which the
discussion of questions with my colleagues is taking place
but merely to explain my possibilities in respect of consti-
tutional power. I want to say that in concluding any peace
treaties I have to take into account the fact that they must
be approved by the U. S. Senate.

Stalin: Does the President’s statement refer only to peace
treaties or to all questions discussed here?

Truman: This refers only to agreements and _ treaties
which the Constitution says must be sent for approval by
the U.S. Senate.

Stalin: That means all the other questions can be settled?

Truman: We can settle any question here unless it must
have the ratification of the Senate.

Stalin: That means that only the question of peace trea-
ties requires ratification by the Senate?

Truman: That’s right. I have wide powers but I don’t
want to abuse them.

Churchill: | propose that we return to the question of
the Polish movement westward.

Stalin: We did not prepare for this question, it has been
raised by chance. Of course, I agree to have an exchange
of opinion, but it is extremely hard to settle it now.

Churchill: 1 don’t want to discuss the question today. I
should only like to say that the success of the whole Con-
ference depends on this question. If the Conference ends its
work, say, within 10 days, without adopting any decision
on Poland, and if the question of an equitable distribution
of food over the whole of German territory is not settled,
all this will undoubtedly mean failure for the Conference.

256

We shall then have to return to Mr. Byrnes’s proposal that
everyone will have to make do with what he has in his
zone. I hope that we shall reach agreement on this group
of questions which lie at the root of all our work. We
must admit that we have not achieved any progress
until now.

Truman: 1 agree with the Prime Minister’s opinion that
we have not had any progress on these questions.

Stalin: I think that the supply of the whole of Germany
with coal and metal is of much greater importance. The
Ruhr gives 90 per cent of the metal and 80 per cent of the
hard coal.

Churchill: If coal is supplied from the Ruhr to the Rus-
sian Zone, it will have to be paid for with food deliveries
from that zone.

Stalin: If the Ruhr remains a part of Germany it must
supply the whole of Germany.

Churchill: Why then can’t we take food from your zone?

Stalin: Because that territory goes to Poland.

Churchill: But how can workers in the Ruhr produce the
coal if they have nothing to eat, and where can they obtain
the food?

Stalin: It has long been known that Germany has always
imported foodstuffs, notably grain. If Germany is short of
grain and food she will buy it.

Churchill: Then how will she be able to pay the repara-
tions?

Stalin: She will be able to. Germany still has a lot of
some things.

Churchill: It is true that Ruhr coal is in our zone, but I
cannot take the responsibility for any settlement which may
result in famine in the zone this winter, while the Poles
have all the food to keep for themselves.

Stalin: That’s not quite right. They recently asked for
assistance in grain; they are short of grain, they asked for
grain until the new crop.

Churchill: I hope the Generalissimo will recognise some
of our difficulties as we recognise his. In Britain, this year,
we shall have the most coalless winter because we are short
of coal.

Stalin: Why? Britain has always exported coal.

Churchill: That’s because the miners have not yet been
demobilised, there’s a labour shortage in the coal industry.

17-876 957

Stalin: There are enough POWs. We have POWs working
on coal, it would be very hard without them. We are reha-
bilitating our coal basins and are using POWs for that pur-
pose. You have 400,000 German soldiers in Norway, they
are not even disarmed, and I don’t know what they’re
waiting for. There you have manpower.

Churchill: | didn’t know they had not been disarmed. At
any rate, our intention is to disarm them. I am not aware
of the exact situation there, but this question was settled by
the Supreme Command of the Allied Expeditionary Force.
In any case, I shall inquire.

I want to repeat and draw your attention to the fact that
we are short of coal because we are exporting it to France,
Belgium and Holland. And while we are short of coal for
this winter, we fail to understand why the Poles have the
possibility to sell coal from a territory which does not yet
belong to them.

Stalin: They have sold coal from the Dabrowa area. It
is their area.

I am not in the habit of complaining but must say that
our position is even worse. We have lost several million
killed, we are short of men. If I began to complain, I am
afraid you'd shed tears, because the situation in Russia is
so grave. But I do not want to worry you.

Churchill: We are in control of the Ruhr, and we are
prepared to exchange Ruhr coal for food.

Stalin: This question needs thinking about.

Churchill: 1 did not at all expect us to reach any decision
today, but I should like the members of the Conference to
think during this short break about the great problem they
will have to solve.

Truman: If we have nothing else to discuss today, I sug-
gest that we refer the question to the Foreign Ministers.

Churchill: We shall meet again at 5.00 on Friday.

Eden: We have received a notification from Dr. Bene’
asking us to discuss here the question of transferring Ger-
mans from Czechoslovakia. Can the Foreign Ministers deal
with this question?

Stalin: | think the transfer has been made.

Churchill: We don’t think that a great number of Ger-
mans have already departed from there, and we are still
faced with the problem of how to solve this question.

Stalin: Please continue.

258

a

eee

Churchill: Let the Foreign Ministers deal with this ques-
tion and establish the facts.

Stalin: All right.

Truman: | agree.

Before the break, I want to draw your attention once
again to the proposal I made concerning international in-
land waterways. I think the Foreign Ministers could also
discuss this proposal of mine.

(Stalin and Churchill express agreement.

The Soviet delegation then hands to the U.S. President
and the Prime Minister of Britain a memorandum concern-
ing the hindrances being raised to the return home of So-
viet citizens from Austria and Germany, and also a memo-
randum concerning the German troops not yet disarmed in
Norway, mention of which was already made at the sitting
of the Heads of Government.]}

Churchill: But I can assure you that it is our intention to
disarm those troops.

Stalin: I have no doubt. [Laughter.)

Churchill: We are not keeping them up our sleeve so as
later to release them all of a sudden. I shall demand a re-
port on this question at once.

Truman closes the sitting and announces that the next
sitting is to take place at 5.00 p.m. on Friday, July 27.

Tenth Sitting
July 28, 1945

Truman opens the sitting.

(Reporting on the sitting of the Foreign Ministers of the
U.S.S.R., the U.S.A. and Great Britain on July 25, 1945,
the Soviet delegation said the following:

1. The American delegation proposed a discussion at
the Ministers’ sitting on the question of waterways. It ex-
pressed the wish that this question should be dis-
cussed in commission beforehand. The British and Soviet
delegations agreed to this proposal, and as a result the fol-
lowing commission was set up:

From the U.S.A.: Russel and Riddleberger; from Great
Britain: Ward; from the U.S.S.R.: Gerashchenko and Lav-

rishchev.

igs 259

9. The American delegation then touched upon the ques-
tion of resettling the German population from Czechoslo-
vakia.

The British delegation declared that it was not only a
matter of resettling the Germans from Czechoslovakia, but
also from Western Poland and Hungary. It expressed the
opinion that the question of resettling this population would
be under the control of the Allied Control Council acting in
collaboration with the Governments of Poland, Czechoslo-
vakia and Hungary.

The Soviet delegation proposed that the question should
be referred for preliminary examination to a comission so
that a meeting of the three Ministers could then examine
its draft.

The delegations of the U.S.A. and Britain agreed to this
proposal. The following commission was set up:

From the U.S.A.: Cannon; from Great Britain: Harrison;
from the U.S.S.R.: Sobolev and Semyonov.

8. The British delegation tabled a proposal to appoint a
commission to draw up a draft communiqué on the work of
the Conference and a commission to draft a general proto-
col of the Conference decisions.

The delegations of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. agreed
to the proposal. It was decided to set up the following com-
missions:

a) To draft a communiqué on the work of the Confer-
ence:

From the U.S.A.: Walter Brown and Wilder Foot; from
the U.S.S.R.: Sobolev and Golunsky.

b) To draft a general protocol on the Conference deci-
sions:

From the U.S.A.: Dunn, Mathews and Cohen; from the
U.S.S.R.: Gromyko, Kozyrev and Gribanov; from Great
Britain (for both commissions): Bridges, Brooke, Hayter
and Dean.

Reporting further on the sitting of the Foreign Ministers
on July 27, 1945, the Soviet delegation said that the follow-
ing items were on the agenda of the sitting of the three
Ministers:

I. Outstanding questions.

It was stated that the following questions remain outstand-
ing:

1. The economic principles in respect of Germany.

260

Sa

2. Reparations from Germany.

3. Reparations from Italy and Austria.

4, Oil supplies to Europe.

5. Admission of Italy and other former satellite countries
into the United Nations Organisation.

6. Fulfilment of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated
Europe.

7. Easing of the armistice terms for Italy and other
countries.

8. Poland’s western frontier.

9. Co-operation in settling urgent European economic
problems.

10. War criminals.

11. Resettlement of Germans from Poland, Czechoslovakia
and Hungary.

12. Supplementing the political principles on the treat-
ment of Germany with two points from Point 13 of the draft
economic principles.

13. The German Navy.

14. International inland waterways.

II. Admission of Italy and other countries, which have
concluded an armistice and have become co-belligerents
on the side of the Allies into the United Nations Organi-
sation.

The U.S. delegation declared that if the Soviet and the
British delegations were unable to reach agreement on the
wording of a document on this question, it was prepared,
with the consent of the U.S. President, to withdraw the
question from the Conference agenda altogether. The Amer-
ican delegation added that, in its opinion, it was necessary
to examine first of all the vital questions, namely, the ques-
tions of reparations, the German Navy and Poland’s west-
ern frontier.

The British delegation proposed that the formulation of
the last sentence of the third paragraph, tabled by the So-
viet delegation, should be replaced by the following sen-
tence: “The conclusion of peace treaties with the respon-
sible democratic Governments in the states will permit the
three Governments to resume normal diplomatic relations
with them and to support proposals on their side to become
members of the United Nations Organisation.”

The Soviet delegation declared the amendment unaccept-

able.

261

Insofar as no agreement on this question had been reached
at the meeting of the three Ministers, it was decided to
submit it for settlement by the Heads of the three Govern-
ments.

III. Reparations from Germany.

The Soviet delegation declared that it considered the work
of the Reparations Commission unsatisfactory and proposed
that the question of reparations from Germany should be
examined directly at the meeting of the three Ministers.
There were no objections to this proposal. The Soviet del-
egation then read out Clause 4 of the Crimea Protocol on
Reparations and, referring to a statement by the American
representative in the Reparations Commission to the effect
that he withdrew the U.S. Government’s endorsement of
the decision set forth in the said clause, asked the American
delegation whether the U.S. Government continued to ad-
here to the Crimea decisions on this question or had altered
its position.

The American delegation replied that this was a misun-
derstanding. In the Crimea the U.S. Government agreed to
accept the figure of $20,000 million as a basis for discus-
sion, but since then the Soviet and the Allied armies had
wrought great destruction in Germany, some areas had been
separated from Germany and it was now impossible for
practical purposes to start from the over-all figure which
the American delegation had accepted at Yalta as a pos-
sible basis for discussion.

The British delegation declared that it abstained from
making any proposals.

On the proposal of the American delegation it was recog-
nised advisable to postpone this question until the next con-
ference of the three Ministers, after which they would re-
port to the Heads of the three Governments.

IV. Reparations from Austria and Italy.

The Soviet delegation proposed that its proposals
on reparations from Austria and reparations from Italy
should be taken as a basis for turther discussion on_ this
question.

The American delegation declared that it did not consid-
er it possible to levy reparations from Austria and Italy in
the form of deliveries from current production. In the opin-
ion of the American delegation, it was possible only to
make lump withdrawals of war industry equipment which

262

could not be used for peacetime purposes. The British dele-
gation declared that it supported the opinion of the U.S.
delegation.

In view of failure to reach agreement it was decided to
report the differences that had been revealed to the Heads
of the three Governments.

V. Economic principles in respect of Germany.

On the proposal of the U.S. delegation, the discussion of
this question was postponed.

VI. Oil supplies to Europe.

The discussion of the question was postponed in view of
the fact that the commission had not completed its work.

VII. Economic co-operation in Europe.

It was decided to approve the report of the commission
on this question and to report this to the Heads of the three
Governments.]

Truman: Which question are we going to discuss now:
that of Poland’s western frontier or some other?

Stalin: We could discuss this one, or the question of
Italy and the other countries. How much time do you have
today? Could we work for an hour?

Truman: That suits me. Let’s work until 12.00.

Stalin: I want to inform you that we, the Russian’ delega-
tion, have received a new proposal from Japan. Although
we are not duly informed when a document on Japan is
compiled, we believe nevertheless that we should inform
each other of new proposals. [Japan’s note on mediation is
read out in English.) The document does not contain any-
thing new. There is only one proposal: Japan is offering to
co-operate with us. We intend to reply to them in the
same spirit as the last time.

Truman: We do not object.

Attlee: We agree.

Stalin: I have nothing more to add.

Truman: There are two questions to which the Soviet
delegation wants to draw our attention in the first place.
The first question is about Italy and the other satellite
countries, and the second, about reparations from Austria
and Italy.

Stalin: In addition it would be desirable to raise the ques-
tion of the German Navy and the question of Poland’s
western frontier.

Truman: 1 think that we can discuss any question here

268

and I am prepared to hear any proposal and then state my
opinion on these questions.

Attlee: I want to say that I agree to discuss all these
questions. At the same time I should like to express regret
that the events which have taken place in Britain have ham-
pered the work of the Conference, but we are prepared to
stay here as long as need be and deal with any questions.

Stalin: The question of admitting Italy and the other
countries into the United Nations Organisation was discussed
at the previous sitting of the Big Three. However, as was
stated here, the Foreign Ministers had a different impres-
sion of the results of this discussion. The Soviet delegation
was under the impression that the question had in the main
been agreed between the Heads of the three Governments
after the amendments made by the Prime Minister in respect
of Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary and Finland. Wherever
there was reference to the peace treaties, it was decided
to replace the words “with Bulgaria, Rumania”, etc., by the
words “for Bulgaria, Rumania”, etc. The question was then
referred for final drafting by the three Foreign Ministers.
But at the Ministers’ meeting the British delegation
tabled another amendment to the draft, which was not
adopted.

At the Conference of the Heads of Government the ques-
tion was of how the Governments of the said countries
were to be called: responsible or recognised. The Russian
delegation believes that if we say “responsible” this will
be an affront to the Governments because they might think
that they are now regarded as being irresponsible. If we
say “recognised”, as we agreed here at the Conference of
the three Heads of Government, there will be no offence.
Each of our Governments is free to recognise the Govern-
ments of these states when it deems them to be democratic.
There will be no offence for the Governments, and the
meaning, the content, will remain the same. We here adopt-
ed a decision and then the Ministers got together and re-
versed it. That is wrong. This was agreed in principle.

Truman: I ask Mr. Byrnes to speak on this point.

Byrnes: At the meeting of the three Foreign Ministers
the Soviet delegation declared that, as far as it remem-
bered, the U.S. delegation had accepted its proposal. On be-
half of the American delegation I said that the President
accepted the proposal of the Soviet delegation in principle

264

KOSS Sao = a
om

and added that these proposals should be referred for
drafting by the Foreign Ministers: the President had in
mind the replacement of only one word, namely, the word
“to discuss” by the word “to examine” (which makes a
difference in English). That means that there were no dif-
ferences between the American and the Soviet delegation
on this matter.

But I told the Foreign Ministers at the time that, as far
as I recalled, Mr. Churchill had objected to the Soviet del-
egation’s proposal concerning the study of the question of
recognising the Governments of the satellite countries. At
the conclusion of the Conference of the three Heads of Gov-
ernment, Mr. Churchill informed me that he was not in
agreement with this proposal. I also told the Foreign Min-
isters that the American delegation had initially made
its proposal on Italy to grant her some relief. The proposal
merely said that the three Powers would issue a declaration
to the effect that they would support Italy’s entry into the
United Nations Organisation.

The British delegation proposed that we include certain
neutral countries among those whose entry into the United
Nations Organisation we would support. We agreed with
that. The Soviet delegation proposed the inclusion in the
document of a clause on the Franco regime and, to meet
the Soviet delegation half-way, we added a clause concern-
ing the negative attitude taken by the three Péwers to
Spain’s becoming a member of the United Nations under
the Franco regime.

The Soviet delegation then proposed the inclusion of a
clause concerning the Governments of Bulgaria, Rumania,
Hungary and Finland. We agreed to that clause with certain
amendments. After that there was a proposal to change the
wording of the clause on these countries. We agreed to
that as well.

Unfortunately, one gets the impression that when we
agree with our Soviet friends, the British delegation with-
holds its agreement, and when we agree with our British
friends, we do not obtain the agreement of the Soviet dele-
gation. (Laughter.} Once again, if the Soviet and British
delegations could reach agreement concerning the Soviet
proposal we would be prepared to accept the document, but
if they are unable to reach agreement, we are prepared to
withdraw our modest proposal on Italy.

265

Attlee: Mr. President, I ask permission for Mr. Cadogan
to set forth our position on this question.

Cadogan: The document we are examining relates to the
question of admitting Italy and the other satellite countries,
and also, possibly, certain neutral countries, into the
United Nations Organisation. As far as I am aware, the
text of the document could be approved with the exception
of two points. Generalissimo Stalin has already spoken
about one of these points, namely, the replacement of the
words “responsible Governments” by the words “recognised
Governments”. It seems to me that two days ago, when we
discussed this question, we agreed to this substitution.

The other question, which is much more complex, relates
to Clause 3, which says that the three Governments agree
to examine, in the near future, the question of resuming
diplomatic relations with Finland, Bulgaria, Rumania and
Hungary. Mr. Churchill explained that although he was
willing to examine the question of resuming diplomatic re-
lations with these countries, the inclusion of this clause in
the declaration could be misleading, because under the con-
stitution the British cannot establish full diplomatic rela-
tions with countries with whom they are technically still in
a state of war. A compromise proposal was made to the
effect that after the signing of the peace treaties we could
resume full diplomatic relations with these countries. But
it appears that this proposal of ours met with objections on
the part of the Soviet delegation.

Stalin: 1 understood Mr. Cadogan to say that he agrees
to say “recognised Governments” instead of “responsible
Governments”.

Cadogan: Yes.

Byrnes: We find this acceptable: “recognised” instead of
“responsible”.

Stalin: There is no distinction here between the situation
of the Allies and Italy, on the one hand, and the Allies and
other countries, on the other. There is no freely elected
Government in Italy, or in Rumania, or in Hungary, or in
Bulgaria. There is such a Government only in Finland. In
all these countries, as in Italy, the Governments have been
formed by agreement between the main parties.

If Italy has been recognised by the U.S.A. and the Soviet
Union, and to the extent of 90 per cent by the British Gov-
ernment, why is it not possible to raise the question of

266

examining the problem of establishing diplomatic relations,
say, with Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary? From the
standpoint of democracy, the situation there is the same as
in Italy. But Italy has been recognised by the three Powers.
It does not say here: to establish full diplomatic relations.
I must say I fail to understand the meaning of the amend-
ment of which Mr. Cadogan has spoken. Why make such a
distinction between Italy, which does not have a freely
elected Government, and the other countries, which, with
the exception of Finland, have no freely elected Govern-
ments either?

Bevin: Does not the difference lie in the fact that in
respect of Italy we know what the situation there is, and we
know nothing about the situation in the other countries?

Stalin: You are not being asked to commit yourself to a
recognition of these Governments. While you discuss the
question of recognition you will have the opportunity of
studying the situation in these countries.

Bevin: But why should we undertake this obligation be-
fore we know what the situation is in these countries?

Stalin: We also knew little about Italy when we estab-
lished diplomatic relations with her, possibly even less than
you now know about these countries. The question is to
open for these countries, beginning with Italy and ending
with Bulgaria, some ways of easing their position. For Italy
there is the prospect of entry into the United Nations Organ-
isation. This is the second step in easing her position, the
first having been the fact that diplomatic relations were
resumed with her six or eight months after her surrender.
The second step towards relief of Italy’s position consists in
the fact that two years after her surrender we give her an
opportunity of joining the United Nations Organisation.

The task now is to make the first step in respect of the
other countries: to ensure the discussion of the question of
their recognition by the three Powers. It is proposed to do
this ten months after their surrender. If we agreed to ease
Italy’s position, we must do something in this respect for
the other countries as well. That is the point.

Attlee: I think it was explained here that we find it im-
possible to resume full diplomatic relations with these coun-
tries until the signing of the peace treaties. The difficulty
lies in the fact that the adoption of the Soviet proposal
creates the impression that we intend to do something in

267

respect of these countries which it is impossible for us to do.
The amendment proposed by the British delegation, consist-
ing in the statement that full diplomatic relations with
these countries will be resumed after the conclusion of the
peace treaties with them, states what is possible.

Stalin: Why not put it this way: the three states will
examine, each separately, the question of establishing full
or partial diplomatic relations. Diplomatic relations will
have to be resumed with Finland in any case, it is not nice
to drag out the solution of this question, since a freely
elected Government has been formed there. The question
concerns the other countries.

Attlee: It seems to me that this proposal does not corre-
spond with reality.

Stalin: Good, in that case, let us adopt the American
formula: instead of “to discuss” say “to examine”.

Attlee: It seems to me that a change of words does not
alter the substance of the matter. One question put in Par-
liament will give the whole thing away.

Stalin: But we are not concealing anything. What is
there to give away? It is one thing to discuss, and another,
to examine. You will have to examine the question in any
case. It would be strange if we failed to examine the ques-
tion of recognising these Governments. What is so terrible
or new in this? I think the British could accept the Amer-
ican wording. You do not stand to lose anything, but only
to gain from the public opinion in these countries.

Bevin: When we return we shall be asked in Parliament
about the meaning of what we have done. I want to give the
people an absolutely honest answer. If I recognise a Govern-
ment, I really recognise that Government. And I have no
wish to cover up with words things which could be miscon-
strued. I would prefer to adopt the very latest American
proposal and postpone the settlement of the question.

Stalin: Let’s put it off.

Truman: Which question shall we discuss now, that of
Poland’s western frontier or reparations from Italy and
Austria?

(lt was decided to discuss the question of reparations.)

Truman: \n that case, J want to make a statement on
reparations from Italy. As I said on the first day of the
discussion on the question of Italy, rather, the question of
easing the terms of the armistice with Italy, we and the

268

British Government have had to give Italy about $500 mil-
lion to restore her economic situation. We expect to give
Italy another $500 million for the same purpose. The U.S.
Government is prepared to make this money available for
a specified purpose, of which I have already spoken, but
not to enable Italy to pay reparations to Allied and other
countries. If Italy has armaments plants with heavy equip-
ment which the Soviet Union needs, we agree to have the
Soviet Union take that equipment. But the money we in-
tend to give Italy must be covered mainly by exports from
Italy.

Stalin: Jt could be accepted that no reparations are to be
taken from Austria since Austria was not an independent
state. But our Soviet people find it very hard to understand
the absence of any reparations from Italy, which was an
independent state and whose troops reached the Volga and
took part in devastating our country. Austria did not have
any armed forces of her own, reparations from her may be
waived. Italy had her own armed forces and she must pay
reparations.

Truman: If there are objects for reparations in Italy, I
absolutely agree to hand them over to the Soviet Union.
But we are not prepared and do not agree to give money
to Italy for her to use to pay reparations to Allied and
other countries.

Stalin: 1 see the President’s point, but I want the Presi-
dent to see mine as well. What gives the Soviet people the
moral right to speak of reparations? It is the fact that a
sizeable part of the Soviet Union’s territory was occupied
by the enemy forces. For three and a half years the Soviet
people were under the heel of the invader. But for the oc-
cupation, perhaps the Russians would not have the moral
right to speak of reparations. I say perhaps.

Truman: | fully sympathise with you.

Stalin: The President says that Italy may have equip-
ment which the Russians need and that this equipment
might go to meet the reparations. Good, I do not want to
ask a great deal, but I should like to set a rough figure
for these reparations. Italy is a big country. What amount
could be got from Italy, what would be the value of these
reparations? If the President is not prepared to answer this
question, I am willing to wait, but some figure for repara-
tions must be established.

269

Truman: | cannot answer that question just now.

Bevin: In establishing the amount of reparations I propose
that what America and Great Britain are now giving Italy
should not be taken into account; what should be taken
into account is what Italy has at the present time.

Stalin: Of course, I have no intention of ignoring the
interests of America or Britain.

Attlee: I want to say that I fully agree with what the
President has said. At the same time, I have complete
sympathy with the Russian people for what they have suf-
fered. But we have also suffered a great deal from the
attack by Italy. We also have devastated lands, and_ the
feelings of the British people can be easily imagined if Italy
had to pay reparations from the money actually made avail-
able to her by America and Great Britain. Of course, if
Italy has any equipment which could be withdrawn, that
is another matter, but our people will never agree to have
reparations paid from the money given by us and America.

Stalin: We agree to take the equipment.

Attlee: Military equipment.

Stalin: Military equipment.

Attlee: These are to be lump withdrawals of military
equipment and not reparations withdrawals from current
production?

Stalin: These are to be lump withdrawals.

Bevin: I want to ask: is it a question of military equip-
ment for the manufacture of military items?

Stalin: No, why? It is a question of equipment at war
plants which will be used to make peace-time goods; we
are withdrawing the same kind of equipment from Ger-
many.

Attlee: What I had in mind was equipment that cannot
be used for civilian production.

Stalin: Every kind of equipment can be used for civilian
production. We are now switching our war plants to civil-
ian production. There is no military equipment that cannot
be used to make civilian goods. For example, our tank
plants have started to make cars.

Bevin: It will be very hard to determine what you will
take.

Stalin: Of course, we cannot now specify the equipment.
We only want a decision adopted here in principle, and
then we shall formulate our demands.

270

Truman: As I understand it you want it agreed in prin-
ciple here that Italy must pay reparations?

Stalin: Yes, that is correct. It is necessary to determine
the amount of reparations, and I am willing to receive a
smal] amount.

Truman: \ don’t think there are great differences of prin-
ciple between us on this question. The only thing I want is
that this should not affect the advances we have given to
Italy.

Stalin: I do not have these advances in mind.

Bevin: The following question arises: what is to be taken
in the first place? The primary claims in respect of Italy
are those of Great Britain and the United States, which
have granted her a loan; reparations are secondary.

Stalin: We cannot encourage Italy and other aggressors
in letting them emerge from the war scot free, without
paying for at least a part of what they have destroyed. To
waive this is to pay them a bonus for the war.

Truman: | absolutely agree with you.

Bevin: I can’t hear, it’s that plane. (Stalin’s statement is
repeated to Bevin.]

Truman: I agree with the Generalissimo’s statement that
the aggressor must not receive a bonus, but must suffer
punishment.

Stalin: The British were especially hard hit by Italy.

Attlee: We are not forgetting it.

Truman: Shall we fix the time for our sitting tomorrow?
Let’s say five, as usual.

Stalin: All right.

Truman: Perhaps we could start our work at four? With

everyone’s consent, we shall start our sitting tomorrow at
four o’clock.

Eleventh Sitting
July 31, 1945

Truman: Mr. Bevin will report on yesterday’s meeting
of the Foreign Ministers.

Bevin: I propose that no special report be made, because
almost all the items on yesterday’s agenda of the Foreign
Ministers have been included on today’s agenda of the Big
Three sitting.

271

(Bevin's proposal is adopted.)

Truman: The first item on our agenda is the U.S. propo-
sals on German reparations, on Poland’s western frontier,
and on admission to the United Nations Organisation. Mr.
Byrnes will now report on these proposals.

Byrnes: Our proposals on reparations were tabled as
part of the general proposals relating to three outstanding
questions. These questions are: the question of reparations,
the question of Poland’s western frontier, and the question
of admission to the United Nations Organisation. These
three questions are interconnected. The U.S. delegation said
at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers that it is prepared
to make concessions on Poland’s western border and admis-
sion to the United Nations Organisation, provided agree-
ment is reached on all three questions.

Stalin: They are not connected with each other. They
are different questions.

Byrnes: That is true, the questions are different, but they
have been before us for a fortnight and we have failed to
reach any agreement on them. The U.S. delegation has
tabled its proposals on all three questions in the hope of
reaching agreement. But we declare here once again that
we shall not make any concession in respect of the Polish
border, unless agreement is reached on the other two ques-
tions.

Our proposals on reparations, which were discussed at
yesterday’s meeting of the Ministers, provided that 25 per
cent of the capital equipment of the Ruhr area which is not
required for the maintenance of a peace-time economy
would be handed over to the Soviet Union in return for
food, coal, zinc, potassium, oil products, timber, etc., from
the Soviet zone. In addition, we proposed that 15 per cent
of such capital equipment which is considered unnecessary
for the maintenance of a peace-time economy should be
handed over from the Ruhr to the Soviet Union without any
payment or exchange.

During yesterday’s discussion, the British delegation
declared that it could not agree to have all this handed over
from the Ruhr area only, but it could agree to the transfer
of equipment to the Soviet Union from all the Western
zones. We agreed that the only difference between the
British and American proposals consisted in the percent-
age, and that if the percentage is applied to all three West-

272

ern zones of occupation, it should be halved as compared
with that established for the Ruhr area, namely, 12.5 per
cent instead of 25, and 7.5 per cent instead of 15.

The Soviet delegation did not agree with this proposal,
but the American and British delegations believed that this
would be simpler in administrative terms. We also believed
that withdrawals from all three Western zones would be to
the greater advantage of the Soviet Union.

Stalin: We also consider it correct that withdrawals
should be made not only from the Ruhr, but from all West-
ern zones.

Byrnes: This will give you a wide choice of equipment,
since it could come from the American, British and French
zones.

There was a proposal at the Foreign Ministers’ meeting
that the question be solved who is to decide which equip-
ment is not required for the maintenance of a peace-time
economy and is available for reparations. The Soviet dele-
gation believed that it should be precisely specified who is
to determine the quantity and nature of the industrial equip-
ment not required for a peace-time economy and available
for reparations. I proposed that the relevant decision should
be made by the Control Council on directions from the
Allied Reparations Commission and should be subject to
the final approval of the Commander-in-Chief of the zone
from which the equipment is to be withdrawn. I proposed
that the decision should be taken by the Control Council,
because all the four Powers are represented on the Control
Council and because it is an administrative organ vested
with executive functions, while the Reparations Commis-
sion is an organ which elaborates general policy on repa-
rations.

I repeat here the proposal I made yesterday, namely,
that the withdrawal of capital equipment should be com-
pleted within two years, and that deliveries to the Soviet
Union in exchange for deliveries from its zone of occupa-
tion should continue for five years. I also proposed that the
reparations claims of other countries should be met from
the Western zones of occupation.

The two other questions of which I spoke, and which in
our proposals are treated as one, are the question of Po-
land’s western border and the question of admission to the
United Nations Organisation. We agree to the settlement

18-876 273

of these questions provided agreement is reached on the
main question, that of reparations.

Under our proposal on Poland’s western frontier, the
Polish Government is given the right to establish a provi-
sional administration on the whole territory the Poles have
demanded.

As for the question of admission to the United Nations
Organisation, three days ago we withdrew our proposals.
However we now make another proposal on the question
whose wording, we hope, should satisfy the Soviet Union.

The wording of the proposal we discussed four days ago
was: “The three Governments agree to examine each sepa-
rately in the near future, in the light of the conditions then
prevailing, the establishment of diplomatic relations with
Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary.” The British
delegation declared that that was unacceptable to it, since
the British Government could not agree to establish full
diplomatic relations with countries with which it was in a
state of war. The head of the Soviet Government then
asked whether the British Government was prepared to
accord full or partial recognition to the Governments of
these countries. That is why I now table a proposal with the
following wording: “The three Governments express the
desire to examine each separately in the near future, in
the light of the conditions then prevailing, the question of
establishing diplomatic relations with Finland, Rumania,
Bulgaria and Hungary to the extent possible prior to the
conclusion of peace treaties with these countries.”

I hope that our Soviet and British friends are prepared
to accept our proposal in this wording.

Stalin: I have no objection in principle to this wording.

Byrnes: We also proposed to add another clause, to the
effect that the three Governments express the desire that,
in view of the change of conditions as a result of the ending
of the war in Europe, members of the Allied press should
enjoy complete freedom in reporting to the world the events
in Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary and Finland. This is almost
the same wording which we agreed upon when discussing
Poland.

Stalin: This can be accepted, but there should be a change
in the wording to say, instead of “The three Governments
express the desire”, “The three Governments do not doubt
that...”, etc.

274

Byrnes: As regards the United States, this is accept-
able to us. I think we should now adopt the document
as it is.

Thus, we have tabled three proposals, and I very much
hope that all three will be adopted here.

Stalin: We have proposals on reparations.

(The following proposals of the Soviet delegation on
reparations from Germany are then read out:

“1. Reparations shall be levied by each Government in
its own zone of occupation. They shall have two forms:
lump withdrawals from the national property of Germany
(equipment, materials), which shall be made during two
years after surrender, and annual commodity deliveries
from current production, which are to be made during
10 years after surrender.

“2. The reparations are designed to promote the earliest
economic rehabilitation of the countries which have suffered
from the German occupation, with an eye to the need for the
utmost reduction of Germany’s military potential.

“3. Over and above the reparations levied in its own
zone, the U.S.S.R. is to receive additionally from the West-
ern zones:

“a) 15 per cent of the basic industrial equipment, in
complete sets and good repair—primarily in the field of
metallurgy, chemistry and machine-building—which, as
specified by the Control Council in Germany on a report of
the Reparations Commission, is subject to withdrawal in
the Western zones by way of reparations; this equipment
shall be handed over to the Soviet Union in exchange for
an equivalent quantity of foodstuffs, coal, potassium, tim-
ber, ceramic goods and oil products in the course of five
years;

“b) 10 per cent of the basic industrial equipment levied
in the Western zones by way of reparations, without any
payment or exchange of any kind.

“The amount of equipment and materials subject to
withdrawal in the Western zones by way of reparations is
to be established not later than within three months.

“4, In addition, the U.S.S.R. is to receive by way of rep-
arations:

“a) $500 million worth of shares in industrial and trans-
port enterprises in the Western zones;

“‘b) 30 per cent of German investments abroad;

18* 275

“c) 30 per cent of the German gold which the Allies have
at their disposal.

“5. The U.S.S.R. undertakes to settle Poland’s repara-
tions claims from its share of the reparations. The United
States and Great Britain are to do the same thing in respect
of France, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Holland
and Norway.”]

Stalin: Mr. Byrnes proposed here that these three ques-
tions should be bound up into a single whole. I understand
his standpoint: he proposes the tactics which he considers
expedient. It is the right of each delegation to make such
proposals, but the Soviet delegation will nevertheless vote
separately on each of these questions.

The Russian delegation has put forward its proposals.
The question of reparations from Germany is the chief one
causing disputes and differences. Our considerations have
been set forth here. You may have noticed that the Russian
delegation took the standpoint of the American delegation,
for it gave up the idea of stating a definite figure and
quantity, and went over to percentages.

Digressing somewhat from the main subject, I should
like to speak of the withdrawals which the British made
from the Russian zone before its occupation by Soviet troops.
What I mean is the removal of goods and equipment. In
addition, there is a note from the Soviet military command
to the effect that the American authorities drove away 11,000
railway cars from the same territory. I do not know what is
to be done with this property. Is this property to be returned
to the Russians or compensated for in some other manner?
In any case, the Americans and the British are taking equip-
ment not only from their zones, but have also taken some
from the Russian zone, whereas we did not drive away a
single car and did not take any equipment from the plants
in your zones. The Americans had promised not to remove
anything, but they did.

Now on the substance of the matter. I think we have a
possibility of reaching agreement on the question of repara-
tions from Germany. What are the main propositions of the
American plan? The first is that each makes withdrawals
from his own zone of occupation. We agree to this. Second:
equipment is to be removed not only from the Ruhr, but
from all the Western zones. We have accepted this second
proposal. Third proposal: a part of the reparations taken

276

_.

from the Western zones is to be covered with a correspond-
ing equivalent from the Russian zone over a period of
5 years. Then there is the fourth proposition: it is that the
Control Council is to determine the volume of the withdraw-
als from the Western zones. That is also acceptable.

What in that case are the differences? We are interested
in the question of the time limit, the question of the final
calculation of the volume of reparations. Nothing is said of
this in the American draft. We should like to establish a
period of three months.

Byrnes: The question of time should be agreed.

Stalin: It is a question of the time limit for determining
the volume of reparations. Some period has to be proposed.
We propose three months. Is that enough?

Truman: I think it is.

Attlee: That is a short period. I must think a little.

Stalin: It’s worth thinking about, of course. It may be
three, four or five months, but some time limit should be
laid down.

Attlee: 1 propose six months.

Stalin: Right, I agree.

Then there is the percentage of withdrawal. Here again
agreement can be reached. One per cent either way does
not make much difference. I hope that in this matter of
establishing the withdrawal percentage, the British and the
Americans will meet us half way. We have lost a great deal
of equipment in this war, a terrible quantity of it. At least
one-twentieth part of it should be restored. And I expect
Mr. Attlee to support our proposal.

Attlee: No, I cannot do that.

Stalin: Think a little and support us.

Attlee: I thought of this all day yesterday. [Laughter]

Stalin: What have we got then? I think we must try to
reach a general agreement on this question.

Bevin: The Soviet document does not contain the words
I used yesterday, namely, “equipment not needed for peace-
time economy”.

(The Soviet delegation once again reads out the relevant
section of its proposals on the question of reparations.

Bevin: I propose that you accept this phrase of mine,
which expresses my idea quite precisely.

Stalin: What is the gist of it?

Bevin: The Control Council is first of all to determine the

277

quantity of equipment which is to remain for the mainte-
nance of Germany’s peace-time economy.

Stalin: That is the same thing.

Bevin: In that case, you will perhaps accept my phrase?

Stalin: But what’s the difference?

Bevin: There is a great deal of difference. I don’t want
there to be any misunderstandings later. Your text may be
interpreted in a different way, namely, as 15 per cent of all
equipment.

Stalin: No, we have in mind 15 per cent of the equipment
subject to withdrawal, that is, equipment which is not re-
quired for the maintenance of Germany’s peace-time economy.

Bevin: I would propose that this should be inserted in
the document, so that everything would be quite clear.

Stalin: But what is not clear? The Control Council is to
determine which equipment is required for the peace-time
economy of Germany. What is left is to constitute the total
volume for reparations.

Byrnes: Our wording expresses the common view of the
British and American delegations.

Stalin: What do you propose?

Byrnes: The quantity of industrial equipment which is
recognised as unnecessary for peace-time economy and is
therefore available for reparations is determined by the
Control Council on the directives of the Allied Reparations
Commission and is subject to final approval by the Com-
mander of the zone from which the equipment is removed.

Stalin: I do not object.

Byrnes: Consequently, the only question which remains
open is that of percentage. You want 15 per cent and 10 per
cent, instead of 12.5 and 7.5 per cent?

Stalin: Yes.

Byrnes: But in addition you want to receive by way of
reparations $500 million worth of shares of industrial enter-
prises in the Western zones, 30 per cent of Germany’s
investments abroad, and 30 per cent of the German gold
which is at the disposal of the Allies. About the gold, as far
as I am aware of the opinion of our Staff, I can say that
there is some gold which once belonged to other countries.
It would be unfair to reject those countries’ claims.

Stalin: This applies to German gold.

Byrnes: According to our information, there is no Ger-
man gold, because all this gold was plundered by the Ger-

278

mans during the war. We must return this gold to the
countries to which it once belonged. If the Soviet delegation
insists that the Soviet Union should receive in addition to
these percentages $500 million worth of shares of industrial
enterprises, as the Soviet proposals state, 30 per cent of Ger-
many’s investments abroad, and 30 per cent of the gold, this
question should be discussed here.

Stalin: We should like to have this if it is possible.

Byrnes: What do you have in mind when you speak of
Germany’s investments abroad?

Stalin: The investments the Germans had in other coun-
tries, including America.

Byrnes: As for the investments in America, we have
blocked them, and legislation is required to lay claim to
these funds. Congress appears to have done that already.
I have no doubt that there will be all sorts of claims to
these funds also from refugees who are in America. This
question calls for a legal settlement.

Besides, I am sure that if, for instance, there is a certain
quantity of German investments in the countries of Latin
America, the Governments of those countries will have
claims to these resources.

Stalin: That may be.

Bevin: We agreed yesterday that France should be
included in the Reparations Commission so as to take part
in deciding on the equipment subject to withdrawal by way
of reparations. I should like to have France included in this
commission.

Stalin: I do not object.

Bevin: Concerning the percentages. I thought that at
yesterday’s sitting of the Foreign Ministers we met you half
way by agreeing to 12.5 per cent.

In addition, I should like to know: will not the reparations
question hinder the ordinary exchange of goods over the
whole of Germany, considering that we have agreed on the
economic principles and normal exchange of goods in
Germany?

Stalin: Well, we shall discuss that question when we
come to the economic principles.

Bevin: The settlement of the gold question presents great
difficulties. As for Germany’s assets abroad, would you
agree to confine yourself to the assets in neutral territories?

Stalin: I think that could be accepted.

279

Byrnes: We cannot agree to any addition to our main
proposal. I have in mind Clause 4 of the Soviet proposals.

Stalin: In that case the percentage will have to be raised.
On Clause 3 let us raise the percentage, considering that
you have removed much equipment from our zone.
(Laughter.) A vast amount of equipment was destroyed in
our country, and at least a small part of that equipment
should be covered.

Truman: 1 should like to make the following remark
concerning withdrawals from your zone. We learned of this
three days ago, when we got a list of this equipment. I wrote
to General Eisenhower asking him to look into the matter
and report. If such a withdrawal did take place, I assure
you that it was not made on the orders of the U.S. Govern-
ment. I assure you that we shall find possibilities for com-
pensation.

Stalin: I propose that we return to the discussion of the
question of percentages.

Truman: If you are prepared to withdraw Clause 4 I am
prepared to accept 15 per cent and 10 per cent.

Stalin: Good, I withdraw it.

Bevin: We shall find it hard to satisfy France, Belgium
and Holland from the quantity of equipment left. I should
propose 12.5 per cent and 10 per cent. In addition, we ask
the withdrawal of Clause 4.

Stalin: We have already agreed to that. The United
States has shown understanding of our position, how is it
that you do not wish to do the same?

Bevin: We are responsible for the zone from which the
greatest quantity of equipment is to be withdrawn, and in
addition there will be large claims on the part of France,
Belgium and Holland.

Byrnes: The final phrase in our proposals says that the
reparations claims from other countries entitled to repara-
tions are to be covered from the Western zones of occupa-
tion. I request that our wording concerning the claims of
other countries be discussed.

Stalin: All right, 1 agree not to name the countries, and
state this in general terms.

Byrnes: I think that would be more expedient, for it has
already been mentioned that Greece is not in the list. We
also think that it is expedient to state this in general terms.

Stalin: Good.

280

Bevin: It has occurred to me that if you receive the per-
centages you demand, then, with what you receive from
your own zone, you will have more than 50 per cent of all
German reparations.

Stalin: Much less. What is more, we give an equivalent
for the 15 per cent, which is actually an exchange of repa-
rations and not fresh reparations. We receive only 10 per
cent reparations from the Western zones. Those are the
reparations proper; as for the 15 per cent, they are given
for a definite equivalent. Our demands are minimal. We
receive from you 10 per cent, and on the rest we exchange
and pay an equivalent. You have the 90 per cent. If we
receive 7.5 per cent instead of 10 per cent reparations, that
will be unfair. I agree that it should be 15 per cent and 10
per cent. That is fairer. The Americans agree. What about
you, Mr. Bevin?

Bevin: All right, I agree.

Truman: We also agree.

Byrnes: Thus, our draft proposals with the new percent-
ages, plus the establishment of a time limit for determin-
ing the amount of reparations, are accepted.

Stalin: We seem to have exhausted all our differences
on the question of reparations. Can we refer this draft for
final editing?

[The proposal is accepted, and a commission is set up to
edit the adopted decision.)

Truman: The next question is on Poland’s western
frontier.

Byrnes: We handed in our proposals yesterday, and they
were discussed yesterday. I do not think we should read
them out again. If there are any remarks or amendments,
I am ready to hear them, but I hope that our Soviet and
British friends will accept our proposals.

Bevin: As for the position of the British Government, I
have instructions to keep to the frontier along the Eastern
Neisse. That is why I should like to know precisely the
substance of the new proposal. Does the whole of this zone
pass into the hands of the Polish Government and will the
Soviet troops all be pulled out of there, as was the case in
other zones, where the troops of one side fell back and the
other side took over the zone?

I met the Poles and asked them about their intentions
concerning the fulfilment of the declaration mentioned in

281

the U.S. document. I asked them about their intentions
concerning the staging of free and unhampered elections
by secret ballot. They assured me that they intend to carry
out these elections as soon as possible and expect to do so in
early 1946. But this will, of course, depend on some condi-
tions enabling them to carry out these elections.

They also agreed on freedom of the press in Poland and
on access of foreign correspondents to Poland and the pos-
sibility of sending their dispatches without censorship. They
gave me assurances concerning freedom of religion all over
the country.

But there is still one other very important question,
namély, that of the repatriation not only of civilians, but of
the troops which are under Allied command in various
countries. I asked the Poles to make a statement on this
question so that we could be sure that these men, upon their
return to their homeland, would be placed in the same
conditions as all the other citizens.

The next question, which especially concerns the Soviet
Government and the British Government, and which the
Polish Government is now unable to settle, is the question
of a military air line between Warsaw, Berlin and London,
to enable the British Government to maintain constant
contact with its ambassador in Warsaw. I should like to have
an agreement on this point at once. The document tabled by
the United States says that this zone is to be under the
administration of the Polish Government and will not
constitute a part of the Soviet zone. As Mr. Byrnes put it,
this zone will be under the responsibility of the Poles.
However, I take it that although we have placed this zone
under a Polish administration, it remains under the military
control of the Allies.

Byrnes: We have found ourselves in a situation in which
Poland, with the consent of the Soviet Union, is actually
administering the territory. In view of this, the three Powers
have agreed to leave the administration of this territory in
Poland’s hands, to obviate any further disputes concerning
the status of this territory. There is, however, no need
for Poland to have a representative on the Control
Council.

Bevin: J do not insist. If we all understand what it is all
about, I do not object. I shall be asked various questions
upon my return, and I should like to know what is to hap-

282

pen in this zone. Will the Poles take over the whole zone,
and the Soviet troops pull out?

Stalin: The Soviet troops would pull out if this territory
did not constitute the Red Army’s communications, along
which the Red Army’s units are kept supplied. There are
two roads there: one running to Berlin from the north, and
the other, south of Krakow. These two lines are the Soviet
Army’s supply lines. It is the same thing that you have in
Belgium, France and Holland.

Bevin: Is the number of troops limited to these objec-
tives?

Stalin: Yes, indeed. We have already pulled out from
over there four-fifths of the troops that were there during
the war against Germany. We also intend to reduce the
number still there. As for the zone that is going to Poland,
according to the proposal that has been made, Poland is
actually administering that zone already and has its own
administration there; there is no Russian administration
there.

Bevin: Could you now help us with this military air line?
We tried to reach agreement on this matter with the Polish
Government but it cannot agree at present.

Stalin: Why can’t it?

Bevin: | take it that this question concerns the Soviet
military command because we have to fly over a part of the
Russian zone.

Stalin: But you are already flying across the Russian zone
to Berlin.

Bevin: Can you agree to us flying to Warsaw?

Stalin: We shall agree to it if an arrangement can be
made for us to fly to London over France. [Laughter.]
Besides, agreement must be reached with the Poles. Here
is the way I see it: an air line is to be established between
Berlin and Warsaw, and British or Polish planes will fly
it, according to a treaty between Britain and Poland. As
regards an air line to Moscow along this route, Russian
flyers will take over from the point where the border with
Russia begins. As regards the satisfaction of the needs of the
Russians for flights to Paris and London, British or French
planes will apparently fly there. We shall then have a Lon-
don-Paris-Moscow line. That is how I see it.

Bevin: Of course, this whole question of air communica-
tions is much too big to be solved here now, but we shall

283

always be prepared to discuss this question concerning an
air line between London and Moscow. What I ask you now
is to help us establish a line between London and Warsaw,
which we need for our convenience.

Stalin: 1 understand. I shall do all I can.

Bevin: Thank you.

Truman: Have we finished with the Polish question?

Stalin: Is the British delegation in agreement?

Bevin: It is.

Stalin: As I see it, it is up to the Poles now. All right, we
have finished with that matter.

Bevin: We must inform the French about the change in
Poland’s frontier.

Stalin: Yes, of course.

Byrnes: Our next proposal concerns the entry of Italy
and the other satellites into the United Nations Organisa-
tion. We have already handed in our document on this
question.

Bevin: The British delegation agrees.

Stalin: Our amendment has already been stated. It
concerns the new Clause 4, or rather the phrase in it which
starts with the words: “The three Governments express the
desire that”, etc. We propose to say: “The three Govern-
ments do not doubt that”, etc.

(Truman and Attlee agree to this amendment of the
wording.]

Truman: A decision on economic principles in respect
of Germany was deferred until the solution of the repara-
tions question. I think there will now be no difficulty in
solving this question.

Byrnes: | have two proposals concerning the document
on economic principles which I wish to announce. The first
concerns Clause 13, which deals with general policy in
respect of the monetary and banking system, centralised
taxes and tariffs. (He reads out a drafting amendment
which is accepted.) In addition, I propose to add to this
clause another sub-clause “g” concerning transport and
communications. This should also be centralised.

Stalin: This calls for some kind of centralised German
administrative machinery. It is hard to conduct overall
policy in respect of Germany without some kind of central-
ised German machinery.

Byrnes: That is correct.

284

The second proposal concerns sub-clause “d” of Clause
14. I propose an amendment of the last phrase to read as
follows: “Except where determined by the occupying power
concerned to be required for necessary imports, no grant
or credit to Germany or Germans by any foreign persons
or governments can be permitted.”

Bevin: Perhaps it is better to leave out this phrase
altogether?

Byrnes: I agree. | have another remark. As a result of
our agreement on reparations, we consider that Clause 18
is superfluous.

(Stalin and Bevin express their agreement to drop the
clause.)

Bevin: There is also the question of priority payments
for imports, something we spoke about at yesterday’s sitting
of the Foreign Ministers. The British delegation yesterday
proposed the inclusion of the following phrase in the eco-
nomic principles: “Payment for approved imports into Ger-
many shall be a first charge against the proceeds of exports
out of current production and out of stocks of goods.”

The Soviet delegation proposed the addition of the follow-
ing phrase: “As regards the rest, priorities should be given
to reparations, as compared with the satisfaction of other
economic needs.” The British and American delegations
were unable to accept this Soviet proposal. The British
delegation requests that its proposal be adopted.

Stalin: We think this question no longer arises.

Truman: That is how I understand it.

Bevin: 1 think this contradicts the treatment of Germany
as a single whole in respect of export, import, etc. This will
divide Germany into three zones, and we shall not be able
to deal with Germany as a single entity in matters such as
the levying of taxes, etc.

Stalin: This requires a centralised German administrative
machinery through which the German population could be
influenced. This question will be discussed in the section
“Political Principles in Respect of Germany”’.

Bevin: We agreed in principle to the establishment of
such a centralised machinery, but tabled some amendments.
Perhaps we could leave this question and go on to the polit-
ical principles, and we shall then see what can be done on
this question as well.

[Stalin and Truman express their agreement.

285

The Soviet delegation recalls that in connection with the
discussion of the question of economic principles, it tabled
a proposal on the question of the Ruhr area which says that
the Ruhr industrial area should be regarded as a part of
Germany and that four Power control should be established
in respect of the Ruhr area, for which purpose an appro-
priate Control Council should be set up consisting of repre-
sentatives of the United States, Great Britain, France and
the Soviet Union.]

Bevin: As I said yesterday, I am unable to discuss this
question in the absence of the French. This is a major
question of principle, and the French are closely concerned
with it.

Stalin: Perhaps we could put off the question of control
over the Ruhr area, but the idea that the Ruhr area remains
a part of Germany should be reflected in our document.

Truman: It is undoubtedly a part of Germany.

Stalin: Perhaps we could say this in one of our documents?

Bevin: Why is the question being raised?

Stalin: It is being raised because at one of the confer-
ences—at the Tehran Conference—there was a question of
separating the Ruhr from the rest of Germany and mak-
ing it a separate area under the control of the Council. A
few months after the Tehran Conference, when Mr. Chur-
chill came to Moscow, this question was also discussed dur-
ing an exchange of views between the Russians and the
British, and once again the idea was expressed that it would
be a good thing to set the Ruhr apart as a separate area.
The idea of separating the Ruhr area from Germany arose
from the thesis of the dismemberment of Germany. Since
then, there has been a change of view on this question.
Germany remains a united state. The Soviet delegation asks:
do you agree to have the Ruhr area remain a part of Ger-
many? That is why the question was raised here.

Truman: My opinion is that the Ruhr area is a part of
Germany and remains a part of Germany.

Stalin: It would be a good thing to say this in one of our
documents. Does the British delegation agree that the Ruhr
remains a part of Germany?

Bevin: 1 cannot agree because I do not now have a
picture of the foregoing discussion of this question. I know
that the internationalisation of the Ruhr had been suggested
in order to reduce Germany’s war potential. This idea was

286

————

discussed. I agree that pending a solution of this question
the Ruhr remains under the administration of the Control
Council. But I should like to have an opportunity to talk
this over with my Government and propose to refer the
question to the Council of Foreign Ministers so as to have
time to study it thoroughly.

[Stalin and Truman agree to Bevin's proposal.]

Truman: The next question is that of political principles.

Bevin: The Soviet delegation has tabled a draft on the
question of organising a centralised German administration,
which is to help the Control Council. We propose the
adoption of our draft on this question which is shorter. We
propose that no central German Government should be set
up for the time being.

I move the adoption of our short draft instead of the
draft of the Soviet delegation.

Stalin: It can be adopted.

Truman: | have no objections.

Bevin: As for Clause 19 of the economic principles, I
suggest that we refer this clause to the Economic Commis-
sion. Let it discuss this question now, while we are here.

Stalin: Let it discuss it.

Truman: The next question is that of resettling the Ger-
man population from Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Byrnes: The report of the commission dealing with this
question was adopted im toto, with the exception of the last
phrase, which says: “The Czechoslovak Government, the
Polish Provisional Government and the Control Council in
Hungary are at the same time being informed of the above
and are being requested meanwhile to suspend further
expulsion, pending an examination by the Governments
concerned” of this question. I think this last point is very
necessary, then the decision will be effective.

Stalin: But I am afraid such a decision will not yield
serious results. The point is not that the Germans are
expelled from these countries. Things are not quite so
simple. They are placed in a position where it is better for
them to leave these areas. The Czechs and the Poles can say
that there is no formal ban on Germans living there, but in
fact the Germans are placed in such a position that it is
impossible for them to live there. I am afraid that if
we adopt such a decision it will not yield any serious
results.

Byrnes: This clause says that these Governments will be
requested to temporarily suspend the eviction of the German
population pending the discussion of the question in the
Control Council. If these Governments are not expelling
the Germans and are not making them leave Poland or
Czechoslovakia, then the document will not, of course,
yield any results. But if they are doing so, we can request
them to stop this for a time. According to our information
they are making the Germans leave Poland and Czechoslo-
vakia. The resettlement of Germans in other countries
increases our burden. We want these Governments to collab-
orate with us in this case.

Stalin: The Poles and the Czechs will tell you that they
have no orders to evict the Germans. If you insist I can
agree to this proposal, but I am afraid it will yield no great
result.

Truman: If you agree, we shall be thankful. This propos-
al may not alter the existing situation, but it will give us
an opportunity of addressing these Governments.

Stalin: Good, I do not object.

Bevin: We should like to inform the French of this.

[Stalin and Truman agree.]

Stalin: We should like to finish discussing the question of
the German Navy.

Truman: This question is not yet ready today.

Stalin: Let us agree to prepare it for tomorrow.

Truman: All right, I agree. I was going to leave tomor-
row, but I could stay.

Stalin: In principle a decision on the German Navy was
adopted, but it was not finally drawn up. This question has
been decided by the three Heads of Government, and the
decision should be drawn up.

Truman: The commission could report tomorrow morn-
ing.

Stalin: Good. Perhaps we should refer the matter to the
Ministers, since the question has been decided in principle.

Bevin: Perhaps an agreement will be reached.

Byrnes: According to our information, the commission
hopes to reach agreement today. Their sitting is fixed for
tonight.

Stalin: It was decided in principle that the Soviet Union
is to receive one-third of the Navy, with the exception of
submarines, most of which are to be sunk, and one-third of

288

the merchant fleet. I ask you not to postpone the question,
but to settle it tomorrow.

[Truman and Attlee express agreement.]

Truman: The delegation of the United States has tabled
a document concerning a review of the procedure in the
Allied Control! Commissions in Bulgaria, Rumania and
Hungary.

Byrnes: Our proposals concerning the fulfilment of the
Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe were tabled and
examined. We were unable to reach agreement on some
sections of the proposal. But agreement was reached on
two clauses relating to a review of the procedure in the
Allied Control Commissions in the three countries. Clause
I says:

“The three Governments have taken note that the Soviet
Representatives on the Allied Control Commissions in
Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary have communicated to
their United Kingdom and United States colleagues propo-
sals for improving the work of the Control Commissions,
now that hostilities in Europe have ceased. These proposals
include provisions for regular and frequent meetings of the
three representatives, improved facilities for British and
American representatives, and prior joint consideration of
directives.”

Clause 2 reads:

“The three Governments agree that the revision of the
procedures of the Allied Control Commissions in these
countries will now be undertaken, using as a basis of discus-
sion the above-mentioned proposals, and taking into account
the interests and responsibilities of the three Governments
which together presented the terms of armistice to the
respective countries.”

We ask you to examine these clauses and hand you a
document entitled “Revised Allied Control Commission
Procedure in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary”, dated July
31, 1945.

Stalin: This question was not on the agenda. Perhaps we
shall not object once we have examined the question.

Byrnes: It could be examined tomorrow.

Stalin: Good, let us examine it tomorrow.

Truman: The next question is that of Yugoslavia. There
are the British proposals.

Stalin: We have just circulated a draft on the Greek

19-876 289

question. As for Yugoslavia, we handed in a draft on Trieste
and Istria yesterday.

Bevin: 1 think we have presented a rather reasonable
proposal on Yugoslavia. The Soviet delegation has tabled
two other proposals. I propose that we refrain from examin-
ing all three proposals.

Stalin: Good.

Truman: The last question is that of war criminals.

[The Soviet delegation declared that it was prepared to
adopt the British delegation’s draft as a basis on this ques-
tion with one small amendment. It proposed that in the last
phrase of the draft, which said that the three Governments
considered it a matter of great importance to have the trial
of the chief criminals begin as soon as possible, there should
be an addition after the words “chief criminals” of the
words: “such as Goring, Hess, Ribbentrop, Rosenberg,
Keitel, and others’’.|

Attlee: Our difficulty in selecting the war criminals lies
in the fact that we have submitted the draft agreement to
the prosecutor and he may include a number of other
persons. We believe therefore that it would be best to confine
ourselves to our earlier proposal, without naming the chief
war criminals.

Stalin: Our amendment does not propose that only these
men alone should be put on trial, but we propose that men
like Ribbentrop and others should be tried. It is no longer
possible to avoid mentioning certain persons who are known
as the chief war criminals. A great deal has been said of the
war criminals, and the peoples expect us to give some names.
Our silence on this question harms our prestige. I assure
you that is so. That is why we shall gain politically and
satisfy European public opinion if we name some persons.
I do not think the prosecutor will take offence if we name
them as examples. The prosecutor can say that some persons
have been wrongly named. But there is no reason for the
prosecutor to take offence. We shall only gain politically
if we name some of these men.

Byrnes: When we discussed this question yesterday, I
considered it unsuitable to name definite men or to try to
determine their guilt here. Each country has its own “favour-
ites” among the Nazi criminals, and if we fail to include
these criminals in our list, it will be hard for us to explain
why.

290

Stalin: But the proposal says: “such as ... and others”.
This does not limit the number, but makes for clarity.

Byrnes: This gives an advantage to those you name.
[Laughter]

Attlee: 1 don’t believe a listing of names will enhance
our document. For instance, I believe that Hitler is alive,
but he is not on our list.

Stalin: But he is not in our hands.

Attlee: But you give the names of the chief criminals
as examples.

Stalin: 1 agree to include Hitler [General laughter], even
if he is not in our hands. I am making a concession. [General
laughter.]

Attlee: I think the world is aware who the chief crimi-
nals are.

Stalin: But, you see, our silence on this matter is inter-
preted as an intention on our part to save the chief war
criminals, that we are taking it out on the small criminals
and allowing the big ones to escape.

Byrnes: Today, I had a telephone conversation with
Justice Jackson, the Chairman of our Supreme Court. He
is our representative on the War Criminals Commission
which is meeting in London. He expressed the hope that
today or possibly tomorrow there would be agreement on
an International Tribunal. Justice Jackson is going to call
me tomorrow morning to inform me on the question of the
Tribunal. The report on the establishment of the Interna-
tional Tribunal will be good news for the peoples who are
expecting an early trial of the war criminals.

Stalin: That is another question.

Byrnes: But we can include in our statement that an
agreement has been reached in London. That will make our
statement highly effective.

Stalin: Without naming some persons, especially the
odious ones, among the German war criminals, our state-
ment will not be politically effective. I consulted Russian
jurists, and they think it would be better to name some
persons as a guideline.

ruman: | want to make a proposal. We are expecting
news from our representative in London tomorrow morning.
Why not put off this question until tomorrow?
Stalin: Good.

Truman: \ am very much interested in the question of
inland waterways. It would be good to discuss this question
and reach some decisions in principle. We discussed the
question on July 23, and it was referred to a commission
which, as far as I am aware, has not met even once. I very
much want some sort of definite decision worked out con-
cerning the use of these means of communication, because
freedom of movement along these routes is of great impor-
tance. I believe that a common policy on the use of these
inland waterways can play an important part. It is quite
possible that we may not be able to reach agreement on the
details of this question, but I think that this question is so
important that it should be discussed.

Attlee: I agree on the whole with the American pro-
posals on the question.

Stalin: This question arose in connection with that of the
Black Sea Straits which was before us. The question of the
Black Sea Straits was inserted in the agenda by the British
and was then postponed. The question of inland waterways
was raised here additionally. This is a serious question, and
it requires study. The question was brought up unexpectedly
for us, and we do not have the relevant material to hand.
This question is a new one, it needs men who know about it.
Perhaps something could be done before the end of the
Conference, but there is little hope for that.

Truman: | move that this question should be referred to
the Council of Foreign Ministers in London, and before
then all the necessary material can be collected and the
question studied.

[Stalin and Attlee agree.]

Truman: May I inform the representatives of the Polish
Government who are here of our decisions on Poland’s
western frontier?

Stalin: All right.

Truman: Who can be entrusted with this communication?

Stalin: This could be done by the Ministers or a written
communication could be sent. Or the President could be
asked to do this, since he heads our Conference.

Truman: Good. I want to inform you that the commis-
sion on drafting the communiqué is working well. At what
time do we meet tomorrow? At 4.00?

Stalin: I think that we shall have to meet twice: let us
fix the first sitting for 3.00, and the second for 8.00 p.m.

292

That will be the concluding sitting.
[Truman and Attlee agree.]

Twelfth Sitting
August 1, 1945

Truman: Mr. Byrnes will report today on the sitting of
the Foreign Ministers.

Byrnes: The commission dealing with the question of
reparations from Germany has reported that it has failed
to reach agreement on all the questions of the draft agree-
ment on reparations. The representatives of the United
States and Great Britain believed that, in exchange for the
agreed percentages of capital equipment made available to
the Soviet Union under Point 4 of the draft agreement, the
representatives of the Soviet Union agreed to waive their
claims to German assets abroad, the gold seized from the
Germans, and the shares of German enterprises in the
Western zones of occupation. Accordingly, the representa-
tives of the United States and Britain believed that Ger-
many’s assets abroad should be included in Point 3 as a
source of reparations for other countries besides the Soviet
Union. They declared that unless this is done, the agreed
percentages of industrial equipment in Point 4 are unaccept-
able to the representatives of the United States and Britain.

The Soviet representative held that no agreed decision had
been adopted concerning the Soviet Union’s waiver of
claims to Germany’s assets abroad, gold and shares. That
is why the Soviet representative did not agree to the inclu-
sion of German assets abroad in Point 3, and recommended
that the question should be referred for solution to the
Heads of Government.

The representatives of the United States and Britain
declared that the draft agreement on reparations would be
acceptable to them, provided the Soviet representative
agreed to the above-mentioned proposals concerning Ger-
many’s assets abroad, gold and shares. The Soviet repre-
sentative declared that he was unable to agree with this
approach on the part of the representatives of the United
States and Britain.

The question is whether or not it can be considered that
the Big Three yesterday reached agreement on the question

293

of reparations, when the Soviet representative declared that
he would not insist on the Soviet Union being given 30 per
cent of German gold, shares and assets abroad.

Stalin: How are we to understand your proposals that
the Soviet Union makes no claim to industrial shares? Does
that relate only to the Western zone?

Truman: J think that when the Foreign Ministers spoke
of the Western zone, they had in mind the zones of the
United States, Great Britain and France.

Stalin: Can we not agree on the following: the Soviet
delegation waives its claim to gold; as for shares of German
enterprises in the Western zone, we also waive our claim
to them, and will regard the whole of Western Germany as
falling within your sphere, and Eastern Germany, within
ours.

Truman: We shall have to discuss this proposal.

Stalin: As to the German investments, I should put the
question this way: as to the German investments in Eastern
Europe, they remain with us, and the rest, with you.

Truman: Does this apply only to German investments in
Europe or in other countries as well?

Stalin: Let me put it more specifically: the German
investments in Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland,
go to us, and all the rest, to you.

Bevin: The German investments in other countries go
tous?

Stalin: In all the other countries, in South America, in
Canada, etc., all this is yours.

Bevin: Consequently, all German assets in other countries
lying west of the zones of occupation in Germany will belong
to the United States, Great Britain and the other countries?
Does this also apply to Greece?

Stalin: Yes.

Byrnes: How does this apply to the question of the shares
of German enterprises?

Stalin: In our zone they will be ours, and in your zone,
yours. There are the Western and the Eastern zones.

Byrnes: We took your proposal of yesterday to mean that
you will have no claims to shares in the western zone.

Stalin: We shall not.

Byrnes: Do you also withdraw your second proposal, on
investments abroad?

Stalin: There the matter is somewhat different.

294

Bevin: Yesterday, when we were dealing with the ques-
tion of reparations, I understood that the Soviet delegation
waived its claims to Germany’s investments abroad.

Stalin: I believed that the investments in the Eastern
zone were ours. We had in mind the Western zone, when
we spoke of waiving claims to investments. We waive
claims to investments in Western Europe and in all other
countries. It is known that there were many more German
investments in Western Europe and in America than in the
East. We had hoped to receive 30 per cent of these invest-
ments, but subsequently waived this. But you too must
waive your claims to Eastern Europe.

Bevin: I must say that when I agreed to the Genera-
lissimo’s proposal I took the proposal to mean that the Soviet
delegation waived claims to any German investments
abroad at all.

Stalin: But not in Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and
Finland.

Byrnes: That is understandable. I should like to specify
the matter of the shares of industrial or transport enter-
prises in Germany. Say, the head office of such an enterprise
is in Berlin, but the enterprise itself and its property is in
the Western zone or in the United States, will you make
any claim in respect of such enterprises?

Stalin: If the enterprise is in the West, we shall make
no claim to it. The head office may be in Berlin, that
is immaterial, the point is where the enterprise itself is
located.

Byrnes: If an enterprise is not in Eastern Europe but in
Western Europe or in other parts of the world, that enter-
prise remains ours?

Stalin: In the United States, in Norway, in Switzerland,
in Sweden, in Argentina [General laughter], etc.—all that
is yours.

Bevin: I should like to ask the Generalissimo whether he
is prepared to waive all claims to German assets abroad
outside the zone of Russian occupation troops?

Stalin: Yes, I am.

Byrnes: What about the gold?

Stalin: We have already withdrawn our claims to the
gold.

Byrnes: There are German assets in other countries. How
is the Soviet proposal to be understood in this context?

295

Stalin: We keep only what is in the Eastern zone.

Byrnes: I believe it to be very important for us to under-
stand each other. Mr. Bevin’s question is whether the Russian
claims are confined to the assets in the zone occupied by the
Russian army? I should like you to accept Mr. Bevin’s
standpoint.

Stalin: We agree.

Byrnes: A few minutes ago you spoke of the assets in
Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary and Finland. Now I want to
clarify everything so that there should be no misunderstand-
ings in the future. Does your proposal mean that you make
no claim to the assets outside your zone of occupation? You
have claims only to the assets in the Soviet zone?

Stalin: Yes. Czechoslovakia is not included, Yugoslavia is
not included. Eastern Austria will be included.

Bevin: It is clear that the assets belonging to Great
Britain and the United States in that zone will not be
affected.

Stalin: Of course, not. We’re not fighting Great Britain
or the United States. [General laughter.]

Bevin: But during the war these assets may have been
seized by the Germans.

Stalin: That will have to be examined in every case.

Truman: 1 think that we agreed yesterday to meet
the claims of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. But what
happens if they do not lay claim to German assets on their
territory?

Stalin: We shall make no claim to Germany’s assets in
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Western Austria.

Perhaps we shall expound our proposal in the protocol?

Byrnes: I think it would be better to do that in order to
avoid any misunderstandings.

Stalin: Good.

Byrnes: Perhaps we should publish it?

Stalin: It’s all the same, as you wish.

Byrnes: 1 want to call your attention to the sentence in
Clause 3 of the report of the Reparations Commission which
says that the reparations claims of the United States, the
United Kingdom and other countries entitled to reparations
are to be met from the Western zone and from German
assets abroad. In view of the agreement we have just
reached, I do not believe that there will be any differences
on this wording.

296

Stalin: | propose that we say “and from the appropriate
German assets abroad”. This wording can be specified in
the protocol.

Byrnes: Let us have the drafting commission put this
proposal into shape.

Stalin: | have no objections.

Attlee: I have two questions which I should like to raise
here: the first, that the French Government should be invit-
ed by the Governments of Great Britain, the U.S.S.R. and
the United States to be a member of the Reparations Com-
mission as of today.

Stalin: Let us also invite Poland, she has suffered heavily.

Attlee: J understood that we agreed to invite France.

Stalin: And why can’t Poland be invited?

Truman: You agreed yesterday that the Soviet Union
would undertake to meet Poland’s reparations claims, while
we, for our part, undertake to meet the reparations
claims of France and other countries. I think the
inclusion of France in this commission would cause some
confusion.

Stalin: Does Mr. Attlee insist?

Attlee: I should like to.

Stalin: Good, I do not object.

Attlee: My second question is the following: I submitted
a memorandum concerning the fact that the British and
American commanders have to supply 40,000 tons of food-
stuffs a month and 2,400 tons of coal a day to the British
and American sectors in Berlin for 30 days, beginning
from July 15. The Control Council should be immediately
instructed to draw up a programme for the supply of food,
coal and other types of fuel to the Greater Berlin area
over the next six months. These quantities will be delivered
to the Greater Berlin area by the Soviet Government in the
form of advance deliveries under Point 4(a) of the repara-
tions agreement. These are practical measures which will
provide for current requirements.

Stalin: The question has not been prepared, we are not
acquainted with this question, and we know nothing of the
opinion of the Control Council on it. Consequently, we find
it very hard to settle this question now. I think we should
find out beforehand the opinion of the Control Council on
how it intends to satisfy the needs of the population, and
what its plans are concerning supply.

297

Attlee: J understood that deliveries of capital equipment
from the Ruhr basin are to start now, and I think that the
supply of the necessary food and fuel for the Greater Ber-
lin area should also start now. Of course, the quantity can
be fixed by the Control Council.

Stalin: Of course, there must be an agreement, but a
quantity has to be specified, and that is something we can-
not do now, without a report from the Control Council on
its plans in this respect. I must say that the Control
Council will solve this question better than we could
settle it here; it takes a practical approach to solving
this question.

Attlee: That is just what I am asking for. I am asking
that the Control Council should draw up a programme, but
in principle we should agree on that here.

Stalin: | have no information on how things stand. I can
decide nothing without authentic materials. I can’t take
figures out of thin air. The figures must be justified.

Attlee: I’m not asking about figures, in my memorandum
I ask that the Control Council should draw up this pro-
gramme.

Stalin: 40,000 tons of food a month, 2,400 tons of coal
a day—where do these figures come from, how are they
justified?

Attlee: These figures have been agreed upon, and these
quantities are already being supplied.

Stalin: 1 did not know that.

Bevin: The question is that there is a provisional agree-
ment on monthly deliveries for Berlin.

Stalin: Who has agreed to this?

Bevin: A provisional agreement on deliveries was con-
cluded in the Control Council, under which the British and
American authorities undertook to supply these quantities
for Berlin during a month, and this is now being done. We
propose that the Control Council should draw up the neces-
sary programme in principle, and that the Soviet authorities
should start supplying the said quantities when the month
expires. When the period runs out, the question arises: who
is to go on supplying the food and fuel?

Stalin: We must hear the Control Council and its consid-
erations. Then we can decide something.

Attlee: I understood you to say that you want the deliv-
eries of capital equipment from the Ruhr basin to be started

298

right away. We ask for the same thing in respect of your
deliveries of food and fuel.

Stalin: | understand that, but I should like to know what
the Control Council thinks, so that we can discuss it and
adopt a decision. I think the question should be postponed.

Bevin: We want to work with each other.

Stalin: And what if we are not ready for the question,
what are we to do?

Bevin: In that case it will have to be postponed.

Stalin: That is just what we are asking.

Bevin: We merely wanted to reach a mutual agreement
to help each other.

Stalin: We are not prepared for this question, I have had
no occasion to consult with the Control Council and find out
what it thinks.

Truman: \t looks as if we have exhausted all our
differences on the reparations question?

Attlee: I understood the Generalissimo to say that we
shall not be demanding reparations from Austria. Perhaps
we should enter this in the protocol?

Stalin: It could be entered in the protocol.

Byrnes: The next question is that of economic principles
in respect of Germany. The representatives of the United
States and Britain propose the inclusion of a clause on
German assets abroad in the document on economic prin-
ciples. It will be Point 18, reading as follows: “Appropriate
steps shall be taken by the Control Council to exercise
control and the power of disposition over German-owned
external assets not already under the control of
United Nations which have taken part in the war against
Germany.”

Stalin: Is that an amendment or a new proposal?

Byrnes: It is a recommendation to the commission on
economic questions. It proposes the inclusion of this point
in the document on the economic principles in respect of
Germany.

Stalin: Will not an amendment to this point be necessary
after adoption of the decision on reparations? We learned
of this point after we had agreed on the question.

Byrnes: The Soviet representatives in the commission for
economic questions declared that they have little interest
in the matter and reserved their position until the question
is studied. The question concerned relates to control.

299

Stalin: I do not object.

Truman: Thank you.

Byrnes: The commission has not had time to reach
agreement on Point 19 of the draft on economic principles
relating to the question of payment for imports to Germany.
Besides, the Soviet representative declared that he is not
yet prepared to continue discussing the question of oil deliv-
eries to Western Europe.

Stalin: We do not object to the British formulation of
Point 19.

Byrnes: 1 understand that the British representatives
have agreed with the American representatives that if Point
19 is adopted there should be added the words proposed
by the American representatives to the effect that the con-
dition stipulated in the point will not be applicable to
equipment or foodstuffs specified in Points 4 (a) and 4 (b) of
the agreement on German reparations. We believe that
the addendum flows from the agreement on reparations we
reached yesterday.

Stalin: Good.

Attlee: I agree.

Byrnes: Thus, we have finished with all the differences
over the draft on economic principles.

The next question is that of war criminals.

Bevin: Please excuse me, but J think we should inform
the French of these economic principles.

Stalin: If you wish.

Byrnes: The next question is that of war criminals. The
only question remaining open here is whether the names of
some of the major German war criminals should be men-
tioned. The representatives of the United States and Britain,
at today’s meeting of the Foreign Ministers, deemed it right
not to mention these names, but to leave that to the prose-
cutor. They also agreed that the British text should
be adopted. The Soviet representatives declared that they
see eee the British draft, provided some names are
added.

Stalin: I think we need names. This must be done for
public opinion. The people must know this. Are we to take
action against any German industrialists? I think we are.
We name Krupp. If Krupp will not do, let’s name others.

Truman: I don’t like any of them. [Laughter.] 1 think
that if we mention some names and leave out others, people

300

may think that we have no intention of putting those others
on trial.

Stalin: But these names are given here as examples. It is
surprising, for instance, why Hess is still in Britain all pro-
vided for and is not being put on trial. These names must
be given; this will be important for public opinion, for the
peoples.

Bevin: Don’t worry about Hess.

Stalin: It’s not a question of what I think, but of public
opinion, and the opinion of the peoples of all the countries
which had been occupied by the Germans.

Bevin: If you have any doubts about Hess I can promise
that he will be put on trial.

Stalin: 1 am not asking for any undertakings on the part
of Mr. Bevin, his statement is enough to leave me in no
doubt that this will be done. But it is not a question of me,
but of the peoples, of public opinion.

Truman: You are aware that we have appointed Justice
Jackson as our representative on the London Commission.
He is an outstanding judge and a very experienced jurist.
He has a good knowledge of legal procedure. Jackson is
opposed to any names of war criminals being mentioned,
and says that this will hamper their work. He assures us that
the trial will be ready within 30 days, and that there should
be no doubt concerning our view of these men.

Stalin: Perhaps we could name fewer persons, say, three?

Bevin: Our jurists take the same view as the Americans.

Stalin: And ours take the opposite view. But perhaps we
shall agree that the first list of the German war criminals to
be brought to trial should be published not later than in one
month?

[Truman and Attlee agree with Stalin’s proposal.]

Byrnes: The next question is one concerning the use of
Allied property as reparations from satellites or as war
booty. I handed in this proposal yesterday. At today’s sit-
ting, the Soviet delegation asked to be given the possibility
to make a more detailed study of the proposal.

[The Soviet delegation said that in view of the fact that
there had actually been no break between the two sittings
that day, it had not had time to study the wording of the
proposal. It said that the proposal appeared to be correct
and acceptable in substance, but its formulation had to be

studied.]

301

Byrnes: I am prepared to postpone it until tonight.

Attlee: 1 propose that the agenda of tonight’s sitting
should contain as few items as possible.

Byrnes: The next question is that concerning the supply
of oil to Western Europe. The question is now being exam-
ined in the economic commission,

The next question is that of the anti-Soviet activity of
White Russian émigrés and other persons and organisations
hostile to the U.S.S.R. in the American and British zones
of occupation in Germany and Austria. The Anglo-Ameri-
can representatives have declared that they would
examine the situation and the facts set out in the Soviet
document, and would inform the Soviet Union at once
of the results of their investigation, after which they
would be prepared to discuss measures for stopping this
activity.

The Soviet delegation has called attention to the memo-
randum which it handed to the British and American
delegations concerning the repatriation of Soviet citizens.
The British representatives declared that they would clarify
the situation of which the Soviet document speaks and would
deal with the matter immediately upon their return to Lon-
don.

The Soviet representatives handed in a new document on
this question and stressed the great importance they attach
to it. The American and British representatives promised to
deal with the matter as soon as possible.

The Foreign Ministers discussed the report of the com-
mission drafting the protocol of the Conference. The com-
mission failed to reach agreement on four questions, but the
Foreign Ministers managed to reach agreement on these
questions. They also agreed that only the key decisions of
the Conference would be included in the protocol.
They indicated to the protocol commission that the new
decisions of the Conference should also be included in the
protocol.

The next question is that of reviewing the procedure of
the Allied Control Commissions in Bulgaria, Rumania and
Hungary. The U.S draft on the question was adopted with
the exception of the second sentence. It was decided that
the sentence would be replaced by the third, fourth and
fifth points of the letter from the Soviet representative
handed to the representatives of the United States and Great

302

Britain in the Allied Control Commission for Hungary.
This question was referred to the drafting commission,
which, after discussion, recommends to us the following
text:

“The Three Governments took note that the Soviet rep-
resentatives on the Allied Control Commissions in Ruma-
nia, Bulgaria and Hungary have communicated to their
United Kingdom and United States colleagues proposals
for improving the work of the Control Commissions, now
that hostilities in Europe have ceased.

“The Three Governments agreed that the revision of the
procedures of the Allied Control Commissions in these
countries would now be undertaken, taking into account
the interests and responsibilities of the Three Governments
which together presented the terms of armistice to the
respective countries, and accepting as a basis, in respect of all
three countries, the Soviet Government’s proposals for
Hungary.”

Can we adopt the proposal of the drafting commission
in this form?

Stalin: I have no objections.

Truman: Today, I received the President of Poland and
four members of the Provisional Polish Government. I in-
formed them of the decisions on Poland and handed them
a copy of these decisions. They will refrain from making
any statements on these decisions pending their publication
in the press. They asked me on behalf of the Polish Govern-
ment to convey their gratitude to all three Governments
represented at the Conference.

Bevin: I should like to mention that the difficulties con-
cerning the London-Warsaw air line, of which I spoke
yesterday, have been removed. We have reached agreement
with Poland on this question.

Byrnes: At the meeting of the Foreign Ministers I pro-
posed that the words “and radio representatives” should
be added in the documents on Poland and on admission to
the United Nations Organisation, where they deal with the
facilities which are to be extended to members of the Allied
press.

Stalin: | don’t think we should do that.

Attlee: | do not consider it expedient either.

Truman: We in America have a different radio situation
than in other countries, such as Britain. The British radio

303

is under Government control, but in America the radio is
in the same position as the newspapers. We should like the
radio representatives to have the same rights as newspaper
correspondents.

Stalin: t's not worth while.

Truman: The representatives of the American radio will
act in the same way as newspaper correspondents, but they
will file their reports for the American radio.

Stalin: J should not advise doing that. Besides, agreement
must be reached with Poland.

Bevin: But you will not object, will you, against an agree-
ment with the Governments concerned?

Stalin: No, why should I?

Truman: That is acceptable to us.

Stalin: You are welcome. But let us decide not to write
about that here.

Truman: Good, I agree.

Byrnes: The next question is that of the German Navy
and merchant fleet.

Truman: | understand that the report of the commission
on this question is adopted and we confirm the prepared
decision.

Stalin: That’s right.

Byrnes: It was also agreed that the text of the decision
was to be published later.

Bevin: Mr. President, I have drawn up the text of the
point concerning the share of Poland and the other coun-
tries, which I think we could accept. It says: “The United
Kingdom and the United States will provide out of their
shares of the surrendered German merchant ships appro-
priate amounts for other Allied states whose merchant
marines have suffered heavy losses in the common cause
against Germany, except that the Soviet Union shall provide
out of its share for Poland.”

Stalin: | have no objections.

Truman: | agree.

Attlee: Before we adjourn, I should like to ask whether
the Heads of Government think it appropriate to send Mr.
Churchill and Mr. Eden a telegram expressing thanks for
their participation in the first half of the Conference and
for their participation in other conferences?

Stalin: That would be appropriate.

Truman: | agree.

304

[After the interval]

Byrnes: Did you have time to study our document con-
cerning the use of Allied property as payment for repara-
tions by satellites or as war booty?

Stalin: I see no difficulties in settling this question as
regards the substance, but I must have consultation on its
formulation.

Attlee: 1 think the document requires some study, as not
all its propositions appear to be acceptable.

Byrnes: In what respect is the draft unacceptable?

Attlee: Where the property belonging to the Allied
countries has been withdrawn from the satellite countries
as war booty, it is natural that the satellite countries must
compensate the Allied countries to whom the property be-
longed. But where the property is seized by a third party,
there arises the question: must it pay the Allied countries
for this property or must we make the satellite countries
pay for the property. In addition, I think that Point 3 deal-
ing with currency also requires discussion. It seems to me
that all this still needs to be studied.

Truman: Good.

Perhaps we could now acquaint ourselves with the com-
muniqueé?

Stalin: The commission has not yet finished drafting it.

Attlee: 1 propose that the commission on the drafting of
the protocol and the commission on the drafting of the
communiqué should deal with this question immediately,
and that we should adjourn and meet again as soon as the
commissions have completed their work. We could agree
by telephone on the time of the meeting. The Heads of
Government would deal with the question of the commu-
niqué, and the Foreign Ministers with that of the protocol.

Stalin: It would be well to fix the time for the opening of
the sitting, say 8.30 or 9.00 o’clock. The time is set to give
the commissions a spur, then they will try hard.

Truman: A three-hour break suits me.

Byrnes: There was also the President’s proposal on inland
waterways. The protocol commission and the communiqué
commission have not yet reached agreement on the decision
adopted in connection with the President’s proposal.

ruman: This question has been referred to the Council
of Foreign Ministers in London, but I am interested in

20-876 305

having the communiqué say this. I should ask that mention
of this be made in the communique.

Stalin: We have not discussed it.

Truman: I spoke thrice on the question, and the commis-
sion examined it for several days.

Stalin: It was not in the list of questions, we were not
prepared for the question, and had no materials; our ex-
perts on this question are in Moscow. Why such haste; why
should there be such a hurry?

Truman: This question has not been finally settled but
referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers in London.

Stalin: No mention of the Black Sea Straits will be made
in the communiqué either, although the question was on the
agenda. The question of waterways arose as a free supple-
ment to the question of the Straits. And I don’t see why
such preference should be given to the question of inland
waterways over that of Straits.

Truman: The question of the Black Sea Straits will be
mentioned both in the communiqué and the protocol.

Stalin: I think there is no need to put it into the commu-
nique, but only into the protocol.

I propose that no mention be made in the communiqué
either of the Straits or the inland waterways, but that both
these questions be included in the protocol only.

Truman: Good, there are no objections.

Bevin: I propose that we ask France to subscribe to our
decision concerning war criminals. France is a member of
the Council of Foreign Ministers in London.

Stalin: Good.

Truman: | do not object.

I still fail to understand why a decision adopted by us
here and included in the protocol should not also be includ-
ed in the communique.

Stalin: There is no need of it. As it is, the communiqué
is much too long.

Truman: I should like to ask one question: are there any
secret agreements at this Conference?

Stalin: No, not secret ones.

Byrnes: 1 should like to stress that we decided to refer
the question of inland waterways to the Council of Foreign
Ministers. Thus, we have an agreement on this question.
Have we the right to make public the decision on this ques-
tion? And if it is not included in the communiqué, but only

306

in the protocol, can we officially put this question before
the Council of Foreign Ministers?

Stalin: We should take the materials of the Crimea Con-
ference or the Tehran Conference. At the Tehran Con-
ference a number of questions were included in the protocol,
but there was another series of decisions which were of
interest to all and which determined our policy in respect
of key issues. These decisions were included in the commu-
nique.

Take the work of the Crimea Conference. It too had two
series of decisions on record. The first series—the greater
one—went into the protocol, and no one insisted on it being
transferred into the communiqué. The other series—the
much smaller one—went into the communiqué. These were
decisions determining our policy. I propose that we keep to
this good rule, otherwise we shall have a whole volume
instead of a communiqué.

Some of the decisions have no serious significance, some
of the questions, like the one of the inland waterways, were
not even discussed, and they will go into the protocol, so
that no one reproach us with concealing these questions. It
is a different matter with the questions of Germany, of
Italy, of reparations, etc., which are of great significance,
and they go into the communiqué. I think we should not
break with this good tradition, and that there is no point in
including all these questions in the communiqué. A com-
muniqué is a communiqué, and a protocol is a protocol.

Truman: I do not object to this procedure, if it is adopted
for all our decisions. But if I have to make a statement in
the Senate to the effect that the question has been referred
to the Council of Foreign Ministers, shall I have the right
to do so?

Stalin: No one can encroach on your rights.

[Truman closes the sitting.]

Thirteenth (Final) Sitting
August 1, 1945

Truman opens the sitting.
Byrnes: The commission for economic questions has pre-
pared a report on reparations. Proposals acceptable to all

20° 307

delegations have been worked out. Paragraph 1 says that
the Soviet reparations claims are to be met from the zone
of Germany occupied by the Soviet Union and the appro-
priate German investments abroad.

I call your attention to Paragraphs 8 and 9 of this
document. I am very reluctant to propose an amendment right
now, but I think this will be in the general interest.
Paragraph 8 says: “The Soviet Government renounces all
claims to shares of German enterprises”, etc. I propose the
addition of “in respect of reparations” after the words “all
claims”. The purpose of this amendment is to avoid creat-
ing the impression that the Soviet Union has some other
claims to German enterprises apart from reparations. The
same amendment should be made in Paragraph 9, which
deals with the claims of the United States and the United
Kingdom.

Stalin: That is right.

Byrnes: That is my only amendment. Can the reparations
document be considered as approved?

Bevin: And how are we to consider, for instance, the case
of plants belonging to British subjects which were taken
over by the Germans for military purposes before 1939?
In that case, owing to this amendment, the British will be
deprived of their own property.

Byrnes: In the case cited by Mr. Bevin the amendment
does not affect the situation.

Bevin: I do not object.

Byrnes: We can now discuss the question of the use of
allied property to pay reparations or as war trophies, if the
Soviet delegation has had time to study the proposal.

Stalin: We have not had time to consider the wording of
the draft. I propose that we record the following decision:
“The Conference decided to accept the American proposal
in principle. The wording of the proposal to be agreed
through diplomatic channels.”

We have not had time to give thought to the wording,
but we agree with the proposal in substance.

Truman: | agree with the proposal of the Soviet dele-
gation.

Attlee: So do I.

Byrnes: 1 have been informed that the commission charged
with drawing up the protocol has reached agreement. I do
not believe there is any need to read out the protocol in

308

full, but only those points on which there were differences.
Of course, we should add to it the Soviet delegation’s pro-
posal concerning war trophies which we have just adopted.
I have no other amendments.

Stalin: | have an amendment. On the question of Poland’s
western frontier, the second paragraph says that the bound-
ary line must run from the Baltic Sea through Swinemiinde,
as if the line passes through the town itself. 1 propose, there-
fore, that we say that the boundary line runs from the
Baltic Sea immediately west or a little west of Swinemiinde.
That is what the map shows.

(Truman and Attlee agree with the wording “immedi-
ately west of Swinemiinde’’.)

Stalin: The second amendment is about the boundary line
of the K6énigsberg Region. The second paragraph says that
the boundary line is subject to expert examination. It is
proposed to say: “The exact line on the ground should be
established by experts of the U.S.S.R. and Poland.”

Bevin: We cannot leave this only to the Soviet Union
and Poland.

Stalin: But this concerns the boundary line between Poland
and Russia.

Bevin: But this must be recognised by the United Nations.
We agreed that at the Peace Conference we would support
the Soviet desire concerning this frontier, and now you say
that it is to be determined by the Soviet Union and Poland
and that we have nothing to do with it.

Stalin: This is a misunderstanding. The general bound-
ary line is determined by the Peace Conference, but there
is another concept—the line of demarcation on the ground.
The general boundary line is given, but the line of demar-
cation on the ground may deviate from the imaginary line
by half a kilometre or less to one side of it or the other.
Say, the boundary line runs through a village. Why should
the frontier line cut it in half? Only Poland and Russia are
interested in laying down the actual line of demarcation on
the ground. If you think that this is not entirely guaranteed,
whom would you like to include in the commission? Someone
from Britain or the United States? Anyone you wish, we
do not mind.

Attlee: I think the question is as follows. We agreed to
accept the proposal concerning the frontier in principle. As
for the final demarcation of the territory, the precise deter-

309

mination of the frontier, that is the business of the Peace
Conference. If we now hand this business over to the experts
of Poland and Russia we shall be disrupting the technical
work of the Peace Conference.

Stalin: What’s Mr. Bevin’s opinion?

Bevin: We want to have a commission of experts appoint-
ed by the Peace Conference.

Stalin: I fail to see the point.

Byrnes: 1 believe the following wording could be pro-
posed: if there is agreement on the frontier between Poland
and the Soviet Union at the Peace Conference, that will be
the end of the matter, and no experts will be required. But
if there are differences between Poland and Russia during
the Peace Conference a commission of experts will have to
be appointed, with the composition determined by the Coun-
cil of Ministers of Foreign Affairs or the Peace Conference
itself. But that is only in the event of differences between
Poland and the Soviet Union.

Stalin: Let the old wording stand. But it says nothing of
which experts are to be on the commission.

[Truman and Attlee agree to retain the old wording.

The Soviet delegation then tabled an amendment to the
section on the conclusion of peace treaties and on admis-
sion to the United Nations Organisation. The Soviet dele-
gation pointed out that there was a contradiction between
the first and the third paragraph of the document. The first
paragraph said that the Three Governments considered it
desirable that the present anomalous position of Italy, Bul-
garia, Rumania, Hungary and Finland should be terminated
after the conclusion of peace treaties, whereas the third
paragraph provided for the possibility of establishing diplo-
matic relations with Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hun-
gary prior to the conclusion of peace treaties with these
countries. The Soviet delegation proposed the deletion from
the first paragraph of the words “after the conclusion of
peace treaties”’.]

Attlee: In my opinion, that is wrong, because when we
drafted the third paragraph we had in mind the establish-
ment of diplomatic relations “to the extent possible”. If the
words “after the conclusion of peace treaties” are excluded
from the first paragraph, it will mean that we shall be
going farther than we intended to. These words should
be left in.

310

Stalin: But the first paragraph says that diplomatic rela-
tions can be re-established only after the conclusion of
peace treaties, and the third paragraph says something dif-
ferent. This leads to a contradiction.

Attlee: That is just why the British want to include these
words. The first paragraph provides for mandatory action,
namely, the establishment of diplomatic relations after the
conclusion of peace treaties, whereas the third paragraph
proposes that an effort should be made to do this, insofar
as possible, before the conclusion of peace treaties.

Stalin: We cannot agree with that, because the effort
which is assumed in the third paragraph to establish diplo-
matic relations is explicitly denied in the first paragraph.
That changes the meaning of the whole decision. How can
we agree to that?

Attlee: I do not think there is any contradiction there: in
the first instance it is a question of establishing normal
relations, that is, full diplomatic relations, and in the
second, of an effort to come as close as possible to establishing
such relations.

Stalin: I’m afraid I cannot agree with this interpretation.
Let us take a concrete example—Finland. There is no rea-
son at all to object any more to restoring diplomatic rela-
tions with Finland, but in the first paragraph the words
“after the conclusion of peace treaties” explicitly prohibit
the establishment of diplomatic relations. That is quite
wrong.

Attlee: We are still in a state of war with Finland.

Stalin: The state of war with Italy is not yet over either,
but America already has diplomatic relations with Italy,
and so do we.

Attlee: I think we are now returning to something we
already discussed a few days ago. We fully explained our
standpoint, and we met the Soviet Union as far as we could
under our constitution. We believe that we have made big
concessions, beyond which we cannot go.

Stalin: Nothing will come of this. Finland has much more
right than Italy to the establishment of diplomatic relations.
Finland has a freely elected government, it has long since
ended the war against the Allies and declared war on
Germany. Italy has no freely elected government, and her
participation in the war against Germany since her surren-
der has been minimal. On what grounds should we delay

311

establishment of diplomatic relations with Finland? Where
is the logic in that?

Bevin: | want to reach agreement and therefore make the
following proposal. I propose the following wording for the
first paragraph: “The Three Governments consider it desir-
able that the present anomalous position of Italy, Bulgaria,
Finland, Hungary and Rumania should be_ terminated
by the conclusion of peace treaties. They trust that the
other interested Allied Governments will share these
views.

Stalin: Good. The Soviet delegation has no more amend-
ments.

Bevin: Hurrah! [General laughter.]

Byrnes: The next question is that of the communiqué. We
have received from the British delegation a new wording
of the introductory part. We have no objections to it.

Stalin: Is there any great difference? What is the dif-
ference?

Byrnes: On the second page there are changes of a purely
drafting nature, the meaning is unchanged.

Stalin: Perhaps we could do this: after the translation
into Russian, we shall examine this alteration, and shall
now go on to the next section.

[Truman and Attlee agree.]

Byrnes: Section II—on the institution of the Council of
Foreign Ministers. There are no differences here.

[Section II is adopted.]

Byrnes: Section WI—on Germany. The words “loudly
applauded” in the first paragraph have evoked objections.

Stalin: Let us say: “openly approved”.

Bevin: Blindly obeyed, that is obeyed in a stupid manner.

Stalin: I propose that we put it this way: “whom, in the
pee of their success, they openly approved and blindly
obeyed”.

[The proposal is accepted.]

Byrnes: Are there any other amendments?

Stalin: No.

Bevin: Paragraph 12 of the economic principles repeats
what is already said in Paragraph 9 (IV) of the political
principles.

Stalin: I propose that we delete this expression from the
economic principles and leave it in the political principles.
[All agree.] We have no other amendments.

312

Byrnes: Section IV—on reparations from Germany.
There are no amendments.

Section V—on Germany’s Navy and Merchant Marine.

Stalin: There is an agreed decision; we have no amend-
ments.

Byrnes: Section VI—on Kénigsberg and the Adjacent
Area.

Stalin: I agree.

Byrnes: Section VII—War Criminals.

Stalin: I think the first introductory paragraph should be
excluded and only the second paragraph retained, beginning
with the words: “The Three Governments have taken note,
etc.”

Bevin: We have already done that.

Stalin: Good.

Byrnes: Section VIII—on Austria.

[The Soviet delegation proposes the exclusion from the
section on Austria of the last sentence—concerning repa-
rations, leaving it only in the protocoi.]

Truman: We accept the proposal of the Soviet delegation—
to exclude the last sentence from the communique.

Byrnes: Section [X—on Poland.

Stalin: There are no amendments.

Bevin: 1 wish to propose a small amendment of the word-
ing. In the second paragraph to say “they defined their
attitude in the following statement” instead of the words:
“their position was defined in the following statement”.

Stalin: All right.

Bevin: On the second page, also concerning Poland, I
should substitute the words “Concerning Poland’s western
boundary they established the following standpoint” for
the introductory words “the agreement was reached on the
western boundary of Poland”.

Truman: 1 have already informed the representatives of
the Polish Government that we agreed on the earlier
wording.

Stalin: In that case it is better to leave the old wording.

Bevin: I find Generalissimo Stalin’s expression, “imme-
diately west of Swinemtinde” very apt.

Stalin: Yes, it will be better to put it that way. Let’s go on
to the tenth section.

Bevin: Here I wish to make a small amendment, mainly
of a psychological nature. I would phrase the introductory

313

part of Section X as follows: “The Conference agreed upon
the following statement of common policy for establishing,
as soon as possible, the conditions of lasting peace after
victory in Europe.” This reads better.

Stalin: The wording is essentially the same, there is noth-
ing new in it.

Truman: Both are acceptable.

Bevin: It reads better in English. Maybe it reads worse
in American? (Laughter.)

Truman: Both are acceptable.

Stalin: The earlier wording contains the same idea which
Mr. Bevin has expressed, but it is set out more briefly. Of
course, we could accept either.

Bevin: Suppose you prefer our wording this time.
[Laughter.]

Stalin: If Mr. Bevin insists, I suppose we could accept his
wording.

Truman: 1 agree. Section XIi—regarding the revision of
Allied Control Commission procedure in Rumania, Bulgaria
and Hungary.

Stalin: That has been agreed.

Truman: Section XIII—transferring of German popula-
tions.

Stalin: Here the formulation is already better—“orderly
transfers”’.

Truman: The question of military negotiations.

Stalin: It is of general interest. I do not object to its
inclusion in the communique.

Bevin: The British delegation has one question on Section
XII—on revising the procedure in the Allied Control Com-
missions for Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. The last three
lines say: ‘and accepting as a basis, in respect of all three
countries, the Soviet Government’s proposals for the Allied
Control Commission in Hungary”. But we do not say what
these proposals are. That is why we could say: “and accept-
ing as a basis the agreed proposals”.

Stalin: All right. Which signatures are to stand under
the communiqué?

Truman: All will sign.

Stalin: Good.

Truman: Let us return to the introductory part of the
communique.

Stalin: We have no objections.

314

Bevin: We should like to publish the communiqué in the
press on Friday morning.

Stalin: And when can it be broadcast on the radio?

Bevin: At 9.30 p.m. GMT on Thursday.

Stalin: Good.

Byrnes: Concerning the Ruhr area. The Russian text of
the protocol says that the Conference examined the Soviet
proposals concerning the Ruhr industrial area. It was decid-
ed to refer this question for discussion by the Council of
Foreign Ministers in London. The English text of the pro-
tocol makes no mention of the Ruhr area. I understand that
no such decision was taken, but the President says that it
was adopted on his proposal. I propose, therefore, that the
wording should be made more precise. It says nothing here
of the content of the Soviet delegation’s proposal which is
being referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers in
London.

Stalin: 1 think this question should be deleted.

Truman: Good.

Stalin: [After studying the text of a message of greetings
to Churchill and Eden.] I have no objection to the proposed
text of the greetings.

Attlee: | propose that the telegram in English should be
signed by the President and the Generalissimo.

Stalin: Could the President, as the Chairman of the Con-
ference, sign first?

Attlee: All the three signatures will be there.

[The telegram of greetings is signed by the three Heads
of Government.]

Byrnes: I think that we should appoint representatives
to verify the text of the protocol.

[Representatives are appointed to a commission to edit
the protocol.]

Truman: 1 declare the Berlin Conference closed. Until
our next meeting, which, I hope, will be soon.

Stalin: Let’s hope so.

Attlee: Mr. President, before we separate I should like
to express our gratitude to the Generalissimo for the excel-
lent measures taken both for our accommodation here and
to provide the conditions for work, and to you, Mr. Presi-
dent, for so ably presiding over this Conference.

I should like to express the hope that this Conference
will be an important milestone on the road which our three

315

nations are taking together towards a stable peace, and
that the friendship between the three of us who have met
here will be strong and enduring.

Stalin: That is also our hope.

Truman: On behalf of the American delegation I want
to thank the Generalissimo for everything he has done for
us, and I wish to join Mr. Attlee in what he has said here.

Stalin: The Russian delegation joins Mr. Attlee in the
gratitude he expressed to the President for his able and
apt chairmanship.

Truman: I thank you for your kind co-operation in set-
tling all the important questions.

Stalin: I should personally like to thank Mr. Byrnes, who
has helped our work very much and has promoted the
achievement of our decisions.

Byrnes: 1 am deeply touched by the Generalissimo’s kind
words, and I hope that together with my colleagues I have
been of use in the work of the Conference.

Stalin: The Conference, I believe, can be considered a
success.

Truman: 1 want to thank the other Foreign Ministers and
all those who have helped us so much in our work.

Attlee: I join in the expression of these feelings in respect
of our Foreign Ministers.

Truman: 1 declare the Berlin Conference closed.

[The Conference ended at 00.30 hours on August 2,
1945.)

COMMUNIQUE ON THE TRIPARTITE CONFERENCE
OF BERLIN

On July 17, 1945, the President of the United States of
America, Harry S. Truman, the Chairman of the Council
of People’s Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, Generalissimo J. V. Stalin, and the Prime Min-
ister of Great Britain, Winston S. Churchill, together
with Mr. Clement R. Attlee, met in the Tripartite Confer-
ence of Berlin. They were accompanied by the Foreign
Secretaries of the Three Governments, Mr. James F. Byrnes,
Mr. V. M. Molotov, and Mr. Anthony Eden, the Chiefs of
Staff, and other advisers.

There were nine meetings between July 17 and July 25.
The Conference was then interrupted for two days while
the results of the British general election were being de-
clared.

On July 28, Mr. Attlee returned to the Conference as
Prime Minister, accompanied by the new Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ernest Bevin. Four more sittings
then took place. During the course of the Conference there
were regular meetings of the Heads of the Three Govern-
ments accompanied by the Foreign Secretaries, and also of
the Foreign Secretaries alone. Committees appointed by the
Foreign Secretaries for preliminary consideration of ques-
tions before the Conference also met daily.

The meetings of the Conference were held at the Ceci-
lienhof near Potsdam. The Conference ended on August 2,
1945.

Important decisions and agreements were reached. Views
were exchanged on a number of other questions and con-
sideration of these matters will be continued by the Council
of Foreign Ministers established by the Conference.

317

President Truman, Generalissimo Stalin and Prime Min-
ister Attlee leave Conference, which has strengthened the
ties between the Three Governments and extended the
scope of their collaboration and understanding, with renewed
confidence that their Governments and peoples, together
with the other United Nations, will ensure the creation of
a just and enduring peace.

ESTABLISHMENT OF A COUNCIL
OF FOREIGN MINISTERS

A. The Conference reached an agreement for the estab-
lishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers representing
the five principal Powers to continue the necessary prepar-
atory work for the peace settlements and to take up other
matters which from time to time may be referred to the
Council by agreement of the Governments participating in
the Council.

The text of the agreement for the establishment of the
Council of Foreign Ministers is as follows:

(1) There shall be established a Council composed of the
Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, China, France and the United
States.

(2) (i) The Council shall normally meet in London, which
shall be the permanent seat of the joint Secretariat which
the Council will form. Each of the Foreign Ministers will
be accompanied by a high-ranking Deputy, duly authorised
to carry on the work of the Council in the absence of his
Foreign Minister, and by a small staff of technical advisers.

(ii) The first meeting of the Council shall be held in
London not later than September Ist, 1945. Meetings may
be held by common agreement in other capitals as may be
agreed from time to time.

(3) (i) As its immediate important task, the Council shall
be authorised to draw up, with a view to their submission
to the United Nations, treaties of peace with Italy, Ruma-
nia, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, and to propose settle-
ments of territorial questions outstanding on the termination
of the war in Europe. That Council shall be utilised for the
preparation of a peace settlement for Germany to be ac-

318

cepted by the Government of Germany when a government

adequate for the purpose is established. :

(ii) For the discharge of each of these tasks the Council
will be composed of the Members representing those States
which were signatory to the terms of surrender impose
upon the enemy State concerned. For the purposes of the
peace settlement for Italy, France shall be regarded as a
signatory to the terms of surrender for Italy. Other Mem-
bers will be invited to participate when matters directly
concerning them are under discussion.

(iii) Other matters may from time to time be referred to
the Council by agreement between the Member Govern-
ments.

(4) (i) Whenever the Council is considering a question of
direct interest to a State not represented thereon, such State
should be invited to send representatives to participate in
the discussion and study of that question.

(ii) The Council may adapt its procedure to the particular
problem under consideration. In some cases it may hold its
own preliminary discussions prior to the participation of
other interested States. In other cases, the Council may
convoke a formal conference of the States chiefly interested
in seeking a solution of the particular problem.

B. In accordance with the decision of the Conference the
Three Governments have each addressed an identical invi-
tation to the Governments of China and France to adopt
this text and to join in establishing the Council.

C. The establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers
for the specific purposes named in the text will be without
prejudice to the agreement of the Crimea Conference that
there should be periodic consultation among the Foreign
Secretaries of the United States, the Union of Soviet Social-
ist Republics and the United Kingdom.

D. The Conference also considered the position of the
European Advisory Commission in the light of the agree-
ment to establish the Council of Foreign Ministers. It was
noted with satisfaction that the Commission had ably dis-
charged its principal tasks by the recommendations that it had
furnished for the terms of Germany’s unconditional surren-
der, for the zones of occupation in Germany and Austria,
and for the inter-Allied control machinery in those coun-
tries. It was felt that further work of a detailed character
for the co-ordination of Allied policy for the control of

319

Germany and Austria would in future fall within the com-
petence of the Allied Control Council at Berlin and the
Allied Commission at Vienna. Accordingly, it was agreed
to recommend that the European Advisory Commission be
dissolved.

Hl
GERMANY

The Allied armies are in occupation of the whole of
Germany and the German people have begun to atone for
the terrible crimes committed under the leadership of those
whom, in the hour of their success, they openly approved
and blindly obeyed.

Agreement has been reached at this Conference on the
political and economic principles of a co-ordinated Allied
policy toward defeated Germany during the period of
Allied control.

The purpose of this agreement is to carry out the Crimea
declaration on Germany. German militarism and Nazism
will be extirpated and the Allies will take in agreement
together, now and in the future, the other measures neces-
sary to assure that Germany never again will threaten her
neighbours or the peace of the world.

It is not the intention of the Allies to destroy or enslave
the German people. It is the intention of the Allies that
the German people be given the opportunity to prepare for
the eventual reconstruction of their life on a democratic and
peaceful basis. If their own efforts are steadily directed to
this end, it will be possible for them in due course to take
their place among the free and peaceful peoples of the
world.

The text of the agreement is as follows:

THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES TO GOVERN
THE TREATMENT OF GERMANY IN THE INITIAL CONTROL PERIOD

A. POLITICAL PRINCIPLES
1, In accordance with the Agreement on Control Machin-
ery in Germany, supreme authority in Germany is exercised

on instructions from their respective Governments, by

320

the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of
America, the United Kingdom, and the French Republic,
each in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in
matters affecting Germany as a whole, in their capacity as
members of the Control Council.

2. So far as is practicable, there shall be uniformity of
treatment of the German population throughout Germany.

3. The purposes of the occupation of Germany by which
the Control Council shall be guided are:

(I) The complete disarmament and demilitarisation of
Germany and the elimination or control of all German
industry that could be used for military production. To
these ends:—

(a) All German land, naval and air forces, the S.S., $.A.,
S.D. and Gestapo, with all their organisations, staffs and insti-
tutions, including the General Staff, the Officers’ Corps,
Reserve Corps, military schools, war veterans’ organisations
and all other military and quasi-military organisations,
together with all clubs and associations which serve to keep
alive the military tradition in Germany, shall be completely
and finally abolished in such manner as permanently to
prevent the revival or reorganisation of German militarism
and Nazism;

(b) All arms, ammunition and implements of war and
all specialised facilities for their production shall be held at
the disposal of the Allies or destroyed. The maintenance
and production of all aircraft and all arms, ammunition and
implements of war shall be prevented.

(11) To convince the German people that they have suffered
a total military defeat and that they cannot escape
responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves,
since their own ruthless warfare and the fanatical Nazi
resistance have destroyed German economy and made chaos
and suffering inevitable.

(UI) To destroy the National Socialist Party and_ its
affiliated and supervised organisations, to dissolve all Nazi
institutions, to ensure that they are not revived in any
form, and to prevent all Nazi and militarist activity or prop-
aganda.

(IV) To prepare for the eventual reconstruction of Ger-
man political life on a democratic basis and for eventual
peaceful co-operation in international life by Germany.

21-876 321

4. All Nazi laws which provided the basis of the Hitler
regime or established discrimination on grounds of race,
creed, or political opinion shall be abolished. No such
discriminations, whether legal, administrative or otherwise,
shall be tolerated.

5. War criminals and those who have participated in
planning or carrying out Nazi enterprises involving or re-
sulting in atrocities or war crimes shall be arrested and
brought to judgement. Nazi leaders, influential Nazi sup-
porters and high officials of Nazi organisations and insti-
tutions and any other persons dangerous to the occupation
or its objectives shall be arrested and interned.

6. All members of the Nazi Party who have been more
than nominal participants in its activities and all other
persons hostile to Allied purposes shall be removed from
public and semi-public office, and from positions of respon-
sibility in important private undertakings. Such persons
shall be replaced by persons who, by their political and
moral qualities, are deemed capable of assisting in develop-
ing genuine democratic institutions in Germany.

7. German education shall be so controlled as complete-
ly to eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make
possible the successful development of democratic ideas.

8. The judicial system will be reorganised in accordance
with the principles of democracy, of justice under law, and
of equal rights for all citizens without distinction of race,
nationality or religion.

9. The administration of affairs in Germany should be
directed towards the decentralisation of the political struc-
ture and the development of local responsibility. To this
end:

(I) local self-government shall be restored throughout
Germany on democratic principles and in particular through
elective councils as rapidly as is consistent with military
security and the purposes of military occupation;

(I) all democratic political parties with rights of assembly
and of public discussion shall be allowed and encouraged
throughout Germany;

(III) representative and elective principles shall be intro-
duced into regional, provincial and state (Land) adminis-
tration as rapidly as may be justified by the successful
application of these principles in local self-government;

(IV) for the time being no central German Government

322

shall be established. Notwithstanding this, however, certain
essential central German administrative departments, head-
ed by State Secretaries, shall be established, particularly in
the fields of finance, transport, communications, foreign trade
and industry. Such departments will act under the di-
rection of the Control Council.

10. Subject to the necessity for maintaining military
security, freedom of speech, press and religion shall be
permitted, and religious institutions shall be respected.
Subject likewise to the maintenance of military security,
the formation of free trade unions shall be permitted.

B. ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES

11. In order to eliminate Germany’s war potential, the
production of arms, ammunition and implements of war
as well as all types of aircraft and sea-going ships shall be
prohibited and prevented. Production of metals, chemicals,
machinery and other items that are directly necessary to
a war economy shall be rigidly controlled and restricted to
Germany’s approved post-war peace-time needs to meet the
objectives stated in Paragraph 15. Productive capacity not
needed for permitted production shall be removed in ac-
cordance with the reparations plan recommended by the
Allied Reparations Commission and approved by the Gov-
ernments concerned or if not removed shall be destroyed.

12. At the earliest practicable date, the German economy
shall be decentralised for the purpose of eliminating the
present excessive concentration of economic power as exem-
plified in particular by cartels, syndicates, trusts and other
monopolistic arrangements.

13. In organising the German economy, primary empha-
sis shall be given to the development of agriculture and
peaceful domestic industries.

14. During the period of occupation Germany shall be
treated as a single economic unit. To this end common
policies shall be established in regard to:

(a) mining and industrial production and allocations;

(b) agriculture, forestry and fishing;

(c) wages, prices and rationing;

(d) import and export programmes for Germany as a
whole;

21° 823

(e) currency and banking, central taxation and customs;
(f) reparation and removal of industrial war potential;
(g) transportation and communications.

In applying these policies account shall be taken, where
appropriate, of varying local conditions.

15. Allied controls shall be imposed upon the German
economy but only to the extent necessary:

(a) to carry out programmes of industrial disarmament
and demilitarisation, of reparations, and of approved ex-
ports and imports;

(b) to assure the production and maintenance of goods
and services required to meet the needs of the occupying
forces and displaced persons in Germany and essential to
maintain in Germany average living standards not exceed-
ing the average of the standards of living of European
countries (European countries means all European countries
excluding the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics) ;

(c) to ensure in the manner determined by the Control
Council the equitable distribution of essential commodities
between the several zones so as to produce a_ balanced
economy throughout Germany and reduce the need for
imports;

(d) to control German industry and all economic and
financial international transactions, including exports and
imports, with the aim of preventing Germany from develop-
ing a war potential and of achieving the other objectives
named herein;

(e) to control all German public or private scientific bodies,
research and experimental institutions, laboratories, etc.,
connected with economic activities.

16. In the imposition and maintenance of economic con-
trols established by the Control Council, German adminis-
trative machinery shall be created and the German authori-
ties shall be required to the fullest extent practicable to
proclaim and assume administration of such controls. Thus
it should be brought home to the German people that the
responsibility for the administration of such controls and
any breakdown in these controls will rest with themselves.
Any German controls which may run counter to the objec-
tives of occupation will be prohibited.

17. Measures shall be promptly taken:

(a) to effect essential repair of transport;

324

(b) to enlarge coal production;
(c) to maximise agricultural output; and

(d) to effect emergency repair of housing and essential
utilities.

18. Appropriate steps shall be taken by the Control Coun-
cil to exercise control and the power of disposition over
German-owned external assets not already under the control
of United Nations which have taken part in the war against
Germany.

19. Payment of reparations should leave enough resources
to enable the German people to subsist without external
assistance. In working out the economic balance of Germany
the necessary means must be provided to pay for imports
approved by the Control Council in Germany. The proceeds
of exports from current production and stocks shall be avail-
able in the first place for payment for such imports.

The above clause will not apply to the equipment and
products referred to in paragraphs 4(a) and 4(b) of the
Reparations Agreement.

IV
REPARATIONS FROM GERMANY

In accordance with the Crimea decision that Germany be
compelled to compensate to the greatest possible extent for
the loss and suffering that she has caused to the United
Nations and for which the German people cannot escape
responsibility, the following agreement on reparations was
reached:

1. Reparation claims of the U.S.S.R. shall be met by re-
movals from the zone of Germany occupied by the U.S.S.R.
and from appropriate German external assets.

2. The U.S.S.R. undertakes to settle the reparation claims
of Poland from its own share of reparations.

8. The reparation claims of the United States, the United
Kingdom and other countries entitled to reparations shall
be met from the Western zones and from appropriate Ger-
man external assets.

4. In addition to the reparations to be taken by the
U.S.S.R. from its own zone of occupation, the U.S.S.R. shall
receive additionally from the Western zones:

$25

(a) 15 per cent of such usable and complete industrial
capital equipment, in the first place from the metallurgical.
chemical and machine manufacturing industries, as is un-
necessary for the German peace economy and should be
removed from the Western zones of Germany, in exchange
for an equivalent value of food, coal, potash, zinc, timber,
clay products, petroleum products, and such other commod-
ities as may be agreed upon.

(b) 10 per cent of such industrial capital equipment as
is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should
be removed from the Western zones, to be transferred to
the Soviet Government on reparations account without pay-
ment or exchange of any kind in return.

Removals of equipment as provided in (a) and (b) above
shall be made simultaneously.

5. The amount of equipment to be removed from the
Western zones on account of reparations must be determined
within six months from now at the latest.

6. Removals of industrial capital equipment shall begin
as soon as possible and shall be completed within two years
from the determination specified in Paragraph 5. The de-
livery of products covered by 4(a) above shall begin as
soon as possible and shali be made by the U-S.S.R. in agreed
installments within five years of the date hereof. The de-
termination of the amount and character of the industrial
capital equipment unnecessary for the German peace econ-
omy and therefore available for reparations shall be made
by the Control Council under policies fixed by the Allied
Reparations Commission with the participation of France,
subject to the final approval of the zone Commander in the
zone from which the equipment is to be removed.

7. Prior to the fixing of the total amount of equipment
subject to removal, advance deliveries shall be made in
respect of such equipment as will be determined to be eligi-
ble for delivery in accordance with the procedure set forth
in the last sentence of Paragraph 6.

8. The Soviet Government renounces all claims in respect
of reparations to shares of German enterprises which
are located in the Western zones of occupation in Germany
as well as to German foreign assets in all countries except
those specified in Paragraph 9 below.

9. The Governments of the U.K. and the U.S.A. renounce
their claims in respect of reparations to shares of German

326

enterprises which are located in the Eastern zone of occu-
pation in Germany, as well as to German foreign assets in
Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Rumania and Eastern Austria.

10. The Soviet Government makes no claims to gold
captured by the Allied troops in Germany.

Vv

DISPOSAL OF THE GERMAN NAVY AND
MERCHANT MARINE

The Conference agreed in principle upon arrangements
for the use and disposal of the surrendered German fleet
and merchant ships. It was decided that the Three Govern-
ments would appoint experts to work out together detailed
plans to give effect to the agreed principles. A further joint
statement will be published simultaneously by the Three
Governments in due course.

Vi
CITY OF KONIGSBERG AND THE ADJACENT AREA

The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet
Government that pending the final determination of terri-
torial questions at the peace settlement, the section of the
western fronticr of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
which is adjacent to the Baltic Sea should pass from a point
on the eastern shore of the Bay of Danzig to the east, north
of Braunsberg-Goldap, to the meeting point of the
frontiers of Lithuania, the Polish Republic and East
Prussia.

The Conference has agreed in principle to the proposal
of the Soviet Government concerning the transfer to the
Soviet Union of the City of Konigsberg and the area
adjacent to it as described above subject to expert exami-
nation of the actual frontier.

The President of the United States and the British Prime
Minister have declared that they will support the proposal
of the Conference at the forthcoming peace settlement.

327

Vil
WAR CRIMINALS

The Three Governments have taken note of the discus-
sions which have been proceeding in recent weeks in Lon-
don between British, United States, Soviet and French
representatives with a view to reaching agreement on the
methods of trial of those major war criminals whose crimes
under the Moscow Declaration of October 1943 have no
particular geographical localisation. The Three Govern-
ments reaffirm their intention to bring those criminals to
swift and sure justice. They hope that the negotiations in
London will result in speedy agreement being reached for
this purpose, and they regard it as a matter of great impor-
tance that the trial of those major criminals should begin at
the earliest possible date. The first list of defendants will
be published before September 1.

Vili
AUSTRIA

The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet
Government on the extension of the authority of the
Austrian Provisional Government to all of Austria.

The Three Governments agreed that they were prepared
to examine this question after the entry of the British and
American forces into the city of Vienna.

IX
POLAND

The Conference considered questions relating to the
Polish Provisional Government and the western boundary
of Poland.

On the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity
they defined their attitude in the following statement:

A. We have taken note with pleasure of the agreement
reached among representative Poles from Poland and
abroad which has made possible the formation, in accordance
with the decisions reached at the Crimea Conference, of

328

a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity recog-
nised by the Three Powers. The establishment by the British
and United States Governments of diplomatic relations with
the Polish Provisional Government has resulted in the with-
drawal of their recognition from the former Polish Govern-
ment in London, which no longer exists.

The British and United States Governments have taken
measures to protect the interest of the Polish Provisional
Government as the recognised Government of the Polish
State in the property belonging to the Polish State located
in their territories and under their control, whatever the
form of this property may be.

They have further taken measures to prevent alienation
to third parties of such property. All proper facilities will
be given to the Polish Provisional Government for the
exercise of the ordinary legal remedies for the recovery of
any property belonging to the Polish State which may have
been wrongfully alienated.

The Three Powers are anxious to assist the Polish Pro-
visional Government in facilitating the return to Poland as
soon as practicable of all Poles abroad who wish to go,
including members of the Polish Armed Forces and the
Merchant Marine. They expect that those Poles who return
home shall be accorded personal and property rights on
the same basis as all Polish citizens.

The Three Powers note that the Polish Provisional
Government in accordance with the decisions of the Crimea
Conference has agreed to the holding of free and unfettered
elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suf-
frage and secret ballot in which all democratic and anti-
Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put
forward candidates, and that representatives of the Allied
press shall enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon
developments in Poland before and during the elections.

B. The following agreement was reached on the western
frontier of Poland:

In conformity with the agreement on Poland reached at
the Crimea Conference the three Heads of Government
have sought the opinion of the Polish Provisional Govern-
ment of National Unity in regard to the accession of terri-
tory in the north and west which Poland should receive.
The President of the National Council of Poland and
members of the Polish Provisional Government of National

22-876 329

Unity have been received at the Conference and have fully
presented their views. The three Heads of Government
reaffirmed their opinion that the final delimitation of the
western frontier of Poland should await the peace settle-
ment.

The three Heads of Government agree that, pending the
final determination of Poland’s western frontier, the former
German territories east of a line running from the Baltic
Sea immediately west of Swinemiinde, and thence along the
Oder River to the confluence of the western Neisse River
and along the western Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier,
including that portion of East Prussia not placed under the
administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
in accordance with the understanding reached at this Confer-
ence and including the area of the former free city of
Danzig, shall be under the administration of the Polish
State and for such purposes should not be considered as
part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany.

X

CONCLUSION OF PEACE TREATIES AND ADMISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION

The Conference agreed upon the following statement of
common policy for establishing, as soon as possible, the
conditions of lasting peace after victory in Europe:

The Three Governments consider it desirable that the
present anomalous position of Italy, Bulgaria, Finland,
Hungary and Rumania should be terminated by the conclu-
sion of Peace Treaties. They trust that the other interested
Allied Governments will share these views.

For their part the Three Governments have included the
preparation of a Peace Treaty for Italy as the first among
the immediate important tasks to be undertaken by the new
Council of Foreign Ministers. Italy was the first of the Axis
Powers to break with Germany, to whose defeat she has
made a material contribution, and has now joined with the
Allies in the struggle against Japan. Italy has freed herself
from the Fascist regime and is making good progress towards
the re-establishment of a democratic government and insti-
tutions. The conclusion of such a Peace Treaty with a
recognised and democratic Jtalian Government will make it

330

possible for the Three Governments to fulfil their desire to
support an application from Italy for membership of the
United Nations.

The Three Governments have also charged the Council
of Foreign Ministers with the task of preparing Peace
Treaties for Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania. The
conclusion of Peace Treaties with recognised democratic
Governments in these States will also enable the Three
Governments to support applications from them for mem-
bership of the United Nations. The Three Governments
agree to examine each separately in the near future, in the
light of the conditions then prevailing, the establishment of
diplomatic relations with Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and
Hungary to the extent possible prior to the conclusion of
peace treaties with those countries.

The Three Governments have no doubt that in view of
the changed conditions resulting from the termination of
the war in Europe, representatives of the Allied press will
enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments
in Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland.

As regards the admission of other states into the United
Nations Organisation, Article 4 of the Charter of the United
Nations declares that:

“1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other
peace-loving States who accept the obligations contained in
the present Charter and, in the judgement of the organi-
sation, are able and willing to carry out these obligations;

“2. The admission of any such State to membership in
the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the
General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security
Council.”

The Three Governments, so far as they are concerned,
will support applications for membership from those States
which have remained neutral during the war and which
fulfil the qualifications set out above.

The Three Governments feel bound however to make it
clear that they for their part would not favour any applica-
tion for membership put forward by the present Spanish
Government, which, having been founded with the support
of the Axis Powers, does not, in view of its origins, its
nature, its record and its close association with the aggressor
States, possess the qualifications necessary to justify such
membership.

22*

Xl
TERRITORIAL TRUSTEESHIPS

The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet
Government concerning trusteeship territories as defined
in the decision of the Crimea Conference and in the Charter
of the United Nations Organisation.

After an exchange of views on this question it was decid-
ed that the disposition of any former [Italian colonial
territories was one to be decided in connection with the
preparation of a peace treaty for Italy and that the question
of Italian colonial territories would be considered by the
September Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

Xll

REVISED ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION PROCEDURE
IN RUMANIA, BULGARIA AND HUNGARY

The Three Governments took note that the Soviet repre-
sentatives on the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania,
Bulgaria and Hungary, have communicated to their United
Kingdom and United States colleagues proposals for improv-
ing the work of the Control Commissions, now that hostili-
ties in Europe have ceased.

The Three Governments agreed that the revision of the
procedures of the Allied Control Commissions in these
countries would now be undertaken, taking into account the
interests and responsibilities of the Three Governments
which together presented the terms of armistice to the
respective countries, and accepting as a basis the agreed
proposals.

XIll
ORDERLY TRANSFERS OF GERMAN POPULATIONS

The Conference reached the following agreement on the
removal of Germans from Poland, Czechoslovakia and
Hungary:

The Three Governments, having considered the question
in all its aspects, recognise that the transfer to Germany of

332

German populations, or elements thereof, remaining in
Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, will have to be
undertaken. They agree that any transfers that take place
should be effected in an orderly and humane manner. Since
the influx of a large number of Germans into Germany
would increase the burden already resting on the occupying
authorities, they consider that the Allied Control Council
in Germany should in the first instance examine the problem
with special regard to the question of the equitable distribu-
tion of these Germans among the several zones of occupa-
tion. They are accordingly instructing their respective
representatives on the Control Council to report to their
Governments as soon as possible the extent to which such
persons have already entered Germany from Poland,
Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and to submit an estimate
of the time and rate at which further transfers could be
carried out, having regard to the present situation in
Germany.

The Czechoslovak Government, the Polish Provisional
Government and the Control Council in Hungary are at
the same time being informed of the above, and are being
requested meanwhile to suspend further expulsions pending
the examination by the Governments concerned of the report
from their representatives on the Control Council.

XIV
MILITARY TALKS

During the Conference there were meetings between the
Chiefs of Staff of the Three Governments on military mat-
ters of common interest.

XV
(Here a list of the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A. and the United
Kingdom delegates to the Conference is given.)

J. U. STALIN
HARRY S. TRUMAN
C. R. ATTLEE

333

PROTOCOL OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE BERLIN CONFERENCE

The Berlin Conference of the Three Heads of Govern-
ment of the U.S.S.R., U.S.A., and U.K., which took place
from July 17 to August 2, 1945, came to the following
conclusions:

ESTABLISHMENT OF A COUNCIL OF FOREIGN
MINISTERS

A. The Conference reached the following agreement for
the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers to do
the necessary preparatory work for the peace settlements:

“(1) There shall be established a Council composed of
the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, France and the United
States.

“(2) (i) The Council shall normally meet in London,
which shall be the permanent seat of the joint Secretariat
which the Council will form. Each of the Foreign Ministers
will be accompanied by a high-ranking Deputy, duly autho-
rised to carry on the work of the Council in the absence
of his Foreign Minister, and by a small staff of technical
advisers.

“(ii) The first meeting of the Council shall be held in
London not later than September Ist, 1945. Meetings may
be held by common agreement in other capitals as may be
agreed from time to time.

“(3) (i) As its immediate important task, the Council shall
be authorised to draw up, with a view to their submission
to the United Nations, treaties of peace with Italy, Ruma-
nia, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, and to propose settle-
ments of territorial questions outstanding on the termina-
tion of the war in Europe. The Council shall be utilised for
the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany to be
accepted by the Government of Germany when a govern-
ment adequate for the purpose is established.

“(ii) For the discharge of each of these tasks the Council
will be composed of the Members representing those States
which were signatory to the terms of surrender imposed

334

upon the enemy State concerned. For the purposes of the
peace settlement for Italy, France shall be regarded as a
signatory to the terms of surrender for Italy. Other Members
will be invited to participate when matters directly concern-
ing them are under discussion.

(iii) Other matters may from time to time be referred to
the Council by agreement between the Member Govern-
ments.

“(4) (i) Whenever the Council is considering a question
of direct interest to a State not represented thereon, such
State should be invited to send representatives to participate
in the discussion and study of that gestion.

“(ii) The Council may adapt its procedure to the partic-
ular problem under consideration. In some cases it may
hold its own preliminary discussions prior to the partici-
pation of other interested States. In other cases, the
Council may convoke a formal conference of the States
chiefly interested in seeking a solution of the particular
problem.”

B. It was agreed that the Three Governments should
each address an identical invitation to the Governments of
China and France to adopt this text and to join in establish-
ing the Council. The text of the approved invitation was as
follows:

COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS

DRAFT FOR IDENTICAL INVITATION TO BE SENT
SEPARATELY BY EACH OF THE THREE GOVERNMENTS
TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF CHINA AND FRANCE

“The Governments of the United Kingdom, the United
States and the U.S.S.R. consider it necessary to begin
without delay the essential preparatory work upon the peace
settlements in Europe. To this end they are agreed that
there should be established a Council of the Foreign Min-
isters of the Five Great Powers to prepare treaties of peace
with the European enemy States, for submission to the
United Nations. The Council would also be empowered to
propose settlements of outstanding territorial questions in

335

Europe and to consider such other matters as Member
Governments might agree to refer to it.

“The text adopted by the Three Governments is as
follows:

“In agreement with the Governments of ... the Govern-
ment of ... extends a cordial invitation to the Government
of China (France) to adopt the text quoted above and to
join in setting up the Council.

“The Government of ... attaches much importance to
the participation of the Chinese Government (French
Government) in the proposed arrangements and it hopes
to receive an early and favourable reply to this invi-
tation.”

C. It was understood that the establishment of the Council
of Foreign Ministers for the specific purposes named in the
text would be without prejudice to the agreement of the
Crimea Conference that there should be periodical consul-
tation between the Foreign Secretaries of the United States,
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United
Kingdom.

D. The Conference also considered the position of the
European Advisory Commission in the light of the agree-
ment to establish the Council of Foreign Ministers. It was
noted with satisfaction that the Commission had ably dis-
charged its principal tasks by the recommendations that it
had furnished for the terms of surrender for Germany, for
the zones of occupation in Germany and Austria and for
the inter-Allied control machinery in those countries. It was
felt that further work of a detailed character for the co-
ordination of Allied policy for the control of Germany and
Austria would in future fall within the competence of the
Allied Control Commission at Berlin and the Allied Com-
mission at Vienna. Accordingly the Conference agreed to
recommend to the Member Governments of the European
Advisory Commission that the Commission might now be
dissolved.

[The subsequent text is omitted, as it is repeated in the

Communiqué on the Tripartite Conference of Berlin.—
Editor's Note.]

IV

DISPOSAL OF THE GERMAN NAVY AND
MERCHANT MARINE

A

The following principles for the distribution of the Ger-
man Navy were agreed:

(1) The total strength of the German surface navy,
excluding ships sunk and those taken over from Allied
Nations, but including ships under construction or repair,
shall be divided equally among the U.S.S.R., U-K., and U.S.

(2) Ships under construction or repair mean those ships
whose construction or repair may be completed within three
to six months, according to the type of ship. Whether such
ships under construction or repair shall be completed or
repaired shall be determined by the technical commission
appointed by the Three Powers and referred to below,
subject to the principle that their completion or repair must
be achieved within the time limits above provided, without
any increase of skilled employment in the German shipyards
and without permitting the reopening of any German ship
building or connected industries. Completion date means
the date when a ship is able to go out on its first trip, or,
under peace-time standards, would refer to the customary
date of delivery by shipyard to the Government.

(3) The larger part of the German submarine fleet shall
be sunk. Not more than thirty submarines shall be preserved
and divided equally between the U.S.S.R., U.K. and the US.
for experimental and technical purposes.

(4) All stocks of armament, ammunition and supplies of
the German Navy appertaining to the vessels transferred
pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (3) hereof shall be handed
over to the respective Powers receiving such ships.

(5) The Three Governments agree to constitute a tripar-
tite naval commission comprising two representatives for
each Government, accompanied by the requisite staff, to
submit agreed recommendations to the Three Governments
for the allocation of specific German warships and to
handle other detailed matters arising out of the agreement
between the Three Governments regarding the German

337

fleet. The Commission will hold its first meeting not later
than 15th August, 1945, in Berlin, which shall be its head-
quarters. Each Delegation on the Commission will have the
right on the basis of reciprocity to inspect German warships
wherever they may be located.

(6) The Three Governments agreed that transfers, includ-
ing those of ships under construction and repair, shall be
completed as soon as possible, but not later than 15th
February, 1946. The Commission will submit fortnightly
reports, including proposals for the progressive allocation of
the vessels when agreed by the Commission.

B

The following principles for the distribution of the Ger-
man Merchant Marine were agreed.

(1) The German Merchant Marine, surrendered to the
Three Powers and wherever located, shall be divided
equally among the U.S.S.R., the U.K., and the U.S. The
actual transfers of the ships to the respective countries shall
take place as soon as practicable after the end of the war
against Japan. The United Kingdom and the United States
will provide out of their shares of the surrendered German
merchant ships appropriate amounts for other Allied States
whose merchant marines have suffered heavy losses in the
common cause against Germany, except that the Soviet
Union shall provide out of its share for Poland.

(2) The allocation, manning, and operation of these ships
during the Japanese War period shall fall under the cogni-
zance and authority of the Combined Shipping Adjustment
Board and the United Maritime Authority.

(3) While actual transfer of the ships shall be delayed
until after the end of the war with Japan, a Tripartite
Shipping Commission shall inventory and value all avail-
able ships and recommend a specific distribution in accor-
dance with Paragraph (1).

(4) German inland and coastal ships determined to be
necessary to the maintenance of the basic German peace
economy by the Allied Control Council of Germany shall
not be included in the shipping pool thus divided among
the Three Powers.

(5) The Three Governments agree to constitute a tripar-
tite merchant marine commission comprising two represen-

338

a

tatives for each Government, accompanied by the requisite
staff, to submit agreed recommendations to the ‘Three
Governments for the allocation of specific German merchant
ships and to handle other detailed matters arising out of
the agreement between the Three Governments regarding
the German merchant ships. The Commission will hold its
first meeting not later than September Ist, 1945, in Berlin,
which shall be its headquarters. Each delegation on the
Commission will have the right on the basis of reciprocity
to inspect the German merchant ships wherever they may
be located.

[The subsequent text is omitted, as it is repeated in the
Communiqué on the Tripartite Conference of Berlin.—
Editor’s Note.]

XIV
IRAN

It was agreed that Allied troops should be withdrawn
immediately from Tehran, and that further stages of the
withdrawal of troops from Iran should be considered at the
meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to be held in
London in September 1945.

XV
THE INTERNATIONAL ZONE OF TANGIER

A proposal by the Soviet Government was examined and
the following decisions were reached.

Having examined the question of the Zone of Tangier,
the Three Governments have agreed that this Zone, which
includes the city of Tangier and the area adjacent to it,
in view of its special strategic importance shall remain
international.

The question of Tangier will be discussed in the near
future at a meeting in Paris of representatives of the
Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
the United States of America, the United Kingdom and
France.

XVI
THE BLACK SEA STRAITS

The Three Governments recognised that the Convention
concluded at Montreux should be revised, as failing to meet
present-day conditions.

It was agreed that as the next step the matter should be
the subject of direct conversations between each of the Three
Governments and the Turkish Government.

XVIl
INTERNATIONAL INLAND WATERWAYS

The Conference considered a proposal of the U.S. Dele-
gation on this subject and agreed to refer it for consideration

to the forthcoming meeting of the Council of Foreign Min-
isters in London.

XVIII
EUROPEAN INLAND TRANSPORT CONFERENCE

The British and U.S. Delegations to the Conference
informed the Soviet Delegation of the desire of the British
and U.S. Governments to reconvene the European Inland
Transport Conference and stated that they would welcome
assurance that the Soviet Government would participate in
the work of the reconvened Conference. The Soviet

Government agreed that it would participate in this
Conference.

XIX
DIRECTIVES TO MILITARY COMMANDERS
ON ALLIED CONTROL COUNCIL FOR GERMANY

The Three Governments agreed that each would send a
directive to its representative on the Control Council con-
cerning questions coming within the scope of his competence.

340

i an a aR i

USE OF ALLIED PROPERTY FOR SATELLITE
REPARATIONS OR “WAR TROPHIES”

The Conference decided to accept in principle the propo-
sal of the American Delegation. [...] The wording of this
proposal is to be agreed upon through the diplomatic
channel.

[The subsequent text is omitted, as it is repeated in the
Communiqué on the ‘Tripartite Conference of Berlin.—
Editor’s Note.]

J. U. STALIN

HARRY S. TRUMAN
C. R. ATTLEE

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